高盛-2024年美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)展望

Note:ThefollowingisaredactedversionoftheoriginalreportpublishedNovember12,2023[19pgs].

12November2023|5:28PMEST

USEconomicsAnalyst

2024USEconomicOutlook:FinalDescent(Mericle)

nTheUSeconomyde?edrecessionfearsin2023andmadesubstantialprogresstowardasoftlanding.ThekeysurprisehasbeenmuchstrongerthanexpectedGDPgrowth,thoughthishasnotpreventedthelabormarketfromcontinuingtorebalanceorin?ationfromcontinuingtofall.

nThehardpartofthein?ation?ghtnowlooksover.Itwasfairtowonderlastyearwhetherlabormarketoverheatingandanattimesunsettlinghighin?ation

mindsetcouldbereversedpainlessly.Buttheseproblemsnowlooklargely

solved,theconditionsforin?ationtoreturntotargetareinplace,andthe

heaviestblowsfrommonetaryand?scaltighteningarewellbehindus.Asa

result,wenowseeonlyahistoricallyaverage15%probabilityofrecessionoverthenext12months.

nCorein?ationhasfallensharplyfromitspandemicpeakandshouldbeginits?naldescentin2024.Weseefurtherdisin?ationinthepipelinefromrebalancingintheauto,housingrental,andlabormarkets,thoughweexpectasmalloffset

fromadelayedaccelerationinhealthcare.Wagegrowthhasfallenmostofthewaytoits3.5%sustainablepace,andsurveyssuggestitwillgettherenextyear.AllofthisshouldpushcorePCEin?ationtoaround2.4%byDecember2024.

nWeexpectGDPtogrow1.8%in2024onaQ4/Q4basis(or2.1%onafull-yearbasis),againeasilybeatinglowconsensusexpectations.Weforecastjustunder2%consumptiongrowth,withrealdisposableincomegrowthofnearly3%

partlyoffsetbya1ppriseinthesavingrate.Wealsoforecastslowerbusinessinvestmentgrowthofroughly2%asthesurgeinmanufacturingfacility

investmentdrivenbyCHIPSActandIn?ationReductionActsubsidiesslows,and?atresidentialinvestmentasthehousingshortagecontinuestotemperthe

impactofreducedaffordability.

nWeexpecttheFOMCtodeliverits?rstratecutin2024Q4oncecorePCE

in?ationfallsbelow2.5%.Wethenexpectone25bpcutperquarteruntil

2026Q2,whenthefedfundsratewouldreach3.5-3.75%,ahigherequilibriumratethanlastcycle.Whilewedonothaveanymajormacroeconomicshocksinour2024forecast,wethinkthebartocutinresponsetoagrowthscarewillbelowincomingyearsandwouldnotbesurprisedbyinsurancecutsatsome

point.

nTwokeyrisksremaintopofmind.The?rstisgeopoliticalcon?ictandtheriskof

JanHatzius

+1(212)902-0394|

jan.hatzius@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

AlecPhillips

+1(202)637-3746|

alec.phillips@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

DavidMericle

+1(212)357-2619|

david.mericle@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

SpencerHill,CFA

+1(212)357-7621|

spencer.hill@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

RonnieWalker

+1(917)343-4543|

ronnie.walker@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

TimKrupa

+1(202)637-3771|

tim.krupa@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

ManuelAbecasis

+1(212)902-8357|

manuel.abecasis@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcerti?cationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html.

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

12November20232

aspikeinoilprices.Whilepossible,wethinkthiswouldmorelikelybeasetbackinthein?ation?ghtthanagamechanger.Thesecondistheriskthatsomethingcould“break”intheabrupttransitiontoahigherinterestrateregime.Ouranalysis

suggeststhattherisksarerealbutmanageable,inpartbecausetheFedwouldbeatlibertytocutinresponsenextyearandwillhaveplentyofroom.

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

2024USEconomicOutlook:FinalDescent

TheUSeconomyde?edrecessionfearsin2023andmadesubstantialprogresstowardasoftlanding.ThekeysurprisethisyearhasbeenmuchstrongerthanexpectedGDPgrowth(Exhibit1).Wehadseenreaccelerationasthekeyriskatthestartoftheyearasthedragongrowthfrommonetaryand?scalpolicytighteningsubsided,butwe

assumedifitmaterializedwhilein?ationwasstillhigh,theFedwouldlikelyhikemoreaggressivelytoensurethatdemandgrowthremainedsubduedsothatsupplycould

continuetocatchup.Whydidn’tit?Inthespringthebankingstressheightened

concernaboutraisingratestoomuch,andbythesummeritbecameclearthatstrongGDPgrowthwasnotpreventingthelabormarketfromcontinuingtorebalanceorwagegrowthandin?ationfromcontinuingtofallafterall.

Exhibit1:StrongerThanExpectedGDPGrowthWastheKeySurpriseof2023...

Percentchange,year-on-yearPercentchange,year-on-year

3.53.02.52.01.51.00.50.0

.

ForecastsasofNov2022:

US2023RealGDPGrowthForecasts

GSBloombergConsensus

GS1.0%,Consensus0.4%

3.53.02.52.01.51.00.50.0

JanMarMayJulSepNovJanMarMayJulSepNov20222023

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,Bloomberg

Infact,despitestronggrowth,progressonbothfrontshasbeenfasterthisyearthanlast(Exhibit2).Howhavewebeenabletohaveitbothwaysin2023?Partofthe

answeristheoutperformanceofthesupplyside:laborsupplyhasnotjustmostly

recoveredbutmorethanrecovered,transitoryin?uencesonwagesandpriceshave

fadedorreversed,andhighpriceshavecuredthemselvesby,forexample,incentivizingmassiveconstructionofrentalhousing.Moresurprisingat?rstglanceiswhylabor

demandhasbeencontainedevenas?naldemandforgoodsandservicesacceleratedandrecessionfearsfaded,butwesuspectthisre?ectsthelogicthatdrivesthe

non-linearityoftheBeveridgecurve,whereextremelytightlabormarketscreatea

feedbackloopbetweenworkersquittingandemployerspreemptivelypostingmorejobopenings,whichcanheatupquicklybutcancooldownquicklytoo.

12November20233

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit2:...ButStrongDemandGrowthHasNotPreventedtheLaborMarketfromRebalancingSubstantiallyFurtherorWageGrowthandIn?ationfromFallingThisYear

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

Percentchange,yearagoMillions

to

StartingPointandCalmWageGrowthandInflation

TheSlowdownRequiredRebalancetheLaborMarket9

Endof20222023Latest

8

7

3mAnnualizedDallasFed

TrimmedMean

Q3AnnualizedRate

Required,GSEstimate

2023Q4Annualized,GSTracking

6

5

4

3

2

1

DomesticFinalJobs-WorkersWageGrowthCorePCEInflation(left)

0

SalesGrowth(left)

Gap(right)*(left)

Below-potentialdemandgrowth...

...lowersthejobs-...whichslowsdown...tobringdown

workersgap...wagegrowth...coreinflation

*BasedonjobopeningsmeasuresfromJOLTS,Indeed,andLinkUp.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

TheHardPartIsOver

ItwasfairtowonderattheoutsetoftheFed’shikingcyclewhetherextremelabor

marketoverheatingandanattimesunsettlinghighin?ationmindsetcouldbereversedpainlesslywithoutarecession.Afterall,toexpectthiswastoexpectsomething

historicallyunprecedented.Whilewefeltstronglythattherewasacoherentwaytonavigatetheseproblemsgently,thatdidnotmeanitwouldbesimple.

Butatthispointthehardpartofthein?ation?ghtlooksover.FollowingaverticaldropontheBeveridgecurve(Exhibit3,left),theunemploymentrateisbarelychangedbut

othermeasuresoflabormarkettightnesshavefallensharplyandarenowonaverageonlyslightlyabovepre-pandemiclevels(Exhibit3,right).Thiscoolingofftodateislikelygoodenoughornearlygoodenoughbecausein?ationwasabittoolowbeforethe

pandemic,andthismeansthatfurtherbelow-potentialgrowthisnolongerneeded.

12November20234

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit3:AfteraPainlessRebalancingCapturedbytheVerticalDropontheBeveridgeCurve,MeasuresofLaborMarketTightnessAreNowOnlySlightlyAbovePre-PandemicLevelsonAverage

8

7

JobOpeningsRate(%)

6

5

4

3

2

1

BeveridgeCurve:

JobOpeningsRatevs.UnemploymentRate

Sep2021-Present

Apr2020-Aug2021

End-2023(f)

Jan2009-Mar2020

Jan2001-Dec2008

3456789101112131415UnemploymentRate(%)

Z-scoresZ-scores

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

MeasuresofLaborMarketTightness

rMarketDifferential

JOLTS:QuitsRate

NFIB:%ofFirmsWithPositionsNotAbletoFillJobs-WorkersGap*

UnemploymentRate(Inverted)Average

ConferenceBoard:Labo

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

20012004200720102013201620192022

*For2020-present,usesaveragejobs-workersgapimpliedbyJOLTS,Indeed,andLinkUp.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,DepartmentofLabor,TheConferenceBoard,NFIB

In?ationpsychologyhasnormalizedtoofromthedayswhenpricesseemedtobe

spikingeverywhereandmanybusinessesandworkersfeltitwasonlyfairthattheirownpricesandwagesriseaccordingly.TheFed’scompositein?ationexpectationsindexhasfallensharplytoaroughlytarget-consistentlevelasthepriceshocksassociatedwith

reopeningandshortageshavebecomeamoredistantmemory(Exhibit4).

Exhibit4:In?ationExpectationsHaveFallenSharplytoRoughlyTarget-CompatibleLevels

PercentPercent

2.50

2.50

IndexofCommonInflationExpectations,

ProjectedontoSurveyofProfessionalForecasters10YPCEExpectations

2.25

2.25

2.00

2.00

1.75

1.75

199920022005200820112014201720202023

Source:FederalReserveBoard

Withthemoredauntingproblemslargelysolved,theconditionsforin?ationtoreturntotargetinplace,andtheheaviestblowsfrommonetaryand?scaltighteningwellbehindus(Exhibit10below),wenowseeonlyahistoricallyaverage15%probabilityof

recessionoverthenext12months.Theconsensus,incontrast,stillseesamuchhigherrecessionprobabilityof48%overthenext12months(Exhibit5).

12November20235

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit5:WiththeHardPartoftheIn?ationFightNowBehindUs,WeSeeOnlyaHistoricallyAverageRecessionProbabilityof15%OvertheNext12Months

GSBloombergConsensus

April2022:

LaunchedGS

March2023:Raisedto35% onBankingStress

June2022:Raisedto30% onHigherInflation

PercentUS12-MonthAheadRecessionProbabilityPercent

100

80

60

40

20

0

September2023:Loweredto15%onContinuedPositive LaborMarketandInflationNews

Trackingat15%

October2022: Raisedto35%onHawkishFed

June2023: Loweredto25%onRecedingDebtLimitandBankingRisks

February2023:Loweredto25%onLaborMarketAdjustment

July2023:Loweredxto20%on

DisinflationProgress

100

80

60

40

20

0

Mar-22Jun-22Sep-22Dec-22Mar-23Jun-23Sep-23

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,Bloomberg

2024In?ationOutlook:FinalDescent

In?ationhasfallensharplyfromitspandemicpeakandshouldbeginits?naldescentin2024.CorePCEin?ationisdownfroma5.5-6%toa2.5-3%sequentialannualizedpace(Exhibit6),andothermeasuresoftheunderlyingtrendsuchasthetrimmedmeanandthemedianhavesoftenedsigni?cantlyaswell.

Exhibit6:CoreIn?ationHasFallenSharplyfromthePeakandIsonTracktoFallFurtherin2024

PercentCorePCEInflationandGSForecastPercent

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

CorePCE3mAnnualizedRateCorePCE6mAnnualizedRateCorePCEYoY

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

Jan-19Oct-19Jul-20Apr-21Jan-22Oct-22Jul-23Apr-24

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,DepartmentofCommerce

Weseefurtherdisin?ationinthepipelinefromrebalancingintheauto,housingrental,andlabormarkets.Intheautomarket,ittooklongerthanexpectedbuteventually?xingsupplychainproblems,restoringproductiontonormallevels,andrebuildinginventoriesreintroducedcompetitionamongdealersandmanufacturersthathasbeguntoreverse

12November20236

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

shortage-drivenpricespikes.Inventorylevelshavemoreroomtorecoverin2024,andnewandusedcarpriceshavefurthertofall(Exhibit7,left).

Inthehousingrentalmarket,normalizationofelevatedpandemicdemandandalargeincreaseinapartmentsupplyhasslowedleadingindicatorsofnewtenantrentin?ationtoa1-2%annualizedpacethisyear(Exhibit7,right).Theof?cialhousingin?ation

numbershaveslowedlessbecausetheyalsocovercontinuingtenantrents,whichfellbehindtherapidgrowthofmarketratesin2021and2022andhavebeencatchingup.Butweestimatethatthegapbetweenmarketratesandcontinuingtenantrentshasfallenfrom7.5%toaround2%,meaningthatcatch-upiscomingtoanendandthe

of?cialnumbersshouldconvergemorequicklytowardtheslowerpaceoftheleadingindicatorsnextyear.

Exhibit7:ThereIsMoreDisin?ationinthePipelineontheGoodsSidefromAutosandontheServicesSidefromShelter

Percentofavg.2019levelDollarspervehicle

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

NewCarInventories(left)

AutoDealerIncentives(right)

4,300

3,800

3,300

2,800

2,300

1,800

1,300

800

Jan-19Sep-19May-20Jan-21Sep-21May-22Jan-23Sep-23

Percentchange,yearagoPercentchange,yearago

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

AverageofCoStar,Zillow,andYardiRentMeasures

New-TenantRepeatRentIndexContinuing-TenantRentIndexPCERent+OER

LeadingIndicatorsofMarketRentInflationinQ3:1.6%

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

2016201720182019202020212022202320242025Note:IncludesadjustmentstothemostrecentquartersofNew-TenantRepeatRentIndexandContinuing-TenantRentIndex

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,DepartmentofCommerce,CoStar,Zillow,Yardi,DepartmentofLabor

Inthelabormarket,anarrowerjobs-workersgapandloweryear-aheadin?ationexpectationshavebroughtourwagegrowthtrackerdownfromapeakof5.6%

year-on-yearto4.4%,andbusinesssurveyspointtoafurtherdeclinenextyearto

roughlythe3.5%ratethatweestimatewouldbecompatiblewith2%in?ation(Exhibit8).Whilerecentheadlinesaboutunionwagedemandshavesparkedconcernaboutareacceleration,thewagehikestheyhavewonhavenotbeenaslargeasadvertised,andunionizedworkers’wagegrowthrateisalaggingindicatorbecausetheytendtohave

longer-lastingcontracts.

12November20237

Exhibit8:WageGrowthIsSlowing,andBusinessSurveysPointtoFurtherDecelerationNextYeartothe3.5%RateCompatiblewith2%In?ation

1010

99

88

77

66

55

44

33

22

11

00

Percentchange,yearagoPercentchange,yearago

7

6

5

4

3

2

GSWageTracker

EmploymentCostIndex*AverageHourlyEarnings**

AtlantaFedWageTracker***

7

6

5

4

3

2

201820192020202120222023

Note:Ourwagetrackerextractsthecommonsignalfromseveralhigh-qualitywagegrowth

measures.*Privateindustryworkersex-incentivepaidoccupations.**Allprivateindustryworkers,GScomposition-adjustedfrom2020-2021.***Non-smoothedmedianwagegrowth,adjusted

downby0.5pptoaccountforcompositiondifferencefromothermeasures.

Percentchange,annualratePercentchange,annualrate

——GSWageSurveyTracker*IndeedWageTracker

2015201620172018201920202021202220232024*AverageofNFIB,DallasFedmanufacturing,DallasFedservices,RichmondFed

Manufacturing,RichmondFedservices,NYFedservices,andKansasCityFedservices,scaledto6-monthannualizedaveragehourlyearnings.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,DepartmentofLabor,FederalReserve,Indeed

Weexpectasmalloffsettothesedisin?ationarypressuresfromadelayedaccelerationinthehealthcaresector,wheremulti-yearcontractshavesofarpreventedlargecost

increasesfrom?owingthroughfullytoprices.

Theseandothertrendsaresummarizedinourcomponent-levelforecasttable(Exhibit9)anddescribedinmoredepthinour2024In?ationOutlook.WeexpectcorePCE

goodsin?ationtofallfrom0.1%nowto-1.2%inDecember2024,housingservicestofallfrom7.2%to4.1%,andcoreservicesex-housingtofallfrom4.3%to3.4%,

implyingadeclineinoverallcorePCEin?ationfrom3.7%to2.4%byDecember2024.CoreCPIin?ationislikelytorunhotterthisfallandwinter,butweexpectittofallto

2.7%byDecember2024.

Whilewearecon?dentthatcorein?ationwillfallmeaningfullyfurthernextyear,itis

worthbearinginmindthatitwashardtoforecasteveninthepre-pandemicdecadesoflowandstablein?ation,whentheaverageabsoluteyear-aheadforecasterrorforprivatesectorandFedforecasterswasabout0.4pp.Surprisesofthatmagnitudeshouldnotbesurprising,andtheyarelargeenoughtoin?uenceFedpolicy.

12November20238

Exhibit9:WeExpectCorePCEIn?ationtoFallto3.3%byDecember2023and2.4%byDecember2024,withDeclinesinMostCategoriesPartlyOffsetbyaDelayedAccelerationinHealthCareServices

Weight

Sep.2023

YoY

GSBottom-upCorePCEForecast

Dec.2023

Dec.2024

YoY

ContributiontoChange

YoY

ContributiontoChange

CorePCE

100.0

3.7

3.3

-0.4

2.4

-1.3

CoreGoods

26.1

0.1

0.0

0.0

-1.2

-0.3

NewVehicles

2.4

2.6

0.7

0.0

-1.7

-0.1

UsedVehicles

1.5

-8.0

-7.3

0.0

-5.5

0.0

HouseholdAppliances

0.5

-6.4

-8.2

0.0

-3.5

0.0

Video,Audio,Computers

2.5

-7.1

-6.0

0.0

-9.0

0.0

RecreationalVehicles

0.6

2.0

0.7

0.0

1.0

0.0

Jewelry,Watches

0.6

0.5

0.2

0.0

1.1

0.0

Clothing&Footwear

3.1

2.4

2.6

0.0

0.3

-0.1

Pharma&Medical

3.9

3.4

3.7

0.0

1.9

-0.1

PetsProducts

0.7

4.8

3.4

0.0

1.3

0.0

ExpendituresAbroad

0.1

11.5

6.7

0.0

0.5

0.0

ResidualCoreGoods

10.1

0.1

0.1

0.0

-0.7

-0.1

CoreServices

73.9

5.0

4.4

-0.4

3.6

-1.1

Housing

17.4

7.2

6.3

-0.1

4.1

-0.5

GroundTransportation

0.4

2.2

2.1

0.0

1.9

0.0

AirTransportation

1.2

3.5

0.2

0.0

3.9

0.0

FoodServices&Accommodation

8.3

6.0

4.8

-0.1

3.5

-0.2

FinancialServices&Insurance

8.2

5.6

5.1

0.0

3.4

-0.2

MedicalServices

18.3

2.3

2.6

0.1

3.3

0.2

ForeignTravel

1.4

-0.7

-4.6

-0.1

2.6

0.0

ResidualCoreServices

18.7

5.4

5.0

-0.1

3.5

-0.4

Coreservicesex.housing56.54.33.8-0.33.4-0.5

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,DepartmentofCommerce

2024GrowthOutlook:HoldingUpatHigherRates

Wethinkthatthemainreasontheeconomyacceleratedfrom2022to2023isthattheimpactof?scalandmonetarypolicytighteningonGDPgrowthdiminishedsharply.Theimpactshouldbesimilarnextyear,withabitoffurtherdragfromboth?scaltighteningandtherecenttighteningin?nancialconditionsworthabout?-?ppintotal.

12November20239

GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit10:TheDragonGDPGrowthfromFiscalandMonetaryPolicyTighteningPeakedin2022,DeclinedSharplyin2023,andShouldRemainModestin2024

PercentagePercentage

ImpulsetoQuarterlyAnnualizedGDPGrowth

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

pointspoints

fromFiscalPolicyandFinancialConditions,

GSEstimates,3-QuarterCenteredMovingAverages

FiscalImpulse

FinancialConditionsImpulseTotal

Q1Q2Q3Q4

2021

Q1Q2Q3Q4

2022

Q1Q2Q3Q4

2023

Q1Q2Q3Q4

2024

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

BelowwediscussthegrowthoutlookbyGDPcomponent.OurreturntoatextbookC+I+G+NXapproachandourtraditionalforecastingmodelsmarkstheendoftheperiodwhenassumptionsaboutspecialfactorssuchasvirusspreadorsupplychaindisruptionsplayedalargeroleincyclicaltrends.

Consumption

Our2024ConsumerOutlooknotesthatweexpectslowingbutsolidjobgains,roughly1%realwagegrowth,andalargeincreaseinhouseholdinterestincometofuelreal

disposableincomegrowthofnearly3%nextyear(Exhibit11).Interestincomewillaccruemostlytothetopincomequintile,whereweexpect4%realincomegrowth,versusjust1?%forthebottomincomequintile.

Weexpectstrongincomegrowthtobepartlyoffsetbya1ppriseinthesavingrate.Thesavingrateoughttobeverylowatthemomentbecauseboththeprecautionaryand

retirementmotivesforsavingareweakatatimewhenthelayoffrateislowandthewealth-to-incomeratioishistoricallyhigh,butitisalittletoolowcomparedtoits

pre-pandemiclevel,whenthesamewastruetoaslightlylesserdegree.

Onnet,realincomegrowthofjustunder3%anda1ppriseinthesavingrateimply

consumptiongrowthofjustunder2%in2024onaQ4/Q4basis.Thelastfewyears

haveseenlargeshiftsinthecompositionofconsumerspendingbetweengoodsand

services,butwethinkthatthesearelargelyover.Whiletheshareofservicesintotal

consumerspendingremainsbelowitspre-pandemiclevel,thisappearstobeduetothelargeincreaseintheshareofpeopleworkingfromhome,whichhasnowstabilized.

12November2023