2901.B肇慶市工商銀行給小企業(yè)貸款問題研究 外文參考文獻譯文及原文doc

1、本科畢業(yè)設計（論文）外文參考文獻譯文及原文 學 院 經濟管理學院 專 業(yè) 工商管理 年級班別 學 號 學生姓名 指導教師 年 月 日貸款擔保-小型企業(yè)的成本費用摘 要很多國家的政府都在積極地扶持中小企業(yè)成長，而且大部分是被鼓勵發(fā)展的。中小企業(yè)的成長通常需要擴大資本，它時常會被拿來與較大的企業(yè)相比較，中小企業(yè)面對不成比例的，很少貸款給它們的債務資金，卻是它們需要的啟動、生長和生存的資本。因此，政府和貿易協(xié)會在信用市場中則介入到承擔起貸款的金融機構對中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的保證人的角色。舉例來說，在美國的小企業(yè)管理部門就提供被銀行做的貸款的保證給取得資格的中小企業(yè)。在其他的國家例如，加拿大、日本、英國、韓國

2、和德國之中相似的計劃是有效的。貿易協(xié)會在法國、西班牙和其他的國家也承擔如此的角色。支援小企業(yè)的為斷擴充的貸款可能傳達關于外來公司的重要益處，可透過工作創(chuàng)新來提高對社會的閑置資金的利用率。然而在某些程度上，一些借用人不能夠履行他們債務的付還義務，擔保人也面對誠信，要對出借人承擔保證物質的實質費用。貸款保證計劃被設計成很多種方式。但通常這些計劃似乎不反映來自經濟的理論或經驗的指導。本文利用經驗的證據把費用和利益作比較。除此之外，它使用經驗和經濟的理論提供一些指導給貸款保證計劃的設計。最后，研究表示貸款保證計劃是支持新興的、具有風險的小企業(yè)的啟動、生長和生存的有效方法。文章回顧早前的嘗試引用費用利益

3、貸款保證計劃的分析，在拖欠率中，它找到廣泛的國際性的變化。發(fā)表的數據表明，拖欠率從少于5%（德國）變成到超過40%（英國）。加拿大在經驗分析貸款保證計劃的落實上把其稱為小企業(yè)貸款行動（sbla）。調查結果包括（1）在sbla的期限之下允許的貸款被保證提供一個工作創(chuàng)新的極其有效的方法，并非常低廉地估計每一工作的費用。（2）拖欠率對于新成立的公司是比較高的，從而增加大量的借貸基金，而且廣泛地根據部門改變;(3)對較大的公司和較大的貸款的弄寬適任不可能勸告得好而且對計劃的目標感到不一致。而且當為服務大部分中小企業(yè)的時候，減少貸款的最高限額會使一些有疑義的的貸款申請失去信心。除此之外，資金出借方的動機

4、分析意味著，拖欠率在擔保的貸款的資產組合身上評估。因此誠實的擔保費用，對擔保的水平特別地敏感。在擔保（比方說，資金出借方對擔保85% 的負責人自然增加興趣而非 80%）的水平可以在拖欠率中導致可觀的減少。1 介 紹因為政策制定者和企業(yè)家的研究員身分，二十世紀末的一個重大研究發(fā)現(xiàn)是大量新的工作崗位的出現(xiàn)歸屬于中小企業(yè)的成長。因此，大多數國家的政府尋求扶持中小企業(yè)成長的方法。但有許多察覺到在這生長在信用市場中是被不完全阻隔。引用的缺點是導致規(guī)模比較小的企業(yè)獲得比較少的對啟動、生長和生存需要的債務資金的接觸機會。政府時常藉由使用借出保證計劃在信用市場中干涉。然而，貸款保證計劃時常被設計成特別的方式和

5、多種不反映來自經濟的理論的指導或者經歷的方法。因此，本文嘗試在從經驗的證據和經濟的理論來指導貸款保證計劃的設計。本文公開采用貸款保證的總體特征的描述規(guī)劃而且描述保證人和遞送代理人之間的代理商關系。本文然后藉由舉例說明描述貸款保證計劃在美國、加拿大和英國的設計和結果中變化。它被加拿大小商務貸款比較詳細地描述為跟隨行動 (sbla)。下一個章節(jié)呈現(xiàn)費用分析的經驗調查結果和sbla的利益并且識別過去在保證的貸款上的拖欠率和其之間的關系計劃參數。本文在理論上用貸款保證設計的這些調查結果的含意的討論規(guī)劃為結尾，并且表示為什么拖欠率對被保證的貸款的比例高度地敏感。2 設計貸款保證規(guī)劃-貸款保證的專屬計劃所

6、有的貸款保證計劃至少包括三個參與者：借用人、出借人和保證人。這三個參加者的動機不一致。借用人時常是尋求債務資金的中小企業(yè)。因為商務原因，借用人接近一個出借人。出借人通常是從貸款交易中尋求得益的一個財務機構。面對不完全統(tǒng)計出來的數據顯示，出借人尋找來自借用人的信用價值的告示。對于新或小的業(yè)務，評估的高費用可能促使出借人拒絕貸款申請。二者擇一地，參與者可能訴諸貸款的一個第三者保證。保證人，通常是一個政府或貿易協(xié)會，為債務的一些物質部分提供保證給出借人促進接觸債務資金。這個專屬的安排暗示保證人和出借人之間的代理商關系。出借人為保證人擔任一個遞送代理人。然而，出借人和保證人有不同的目的。保證人必須用出

7、借人的利潤最大值化動機，排列它的目的(促進信用)。一般來說，保證人能處理下列的參數。1、信用決定的慎重程度。在一些權限(例如，加拿大)中，出借人決定哪些借用人接受保證貸款。而在其他權限(例如，英國)里面，保證人必須至少在概念上經過每個申請的審查。2、保證的水平。這也根據權限和在權限里面改變。 舉例來說，當美國 sba 在 1982 年介紹了它的“優(yōu)先的出借人”計劃的時候，保證是給75%的債務為平常的sba 有效與給90% 相比較的保證貸款。3、費用。一般地，保證人設定費用試圖追回因疏怠職責導致的費用或者保護共用物的直接資金，但在一些落實方面，時常落后于保證。4、適任標準。在大多數的落實方面，外

8、來的特定目的不能被允許為其保證。因為貸款過去一直是用于支援營運資本，在加拿大，舉例來說，這樣的保證是不可得。3 一種國際的遠景-加拿大：小商務貸款行動小商務貸款行動(sbla)已經提供同盟保證，在1961，自從它起步以后借出必先經過出借人的核準。借用人通過商議，讓來自一個經核準借貸的機構的貸款獲得 sbla 保證的貸款。出借人要在適任的期限里面保證關于貸款的決定和申請的完整慎重。不像貸款保證在美國和英國計劃，加拿大政府的角色是消極的。工業(yè)部門為維持貸款的登記負有主要的責任。sbla計劃專門為將收入用來供給土地、前提，設備和特定的其他項目經費的期限的貸款提供保證。收入不可能用來供給營運資本、部份

9、獲得經費、再借出和無形資產(包括許可證和操作許可證)。在 1993 年四月，加拿大聯(lián)邦政府在多種方面修正了該計劃。這些變化包含： 暫時把貸款的保證幅度從85%調整至90%。 用5，000，000美元(早先的界限被設定在2，000，000美元)的年度收入和部門，像是財務、保險，采礦和職業(yè)的公司把適任擴大至公司。 增加從100，000美元到250，000美元的最高的貸款限額。 在國家宣布的基準利率的基礎收上調1.75%的幅度。 由于這些變化的部分結果，在1993年期間借貸行為的期限許多為三十五億美元，在94年以后大約發(fā)五億美元的幅度在增加。1997 之前，累積的借貸超過一百億美元，而且計劃的期限再

10、一次被審查。4 美國：小企業(yè)管理貸款保證計劃sbla的創(chuàng)立，給小企業(yè)管理 (sba) 的前提是不愿意借給小公司的銀行也遭到危險， 然而有許多“善行”小的商務信用的杰出人物。因此，sba 在 1953 年被計劃制造直接的貸款，與銀行合伙借出資金，而且提供貸款保證。在起初，sba以銀行不競爭出借人的角色出現(xiàn)。因此，sba從貸款保證的直接借貸中移開了。在如此的保證下，因為他們的規(guī)模太小，沒有被符合銀行信用標準的借用人想要。在歷史上，一個尋求貸款的借用人可以經過出借人為一個適用于sba的小企業(yè)作保證。為了取得資格，出借人必須是曾經檢定生意為沒有保證的信用，否則不會取得資格，但是付還的呼聲還是有的。本來

11、，sba 職員審查了每個申請。如果核準，一個信用達 90% 金額達 $155，000的貸款保證是有可能被批準的。貸款被保護到的范圍是有形資產，資產是可得的，而且執(zhí)行的個人保證是有需要。在保證的期限之下，借用人如果到期但仍未付款達到60天，出借人可以要求 sba 購買其主要的資產，而且使成為的原因感興趣并且收集。在最后十年期間sba已經從所有貸款申請的正式批準移開，而放較多的職責在出借人身上。大約在美國銀行中有三分之二在sba 計劃下面擔任出借人。然而，有各種不同的出借人實際上參加的范圍有相當多的變化。sba 已經受到相當多的稱贊的影響，但是也受制于強烈的批評。在關心的主要因素之中是拖欠率的貸款

12、的計劃行政和費用的高費用。在 1980 年代期間，sba的操作預算為每年70，000，000美元，而且長期顯示拖欠率的估計范圍從16.4%到 23.5%。最近經常地，sba 已經集中和更有效率和更有責任的出借人借以及激勵其他的出借人效法他們的例子。這些努力，依照 sba(1998)，已經造成增加的生產力和效率和假設值被減少的比率。在努力減少部分貸款上的拖欠率之時，一般辦公室的檢查員在尋找識別一個成功出借人的典型的開始、分析和監(jiān)聽技術。這些工作為有效的在控制信用危險方面確認一些練習。 成功的出借人： 培養(yǎng)一個長期的而且擴充超過 sba 貸款的范圍的他們的借用人的全面的關系 更多的評估一個個別的的

13、借用人的情形比自動篩選方法更為可靠，例如信用得分。 通常避免外部貸款的使用包裝者 需要借用人在到哪些信用是要延長的生意的類型中示范有關的經驗 盡管 sba 的有效保證，但仍需要借用人抵押個人的和商務上的資產， 最后的借貸確定一致性和控制的決定 開始強調在監(jiān)聽上的質量貸款 分配危險等級到新的貸款而且定期地在貸款的活動中再評價他們 積極地留意將來貸款付還問題的警告告示 監(jiān)定過去借出得早的應得東西而且開始精力充沛的努力收集 強調解決問題貸款避免償還。報告得出結論上述的嘗試，雖然不是包羅萬象, 可能是關于需要發(fā)展程序讓他們的 sba 貸款資產的管理或者希望改善對信用制度的控制出借人的有用指南。sba

14、也可以鼓勵或者需要改善他們的 sba 保證貸款的管理的出借人的這些嘗試。5 英國: 工業(yè)貸款保證方案貸款保證方案 (lgs) 在 1981年隨著威爾遜委員會的推薦被介紹為“在銀行之間的競爭不夠有效確定可行的小生意總是在合理的期限上有必要地充份地接觸基金。” 該方案是貿易部和工業(yè)部 (dti) 和出借人之間的共同投資以致力于保證被限制到已經嘗試而且沒有獲得貸款的公司。出借人一定會使他們自己滿意，他們會提供傳統(tǒng)的貸款方式，但是為缺乏間接的或者記錄所有的個人的資產作為傳統(tǒng)的貸款。在事實上，dti 為 85%的總計貸款提供一個保證給出借人。以換取政府支持，借用人一定支付 dti 年度額外費用。除此之外

15、，出借人可能需要一個真正資產的保證抵押而且將會通常在這樣的資產上采取一項固定的或漂浮的費用。如pieda所注意，lgs貸款的拖欠率在1981年6月至1984年3月之間被允許完成的貸款是有40%的。由于在最初二年里面疏怠職責，多數的拖欠在最初二年里面發(fā)生，就此指出了信用決策程序的潛在缺點。拖欠率在用了保證供給營運資本經費的那些公司之中也更常用，一個要期望的結果是：供給短期的資產經費的長期義務是使用違反長期存在的財務智能。首先，英國的步驟包括保證人在貸款贊成步驟中，至少要有名字在其中。這是耗費時間、昂貴，且與出借人最好預備作出信用決定的這種方法是不一致。在加拿大，決定被獨有地留下給出借人，且信賴在

16、銀行部門專長方面的較好的能有所貢獻的范圍。其次，保證的水平可能會對拖欠率有戲劇性的影響。在美國被測量的評估期間，保證的水平被設定為90%。第三，費用的程度可以說影響到計劃的借用人的質量。如果費用是太高，質量好借用人將不參與計劃，并且市場惡化的周期正如akerlof、stiglitz和weiss所描述的。比較高的拖欠率在他們自己不是否定指示。最重要的是對超過計劃的費用的社會補助金補助的程度。 在美國，rhyne估計這一補助金的范圍在11%至13%。然而，如沃格特和亞當觀察,，在美國，英國, 或加拿大，社會福利利益尚沒有嚴格的評估。因此，任何的聲明一定會取得資格。然而，它卻很清楚在英國和美國對積極

17、的評估障礙要比在加拿大大。其他的國家有方案設計經過貸款保證促進 sme 融資。在荷蘭和德國，政府基金給企業(yè)做出保證借出。政府的外部組織，包括貿易協(xié)會,，在比利時、盧森堡、愛爾蘭、法國、葡萄牙、西班牙和希臘提供貸款保證。在亞洲國家，像是日本、韓國、臺灣和馬來西亞，多種制度的安排為貸款保證提供。計劃的操作政策和細節(jié)在整個司法權非常地不一致, 然而一個理論基礎或者經驗的研究將去指導計劃設計。6 早先的研究: 貸款保證沃格特和亞當提出一份評論回顧，并為支持貸款保證計劃發(fā)展的原理作出分析。他們提出要注意以下幾點：1. 貸款保證計劃的設計不合乎邏輯地反映關于信用市場不完全的假定2. 所有的貸款保證計劃包括

18、補助金3. 大多數的評估只報告計劃的費用的部分4. 研究不能夠測量正確地沃格特和亞當指出信用市場不完全不提供一個有效的原理給貸款保證計劃，然而他們在那些小企業(yè)可能面對獲得債務資金的不成比例困難之下識別二個環(huán)境。當對中小企業(yè)借出的費用是太高而無法應對財務機構的時候，第一種情況發(fā)生。這高額費用起源于二個來源：出借人可以預期的危險額外費用和評估監(jiān)聽的固定費用。這些在市場上不是不完整的。這些情況在操作上是正常方法的一部份。然而，中小企業(yè)面對不成比例有權使用債務資金的困難。當出借人放重要性在間接利用上的時候，第二種情形發(fā)生。如果小企業(yè)在質量和數量上沒有得到充份間接利用，貸款可能被否認是必需的。loan

19、guaranteescosts of default and benefits to small firmstest from: allan l. ridinga，george hainesjr. loan guaranteescosts of default and benefits to small firmsj，carleon university, ottawa, ontario, canadaabstractgovernments of most countries seek to encourage small and medium sized enterprise ( sme)

20、growth and the job creation that many believe is fostered by such growth. substantive growth usually requires expansion capital. it is often perceived that compared with larger firms, smes face disproportionately less access to the debt capital they need for start-up, growth, and survival. consequen

21、tly, governments and trade associations have often intervened in credit markets by taking on the role of guarantor of loans that financial institutions advance to smes. for example, the small business administration in the united states provides guarantees of loans made by banks to qualifying small

22、firms. similar schemes are in effect in, among other countries, canada, japan, the u.k., korea, and germany. trade associations take on such roles in france, spain, and other nations. loans hat support the expansion of small enterprises may convey significant benefits to the borrowing firms and, thr

23、ough job creation and retention, to the rest of society. however, to the extent that some borrowers are unable to meet the repayment obligations of their debt, guarantors also face material real costs of honoring their guarantee to the lenders. loan guarantee programs are designed in a variety of wa

24、ys. this paper draws on empirical evidence to compare costs with benefits. in addition, it uses the results and economic theory to provide some guidance for the design of loan guarantee programs. finally, the study shows that loan guarantee programs can be an effective means of supporting start-up,

25、growth, and survival of new and risky enterprises. the paper reviews previous attempts to conduct cost-benefit analyses of loan guarantee programs. it finds wide variation, internationally, in default rates. published data suggests default rates vary from less than 5% (germany) to more than 40% (u.k

26、.). the empirical analysis reported here focuses on the canadian implementation of loan guarantees, the small business loans act (sbla). findings include (1) loan guarantees granted under the terms of the sbla provide an extremely efficient means of job creation, with very low estimated costs per jo

27、b; (2) default rates are higher for newer firms, increase with the amount of funds borrowed, and vary widely by sector.(3) the widening eligibility to larger firms and to larger loans may not be well advised and is inconsistent with the goals of the program. moreover, reducing the loan ceiling would

28、 arguably discourage fraudulent applications while servicing those smes most in need of early-stage capital. in addition, analysis of the lenders' motives suggests that default rates on the portfolio of guaranteed loans and, therefore, the costs of honoring guarantees, are particularly sensitive

29、 to the level of the guarantee. small reductions in the level of the guarantee (for example, guaranteeing 80% of principal and accrued interest instead of 85%) could lead to substantial reductions in default rates. 1 introductionfor policy makers and entrepreneurship researchers, a far-reaching rese

30、arch finding of the late twentieth century was that a disproportionate amount of job creation is attributable to the growth of smes. consequently, governments of most countries seek to foster sme growth. many perceive this growth to be obstructed by imperfections in the credit market. the flaws cite

31、d are such that smaller firms obtain disproportionately less access to the debt capital needed for start-up, growth, and survival. governments have, therefore, often intervened in credit markets by using loan guarantee programs. however, notes that loan guarantee programs are often designed in an ad

32、-hoc manner and in a variety of ways that do not reflect guidance from economic theory or experience. therefore, this paper reports on an attempt to draw from empirical evidence and economic theory to guide the design of loan guarantee programs. the paper opens with a short description of the generi

33、c features of loan guarantee programs and describes the agency relationship between the guarantor and delivery agents. the paper then illustrates variations in design and outcomes by describing loan guarantee programs of the united states, canada, and the uk. this is followed by a more detailed desc

34、ription of the canadian small business loans act (sbla).the next section presents empirical findings of the analysis of costs and benefits of the sbla and identifies empirical relationships between the default rate on guaranteed loans and program parameters. the paper closes with a discussion of the

35、 implications of these findings for the design of loan guarantee programs and shows theoretically why the rate of default is highly sensitive to the proportion of loan that is guaranteed. 2 designing loan guarantee programsgeneric features of loan guarantee schemesall loan guarantee programs involve

36、 at least three parties: borrower, lender, and guarantor. the motives of the three participants differ. the borrower is often an sme seeking debt capital. typically, the borrower approaches a lender for a business loan. the lender is most often a private financial institution seeking to profit from

37、the loan transaction. faced with information asymmetry, lenders look for signs of creditworthiness from borrowers. for new or small businesses the high costs of evaluation may prompt the lender to refuse the loan application. alternatively, the parties may resort to a third-party guarantee of the lo

38、an. the guarantor, usually a government or a trade association, seeks to facilitate access to debt capital by providing lenders with the comfort of a guarantee for some material portion of the debt. this generic arrangement implies an agency relationship between the guarantor and the lender. the len

39、der acts as a delivery agent for the guarantor; however, lender and the guarantor have different objectives. the guarantor must align its objective (facilitating credit) with the lenders' profit-maximization motives. typically, guarantors can manage the following parameters. 1. the degree of dis

40、cretion in credit decisions. in some jurisdictions (e.g., canada), the lender decides which borrowers receive guaranteed loans. in others (e.g., the uk), the guarantor reviewsat least notionallyeach application.2. the level of the guarantee. this also varies by jurisdiction and within jurisdictions.

41、 for example, when the u.s. sba introduced its “preferred lender” program in 1982, the guarantee was for 75% of the debt compared with the 90% in effect for the (then) usual sba-guaranteed loans.3. fees. typically, guarantors set fees in an attempt to recover costs of honoring defaults or to preserv

42、e the integrity of the pool of capital that, in some implementations, often lies behind the guarantees.4. eligibility criteria. in most implementations, guarantees may not be permitted for certain purposes of borrowing. in canada, for example, guarantees are not available for loans used to support w

43、orking capital.to illustrate variations on these themes, it is instructive to review selected international implementations of loan guarantee arrangements. 3 an international perspectivecanada: the small business loans actthe small business loans act (sbla) has provided for federally-guaranteed term

44、 loans through approved lenders since its inception in 1961. borrowers negotiate for a loan from an approved lending institution to obtain an sbla-guaranteed loan. lenders have full discretion regarding the loan decision and the invocation of the guarantee within the terms of eligibility. unlike loa

45、n guarantee schemes in the united states and the uk, the role of the canadian government is passive. the industry ministry is responsible primarily for maintaining registration of the loans and, in the event of default, it honors the guarantee. the sbla program provides exclusively for guarantees of

46、 term loans where the proceeds are used to finance land, premises, equipment, and certain other items. proceeds may not be used to finance working capital, share acquisition, refinancing, and intangibles (including franchise and operating permits). in april 1993 the canadian federal government amend

47、ed the act in a variety of ways. these changes included: temporarily increasing the level of the guarantee from 85% to 90%;4 widening eligibility to firms with annual revenues of up to $5 million (the previous limit was set at $2 million) and to firms in sectors such as finance, insurance, mining, a

48、nd the professions; increasing the maximum loan size from $100,000 to $250,000; providing for a higher interest rate spread of up to 1.75% over prime. as a partial result of these changes, lending volume under the terms of the act increasedfrom an annual dollar volume of approximately $500 million i

49、n 1993 to $3.5 billion during 1994. by 1997, cumulative lending was in excess of $10 billion, and the terms of the program were again reviewed.4 united states: the small business administration loan guarantee programat its founding, a premise for the small business administration (sba) was that bank

50、s were too risk averse to lend to small firms, yet there were plenty of “good” small businesses worthy of credit. hence, the sba was created in 1953 to make direct loans, loans in partnership with banks, and to provide loan guarantees. at its inception, it was intended that the sba would not compete

51、 with bank lenders. the sba, therefore, moved away from direct lending towards loan guarantees. such guarantees were intended for borrowers who, because of their small size, did not meet bank credit standards.historically, a borrower seeking a loan could apply to the sba for a guarantee through the

52、lender. to be eligible, the lender must have certified that the business would not have qualified for credit without the guaranteebut that the likelihood of repayment is sound! originally, sba staff reviewed each application. if approved, a guarantee of up to 90% of loans up to $155,000 could be adv

53、anced. loans were secured to the extent that tangible assets were available and the chief executive's personal guarantee was required. under the terms of the guarantee, if the borrower was at least 60 days in arrears the lender could demand that the sba purchase the outstanding principal and int

54、erest and become responsible for collection. the sba has moved away from approval of all loan applications to place more responsibility on the lenders during the last decade. approximately two-thirds of u.s. banks act as lenders under the sba program. yet, there is considerable variation in the exte

55、nt to which various lenders actually participate. the sba has come under considerable praise but has also been subject to intense criticism. among the major causes of concern were the high costs of program administration and costs of honoring loans in default. during the 1980s, the operating budget

56、of the sba was of the order to $70 million per year (rhyne 1988), and estimates of long-run default rates ranged from 16.4% (sba, 1983, as reported by mandel 1992) to 23.5% (rhyne 1988). more recently, the sba has concentrated lending with the more efficient and responsible lenders and also encourag

57、ed other lenders to emulate their examples. these efforts, according to the sba (1998), have resulted in increased productivity and efficiency and a reduced rate of defaults. as part of the continuous effort to reduce the default rate on loans, the office of inspector general (1996) sought to identi

58、fy the best credit initiation, analysis, and monitoring techniques of a cross-section of successful lenders. the work identified some practices as effective in controlling credit risk. successful lenders: foster a long-term and comprehensive relationship with their borrowers that extends beyond the scope of an sba loan rely more on evaluating an individual borrower'