美國反壟斷執(zhí)法部門發(fā)布2023財年經(jīng)營者集中反壟斷審查報告-Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report Fiscal Year 2023

FederalTradeCommissionDepartmentofJustice

BureauofCompetitionAntitrustDivision

Hart-Scott-RodinoAnnualReport

FiscalYear2023

October1,2022throughSeptember30,2023

Section7AoftheClaytonAct

Hart-Scott-RodinoAntitrustImprovementsActof1976

(Forty-SixthAnnualReport)

LinaKhan

Chair

FederalTradeCommission

JonathanKanter

AssistantAttorneyGeneral

AntitrustDivision

INTRODUCTION

TheHart-Scott-RodinoAntitrustImprovementsActof1976,Pub.L.No.94-435(HSRActortheAct),togetherwithSection13(b)oftheFederalTradeCommissionActandSection15oftheClaytonAct,enablestheFederalTradeCommission(FTCorCommission)andtheAntitrustDivisionoftheDepartmentofJustice(AntitrustDivisionorDivision)topreventanticompetitivemergers,acquisitions,andothertypesoftransactionsandtopreventinterimharmto

competitionassociatedwiththosetransactions.ThepremergernotificationprogramwasinstrumentalinalertingtheCommissionandtheDivisiontotransactionsthatbecamethesubjectsofthenumerousenforcementactionsbroughtinfiscalyear2023.

1

TheCommissionandtheAntitrustDivisioncontinuetheireffortstoprotectcompetitionbyidentifyingandinvestigatingthosemergersandacquisitionsthatraisepotentiallysignificantcompetitiveconcerns.Together,theFTCandtheDivisionrepresenttheAmericanpeople’s

front-linedefenseagainstunlawfulindustryconsolidation,andstoppingillegalmergersis

centraltothatmission.Infiscalyear2023,1,805transactionswerereportedundertheHSR

Act.SeeFigure1below.Nearlyone-fourthofthetransactionsreviewedbytheagencieswerevaluedover$1billion(seeTableI),continuingatrendinrecentyearstowardslargerandmorecomplextransactions.SeeFigure2below.

NumberofTransactions

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

HSRMergerTransactionsReportedFiscalYears2014-2023

3,520

3,152

2,0522,1112,089

1,8011,832

1,805

1,663

1,637

201420152016201720182019

FiscalYear

2020202120222023

(Figure1)

1Fiscalyear2023coveredtheperiodfromOctober1,2022throughSeptember30,2023.

2

PercentageofTransactionValuesEqualtoorGreaterthan$1Billion

PercentofTransactions

30.0%

25.0%

20.0%

15.0%

10.0%

5.0%

0.0%

FiscalYears2014-2023

24.0%

20.2%

16.9%

14.8%

14.8%

13.6%

13.5%

13.9%

12.8%

13.3%

2014201520162017201820192020202120222023

Fiscalyear(Figure2)

Duringfiscalyear2023,theFederalTradeCommissionandtheAntitrustDivisionworkedtoblockunlawfulmergersacrossarangeofindustries,includingpharmaceuticals,

transportation,hospitals,agriculture,mortgagelending,financialservices,cement,

construction,healthcareadvertising,broadcasting,medicaldevices,electricity,and

reproductivehealthservices.TheCommissiontookactionagainst16deals:twoinwhichit

issuedconsentordersforpubliccomment;teninwhichthetransactionwasabandonedor

restructuredasaresultofantitrustconcernsraisedduringtheinvestigation;andfourinwhichtheCommissioninitiatedadministrativeorfederalcourtlitigation.2TheDivisiontookaction

against12mergertransactions:twothatwereblockedthroughlawsuitsinU.S.districtcourtsandteninwhichthetransactionwasabandonedorrestructuredaftertheDivisionraised

concernsaboutthethreatitposedtocompetition.Insomecases,thepartiesabandonedtheirmergerplanspriortoacomplaint,avoidingtheexpenseofextendedlitigationforboththe

2Toavoiddouble-counting,thisReportincludesonlythosemergerenforcementactionsinwhichtheCommissionortheAntitrustDivisiontookitsfirstpublicactionduringfiscalyear2023anddoesnotfullyreflectallthemergerenforcementactivitiesoftheagencies,includinglitigationresultinginconsentordersand/ordivestituresduringFY2023oron-goinginvestigationsandlitigation.

3

partiesandtheagency.

3

Collectively,theagencies’enforcementactionspreservedcompetitionacrosstheAmericaneconomy.

TheFederalTradeCommission

FTCEnforcementActionsbyDealSize:

4

<$500M

3

Between$500Mand$1B

1

Between$1Band$10B

1

Over$10B

3

SummaryNumbersforEnforcementActions:

5

ComplaintsFiled

4

LitigatedWin

1

ConsentEnteredintheCourseofLitigation

6

2

LitigationOngoing

1

ConsentFiledwithComplaint

2

AbandonedorRestructuredPre-Complaint

10

AmajorareaoffocusoftheFTCwasprotectingcompetitioninhealthcaremarkets.TheFTCchallengedAmgen’s$27.8billionproposedacquisitionofHorizonTherapeutics,alleging

thatthetransaction—oneofthelargestpharmaceuticaldealsinrecentmemory—would

3See,e.g.,PressRelease,Fed.TradeComm’n,StatementofElizabethWilkins,DirectoroftheFTC’sOfficeofPolicy

Planning,ontheDecisionofSUNYUpstateMedicalUniversityandCrouseHealthSystem,Inc.toDropTheir

ProposedMerger(Feb.16,2023),

/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/02/statement-

elizabeth-wilkins-director-ftcs-office-policy-planning-decision-suny-upstate-medical;

PressRelease,Fed.Trade

Comm’n,StatementRegardingtheTerminationofCalPortlandCompany’sAttemptedAcquisitionofAssetsOwned

byRivalCementProducerMartinMariettaMaterials,Inc.(Apr.28,2023),

/news-

events/news/press-releases/2023/04/statement-regardingtermination-calportland-companys-attempted-

acquisition-assets-owned-rival-cement;

PressRelease,Fed.TradeComm’n,StatementRegardingtheTerminationofBostonScientificCorporation’sAttemptedAcquisitionofaMajorityStakeinM.I.TechCo.,Ltd.(May24,2023),

/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/05/statement-regarding-termination-boston-

scientificcorporations-attempted-acquisition-mi-tech;

PressRelease,Fed.TradeComm’n,StatementRegarding

TerminationofCooperCompanies’AttemptedAcquisitionofCookMedical’sReproductiveHealthBusiness(Aug.1,

2023),

/news-Pevents/news/press-releases/2023/08/statement-regarding-termination-

coopercompanies-attemptedacquisition-cook-medicals-reproductive;

PressRelease,InfineumUSAL.P.,AcquisitionTerminated(Feb.16,2023),

/en-gb/news/acquisition-terminated/

.

4TransactionvaluesrepresentonlythoseCommissionactionsforwhichthevalueofthetransactionhasbeenpubliclydisclosed.

5InadditiontotheComplaintsfiledinFY2023,theFTC’slitigationwinsinthefiscalyearincludedIllumina/Grail.InMarch2023,theCommissionfoundthatDNAsequencingproviderIllumina’s$7.1billionverticalacquisitionof

GRAIL,Inc.,whichmakesamulti-cancerearlydetection(MCED)test,waslikelytosubstantiallyreducecompetitioninU.S.marketforresearch,development,andcommercializationofcancertestsandorderedIlluminatodivest

Grail.

/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/d09401commissionfinalopinion.pdf.

6MatterswheretheCommissionsuccessfullyreachedaresolutionevenafterfederalcourtlitigationhadbeen

initiatedarelistedunder“ConsentOrders”butnotunder“LitigatedWins.”“LitigatedWins”herelistsonlythosematterswhereanevidentiaryhearingwascompletedandadecisionwasissuedbythecourt.

4

substantiallylessencompetitioninthemarketforFDA-approveddrugsandwouldenable

Amgentopressureinsurancecompaniesandpharmacybenefitmanagersintofavoring

Horizon’stwomonopolyproducts,TepezzaandKrystexxa.Afterthecomplaintwasfiled,thepartiesagreedtoaconsentorder,prohibitingthebundlingofanyAmgenproductwith

Horizon’smedicationsusedtotreatthyroideyediseaseandchronicrefractorygout—andprotectingAmericanswhorelyonthesetreatments.

TheCommissionalsofiledanadministrativecomplaintandsoughtapreliminary

injunctionchallengingthe$700millionproposedacquisitionofPropelMedia,Inc.byIQVIA,theworld’slargestproviderofhealthcaredata,allegingthatthedealwouldunlawfullyreduce

competitionandraisehealthcarepricesforAmericans.Afteratwo-weekhearing,theU.S.DistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkgrantedtheCommission’spreliminaryinjunction,promptingthepartiestoabandontheirmergerplans.7

TheCommission’smergerenforcementworkalsopromptedfirmstoabandondeals

involvingreproductivefertilitytreatments,medicalstents,andthecombinationoftwomajorhealthcaresystems—protectingpatientsacrossthecountry.

TheCommission’sworkalsoprotectedhomebuyersfromhighercosts.TheCommissionfiledanadministrativecomplaintandsoughtapreliminaryinjunctionchallenging

IntercontinentalExchange’s(ICE)$13.1billionproposedacquisitionofBlackKnight,which

wouldhavecombinedthetwolargestprovidersofhomemortgageloanoriginationsystems.Afterthecomplaintwasfiled,thepartiesagreedtoaconsentordertodivestBlackKnight’s

OptimalBlueandEmpowerbusinessplatformstoConstellationWebSolutionsandprohibitingthepartiesfromenforcinganynoncompeteornon-solicitprovisionsagainstemployees.8ThestructuralreliefobtainedbytheFTChelpedprotectcompetitioninkeyareasofthemortgageoriginationprocess,protectinghomebuyersandlendersfromhighercosts.TheFTC’smergerenforcementworkalsoledtotheabandonmentofanacquisitioninvolvingmajorcement

producersthatwouldhavefurtherconcentratedthemarketandriskedraisingcostsforconstructionandinfrastructureprojects.

Lastly,theFTCchallengedMicrosoft’s$69billionacquisitionofActivision,allegingthatMicrosoftwouldhaveboththemeansandmotivetoharmcompetitionbydegrading

Activision’sgamequalityorplayerexperienceonrivalgamingplatforms,orlimitingor

withholdingActivision’scontent—creatingawalledgardenratherthanmaintaininganopen

market.Afterthedistrictcourtdeniedapreliminaryinjunction,theCommissionappealedandthecaseismovingforwardintheCommission’sadministrativeproceedings.9

7FTCv.IQVIAHoldings,Inc.,No.1:23-cv-06188(S.D.N.Y.Jan.8,2024(Op.&Order)).

8SeePressRelease,Fed.TradeComm’n,FTCApprovesFinalOrderResolvingAntitrustConcernsSurroundingICE,BlackKnightDeal(Nov.3,2023),

/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/11/ftc-approves

-final-order-resolving-antitrust-concerns-surrounding-ice-black-knight-deal.

9IntheMatterofMicrosoftCorporationandActivisionBlizzard,Inc.,FTCDkt.C-9412(complaintfiledonDec.8,2022).

5

TheDepartmentofJustice

EnforcementActionsbyDealSize:

<$500M

2

Between$500Mand$1B

2

Between$1Band$10B

7

JVAffectingCommerceAbove$5B

10

1

Summary

NumbersforEnforcementActions:

ComplaintsFiled

11

1

LitigatedWin

12

2

ConsentEnteredintheCourseofLitigation

13

1

AbandonedPost-Complaint

0

ConsentFiledwithComplaint

0

AbandonedorRestructuredPre-Complaint

10

TwooftheDivision’smostnoteworthyachievementshelpedprotectcompetitionthat

benefitsairlinepassengers.Inonecase,theUnitedStatesandagroupofstateAttorneys

GeneralsuccessfullypersuadedadistrictcourttounwindajointventurebetweenAmerican

AirlinesandJetBlueAirways.Inasecond,relatedcase,theUnitedStatesanditsstateAttorneysGeneralpartnerspersuadedanotherjudgetoblockJetBlue’sproposedacquisitionofSpirit

Airlines.AsthecourtobservedinJetBlue-Spirit,thatacquisition“doesviolencetothecore

principleofantitrustlaw:toprotecttheUnitedStates’markets–anditsmarketparticipants–fromanticompetitiveharm.”

14

Theseenforcementeffortsprotectedmillionsoftravelers—

especiallythemostprice-sensitiveones—flyingonhundredsofroutesacrossthecountry.

TwootherenforcementeffortshighlighttheDivision’scommitmenttoprotectingcompetitionacrosskeyindustries.Tenaris,S.A.soughttoacquireBentelerSteel&Tube

10ThisreflectsthetrialvictoryinUnitedStatesv.AmericanAirlinesGroupInc.,No.CV21-11558-LTS,2023WL4766220(D.Mass.July26,2023).Asdescribedfurtherbelow,seeinfranote33,theDivisionpreviouslyhad

categorizedthisenforcementeffortasanon-mergermatterforpurposesofitsannualreporting,butreportsithereasamergermatter,inpartbecauseofthecourt’sfindingsaftertrial.

11ThecomplaintfiledinFY23was

UnitedStatesv.JetBlueAirwaysCorp.andSpiritAirlines,

1:23-cv-10511(D.

Mass.filedMarch7,2023).Becausethe“LitigatedWin”and“ConsentEntered”rowsreflectcasesfiledbeforeFY23,thesumofthe“LitigatedWin”and“ConsentEntered”rowsisgreaterthanthe“ComplaintsFiled”row.

12Thisincludes

UnitedStatesv.BertelsmannSE&Co.KGaA,PenguinRandomHouse,LLC,ViacomCBS,Inc.,and

Simon&Schuster,Inc.,

1:21-cv-02886(D.D.C.filedNov.2,2021),whichwasdiscussedinthe2022annualreportbecauseitwasinitiatedinfiscalyear2022,butreachedresolutioninfiscalyear2023,andalsoincludesthe

AntitrustDivision’strialvictoryagainstAmericanAirlinesGroupInc.andJetBlueAirwaysCorp.Seeinfranotes31-33.

13In

UnitedStatesv.ASSAABLOYABandSpectrumBrandsHoldings,Inc.,

1:22-cv-02791-ABJ(D.D.C.filedSept.15,2022),theU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbiaenteredfinaljudgmentonSeptember13,2023,requiringASSAABLOYtodivestassetsandabidebyotherremedies.LikeU.S.v.Bertelsmann,thiscasewasdiscussedinthe2022annualreportbecauseitwasinitiatedinfiscalyear2022,butreachedresolutioninfiscalyear2023.

14UnitedStatesv.JetBlueAirwaysCorp.,712F.Supp.3d109(D.Mass.2024).

6

ManufacturingCorp.Theproposedacquisition,ifcompleted,wouldhavediminished

competitioninthedomesticsupplyofseamlesstubingandproductioncasing,importanttypes

ofsteelpipeusedintheextractionofoilandgas.InFebruary2023,TenarisandBentelerabandonedthistransactioninthefaceofpotentialenforcementactionbytheAntitrustDivision.

InMarch2023,VistraCorporationannounceditsplantoacquireEnergyHarbor

Corporation’snuclearplantsinPJMInterconnection(PJM),theregionaltransmission

organizationthatmanagestheelectricitygridformorethan65millionconsumersinallorpartsof13statesandtheDistrictofColumbia.TheAntitrustDivisionandtheFederalEnergy

RegulatoryCommission(FERC)sharejurisdictiontoreviewacquisitionsofelectricpowerplants.InaccordancewithPresidentBiden’sExecutiveOrder

15

mandatingthatexecutivebranch

agenciestakeawhole-ofgovernmentapproachtoprotectingcompetition,theAntitrust

DivisionsubmittedacommenttoassistFERC’sreviewoftheannouncedmerger.TheDivision

explainedthattheproposedacquisitioncouldincreaseVistra’sabilityorincentivetowithhold

electricityfromaplantlocatedinOhioinordertoraisewholesaleelectricitypricesinpartof

thePJMregion,specificallyOhioandPennsylvania.InresponsetotheDivision’sconcernsand

furtheractionfromFERC,VistraofferedtorestructureitsproposedacquisitionbydivestingthatpowerplantinOhio.FERCissuedanOrderonFebruary16,2024,mandatingthedivestiture.

16

TheCommission’sPremergerNotificationOffice(PNO)website

17

includesinstructionsforcompletingtheHSRform,informationontheHSRrules,currentfilingthresholds,filingfeeinstructions,andproceduresforsubmittingpost-consummationfilings.Thewebsitealso

providesfrequentlyaskedquestionsregardingHSRfilingrequirements,thenumberofHSRtransactionssubmittedeachmonth,andcontactinformationforPNOstaff.

18

BACKGROUNDOFTHEHSRACT

Section201oftheHSRActamendedtheClaytonActbyaddinganewSection7A,15

U.S.C.§18a.Ingeneral,theHSRActrequiresthatcertainproposedacquisitionsofvoting

securities,non-corporateinterests,orassetsbereportedtotheCommissionandtheAntitrustDivisionpriortoconsummation.Thepartiesmustthenwaitaspecifiedperiod,usually30days(15daysinthecaseofacashtenderofferorbankruptcysale),beforetheymaycompletethetransaction.Whetheraparticularacquisitionissubjecttotheserequirementsdependsonthevalueoftheacquisitionand,incertainacquisitions,thesizeofthepartiesasmeasuredbytheirsalesandassets.Acquisitionsvaluedbelowacertainthreshold,acquisitionsinvolvingparties

withassetsandsalesbelowacertainthreshold,andcertainclassesofacquisitionsthathavebeenviewedaslesslikelytoraiseantitrustconcernsareexcludedfromtheAct’scoverage.

15Exec.OrderNo.14036,86Fed.Reg.36987(July9,2021).

16EnergyHarborCorp.VistraCorp.,186FERC?61,129(Feb.16,2024).

17SeeFed.TradeComm’n,PremergerNotificationProgram(Aug.28,2024),

/enforcement/premerger-notification-program.

18ResourcematerialsareavailableonthePNOwebsite;inaddition,PNOstaffisalwaysavailabletohelpHSRpractitionerscomplywithHSRnotificationrequirements.

7

TheCommission,withtheconcurrenceoftheAssistantAttorneyGeneralforthe

AntitrustDivision,promulgatedfinalrulesimplementingthepremergernotificationprogramonJuly31,1978.Atthattime,acomprehensiveStatementofBasisandPurposewaspublished,

containingasection-by-sectionanalysisoftherulesandanitem-by-itemanalysisofthefilingform.

19

TheprogrambecameeffectiveonSeptember5,1978.TheCommission,withthe

concurrenceoftheAssistantAttorneyGeneral,hasamendedtherulesandthefilingformonmanyoccasionsovertheyearstoimprovetheprogram’seffectivenessandtolessenthe

burdenofcomplyingwiththerules,whileensuringthattheagenciesreceivesufficientinformationtoanalyzetheunderlyingtransaction.

20

Theprimarypurposeofthestatutoryscheme,asthelegislativehistorymakesclear,istoprovidetheantitrustenforcementagencieswiththeopportunitytoidentifyandreview

potentiallyanticompetitivemergersandacquisitionsbeforetheyareconsummated.The

premergernotificationprogram,withitsfilingandwaitingperiodrequirements,facilitatesthisgoal.

Ifeitherreviewingagencydeterminesduringthewaitingperiodthatfurtherinquiryisnecessary,thereviewingagencyisauthorizedbySection7A(e)oftheClaytonActtoissuea

requestforadditionalinformationanddocumentarymaterial(SecondRequest).

21

TheSecondRequestextendsthewaitingperiodforaspecifiedperiodoftime(usually30days,but10daysinthecaseofacashtenderofferorbankruptcysale)afterallpartieshavecompliedwiththe

SecondRequest(or,inthecaseofatenderofferorbankruptcysale,aftertheacquiringpersoncomplies).Thisadditionaltimeprovidesthereviewingagencywiththeopportunitytoanalyzetheinformationandtotakeappropriateactionbeforethetransactionisconsummated.Ifthereviewingagencybelievesthataproposedtransactionmaysubstantiallylessencompetitionortendtocreateamonopoly,theagencymaychallengethetransaction.

ASTATISTICALPROFILEOFTHEPREMERGERNOTIFICATIONPROGRAM

TheappendicestothisReportprovideastatisticalsummaryoftheoperationofthepremergernotificationprogram.AppendixAshows,fortheten-yearperiodcoveringfiscalyears2014-2023,thenumberoftransactionsreported;thenumberoffilingsreceived;thenumberofmergerinvestigationsinwhichSecondRequestswereissued;andthenumberoftransactionsinwhichrequestsforearlyterminationofthewaitingperiodwerereceived,

1943Fed.Reg.33450(July31,1978).

20SeeFed.TradeComm’nLegalLibrary:StatementsofBasisandPurpose(June29,2023),

/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/statute-rules-and-formal-

interpretations/statements-basis-purpose.

2115U.S.C.§18a(e)(1)(A)(“TheFederalTradeCommissionortheAssistantAttorneyGeneralmay,priortothe

expirationofthe30-daywaitingperiod(orinthecaseofacashtenderoffer,the15-daywaitingperiod)....

requirethesubmissionofadditionalinformationordocumentarymaterialrelevanttotheproposedacquisition.”).

8

granted,andnotgranted.

22

AppendixAalsoshowsthenumberoftransactionsinwhich

SecondRequestscouldhavebeenissued,aswellasthepercentageoftransactionsinwhichSecondRequestswereissued.AppendixBprovidesamonth-by-monthcomparisonofthe

numberoftransactionsreportedandthenumberoffilingsreceivedforfiscalyears2014through2023.

Thestatisticssetoutintheseappendicesshowthatthenumberoftransactions

reportedinfiscalyear2023decreasedfromtherecordhighnumberoftransactionsreportedinfiscalyears2021and2022butweregenerallyinlinewiththenumberofreportedtransactionsoverthepastdecade.

23

Ofthe1,805reportedtransactionsinfiscalyear2023,SecondRequestscouldhavebeenissuedin1,735ofthem.TheFTCissued26SecondRequestsinFY2023.InFY2023,theDivisionissued11SecondRequests.SeeTableI.

Thetables(TablesIthroughXI)inExhibitAcontaininformationregardingtheagencies’enforcementactivitiesfortransactionsreportedinfiscalyear2023.Thetablesprovide,for

example,variouscharacteristicsoftransactions,thenumberandpercentageoftransactionsinwhichoneantitrustagencygrantedtheotherclearancetocommenceaninvestigation,andthenumberofmergerinvestigationsinwhicheitheragencyissuedSecondRequests.TableIIIof

ExhibitAshowsthatinfiscalyear2023,theagenciesreceivedclearancetoconductaninitial

investigationin10.2percentofthetotalnumberoftransactionsreported.Thetablesalso

providethenumberoftransactionsbasedonthedollarvalueoftransactionsreportedandthereportingthresholdindicatedinthenotificationreport.Infiscalyear2023,theaggregatedollarvalueofreportedtransactionswas$1.6trillion.

24

TablesXandXIprovidethenumberoftransactions,bybroadindustrygroup,inwhichtheacquiringpersonandtheacquiredentity,respectively,derivedthemostrevenue.Figure3illustratesthepercentageofadjustedtransactionswithinindustrygroupsforfiscalyear2023

basedontheacquiredentity’soperations,reflectingthebreadthoftheagencies’experienceinreviewingtransactionsthatimpacteverysectoroftheU.S.economy

25

22Theterm“transaction,”asusedinAppendicesAandBandExhibitAtothisReport,doesnotreferonlyto

individualmergersoracquisitions.Aparticularmerger,jointventure,oracquisitionmaybestructuredsuchthatitinvolvesmorethanonefilingthatmustbemadeundertheHSRAct.

23ThisReport,likepreviousReports,alsoincludesannualdataon“adjustedtransactionsinwhichaSecond

Requestcouldhavebeenissued”(adjustedtransactions).SeeAppendixA&AppendixAn.2(explainingcalculationofthatdata).Therewere1,735adjustedtransactionsinfiscalyear2023,andthedatapresentedintheTablesandthepercentagesdiscussedinthetextofthisReport(e.g.,percentageoftransactionsresultinginSecondRequests)arebasedonthisfigure.

24Theinformationonthevalueofreportedadjustedtransactionsforfiscalyear2023isdrawnfromadatabasemaintainedbythePremergerNotificationOffice.

25Thecategorydesignatedas“Other”consistsofindustrysegmentsthatincludeconstruction,educationalservices,performingarts,recreation,andothernon-classifiablebusinesses.

9

PercentageofTransactionsByIndustryGroupofAcquiredEntityFiscalYear2023

Chemicals&

Pharmaceuticals48%

HealthServices,3.6%

,.Transportation,3.6%

ConsumerGoods&

Services,31.5%

Energy&NaturalResources,7.1%

Information

Technology,6.6%

Other,22.1%

Manufacturing,10.3%

Banking&Insurance,

10.3%

(Figure3)

DEVELOPMENTSWITHINTHEPREMERGERPROGRAM

1.ThresholdAdjustments

The2000amendmentstotheHSRActrequiretheCommissiontopublishadjustments

totheAct’sjurisdictionalandfilingfeethresholdsintheFederalRegisterannually,foreach

fiscalyearbeginningonSeptember30,2004,basedonthechangeinthegrossnational

product,inaccordancewithSection8(a)(5)oftheClaytonAct.TheCommissionamendedthe

rulesin2005toprovideamethodforfutureadjustmentsasrequiredbythe2000amendments,andtoreflecttherevisedthresholdscontainedintherules.TheCommissionusuallypublishes

therevisedthresholdsannuallyinJanuary,andtheybecomeeffective30daysafterpublication.

OnJanuary26,2023,theCommissionpublishedanotice

26

toreflectadjustmentofthereportingthresholdsasrequiredbythe2000amendments

27

toSection7AoftheClaytonAct,15U.S.C.§18a.Therevisedthresholds,includinganincreaseinthesizeoftransaction

thresholdfrom$101millionto$111.4million,becameeffectiveFebruary27,2023.The

thresholdsarecalculatedbasedontheprioryear’sGNP.Inadditiontotheadjustmentofthereportingthresholds,theCommissionannouncednewmergerfilingfeesbasedonthesizeoftheproposedtransaction.The2023ConsolidatedAppropriationsActnowrequirestheFTCto

2688Fed.Reg.5006(Jan.26,2022).

2715U.S.C.§18a(a).SeePub.L.No.106-553,114Stat.2762.

10

revisetheHSRfilingfeethresholdsonanannualbasisbasedonanamountequaltothepercentageincrease,ifany,intheconsumerpriceindex.

2.HSRCompliance

TheCommissionandtheAntitrustDivisioncontinuedtomonitorcompliancewiththe

premergernotificationprogram’sfilingandwaitingperiodrequirementsandinitiatedanumberofcomplianceinvestigationsinfiscalyear2023.Theagenciesuseseveralmethodstooversee

compliance,includingmonitoringnewsoutletsandindustrypublicationsfortransactionsthatmaynothavebeenreportedinaccordancewiththeHSRAct’srequirements.Industrysources,suchascompetitors,customers,andsuppliers,interestedmembersofthepublic,and,in

certaincases,thepartiesthemselves,alsoprovidetheagencieswithinformationabouttransactionsandpossibleviolationsoftheAct’srequirements.

UnderSection7A(g)(1)oftheAct,anypersonthatfailstocomplywiththeAct’s

notificationandwaitingperiodrequirementsisliableforacivilpenaltyofupto$50,120foreachdaytheviolationcontin