亦正亦邪：基金“軟美元(Soft Dollar)”交易.doc

亦正亦邪：基金“軟美元(Soft Dollar)”交易 目錄“軟美元”根源：代理交易1“軟美元”特殊性：難以清晰界定1“軟美元”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的先行者2借鑒2 在基金界，基金經(jīng)理人和經(jīng)紀(jì)商的關(guān)系一直都是比較微妙和復(fù)雜的。某種情況下可能會(huì)有一些理不清剪還亂的灰色地帶，以致導(dǎo)致了基金經(jīng)理人和投資者之間的利益沖突?；鸬摹败浢涝?Soft Dollar)”即是其中的一個(gè)方面。“軟美元”最早的定義來(lái)源于美國(guó)的代客理財(cái)業(yè)務(wù)的發(fā)展，但實(shí)際上各國(guó)都有類似的交易，現(xiàn)在“軟美元”已成為了一種特殊交易的代名詞。所謂“軟美元”，是相對(duì)于“硬美元”來(lái)說(shuō)的，“軟美元”是指基金管理人使用經(jīng)紀(jì)業(yè)務(wù)為條件來(lái)獲取經(jīng)紀(jì)商提供的研究服務(wù)或其它服務(wù);與此對(duì)應(yīng)，“硬美元”是指投資者直接用來(lái)支付研究服務(wù)或其他服務(wù)費(fèi)用的資金?！败浢涝备矗捍斫灰?“軟美元”的產(chǎn)生源自于代理交易，發(fā)展到現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)成為基金經(jīng)紀(jì)交易的一種特殊的形式。在代理交易中，代理關(guān)系一旦形成，當(dāng)客戶委托基金管理人進(jìn)行投資時(shí)就可能產(chǎn)生“軟美元”。在“軟美元”交易中，基金管理人與經(jīng)紀(jì)商協(xié)商通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)業(yè)務(wù)來(lái)?yè)Q取研究報(bào)告或者其他經(jīng)紀(jì)商服務(wù)，如果基金管理人利用經(jīng)紀(jì)商提供的研究報(bào)告等服務(wù)于其他與此基金無(wú)關(guān)的交易從而令自己受益，或者完全不考慮客戶的利益導(dǎo)致客戶成本的增加，這種情況下“軟美元”交易是不合理的;如果基金管理人是善意的，并且考慮到了經(jīng)紀(jì)商提供的經(jīng)紀(jì)服務(wù)和研究服務(wù)對(duì)基金的價(jià)值，這種情況下“軟美元”交易是合理的，基金管理人可以免責(zé)。“軟美元”特殊性：難以清晰界定 雖然“軟美元”交易有其合理性的一面，但是由于其界定的模糊性和特殊性很容易導(dǎo)致基金管理人和客戶之間的糾紛，因?yàn)樵跊](méi)有很明確地規(guī)定如何處理 “軟美元”問(wèn)題前，基金管理人很容易侵犯客戶的權(quán)益，利用“軟美元”交易的空隙為自己尋求利益。事實(shí)上，要去判斷哪些研究成果和服務(wù)是使此基金受益，哪些研究成果和服務(wù)是為了基金管理人受益是比較困難的。如何能夠客觀的評(píng)價(jià)這些問(wèn)題并建立一個(gè)完整的體系去衡量迫切需要法律法規(guī)的完善及“軟美元”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的出臺(tái)?！败浢涝睒?biāo)準(zhǔn)的先行者 為了公平公正的處理“軟美元”交易問(wèn)題，也為了免除許多投資者對(duì)基金管理人的訴訟，美國(guó)1934年證券法修正案推出了關(guān)于軟美元交易“安全港”的規(guī)定，為正常的基金“軟美元交易”提供了避風(fēng)港。它認(rèn)為，當(dāng)基金管理人所得到的研究成果或其他服務(wù)對(duì)于客戶的投資價(jià)值和所支付的經(jīng)紀(jì)費(fèi)用相當(dāng)時(shí)，基金管理人可以支付高于可得到的最低傭金率來(lái)獲得研究成果或服務(wù)，這種行為是基金管理人基于自己投資判斷力所進(jìn)行的正確行為而非違反信托責(zé)任的非法行為?！鞍踩邸币?guī)定的推出保證了基金管理人的權(quán)益，但是它并沒(méi)有明確地規(guī)定基金經(jīng)理人如何來(lái)處理涉及“軟美元”的問(wèn)題。美國(guó)投資管理和研究協(xié)會(huì)所制定的“軟美元”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)對(duì)基金管理人如何處理“軟美元”事務(wù)有比較詳細(xì)的規(guī)定，主要強(qiáng)調(diào)以下六個(gè)方面：對(duì)“軟美元”下定義;對(duì)研究成果下定義;混合使用研究成果;信息披露;記錄保留以及客戶指定經(jīng)紀(jì)費(fèi)用。依照投資管理和研究協(xié)會(huì)的“軟美元”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)定，判斷某一研究成果或其他服務(wù)是否屬于“軟美元”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是關(guān)鍵。只有那些的確對(duì)投資決策有幫助的研究成果和服務(wù)才是符合“軟美元”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的，那些能給基金經(jīng)理人所在公司帶來(lái)收益但不能有助于基金經(jīng)理人作出決策的研究成果和服務(wù)是不符合“軟美元”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的。為了使基金經(jīng)理人能準(zhǔn)確判斷某一研究成果或服務(wù)是否屬于“軟美元”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)所規(guī)定的范圍，投資管理和研究協(xié)會(huì)特意制定了判斷某研究成果和服務(wù)類別的行動(dòng)指引。通過(guò)指引的規(guī)定，可以使基金經(jīng)理人比較精確的判斷某一個(gè)研究成果或服務(wù)的類別，進(jìn)而確定是否能利用客戶的經(jīng)紀(jì)費(fèi)用來(lái)獲得此研究成果和服務(wù)。借鑒 綜上所述，在基金業(yè)比較發(fā)達(dá)的美國(guó)，相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)，其法規(guī)中對(duì)于基金管理人“軟美元”交易有比較完整的規(guī)定，不是完全禁止，對(duì)于合理的“軟美元”給予法律的保護(hù)。反觀我國(guó)的證券投資基金法規(guī)如證券投資基金管理暫行辦法、證券投資基金法中沒(méi)有關(guān)于這方面的立法，只有一些比較抽象性規(guī)定。這種規(guī)定不足以很好地規(guī)范基金管理人的行為，也不足以保護(hù)投資者的利益，在某些情況下可能存在證券經(jīng)紀(jì)商和基金管理人之間的秘密交易，而這種交易對(duì)投資者是不利的。美國(guó)關(guān)于“軟美元”交易的規(guī)定值得我國(guó)在完善這方面的立法時(shí)予以借鑒。Soft dollarSoft dollars is a term used in finance to describe the commission generated from a trade or other financial transaction between a client and an investment manager.1 A soft dollar arrangement is one in which the investment manager directs the commission generated by the transaction towards a third party or in-house party in exchange for services that are for the benefit of the client but are not client directed.2 Soft dollars, in contrast to hard dollars (actual cash), which have to be reported, are incorporated into brokerage fees and paid expenses, which may not be reported directly. Registered Investment Companies generally comply with the limitations detailed in Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but hedge funds, which are generally not registered, are not subject to the limitations of Section 28(e) and thus the client commissions are not necessarily used for the direct benefit of the client.Background and historyIn the brokerage business, soft dollars have been in use for many years. Prior to May 1, 1975, all brokerage firms used a fixed price commission schedule published by the New York Stock Exchange; the schedule was a matrix listing the number of shares in the trade on one axis, the stocks price per share on the other axis, and the corresponding commission charge in the cells of the matrix. Because broker/dealers traditionally were required to charge a fixed commission and could not compete by lowering the commission for a trade, they soon began to compete by providing additional services to their institutional clients. In the industry this became known as “bundling” services with commissions.3In the early 1970s, the U.S. government investigated the brokerage industrys pricing practices. They concluded the industry was engaged in price fixing. The government told the brokerage industry that, as of May 1, 1975 it would be required to “fully negotiate” brokerage commissions with each client for each trade. As the May 1, 1975 deadline approached the brokerage industry went through several changes in an attempt to restructure itself so it could offer services and negotiate the price of each service separately. In the industry this process was known as “unbundling.”4 and created the Discount Brokerage segment of the industry. At the same time, the brokerage industry lobbied Congress to allow it to continue to include the cost of investment research given to institutional clients as part of the fully negotiated commission.2 Shortly after May 1, 1975 Congress passed an amendment to Section 28 of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 28(e) provides a safe harbor for any fiduciary that “pays-up” from its fully negotiated commission rate to receive qualifying research from its broker(s).The Securities and Exchange Commission is responsible for interpreting and enforcing Section 28(e). In Section 28(e) the definition of qualifying services is detailed and explicit, but Section 28(e) is not a rule it is just a safe harbor. The use of client commissions to pay for services which are not within the safe harbor of Section 28(e) is not defensible under the safe harbor. A fiduciary who “pays-up” in client commissions to receive non-qualifying services must be able to defend the use of the excess brokerage commissions (and the allocation of services received) on the basis of fiduciary law. Under fiduciary law it is the fiduciarys responsibility to use its clients assets for the exclusive benefit of the client / beneficiary /principal. Fiduciary law and ERISA have confirmed that institutional brokerage commissions are an asset of the client / beneficiary / principal.5Statistical studies over several recent years and large populations of institutional trade data have revealed that the cost of executing and clearing institutional trades is between 1.25 and 1.65 cents per share.6 Most institutional advisors pay 5 to 6 cents per share commissions to their brokers. Many of these institutional fiduciaries provide no disclosure of what services they are receiving for the excess over their fully negotiated commission rate. In bundled full service brokerage arrangements this lack of disclosure is particularly problematic because it makes it difficult to apply Section 28(e) tests and measure Section 28(e) compliance.ExamplesAs an example, lets assume fund ABC Capital purchases computer equipment from XYZ Computers. Rather than paying XYZ for the computers, ABC adds a few cents to the brokerage fees it pays for executing transactions through its broker, LMN Brokers. LMN then sends payment to XYZ. (Of course, in this arrangement where third-party services have been acquired, there would be invoices and statements which would be documented in the brokers books and records and would serve as documentation of the expense.) If ABC had paid XYZ directly, the transaction would have been designated as a hard dollar cost.The costs of research services are generally not disclosed to the funds investors. Fully disclosed third-party brokerage facilitates the provision of independently produced research, which may have fewer potential conflicts of interest.An example of illegal use of undisclosed soft dollars might be when a mutual fund manager pays excess commissions and as a quid pro quo receives an allocation of a hot IPO from his broker (so he can flip the IPO, generally before the end of the stabilization period, for a fast profit). Or, a situation where a fund manager wants to reward a wire-house for providing shelf space and marketing favoritism for her family of funds, or perhaps where an investment manager wants to earn favoritism for late trading consideration by paying-up in commissions. Such brokerage arrangements, where favors are traded in exchange for institutional clients excess commissions have been criticized by securities regulators. Full-service brokerage bundled commission arrangements involving the exchange of brokerage firms undisclosed proprietary services provided for institutional clients brokerage commissions (paid in excess of a fully negotiated execution only commission rate) can create conflicts of interest and motivate fraud. The lack of transparency in these full-service brokerage arrangements may shield abuses from immediate detection.7In soft dollar arrangements, the brokerage commissions are higher than they would be for an execution only trading relationship, and over time investment performance may suffer by that higher commission cost. Because institutional funds can trade a significant number of shares every day, the soft dollars add-up quickly. The amount of soft dollars institutional funds use is quite high (estimated in 2007 to be in excess of 11 billion dollars). (Note that soft dollar amounts do not have to be disclosed to anyone, not even the agencies responsible for oversight, so only esti