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Arti?cialIntelligence,

globalcompetitionandthefutureofourindustry

Asurveyofglobalsemiconductorexecutives

TableofcontentsForward

1.Movingfastandslow:AI,geopoliticsandthestrategicconundrum

2.Ouroptimisticindustry

3.Our“l(fā)ove-hate”relationshipwithgovernmentpolicies

4.Ourviewsontechnologycompetitionbetweennations

5.Ourpotentialblindspot:the“homecourt”bias

6.Ourplaybook:strategicmovesandpriorities

IntegratedInsightsandGSAconnectedwithover130semiconductorindustryleadersfromtheUS,Europe,MainlandChina,Taiwan,andotherregionstounderstandtheirperspectivesonthelong-termtrajectoryofourindustry.Theresultshighlightanoptimisticindustrythatislaser-focusedon“winning”arti?cialintelligence,whileexpressingdeepconcernaboutthenegativeimpactofgeopolitics.

Whiledi?erentcompanieswilltakedi?erentapproachestothesetwintrends,nearlyallrespondentsindicatethattheycannolongerperform“businessasusual”-theywillneedstrategictransformationforcontinuedsuccess.

ThispublicationisdesignedforsemiconductorCEOs,COOs,CFOs,CTOs,globalsalesleadersaswellasstrategicandcorporatedevelopmentexecutives.Itisequallyrelevantforexecutivesofcompanieswhoseproductsrelyonsemiconductorcomponents,includingtelecommunicationsinfrastructure,cloudservices,datacenters,arti?cialintelligenceplatformproviders,devices,andautomotiveelectronics.

Movingfastandslow:AI,geopoliticsandthestrategicconundrum

4T5

indicatemarginsintheir

segmentwillbestableor

higheroverthenext5years

Anoptimisticindustrydealingwithincreasinglyactivegovernments

40%+believehardware

playerswillbelong-termwinnersinAI

believegovernmentpolicies,notmarkets,willdrive

semiconductor

industrystrategy

Our?ndingsshowcaseourindustry’sremarkablesenseofoptimism,drivenbyrobustgrowthandstablemargins.Meetingthedemandforarti?cialintelligence(AI)solutionsremainsparamount,withcompaniesre-toolingtheirinvestmentsand“pickingupthepace”tokeepabreastoftherapidlychangingmarket.Respondents,especiallyinAsia,believethathardware—speci?callytheGPUsandCPUsfuelingtheAIboom—representsthemostattractivesegmentintheAItechnologystack.RespondentsfromtheUSandTaiwanaremostoptimisticabouttheirregion’scompetitivenessintheseboomingmarkets.

44%

indicategeopoliticsisthebiggestthreattoourindustry

2

3

OUTOF

Atthesametime,respondentsacrossallregionsseeanincreasingimpactfromgovernmentpolicies.Asubstantialminoritybelievesthatgovernmentpoliciesandfunding(notthemarket)willdrivethesemiconductorindustrygoingforward.Whilemostrespondentsviewtheirhomegovernmentpoliciespositively,theincreasedfocusfrompolicymakersresultsingeopoliticalchallenges.RespondentsviewUS-Chinatechnologycompetition,whichisdrivingtheemergenceofdistinctUS-centricandChinese-centricsupplychains,asthemostsigni?cantthreattothesemiconductorindustry.

01

Consolidationandcompetitiveness:AmericanoptimismandmixedviewsonChina

AIandgeopoliticsareshiftingtheindustry’s“balanceofpower.”RespondentsexpectAItoconcentratepowerinleadingcountrieswhileenablingnewcompaniesinthosecountriesto?ourish.This“consolidation”tendencyextendstotheregionalR&Dandmanufacturingfootprint.DespitethesemiconductoraspirationsofregionssuchastheMiddleEast,SoutheastAsia,Indiaandothers,respondentsoverwhelminglybelievethattheincumbentregionswithhighestglobalmarketshare(Japan,Korea,MainlandChina,Taiwan,andtheUS)will“win”ontalent,capital,andinnovationbreakthroughs,whileexpandingtheirmarketshareleadinsemiconductormanufacturing.

4OF5

indicatecustomers

prioritize

performanceandpriceover

geopoliticalriskinchoosingsuppliers

OUT

Thisconsolidatingforcealignswithindustrykeybuyingfactors–customerscarefarmoreaboutproductperformanceandcostthansupplychaingeopoliticalrisk.Ourindustry,whichdemonstrates?rstmover,scaleandclusteringbene?ts,favorsincumbency.Newregionalentrantsmustbuildtheirinvestmentcaseoninnovationandcoste?ectiveness,ratherthantheir“geopoliticaladvantages.”

believetheUSAwillattracttheworld’sbesttechnicaltalent

75%

Despite80%ofrespondentsworkingforAsian,EuropeanorMiddleEasterncompanies,executivesexpresssubstantial

optimismtowardstheUnitedStates.RespondentsfromeveryregionranktheUSasthecountrymostlikelytocreatebreakthroughinnovation,attractglobaltalents,andwinglobalcapitalinvestment.

WhileviewingTaiwanandMainlandChinaasbetterlocationsformanufacturingsemiconductorinnovations,respondentsexpecttheUStogainthemostleading-edgemanufacturingmarketshare.Finally,thegroupanticipatesendcustomersacrossallregions,includingthe“GlobalSouth”,toalignmorewiththeAmericantechnologyecosystemthantheChineseone.

RespondentsexpecttheChinese-centricsemiconductorsupplychaintohavethegreatestsuccessintheautomotivemarket.TherearedivergingperspectivesonthefutureglobalreachoftheChina-centricsemiconductorsupplychain-anequalnumberofrespondentssupportthenotionofan“inChinaforChina”supplychainanda“Chinesesupplychainthatcompetesglobally.”

02

Thecorporateplaybook:ourresponsetotheduelingtrendsofAIandgeopolitics

Companieswilltakethreeactionstowininthisemergingenvironment.

Firstly,theywilllaserfocusoninnovation.Creatingnewtechnologiesanddrivingnewbusinessmodelswillbehigherprioritiesthanrespondingtogeopolitics,reducingcosts,orevenintegratingAIintooperations.

Secondly,acknowledgingtheinadequacyoftheircurrentAIstrategies,mostcompanieswillditch“businessasusual”,pursuenewpartnerships,moveintonewbusinessdomainsand“movefaster”tocatchtheopportunities.

Thirdly,companieswillconsciouslynavigatethebifurcatedsemiconductorlandscape.Manycompaniesarechoosingtoconcentrateresourcesonjustoneofthetwoglobalsemiconductorsupplychains,whileothersareestablishingseparatelegalentitiestoserveboth.TheywillalsoupdatetheirglobalfootprintviainvestinginnewmanufacturingandR&Dlocations,andseekingnewinvestors,suppliersandcustomers.

margin,companieswillprioritizeinvestingininnovationover

geopoliticalmoveslikesupplychainde-risking

1T4

3:1

BYA

companiesplantosplitupintoseparatelegalentitiestocontinueservingtheUSandChinesemarkets

03

Theseduelingtransformationscreateaconundrum.Strategyisaboutmakingchoices,andthetrade-o?s

betweenthedemandsofAIcompetitionandwinningthegeopoliticalgameareclear.

WinninginAIdrivestheneedtomovefaster,toexpandglobalpartnerships,andtoinvestmoreininnovation.De-riskingglobaloperationsrequiresadjustingtothepaceofpolicymaking,investinginduplicativemanufacturingcapabilitiesandsuppliers,breakingupR&Dteams,shrinkingthesetofglobalpartnersand,forsomecompanies,shu?ingawidemixofassets,teams,IPandcustomerrelationshipsbetweentwodistinctlegalentities.

believetheyneedto

changetheircorporatestrategytowininAI

80%+

companiesdonotyethavedetailedexecutionplans

forsupplychainde-risking

2

3

OUTOF

04

Executiveswillalsoneedtoavoidadebilitating“blindspot”evidentinthesurveydata.Universally,respondentsratetheirownregion’scapabilitiesmorehighlythanrespondentsfromotherregions–inotherwords,thereisaconsistent“homecourt”biasthatcouldskewdecision-making.

Givenalltheabove,leadersareunlikelytobeabletoperfectlyoptimizebothAIandgeopoliticalstrategies–somethingwillhavetogive.Inaddition,leaderswillmakethesetrade-o?sinanenvironmentoflong-termuncertainty.Morethan60%ofrespondentsbelievesupplychainstabilityismorethan?veyearsaway.

Thesechallengesmayexplainwhymorethan70%ofcompaniesinoursurveyhavenotyetstartedexecutingtheirnewglobalstrategy.

Inourindustrywhereexecutionisparamountforsurvival,CEOsandleadersthatapproachthisconfoundingsetofchallengeswithagility,insights,patience,andhumility,willbeinamuchbetterpositionthanthosewhocannot.

Thedemographicsofoursurvey

Demographicsofrespondentsbyregion

The130respondentsworkacrossallmajorregionsandrepresentadiversegroupofcompanieswithheadquartersscatteredaroundtheworld.Morethan30%ofrespondents

workinaregiondi?erentthantheheadquarterslocation.Over60%ofrespondentsworkin

Asia,withMainlandChinarepresentingthelargestregionalcohort.

LocationofcompanyHQ

05

Others(8%)MainlandChina

(24%)

Taiwan(18%)

Europe(30%)

USA(20%)

2%2%

2%0%

2%

3%

6%

24%

0%

0%

19%

1%

12%

1%

4%2%

0%4%

1%1%

14%

Taiwan(15%)

Others(8%)

USA(21%)

Europe(24%)

MainlandChina

(34%)

Locationofwork

Demographicsofrespondentsbycompanyroleinthesupplychain

Approximately1/3ofthe130respondentsworkforcompaniesthatsellproductstoendcustomers(fablesscompaniesandIDMs)whilethemajorityprovideproductsorservicestoothersemiconductorcompanies(chemicals,designservices,EDAtools,equipment,foundryservices,packagingandtestingservices,etc.).

25%

Fablesscompanies

65%

11%IDMs

Upstreamsupplychaincompanies

Ouroptimisticindustry

Ourindustryexudespositivesentiment,asweexpectbothtop-linegrowthandbottom-linehealth.Despiteregionaldi?erencesinproductandend-marketfocus,thereisaconsensusthatthe“currentbigthing”,Arti?cialIntelligence,willremainthe“nextbigthing.”

3T4

pickGPUsandCPUsasthemostattractiveindustrysegment

90%

believeourindustrywillgrowfasterthanglobalGDP

OUT

1OF2

believecommerciallyviablequantum

computingismorethan10yearsaway

06

OUROPTIMISTICINDUSTRY

Bigger,morepro?tableanddrivenbyAI

9outof10respondentsanticipatesemiconductorgrowthrateswilloutpaceglobaleconomic

growthoverthenext5years.One-quarterpredictindustrygrowthwillsurpassglobal

economicgrowthbymorethan4percentagepoints.75%forecasttheirsegmentmarginsto

stay?atorriseduringthenext?veyears.

Howrapidlywillglobalsemiconductorindustryrevenuegrowinthenext5years?

40%

9%

1%

26%

24%

4+ptsfasterthantheglobal

economy

2-4ptsfastertheglobaleconomy

1-2ptsfaster

thantheglobal

economy

Revenueswillgrowatthesamerateastheoverallglobaleconomy

Semiconductor

revenueswillgrowmoreslowlythantheglobaleconomy

Howwillpro?tmargininyourindustrysegmentchangeoverthenext5years?

11%

33%

33%

16%

7%

Morethan5ptshigherthantoday

3-5ptshigherthantoday

Nochange

3-5ptslowerthantoday

Morethan5ptslowerthantoday

07

GreaterthanhalfofrespondentschooseAIasthemostattractiveendmarketandindicatethatGPUs,CPUsandAIacceleratorsarethemostattractiveproductsegment.ChipsthatsupporttheAIrollout(connectivity,powermanagementandmemory)bunchtogetherclosely

asthenextmostattractivesegments.Perhapsre?ectingovercapacityconcerns,respondents

gradematurelogicastheleastattractivesegment.

Semiconductorendmarketsrankedbyattractiveness(1beingmostattractive)

andmobile

devices

Metaverse/Web3IoTAutomotive

5.85.14.94.53.62.81.4

PCs,phones

Quantumcomputing

Electri?cationArti?cial

andnewenergyIntelligence

Productsegmentsrankedbyattractiveness(1beingmostattractive)

MicrocontrollerandAnalog

MatureLogicprocessingConnectivity

5.03.93.43.21.6

CPU/GPUandAIaccelerators

MemoryPower

management

G5A

INTEGRATED

INSIGHTS

Endusers EnterprisesoftwarecompaniesthatintegrateAI

AI-focusedsoftwareapplicationdevelopers

Hyperscalersandcloudproviders

GPUandCPUproviders

OUROPTIMISTICINDUSTRY

AIchipoptimismintheEast,softwareoptimismintheWest

Globally,aslightlyhigherpercentageofrespondentsbelievethathardwarecomponents,such

asGPUsandCPUs,willbethebiggestbene?ciariesoftheAIboomcomparedtosoftware

companies.

RespondentsbasedinMainlandChinaaretheleastoptimisticaboutsoftwarecompanies

bene?tingfromtheAIboom.Incontrast,AmericanandEuropeanrespondentsbelievethat,collectively,enterpriseorAI-focusedsoftwaredeveloperswillbene?tmorethanchipproviders.Lessthan10%ofrespondentsbelieveusersofAIwillbethebiggestbene?ciaries.

Whichcompanieswillbene?tmostfromarti?cialintelligenceoverthenext

9%

17%

19%

13%

42%

5years?

12%

12%

31%

19%

27%

26%

29%

19%

10%

16%

21%

21%

58%

16%

50%

5%

11%

18%

38%

25%

25%

13%

Globalaverage

Otherregionrespondents

USA

respondents

Europe

respondents

TaiwanMainlandChinarespondentsrespondents

08

Halfofourrespondentsdoubtthatquantumorall-opticalcomputingwillbeviablewithin

10yearsor“ever”.RespondentsworkingforAmericancompaniesarealmosttwiceasoptimisticabouttheviabilityofquantumcomputingastheirpeersworkingforMainlandChinesecompanies.

Whenwillnext-generationfullyopticalorquantumcomputingarchitecturesbecommerciallyandtechnologicallyviable?

0-5years6-10years10+yearsNever

7%43%48%2%

Globalaverage

USAHQedrespondents

EuropeHQedrespondents

TaiwanHQedrespondents

MainlandChinaHQedrespondents

62%

39%

50%

35%

41%

27%

61%

53%

12%

3%

0%

0%

0%

8%

5%

5%

G5A

INTEGRATED

INSIGHTS

OUROPTIMISTICINDUSTRY

AIcon?denceforUSandTaiwanrespondents,whileMainlandChinarespondentspinhopesonautomotiveandpackaging

RespondentsworkinginMainlandChinaaremostenthusiasticaboutlocalcompanies’sharegainsintheautomotiveendmarket,andintheassembly,packaging,andtestingindustrysegment.ThoseworkingintheUSaremostoptimisticabouttheAIendmarket,andthefablessdesignandEDAindustrysegments.TaiwanrespondentsbelievecompaniestherewillcontinuetogainshareinwafermanufacturingandleadintheAIsegment.DespitePCs,phonesandmobiledevicescontinuingtobethelargestsinglesegmentforsemiconductors,thereislittleoptimisminEuropeorUSthatlocalcompanieswillgainmoreshareinthesegment.

Companiesfromyourregionwillgainthemostglobalmarketshareovernext?veyearsin…

…whichendmarket?…whichindustrysegment?

Quantumcomputing

0%0%

4%

8%

0%

18%

3%6%3%

5%

PCsandmobiledevicesIoT

21%

0%

Electri?cationandnewenergy

14%

26%

26%

Automotive

11%

11%

MaterialsandchemicalsTools&equipment

WafermanufacturingAssembly,packagingortesting

39%

63%

41%

62%

Arti?cialIntelligence

23%

16%

TaiwanMainlandChina

Europe

USA

respondents

respondentsrespondents

respondents

09

Semiconductorrelatedsoftware

FablessdesignorEDA

8%

25%

2%

0%

14%

6%

4%

42%

15%

23%

19%

21%

8%

42%

39%

32%

36%

26%

18%

3%

6%

5%

5%

USA

respondents

Europe

TaiwanMainlandChina

respondents

respondentsrespondents

Our“l(fā)ove-hate”relationshipwithgovernmentpolicies

Wewelcomegovernmentpolicyactionswhentheyhelpusattractcapitalortalent,buthavelittleappetiteforactionsthatinterferewithmarketandsupplychainaccess.Despitetheincreasingimpactofgeopolitics,successinourindustrycontinuestobedrivenbytraditionalfactorsofproduct,performanceandprice.

2T3

indicatethatlocal

governmentpoliciesarepositivefortheindustry

OUT

1OF3

requestgovernmentstoprovidemoresubsidies,whileasimilarnumberrequestgovernmentto“getoutoftheway”

Customersof

Taiwanbased

respondentsare

3X

morelikelytoprioritize“absoluteproduct

performance”than

customersofMainlandChinarespondents

10

OUR“LOVE-HATE”RELATIONSHIPWITHGOVERNMENTPOLICIES

Wehategeopolitics,butwe“l(fā)ike”policiesofourlocalgovernment

Morethanhalfoftherespondentsperceivegeopoliticsastheprimarythreattotheindustry.Atthesametime,2/3ofrespondentsbelievethattheirlocalgovernments'policiesarepositivefortheindustry.

Respondentsshowlessconcernfortheentryofsystemorhyperscalercompaniesintothesemiconductorindustryorthepotentialforproductcommoditization.

Pleaseranktheseverityofthreatstothesemiconductorindustryoverthenext10years(1beingmostthreatening)

Leastthreatening

Notenoughtalent

Slowinginnovationandcommoditization

4.23.63.22.61.4

Sloweconomicgrowth

Geopolitics

Verticalintegrationbyendcustomers

Mostthreatening

Aregovernmentpoliciesinyourregionpositiveornegativefortheindustry?

MorenegativethanpositiveMorepositivethannegative

Negative

Positive

21%

20%

7%

5%

45%

VerynegativeNomaterialimpactVerypositive

11

Respondentshavediverseexpectationsofgovernmentpolicies,with1/3prioritizing

government?nancialsupport,1/3favoringderegulation,andonly10%requesting

governmenttohelpimproveglobalmarketaccess.

RespondentsfromEuropeanandTaiwan-basedrespondentsexpressthegreatestconcerns

abouttalent,whileUSandMainlandChinarespondentsaremostlikelytorequestthe

governmentreduceitsin?uence.

Whatisthe#1actionthegovernmentcouldtaketohelpyourregion’ssemiconductorindustry?

Directly

support

18%

32%

32%

domesticinvestment

35%

39%

IncreasesubsidiesDeveloporimporttalent

12%

0%8%

41%

25%

16%

Marketaccess

26%

0%8%

8%

10%

10%

Fightforbetteraccesstoglobalmarkets

5%

8%

3%

18%

Restrictmarketaccesstoforeigncompetitors

9%

31%

19%

Reduce

governmentin?uence

Getoutoftheway&letprivate

23%

companiesdrive

13%

13%

15%

theindustry

13%

5%

Taiwan

Globalaverage

MainlandChina

USA

respondents

Reducebureaucracyandrestrictions

Europe

respondents

respondents

respondents

G5A

INTEGRATED

lNslGHTS

OUR“LOVE-HATE”RELATIONSHIPWITHGOVERNMENTPOLICIES

Atthecompanylevel,performanceandpricearestillking

Geopoliticalriskisnotthemostimportantdriverofprocurementdecisions.Morethan

three-quartersofrespondentsindicatethatproductattributesdrivecustomers’purchasingdecisions.CustomersofMainlandChinaandTaiwan-basedcompaniesaremorelikelytoprioritizerelativeprice-performancethancustomersofEuropeanorAmericancompanies.

Whenyourcustomerschooseproductsorservices,whichoftheseisthemostimportant?

Geopoliticalconcernsarenotomnipresentincorporatedecision-making.Only2outof5

respondentsbelievegovernmentpolicieswillimpacthalformoreofmajorcorporatedecisions,while1outof4believegovernmentpolicieswillhaveminimalimpact.

Intheregionwhereyoudomostofyourbusiness,geopoliticalconcernswillchange

0%0%

Relationshipwithsupplier

Nationalityandgeopoliticalriskofsupplier

Relative

price-performanceoftheproduct

Absoluteperformanceandreliabilityoftheproduct

5%

16%

57%

22%

Globalaverage

4%

16%

20%

19%

16%

68%

46%

39%

68%

31%

11%

32%

29%

0%

Taiwan

respondents

USA

respondents

Mainland

China

respondents

Europe

respondents

Morethanhalfofinvestmentdecisions

Asmall%of

14%

investmentdecisionsoverthenext?veyears

28%

25%

33%

Halfofinvestmentdecisions

Aquarteroftotal

investmentdecisions

12

G5A

INTEGRATED

lNslGHTS

OUR“LOVE-HATE”RELATIONSHIPWITHGOVERNMENTPOLICIES

Attheindustrylevel,therearestarkregionaldifferencesregardingtherelativein?uenceofthegovernmentversusthemarket

Respondentsaresplitontherelativein?uenceofgovernmentandthemarket,bothinsettingindustrydirectionandinfundingindustrycapitalrequirements.56%indicatethatmarket

forceswilldriveindustrystrategy,with53%indicatingthatprivateinvestorswilldriveindustrycapitalinvestment.

Willthegovernmentorthemarketsdriveindustrystrategyandinvestmentgoingforward?

Viewsacrossallglobalrespondents

Di?erentregionsre?ectdi?erentviewsontherelativerolesofgovernmentversusthemarket.

MainlandChinarespondentsseeamoreimportantroleforgovernmentpoliciesandfunding,

whereasUSandTaiwan-basedrespondentsindicateastrongerbeliefinthecentralroleof

privateinvestorsandmarkets.

Viewsbetweenregionalrespondents

Primarydriverofindustrystrategy

13

PrimarydriverofIndustrystrategy

Government

18%

26%

Themarkets

35%

Privateinvestors

21%

Governmentfunds

Primarydriverofindustryinvestment

Government

MainlandChina

respondents

Themarkets

Europerespondents

USA

respondents

Globalaverage

Taiwan

respondents

PrivateinvestorsGovernmentfunds

Primarydriverofindustryinvestment

G5A

INTEGRATED

lNslGHTS

OUR“LOVE-HATE”RELATIONSHIPWITHGOVERNMENTPOLICIES

Thegreaterthepolicybiastowardslocalplayers,themorelocalplayerssupportgovernmentpolicy

Amajorityofrespondentsbelievethatgovernmentpolicyisbiasedtowardslocalsemiconductorcompanies.RespondentsinMainlandChinaandTaiwanreportthemost“l(fā)ocal

bias”andarealsothemostsatis?edwiththeirgovernment’spolicies.Europeanrespondents

indicatetheleastbiastowardslocalcompaniesaswellastheleastsatisfactionwithgovernmentpolicy.

Morefavorableviewstowardsgovernmentpolicycorrespondtomorepreferentialtreatmentoflocalcompanies

ThereisaperceptiongapregardingtherelativesupportthattheChinesegovernmentgivesto

localcompanies.4outof5respondentsthatworkinMainlandChinafornon-Chinese

companiesperceivealargepolicybiastowardslocalcompanies,whileonlyhalfoftherespondentsworkforlocalChinesecompaniesholdthesameperspective.Thisperceptiongapisnotobservedelsewhere.

Intheregionwhereyouwork,dogovernmentpoliciessupportlocalorforeign?rmsmore?

Impactofgovernmentpolicy

ontheindustry

Mar

inlandChinaespondents

Taiwresponde

annts

Eurrespond

opeents

res

US

pondents

Netnegative/

preferencing

foreign

companies

Netpr

eferentialtolo

cals

(25%)0%25%50%75%

75%

50%

25%

0%

(25%)

WorkinginMainlandChina,forlocal

Chinesecompanies

WorkinginMainlandChina,fornon

Chinesecompanies

Workinginotherregions

6%

16%

29%

48%

8%

8%8%

77%

8%

18%

40%

33%

Supportlocal

companiesmuchmore

Supportglobalcompaniesmore

Equal

treatment

Supportlocal

companiesalittlemore

Localgovernmentpolicybiastowardslocalcompanies

14

G5A

INTEGRATED

lNslGHTS

Ourviewsontechnology

competitionbetweennations

Weexpecttheemergenceofabifurcatedglobalsemiconductorsupplychain.WhileglobalrespondentsaremoreoptimisticaboutandinvestingmoreintheUS-alignedsupplychain,theyseeMainlandChina’sstrengthinmanufacturingandscalingnewtechnologies.CompanieshavediverserevenueexposuretotheChina-centricsemiconductorsupplychainandhavedivergingexpectationsregardingthefutureofthatsupplychain.

72%

believethatbothUSand

MainlandChinawillcontinuetoerectbarrierstotechnology

collaborationgoingforward

4T5

believethesemiconductorsupplychainwillbifurcatebetweenUSandChina-centricspheres

84%

ofMainlandChinarespondentsselecttheUnitedStatesasthe

mostattractivelocationfortalent

70%

believeEuropeancompanieswill

primarilyuseAmerican-sourced

technology,while52%believethe

MiddleEastwilluseequalamountsofAmericanandChinesetechnology

15

TECHNOLOGYCOMPETITIONBETWEENNATIONS

Abifurcatingsemiconductorindustry

MostrespondentsexpecttheUSandChinesegovernmentstoreducecollaborationopportunitiesandmarketaccesstocompaniesfromtheothercountry.35%ofrespondentsworkingformainlandChinesecompaniesbelieveChinawillimprovemarketaccess,whileonly15%ofrespondentsworkingforUScompaniessharethesameperspective.

WhichoftheseisthemostlikelyoutcomeofUS-Chinatechnologycompetitionin5years?

USgovernmentapproachtotechnology

collaborationwithChina

Moreopen

Moreclosed

4%

68%

4%

24%

MoreclosedMoreopen

ChinesegovernmentapproachtotechnologycollaborationwiththeUSA

16

AlargemajorityofrespondentsanticipatetheglobaltechnologyindustrywillsplitintotwoseparatesupplychainstoservetherespectiveUSandMainlandChinesemarkets,withthestabilityofthesetwosupplychainstobe5ormoreyearsinthefuture.

Whatwillbethemostlikelyregionalstructureoftheglobaltechindustryin5-10years?

Leastdisruptiontocurrentstructure

70%

Mostdisruptiontocurrentstructure

9%

9%

12%

Therewillbetwo

“completelyseparate”technologysupply

chains,onefortheChinesemarket

andonefortheAmericanmarket

Therewillbetwo

“mostlyseparate”

Americ

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