生態(tài)可持續(xù)發(fā)展

1、Robert Omahen羅伯特奧瑪恩19/11/01Ecological economy 生態(tài)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)Thesis論文Ecoloqicallv Sustainable Development (ESD) - Rapidwall is one answer? 生態(tài)可持續(xù)進(jìn)展(ESD) 一速成墻是一個(gè)答案嗎？1. Industrial Impacts 工業(yè)影響Since the industrial revolution humans started to manufacture products and goods in a more efficient way, that causes cos

2、t and time reduction. New sorts of products have been discovered. Chemicals that are used, improve lifetime and durability. New shapes and applications are possible today.自工業(yè)革命以來，人類開頭以更為有效的方式制造產(chǎn)品和貨物，這導(dǎo)致了本錢和時(shí)間的削 減。新種類的產(chǎn)品得以覺察。使用的化工品改善了壽命和耐久性。新的外觀和應(yīng)用在今日已成 為可能。The same happened in the building industry.

3、同樣的事情也發(fā)生在建筑工業(yè)。There are a lot more possibilities in the manufacturing process. Companies are able to pre-manufacture building materials, that leads to a cost and time reduction for on site building.在制造過程中有多得多的可能性。各公司能夠預(yù)先制造建筑材料，導(dǎo)致現(xiàn)場(chǎng)的建筑本錢和 時(shí)間削減。But all human activities have impacts on the nature. The

4、economic process (production of goods and services) requires the use of natural equities, e.g. land and energy, and has influence on the nature (Buchholz Script p.1). The increase of business activities leads to higher pollution, than it was 200 years ago.但全部的人類活動(dòng)對(duì)自然界都有影響。經(jīng)濟(jì)過程(貨物和服務(wù)的生產(chǎn))需使用自然資源， 例如土地

5、和能源，并對(duì)自然界產(chǎn)生影響()o商業(yè)活動(dòng)的增加導(dǎo)致比200年前更高的污染。To simplify the ground model we assume that with a certain production of X a certain level of CO2 is emitted, e.g. through smoke of burning fossil fuel. We assume the emission e(X) = X.為了簡(jiǎn)化基本模型，我們假定X量的生產(chǎn)肯定水平的CO2被排放，例如，通 過燃燒礦物燃料的煙霧。我們假定排放量e(X) = XoThe negative ext

6、ernal effect is caused through the production X and creates a damage D(X) for V, who is owning a fruit garden near the power plant. The damage is indicated on bad fruits.負(fù)面的外部效應(yīng)通過生產(chǎn)量X而引起并給V造成D(X)的損失，而V在電廠四 周擁有一個(gè)果園。We discover a increasing marginal damage function D(X), so that DJ,(X)0.我們覺察一個(gè)遞增的邊際損失函

7、數(shù)D(X),這樣D(X)0oThe optimal production level is X*, where B,(X)=D,(X). This production level is a optimal allocation, because we have the biggest public benefit. In this allocation the net public benefit B(X)-D(X) is maximized.最正確的生產(chǎn)水平為X*,其中B(X尸D，(X)。此生產(chǎn)水平是最正確配置，由于我們 擁有最大的公共利益。在此配置下凈公共利益B(X)-D(X)最大化。O

8、bviously 8 X*, a bigger production level is realized, which is not optimal in public benefit. We discover a public loss of EBD with EBD= D -D(X*)-(B -B(X明顯8X*,實(shí)現(xiàn)了更大的生產(chǎn)水平，這不是公共利益的最大化。我們覺察到 一個(gè)公共損失EBD,它滿意EBD= D(8)-D(X*)-(B(8)-B(X*)If external effects are not considered, the loss is happening.假設(shè)外部效應(yīng)不加以考

9、慮，損失就會(huì)發(fā)生。Pic. 11-1 圖 11-1Methods of Maximizing Public Benefits 最大化公共利益的方法As we have seen optimal public allocation is not created if external effects are not considered. In theory different possibilities are known to achieve the optimal production level X*.正如我們所見，假設(shè)對(duì)外部效應(yīng)不加考慮最正確公共配置并未開創(chuàng)。從理論上 講，有各種不同的

10、可能性以實(shí)現(xiàn)最正確生產(chǎn)水平X*。Merging of P and V P 和 V 的合并To avoid the public benefit loss P and V should be owner of the plant and the fruit garden together. There calculation would be than to maximize the net benefit B(X)-D(X).為了避開公共利益的損失，P和V應(yīng)共同為電廠和果園的業(yè)主。在此狀況下，計(jì)算才會(huì)將凈利益B(X)-D(X)最大化。Avoidance Condition 避開的條件A opt

11、imal allocation could be also created if the government would regulate the production to a level of X* by law. The Government has to penalize companies that high that they prefer to avoid a production level higher than X*.假設(shè)政府通過法律規(guī)定生產(chǎn)在X*水平，最正確配置也可開創(chuàng)。政府須懲辦產(chǎn)量高 的公司，這樣他們就寧愿避開高過X*的生產(chǎn)水平。Tax and Subsidy So

12、lution (price solution).稅收與補(bǔ)助方案(價(jià)格方案)Imaginable is also that the government levies a tax per production unit. A tax like that is called Pigou-Tax (from A.C. Pigou, a English economist, who lived 1873- 1959). To achieve the optimal allocation the tax rate has to have the same level than the marginal

13、benefit or marginal damage at the production level X*. f = D，(X)= BX*).可以想象的還有，政府按每單位的生產(chǎn)征收稅賦。這樣的稅叫做皮古稅(源 自A.C.Pigou, 一個(gè)英國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家，生活在1873-1959年)。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)最正確配置， 稅率必需是與生產(chǎn)水平X*上的邊際利潤(rùn)或邊際損失處在同一個(gè)水平上。f = d,(X*) = B,(X*)oP maximizes his profit, which is B(X)- f X . P is producing the amount X* with a benefit of AE f

14、, where B(X*) t* =0.P將他的利潤(rùn)最大化，即B(X)-t*X。P在生產(chǎn)數(shù)量X*,其利潤(rùn)為AEt*,其中 B(X*)- f =0oThe Pigou-Tax creates a double dividend. The first dividend is the reduction of damage. The second dividend is, that the taxes can be used for the reduction of work taxation, which creates a benefit for employees again.皮古稅造成兩份兒

15、回報(bào)。第一份是損失的削減。其次份兒是，這個(gè)稅可用來 削減工作稅賦，這樣就為雇傭勞動(dòng)者再制造一份福利。Another method is the Subsidy Solution. The avoidance of a production unit has to be subsidized with a subsidy rate s. P would maximize in his calculation B(X)+s(8-X). He is producing the amount X*, where B,(X*)-s=0. His profit would be the surface A

16、EsBO. It follows that in the optimal public allocation s= f=D,(X*).另一個(gè)方法是補(bǔ)助方案。避開了的生產(chǎn)量須按補(bǔ)助率S予以補(bǔ)助。P將其計(jì) 算B(X)+s(8-X)最大化。他在生產(chǎn)數(shù)量X*,其中B(X*)-s=0。他的利潤(rùn)將是外表積 AEsBOo其結(jié)果，在最正確公共配置下s=f=D(X*)。The Coase Concept 考斯概念We pointed out that external effects have to be considered if we want to create a optimal public allo

17、cation. Another method to achieve this is the Coase Concept by R. Coase, who mentioned the problem in his famous reportu The Problem of Social Cost (I960). The idea is a negotiation between the players, without government interference.我們指出，假如我們欲制造出最正確公共配置，外部效應(yīng)就必需加以考慮。實(shí) 現(xiàn)這一點(diǎn)的另一個(gè)方法是考斯概念，由R.考斯提出，他在其聞名的

18、報(bào)告社會(huì)成 本問題(I960)中提到了該問題。其思路是各玩家之間的談判，無須政府的干 預(yù)。The scenario is a Laissez-Faire System, where P can produce as much as he wants. P will produce 8, because he is maximizing his profit. To reduce the production units, V is willing to pay P a compensation 0(X).其大綱是個(gè)自由放任的系統(tǒng)，P在其中想生產(chǎn)多少就生產(chǎn)多少。P將生產(chǎn)8, 由于他在使自己的利潤(rùn)

19、最大化。為了削減生產(chǎn)量，V情愿給P支付補(bǔ)償金0(X)。The amount of this compensation is uncertain yet.該補(bǔ)償金的數(shù)目尚不確定。The minimal compensation that P accepts the offer is 0min(X)=B(8)-B(X), because P is loosing profit.使P接受報(bào)盤的最低補(bǔ)償金是0min(X)=B(8)-B(X),由于P在損失利潤(rùn)。The maximal compensation that V is willing to pay is 0max(X)=D(8)-D(X),

20、because V would not pay more than the created damage.V情愿支付的最大補(bǔ)償金是0max(X)=D(8)-D(X),由于他的支付不會(huì)超出造成 的損失。For the negotiation it is important, who makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. This decides about, how the public benefit, which is created through the reduction of production, is allocated.在談判中重要的是，由誰作出

21、不二價(jià)的報(bào)盤。它打算，通過削減生產(chǎn)而制造 的公共利益是如何配置的。If V makes a offer to P, he will only pay Omin(X), because V knows that P will accept the offer. P is than as a benefit maximizing person in the same position, as if he would not accept.假如V向P報(bào)盤，他將只付Omin(X),由于V知道P將接受該報(bào)盤。而P作 為處于同等地位的利益最大化的人，好像不會(huì)接受。The optimal amount of

22、 reduction V is willing to pay Omin(X) for results from the calculation D(8)-D(X)-0min(X) = D(8)-D(X)-(B(8)-B(X), where he maximizes his net benefit. V earns the biggest net benefit, where D,(X)=B,(X). The production level X=X* there is the optimal public allocation.V情愿為之支付Omin(X)的最正確削減數(shù)量是算式D(8)-D(X

23、)-Omin(X) = D(8)- D(X)-(B(8)-B(X)的結(jié)果，他在其中將自己的利益最大化。V賺取最大的凈利益，即 D,(X)=B,(X)o那里X=X*的生產(chǎn)水平就是最正確公共配置。Vice versa the optimal allocation is created if P makes an offer to V. In this case P maximizes his benefit with Omax(X)4-B(X)-B(0)=D(8)-D(X)+B(X)-B(0), where D,(X)=B,(X). P has got a bigger benefit than

24、the ground model indicates.同理，假如由P向V作報(bào)盤，同樣開創(chuàng)最正確配置。在此狀況下，P以O(shè)max(X)+B(X)-B(0) = D(8)-D(X)+B(X)-B(0)使自己的利益最大化，即 D,(X)=B,(X)O P獲得比基本模型所示的更大的利益。Analogous to the Laissez-Faire System are the cases, where we have a Permission-Scenario. In the beginning of negotiations P is not permitted to produce. He has

25、to pay a compensation to produce. Also here it is important for the benefit of a player, who places the offer.與自由放任的系統(tǒng)相像的狀況，是我們有許可大綱的狀況。在談判之初，不 允許P進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)。他必需支付補(bǔ)償金后進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)。在此，對(duì)玩家而言，由誰來報(bào)盤 是重要的。Tradeable Permits (quantity solution)可交易的許可(數(shù)量方案)Tradeable Permits are an instrument for an environmental agency t

26、o reduce emission to a maximum amount, corresponding to a national or international aim for maximal emission, with placing the right for a certain pollution level as a right of ownership on the nature (Fritz Rahmeyer, p. 21).可交易的許可是環(huán)境機(jī)構(gòu)用以最大量地削減排放的一種工具，與國(guó)內(nèi)、國(guó)際 的上限排放目標(biāo)相呼應(yīng)，將肯定量的污染水平的權(quán)力作為一種對(duì)自然的全部權(quán)而設(shè) 置(弗里

27、茲拉赫梅耶爾(Fritz Rahmeyer) , 21頁(yè))。Permits authorize the owner to pollute the amount of a harmful substance to the nature, which is documented on their certificate. The pollution rights work similar to option rights and are tradeable. The permits can be traded on a permit market. For example if a company

28、 doesnt use the pollution rights and produces less emissions than documented on the certificate, free permits can be sold on a market.許可授權(quán)業(yè)主以肯定數(shù)量的有害物質(zhì)污染到大自然中，這在他們的證書中紀(jì) 錄成文。污染權(quán)作用與選擇權(quán)相像并可交易。許可可在許可市場(chǎng)上交易。例如，假 如一家公司不用其污染權(quán)且生產(chǎn)出的排放量少于證書上的規(guī)定，剩余的許可可在市 場(chǎng)上銷售。The calculation of the company is according to their

29、costs of avoidance of pollution. These costs result from actions like reducing their production or improving new energy sources in their production chain. If ifs cheaper to avoid a unit of emission than the price of a permit per emission unit, the company is reducing their emission and selling their

30、 permit. Vice versa if its more expensive to avoid the emission, the company w川 rather buy permits. We assume that avoidance is happening where it is cost efficient.公司的計(jì)算是依據(jù)其避開污染的本錢而來的。這些本錢是在其生產(chǎn)鏈中的諸 如削減其生產(chǎn)量或改進(jìn)新能源的行為所引起的。假如避開一個(gè)單位的污染比每排放 單位許可的價(jià)格廉價(jià)，那么公司將削減其排放量而出售其許可。反過來，假如避開排 放更昂貴，公司將寧愿購(gòu)買許可。我們假定只要是本錢有效

31、之處都有避開的狀況發(fā) 生。If the certificates are valid for a certain time, the environmental agency will be able to adjust the amount of tradeable permits after that period, to extend or reduce emissions in total. If permits are valid forever, the agency will be able to raise or reduce the worth of a certificat

32、e, so that owners have to adjust their pollution.假如證書有時(shí)效，環(huán)境機(jī)構(gòu)將能夠在期限后調(diào)整可交易的許可數(shù)量，擴(kuò)大或 削減排放的總量。假如許可永久有效，該機(jī)構(gòu)將能夠提高或降低證書的價(jià)值，這樣 業(yè)主們就不得不調(diào)整其污染。We distinguish between permits for local pollutants or permits for global pollutants. The difference is that the harmful substance is either only harmful to the area i

33、t was polluted or even harmful to the whole world, no matter where polluted. A global pollutant is carbon dioxide (CO2), which is therefor suited for a global permit market of emission trading. The rights to pollute amounts of CO2 will be documented on so-called carbon credits or permits.我們區(qū)分對(duì)待區(qū)域性污染

34、物許可和全球性污染物許可。其間區(qū)分是，有害物 質(zhì)或是僅對(duì)其污染的區(qū)域有害，或是甚至對(duì)整個(gè)世界有害而不管污染何處。全球性 污染物是二氧化碳(CO2),因此而相宜于全球排放交易市場(chǎng)。污染肯定量C02的權(quán) 力將在所謂的碳信用或許可上規(guī)定成文。The environmental agency has three different opportunities for the first placement of tradeable permits. We distinguish between:環(huán)境機(jī)構(gòu)在第一次的可交易許可的設(shè)置上有三種不同的可能性。我們將其區(qū)分為Auction拍賣Sell for a

35、 fixed price 定價(jià)出售Give away for free. 免費(fèi)發(fā)放。In an auction the documented pollution rights are sold for a maximum price. As mentioned avoidance of emission is happening, where the certificate price is higher than the marginal avoidance costs the price for avoiding one emission unit. Companies decide if

36、 they rather bet for a certificate or avoid their emission.在拍賣中，成文的污染權(quán)力按最高價(jià)格出售。正如所述，對(duì)排放的避開發(fā)生 在證書價(jià)格高于邊際避開本錢一避開單位排放的價(jià)格之處。各公司打算是為證書而 投標(biāo)還是避開其排放。In the case of sell for a fixed price the agency is setting the price for a certificate. To find a optimal price the environmental agency has to refer to the ma

37、rginal avoidance costs.在定勿出售的狀況下，機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)定證書的價(jià)格。為了覺察一個(gè)最正確的價(jià)格，機(jī) 構(gòu)須參照邊際避開本錢。The give away for free method is called the grandfathering clause in the American literature (Kemper 1989, p. 47). The first placement is happening in a free documentation of actual caused emissions of a company, at what they are d

38、efined tradeable by law. The right for emission is dependent on a business license or the actual emission level. The companies achieve ownership over the right of emission through documentation of their emission rights in tradeable permits. That means that new companies have to buy permits from comp

39、anies that own certificates.免費(fèi)發(fā)放的方法在美國(guó)的文獻(xiàn)中稱為祖父條款(凱姆珀?duì)?Kemper)1989, 47 頁(yè))。第一次的發(fā)放以一家公司實(shí)際造成的排放量的免費(fèi)文件形式發(fā)生，以他們按 法律所定義可交易。排放的權(quán)力依商業(yè)許可證或?qū)嶋H排放水平而定。各公司通過將 他們的排放權(quán)力寫入可交易的許可中而實(shí)現(xiàn)其排放權(quán)力的全部。這意味著新公司須 從擁有證書的公司購(gòu)買許可。To show the effect of tradeable permits on market price of permits and the avoidance of emissions we intro

40、duce a simple model.為了顯示可交易許可對(duì)許可的市場(chǎng)價(jià)格和避開排放的影響，我們引入一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)潔 的模型。In the drawing Pic 11-2 we have the marginal avoidance cost curve of a company 1 (Pic ll-2(a) and the marginal avoidance cost curve of a company 2 (Pic II- 2(b).The two companies cause emissions E, which are Eimax and E2max. Without any regu

41、lations the companies cause these emission levels, because they are not considering avoidance possibilities. In Pic ll-2(c) you see the aggregated marginal avoidance cost curve of both companies with a total emission level of Eimax+E2max. If the environmental agency improves tradeable permits to red

42、uce the total emission on E* through selling a E* equivalent amount of certificates in an auction, the permit bid curve is represented as a vertical fixed curve over E* in Pic ll-2(c). The market price Pfor a certificate is now depending on where the permit bid curve and the permit ask curve are cro

43、ssing. This is happening in point EA. EA is the market equilibrium allocation with a market equilibrium price z*.在圖II-2中，我們有公司1的邊際避開本錢曲線(圖ll-2(a)和公司2的邊 際避開本錢曲線(圖ll-2(b)。這兩家公司造成排放量E,分別是Emax和 E2maxo在沒有規(guī)定時(shí)，兩家公司造成這些排放水平，由于他們對(duì)避開(排放)的 各種可能不予考慮。在圖ll-2(c)中，你看到兩家公司合并的邊際避開本錢曲線，總 排放水平為E1max+E2max。假如環(huán)境機(jī)構(gòu)改進(jìn)可交易的許

44、可，通過拍賣相應(yīng)量的證 書將總排放量減至E* ,那么許可競(jìng)標(biāo)曲線以圖ll-2(c)中E*上方的垂直固定線表達(dá)。 證書的市場(chǎng)價(jià)格p現(xiàn)在取決于許可競(jìng)標(biāo)曲線和許可需求曲線相交于何處。此事發(fā)生 在EA點(diǎn)上。EA是市場(chǎng)平衡價(jià)z*下的市場(chǎng)平衡配置。Why is the permit Ask curve represented through the aggregated marginal avoidance cost curve in Pic ll-2(c). As mentioned the companies are willing to reduce emissions through avoida

45、nce possibilities wherever the marginal avoidance costs are lower than the price of a certificate. In other words the ask for certificates is dependant on the market equilibrium price z* and the aggregated marginal avoidance cost curve. As cheaper the certificates are as less avoidance is happening,

46、 so that the ask for certificates is higher and the amount of emission is bigger. In the market equilibrium the ask for certificates of company 1 at aAlso building leaves impacts on the environment in many different ways. The procurement and processing of building materials, the energy that is used

47、for construction and operation are only some examples.還有，建筑以很多不同方式給環(huán)境帶來影響。建筑材料的選購(gòu)和加工、建筑 和運(yùn)營(yíng)所使用的能量?jī)H是一些例子。We could visualize the impacts as followed (Bill Lawson 1996, p. 15): 我們可以指出如下看得見的影響(比爾勞森1996年，15頁(yè))：Big Holes in the Ground 地上的大坑Fouling the Nest弄糟鳥巢the Greenhouse 曰feet.溫室效應(yīng)。A big task is to keep

48、 the impacts as small as possible. In 1987, the United Nations World Commission on the Environment and Development produced a report entitled Our Common Future. The Brundtland Report、as it came to be known, proposed a definition for Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) which has subsequently b

49、een embraced by many governments throughout the world. It states:將影響保持到盡可能地小是一項(xiàng)大任務(wù)。1987年，聯(lián)合國(guó)世界環(huán)境和進(jìn)展委 員會(huì)編制了一份報(bào)告，題目為我們共同的將來。作為布倫特蘭(Brundtland) 報(bào)告為人所知的這份報(bào)告，提議一項(xiàng)生態(tài)可持續(xù)進(jìn)展(ESD)的定義，這項(xiàng)定義在 世界范圍內(nèi)相繼得到了很多政府的擁護(hù)。它闡述到：(Ecologically) Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without

50、compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. (World Commission on Environment and Development 1990, p.87).“(生態(tài)地)可持續(xù)進(jìn)展是滿意目前需要而不犧牲將來的世代滿意他們自己需要的力量的進(jìn)展?！眒arket equilibrium price z* is Ei* (Pic ll-2(a) and it is E2* (Pic ll-2(b) of company 2. The companies have equal marginal a

51、voidance costs in this point.為什么許可需求曲線通過圖ll-2(c)中合并的邊際避開本錢曲線表達(dá)。正如所 述，各公司都情愿通過避開的可能性降低排放量，這種可能性在于邊際避開本錢低 于證書價(jià)格之處。換句話說，對(duì)證書的需求取決于市場(chǎng)平衡價(jià)z*和合并的邊際避開 本錢曲線。證書越廉價(jià)避開(排放)就越少，以至于對(duì)證書的需求更大而排放量也 更高。在市場(chǎng)平衡的狀況下，公司1在市場(chǎng)平衡價(jià)z*下的證書需求為Ei* (圖ll-2(a) 而公司2的那么為E2* (圖ll-2(b)o在這一點(diǎn)上兩家公司具有相等的邊際避開本錢。Therefor the amount of avoidance

52、of company 1 is Eimax- Erand E2max- E2* of company 2. This shows that avoidance is happening where it is cost efficient, through the division of the avoidance aim onto the companies with minimal avoidance costs.所以，公司1的避開量為Eimax- E而公司2的為E2max- E2這說明，(排放的) 避開發(fā)生在本錢有效之處，通過避開目標(biāo)在擁有下限避開本錢的各公司間安排而實(shí) 現(xiàn)。Pic II

53、-2 圖 II-2(a)(b)(c)Environmental Conservation 環(huán)境保護(hù)We introduced a few strategies for pollution abatement, which are part of the theoretical background for ecologically sustainable development. The conservation of the environment includes all actions for reducing, removing and preventing burden to the

54、 environment.我們引進(jìn)削減污染的幾項(xiàng)策略，它是生態(tài)可持續(xù)進(jìn)展的理論背景的一局部。 環(huán)境的保護(hù)包括全部削減、消退和防止給環(huán)境的負(fù)擔(dān)的一切行為。Its a big task to make sure that the whole mankind is aware of the problems about climate change and destruction of nature through our activities, which causes impacts to the earth.巨大的任務(wù)是確保，整個(gè)人類意識(shí)到通過我們的活動(dòng)氣候變化和大自然遭破 壞的問題，它對(duì)地球

55、造成影響。The conservation of the environment demands a careful dealing with natural resources from all diverse players.環(huán)境的保護(hù)要求各種各樣的玩家都留神謹(jǐn)慎地對(duì)待自然資源。Conservation Principles 保護(hù)原那么Environmental policies can be divided into three main principles for making any action of conservation and keeping the burden of

56、nature on a steady level (Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 1997, p. 4).環(huán)境策略可分成三項(xiàng)主要原那么，用以實(shí)行任何保護(hù)行為和保持大自然的負(fù)擔(dān) 在一個(gè)穩(wěn)定水準(zhǔn)上(德國(guó)技術(shù)合作協(xié)會(huì)(GTZ), 1997, 4頁(yè))。Causer principle 造成者原那么Overhead principle 人人有份原那么Precaution principle 預(yù)防原那么The causer principle 造成者原那么In the causer principle all cos

57、ts for abatement, removing or the compensation for environmental burden have to be carried by the causer of emission or pollution. The mentioned theoretical models of avoidance condition, tax solution and tradeable permits work under this principle.在造成者原那么下，全部削減、消退或補(bǔ)償環(huán)境負(fù)擔(dān)的本錢均須由排放或污染 的造成者擔(dān)當(dāng)。所述避開條件的理論

58、模型、稅賦方案和可交易的許可都在此原那么下 工作。The overhead principle 人人有份原那么The costs in this principle have to be carried by public instead by the causer. Instruments to achieve environmental conservation are financed through tax and subsidizing to support nature and environmental friendly production methods, conservat

59、ion technologies and public spending on subsequent removal of environmental damage.在本原那么下的全部本錢是公共擔(dān)當(dāng)而不是由造成者擔(dān)當(dāng)。實(shí)現(xiàn)環(huán)境保護(hù)的工 具通過稅賦進(jìn)行財(cái)政支持及補(bǔ)助以支持自然和環(huán)境友好的生產(chǎn)方法、保護(hù)技術(shù)及在 環(huán)境破壞的事后清除上的公共花費(fèi)。The precaution principle 預(yù)防原那么This principle includes not only precaution against present damages but also against future damages

60、 to hand over an intact nature to future generations.此原那么不僅包括針對(duì)現(xiàn)時(shí)破壞的預(yù)防，還包括針對(duì)將來破壞的預(yù)防以將完好 的大自然傳給將來世代。Instruments of both the causer principle and the overhead principle can be used for precautional treatment. The aims are minimizing human interference intensity, precaution against impairment, reductio