外商直接投資去風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保險(xiǎn)

#30FEBRUARY2025

Investment

PolicyMonitor

FDIderisking

Politicalriskinsurance

HIGHLIGHTS

bClimatechange,geopoliticaltensionsandsupplychaindisruptionssignificantlyamplifyinvestmentrisks,particularlyinstructurallyweakandvulnerablecountries.RobustderiskingstrategiesareneededtounlockprivateinvestmentandbridgethefinancinggaptoachievetheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs).

bAmonginvestmentderiskinginstruments,politicalriskinsurance(PRI)hasacritical,andpotentiallygrowingroletoplayinfosteringinvestmenttowardsdevelopingcountries,andleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs)inparticular.

bExportcreditagencies(ECAs)aretheprimaryprovidersofPRI,accountingfor78percentoftotalissuanceoverthepastdecade,whilemultilateralinstitutionsandprivateinsurersaccountfor7and15percentrespectively.DevelopingcountriesarethelargestPRIbeneficiaries(70percentoftheprojects).AsiaaccountsforthelargestshareofPRIprovidedbyECAsandprivateinsurers,reflectingChina’sdualroleasamajorrecipientofPRIandaleadingprovider,whileAfricareceivesthemostPRIfrommultilateralinstitutions.

bLDCsaccountforonly15percentofprojectscoveredbyPRI.However,insuredprojectvaluesareequivalentto28percentofforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)toLDCs,comparedto6percentindevelopingcountriesand2percentindevelopedcountries.

bFrom2019to2023,PRIcoveragewasprimarilyextendedtomanufacturingprojects(20percent),infrastructure(19percent),naturalresources(14percent)andnon-renewableenergy(14percent).Renewableenergyprojectsreceivedjust4percentoftotalPRI.

bExpandingtheroleofPRIasaderiskingtooltosupportinvestmenttowardstheSDGsrequiresin-depthanalysisofthechallengesandopportunitiesfacedbyPRIprovidersandinvestorsalike.ThisMonitorispartofabroaderUNCTADresearchprojectthatwillexaminethoseissuesinthecontextofenhancinginvestmentflowsintoSDG-relatedsectorsindevelopingcountries,withparticularemphasisonLDCs.

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Introduction

TheinvestmentgaptoachievetheSDGsindevelopingcountriesby2030haswidenedfrom$2.5trilliontoapproximately$4trillionperyearbetween2014and2023(UNCTAD,2023).Thischasmunderscorestheurgentneedforeffectivesolutions.Itiswidelyacknowledgedthatpublicresourcesalone,includingofficialdevelopmentassistance,willbeinsufficientforbridgingthefinancinggap.1Mobilizingprivatesectorfinanceiscritical,withFDIplayingavitalrole.However,privateinvestmentindevelopingeconomies,andLDCsinparticular,isconstrainedbyheightenedrealandperceivedrisks.Between2015and2023,FDIflowssawmodestgrowthof17percentindevelopingcountries,andaconcerningdeclineofnearly20percentinLDCs.AlthoughinvestmentinrenewableenergyandinfrastructuresectorshasgrownsincethelaunchoftheSDGs,investmentinareassuchaswater,sanitationandhealth(WASH),andagrifoodsystemshasdecreased(UNCTAD,2024).

Emergingglobalchallengesaddsignificantuncertainty.Geopoliticaltensions,risingprotectionismandthethreatoftradewarsarereshapingtheglobalinvestmentandtradelandscape,creatingsignificanthurdlesforinternationallyorientedfirms.TheCOVID-19pandemicamplifiedthesechallenges,triggeringasurgeinpoliticalviolenceandstricterforeignexchangecontrols,whichhaveledtoincreasedclaimspaidbypoliticalriskinsurers(MIGA,2024a).Climaterisks,encompassingextremeweatherevents,regulatoryshiftsandliabilityexposuresfurthercomplicatetheinvestmentclimate(Nieto,2019).Supplychainvulnerabilitiesthreatenbusinesscontinuityandprofitability,andmultipolarityandfragmentationaddlayersofunpredictability(Klasenetal.,2024).Inaddition,recentconflictshaveincreasedriskaversionamonginvestors,asheightenedgeopoliticaltensionsandconflictsdisruptthebusinessenvironment.

LDCsandothervulnerablecountriesaremoreaffectedbytheseemergingrisks.Climatechangedisproportionatelyimpactsthemsincetheiradaptivecapacityislimited,makingneededinvestmentsininfrastructure,includingrenewableenergy,particularlychallenging(Branchoux,FangandTateno,2018).SupplychaindisruptionsdisproportionallyaffectLDCs,giventheirrelianceonimportsandlimitedtradediversification.Theriskslinkedtomultipolarityareintensifiedbythegeopoliticalmarginalizationofthesecountries,whichoftenleavesthemvulnerabletotheconflictinginterestsofexternalpowers.Forinvestors,theserisksarefurtheramplifiedbypoliticalinstability,weaklegalsystems,andchallengesinenforcingcontracts(Heard&Laryea,2021).Suchfactorscreateuncertaintyaboutreturnsandthepotentiallossofassets,necessitatingstrongriskmitigationstrategies.

TheUNTradeandDevelopment’sWorldInvestmentReport2024highlightsthat,despitepersistentregulatorygapsandbottlenecks,developingcountriesareimplementinglong-termderiskingstrategiesbyimprovingtheirbusinessenvironmentsandenhancingtheirlegalandregulatoryframeworksforinvestment(UNCTAD,2024).Capital-exportingcountriesalsohaveakeyroletoplayinpromotingriskmitigationstrategiesandfacilitatingoutwardinvestmenttowardsdevelopingcountriesandLDCs.ThisalignswiththeAddisAbabaActionAgendaandSDGindicator17.5.1,whichcallsforhomecountriestoadoptinvestmentpromotionregimesfordevelopingcountries,includingLDCs.PRI,inparticular,playsacrucialroleinfacilitatingFDIinflowstotheworld’smostvulnerablecountries,actingasakeyenablerforsustainabledevelopmentandtheachievementoftheSDGs.

ThisInvestmentPolicyMonitorexplorestheroleandsignificanceofPRIinfosteringFDIindevelopingcountries,particularlyinLDCs,highlightingkeyindustrytrends,includingmajorproviders,primaryrecipientsandthegeographicalandsectoraldistributionofprojectssupportedbyPRI(box1).ThisMonitorispartofabroaderUNCTADresearchprojectthatwillexaminethemainchallengesandopportunitiesfacedbyPRIproviders,inthecontextofenhancingflowsintoSDG-relatedsectorsindevelopingcountries,withparticularemphasisonLDCs.TheconclusionsdrawnfromthisanalysiswillinformpolicyrecommendationstoenhancetheroleofPRItocontributemoreeffectivelytotheSDGs.

1Seeforexample:Developmentcommittee(2015);Baroudi(2017);OECD(2021);McHugh(2021);BanduraandRamanujam(2019).

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Box1

Methodologicalnote:UNTradeandDevelopment’ssurveyofPRIProviders

Inthisreport,thequantitativedataonPRIvolumes,destinationcountries,andsectorsutilizesaggregatedfiguresfromtheBerneUnionSecretariat,theleadingglobalassociationfortheexportcreditandinvestmentinsuranceindustrycomprising84members,includingmostpublicprovidersofPRI,thelargestmultilateralprovidersandseveralprivateones(seethefullmembership

here

).Thisdataiscomplementedbypubliclyavailableproject-levelinformationfromtheMultilateralInvestmentGuaranteeAgency(MIGA)andDevelopmentFinanceCorporationoftheUnitedStates(USDFC),aswellasdisaggregateddataprovideddirectlytoUNTradeandDevelopmentbytheAfricanTrade&InvestmentDevelopmentInsurance(ATIDI),theChinaExport&CreditInsuranceCorporation(SINOSURE),theKoreanTradeInsuranceCorporation(KSURE)andPwCGermany(theGermanECA).

ItisimportanttonotethatwhilethemembersoftheBerneUnion—andthereforeitsdata—includemostpublicprovidersofPRI,includingallthelargeexportcreditagencies,theydonotincludeallprivateinsurersofferingPRI.Notably,theapproximately20Lloyd’ssyndicatesthatprovidePRIarenotmembersoftheBerneUnion.However,thisshouldonlymarginallyaffecttheresultsofthisstudy,asthevolumeofPRIissuedbyprivateprovidersthatarenotmembersoftheBerneUnionisestimatedtoberelativelysmall(WTW,2024).

Source:UNTradeandDevelopment.

PRIandotherFDIderiskingtools

PRIisatypeofguaranteethatspecificallysafeguardsinvestmentabroadagainstpoliticalrisk,eitherdirectlycoveringlossesoninternationalequityinvestmentsorinsuringinvestorswhohaveprovidedloanstofinanceinternationalprojects.Typically,PRIprotectsagainstlossesfromrisksthatcandisruptinvestments,contractsoroperations,includingconfiscation,expropriation,nationalizationanddeprivation;currencyinconvertibility,non-transferabilityandexchangerestrictions;publicbuyerpaymentriskand/orbreachofcontract;politicalviolence(includingriotsandcivilcommotion,warandterrorism);embargo/licencecancellationandexport/importrestrictions.

AmongtheFDIderiskingtools,PRIhasacriticalroletoplayinsupportinginvestmenttodevelopingcountriesandLDCs.Between2018and2022,privatefinancemobilizedbydevelopmentfinanceinterventionsfromofficialdonorstotalled$228billion.2Overthesameperiod,PRIfromcountriesandmultilateralinstitutionsmemberoftheDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)coveredinvestmenttodevelopingcountriesforatotalofabout$75billion.WhenincludingSINOSURE,theECAofChinaandthelargest(andnon-DAC)memberoftheBerneUnion,thefigurerisesto$152billion(figure1).3

AccordingtoasurveybytheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)andtheAfricanUnionCommission(AUC),politicalrisksarecitedasakeyobstacletoinvestmentinAfricabyover80percentofsurveyedinvestors,rankingsecondaftermacroeconomicrisk(MoIbrahimFoundation,2024).Similarly,asurveyof37pensionfundsand30insurancecompaniesfoundthatrisksassociatedwithcorruptionandpoliticalandmacroeconomicinstabilityareamongthemainfactorsinfluencingtheirinvestmentdecisions(OECD,2021).AsurveybyMIGAoninvestmentindevelopingcountriesin2013showedsimilarresults.4

2OfficialdonorsincludeDACcountriesandmultilateralorganizations.SeeOECDdataexploreronprivatefinancemobilization.

3ForSINOSURE,thedataincludePRItoallcountries.

4Thesurveyof459seniorexecutivesfrommulti-nationalenterprisesinvestingindevelopingcountriesfoundthatmacroeconomicandpoliticalrisksrankedfirstandsecondrespectivelyinresponsetothequestionofwhichfactorsweremostlikelytoplacethegreatestrestraintonFDIindevelopingcountriesoverthenextthreeyears(MIGA,2013).

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Climateriskexacerbatespoliticalrisk,creatingaviciouscyclewhereenvironmentalchallengesintensifyconflictsandheightenpoliticaluncertainty.Forinstance,extremeweathereventscandisruptlocaleconomies,leadingtosocialunrestandweakeninggovernmentalinstitutions,thusaffectingpoliticalstability.Thisinterplaybetweenclimateandpoliticalrisksunderscoresthegrowingneedforderiskingtools,includingPRI,toenablethepromotionofFDIinthemostvulnerablecountries,particularlytheLDCs.

Figure1

PRIhelpsdriveinvestmentindevelopingcountries

Privatefinancemobilizedbyofficialdevelopmentfinanceinterventions,2018-2022,billionsofdollars

Directinvestment

incompaniesand76SPVs

Guarantees54

Total

Syndicatedloans31228

billion

Creditlines29

SharesinCIVs27

Simpleco?nancing11

Source:UNTradeandDevelopmentbasedonOECDdataexploreronprivatefinancemobilizationandUNCTADclassificationofdevelopingcountries.

Note:CIV:collectiveinvestmentvehicle;SPV:specialpurposevehicle.

PRIbyECAsandmultilateral

institutionsforprojectsin

developingcountries,2018-2022,billionsofdollars

Total

75

billion

62

ECAsexcludingSINOSURE

13

Multilateralinstitutions

Source:UNTradeandDevelopmentbasedonBerneUnionSecretariatdata.

MainprovidersofPRI

PRIisofferedbypublicandprivateentities.Publicprovidersincludemultilateralinstitutions,suchastheMIGA,orbilateralentities,suchasECAs.5Between2006and2015,thePRImarketexperiencedsteadygrowth,withacompoundannualgrowthrate(CAGR)of6percentfrom2006to2010and11percentfrom2011to2015.In2018,asignificantPRIproviderimplementedachangeinreportingmethodology,renderingcomparisonsbetweenearlierandlaterperiodschallenging.Nevertheless,thePRImarketexperiencedadeclinebetween2019and2023,withaCAGRof-3percent(figure2).ThisdeclineisprimarilyattributedtoareductioninPRIissuancebySINOSUREduringthatperiod.PRIfromotherprovidersremainedstable.

WithintheBerneUnion,theleadingglobalassociationfortheexportcreditandinvestmentinsuranceindustry,privateinsurersaccountedfor37percentoftotalPRIduringtheperiod2006–2010,buttheirsharedeclinedto18percentin2019–2023.Meanwhile,ECAsemergedasthedominantPRIproviders,issuing74percentofnewcoverageduringthelatterperiod.Thistrendmayreflecttherisingimportanceoflarge-scaleinfrastructureanddevelopmentprojectsthatrequiregovernment-backedguarantees.Multilateralinstitutionsalsoincreasedtheirshare,from3percentin2006–2010to8percentin2019–2023.

5ECAsincludegovernmentagenciesaswellasprivateentitiesmanagingPRIissuanceonbehalfoftheirrespectivegovernments.

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In2023,newPRIpoliciesunderwrittenbymembersoftheBerneUnionamountedtonearly$41billion.6Ofthis,ECAscontributed$28billion,or68percentoftotalnewunderwrittenpolicies.Multilateralinstitutionscontributed$6billion(14percent),andtheprivatesector$7billion(18percent).

Figure2

ECAsandmultilateralinstitutionsPRIshareexpandedovertime

NewPRIbytypeofproviderandCAGRoftotalPRIforeachperiod

PublicbilateralMultilateralPrivate

CAGR

11%

CAGR

-3%

CAGR

6%

14%

18%

37%

5%

8%

3%

81%

74%

60%

2006-20102011-20152019-2023

Source:UNTradeandDevelopmentbasedonBerneUnionSecretariatdata.

Note:In2018,alargepublicprovideradjustedtheirmethodologyandhassincereportednoticeablylowerfiguresforPRIcoverprovided.TheanalysisonlyaccountsforprivatePRIprovidersmemberoftheBerneUnion.

PublicbilateralinstitutionsandmultilateralinstitutionsholdasignificantadvantageinprovidingPRI.SupportedbytheirgovernmentsormemberStates,theyhavethediplomaticleveragetoproactivelyengagewithhostcountries.Throughdiplomaticchannelsandcollaborativeefforts,theycanaddressemergingissuesearlyandresolvethembeforetheyescalateintoformalclaimsordisputes.

TheleadingbilateralpublicprovidersofPRIareECAsfromcountriesthatareOECDmembersalongwithSINOSURE.In2023,SINOSUREaccountedfor41percentofthetotalunderwrittenamountbypublicproviders(table1).ThemainmandateofallECAsistopromoteandsupportexportsfromtheircountriesandtofacilitatetheinternationalizationofdomesticenterprises.Theirsupportforoverseasinvestmentsalignswiththisobjective.

6TheBerneUnion’s84membersincludeECAs,multilateralfinancialinstitutionsandprivateinsurersofcreditandpoliticalrisk.

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Table1

AsianECAsprovidedmorethanhalfofpublicPRIworldwide

MainpublicPRIproviders,2023

ShareoftotalpublicPRIprovided

(percent)

Newcoverprovided

(billionsofdollars)

Sinosure(China)

13.7

41

NEXI(Japan)

5.4

16

MIGA

3

9

Investmentguarantee(Germany)

1.5

4

SACE(Italy)

1

3

USDFC(UnitedStates)

0.9

3

KSURE(Rep.ofKorea)

0.5

2

Totalofmainproviders

26

78

Source:UNTradeandDevelopmentbasedonannualreportsofNEXI,andSACE;ondatafromSINOSURE,K-SUREandGermanInvestmentGuaranteeandestimatefromprojectdatafromMIGAandUSDFC;thetotalofthepublicprovidersisbasedondatafromBerneUnionSecretariat.

Therelativelymodestroleofmultilateral,comparedtobilateralinstitutions,inthePRIindustrymaybeattributedtotheinherentcharacteristicsoftheseentitiessuchaslimitedsizeandcapacities.7Mostmultilateralinsurers,exceptMIGA,alsofacespecificchallengesduetotheirheavyrelianceonmaintainingstrongcreditratings,whicharecrucialtotheiroperations.8Astheyareexpectedtorecoverclaimspaid,thecomplexityandtime-consumingprocessofrecoveringpaymentsforpoliticalriskclaims—suchasexpropriation—canhindertheexpansionofPRI.

Despitethesechallenges,multilateralinstitutionshaveincreasedboththeirlevelofPRIcoverageandtheirshareofthetotal,whichrosefromlessthan3percentofPRIunderwrittenduring2006–2008to10percentin2021–2023.Duringthelast15years,MIGAhassignificantlyincreaseditsPRIportfolioindevelopingcountriesandhasparticularlyincreaseditssupporttoprojectsinLDCs(box2).InAfrica,ATIDIhasalsoexpandedsignificantlyinrecentyears,increasingitsoverallportfoliobynearly20percentin2023.

7Arecentstudyhighlightsthatmultilateralproviders(e.g.ATIDI,Dhaman,ICIECandMIGA)generallyoperatewithsignificantlylesscapitalcomparedtodevelopmentbanks.Forinstance,acomparisonwithintheWorldBankGrouprevealsthat,in2018,thepaid-incapitaloftheInternationalFinanceCorporation(IFC)wasseventimeslargerthanthatofMIGA(ICIEC,2020).

8MIGAisnotexplicitlyratedbutrecognisedasazero-riskweightedMDBbytheBaselCommitteeonBankingsupervision(ICIEC,2020).

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Box2

MIGA’sPRIportfolio

MIGAistheprincipalmultilateralproviderofPRI.Itwasestablishedin1988andaimsatencouraginginvestmentindevelopingcountries.Inthelast15years,MIGAhasprovided$40billioninPRIforprojectsglobally,averaging$2.7billionperyear.TheAgency’sannualPRIprovisionhasexpandedsignificantlyfromlessthan$1.5billionin2010tomorethan$4.6billionin2024.Althoughtherewasaslightdecreaseduringthepandemicyears,since2022MIGAhasexperiencedanupwardtrendinitstotalPRIvolume.

Overtime,MIGAhasincreaseditsfocusonLDCs(boxfigure2.1).ThisreflectsanactivepolicytosupportinvestmentsinthesecountriesthroughcollaborationwithlocalgovernmentsandraisingawarenessamonginvestorsabouttheopportunitiesforPRIcoverage.Asaresult,MIGA’sshareofPRIdirectedtowardsLDCshasgrowncontinuouslysince2010.Itmovedfromlessthan$0.7billionandan8percentshareduring2010–2014tonearly$4.5billion,representing27percentoftotalPRIprovidedbyMIGAin2020–2024.Duringthislatterperiod,projectsindevelopingcountriesaccountedfor49percentofMIGA’sPRIcoverage,whilethoseindevelopedcountriesrepresented24percent,primarilyconcentratedintheBalkans(86percent)andEasternEurope(14percent).IncomparisonwithotherPRIproviderMIGAhasahighershareofprojectsinLDCs.

Boxfigure2.1

PRIprovidedbyMIGA,bylevelofdevelopment,2010-2024(billionsofdollars)

2010-20142015-20192020-2024

9.8

8.1

4.5

4.3

4

3.7

2.9

2.2

0.7

DevelopedeconomiesDevelopingeconomiesLeastdevelopedcountries

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Inthelastfiveyears,Africarepresents35percentofMIGAprojects,followedbyEurope(24percent),LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(23percent),andAsia(17percent).WhilePRIinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanandEuropearenearlyexclusivelyfinancialservices,AsiaandAfricahavemorediversifiedprojects.

Over50percentofthePRIprovidedbyMIGAisallocatedtothefinancialservicessector.Thesectorprimarilycoversthemandatoryreservesheldbysubsidiariesofinternationalbanksincentralbanks.Notably,threebanks—Santander,HSBC(inLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean),andASBA/Barclays(inAfrica)—accountfor$5.3billion(83percent)ofPRIprovidedbyMIGAinthissector.Incontrast,infrastructureprojectsaccountfor18percent,whileelectricityproductionfromnon-renewablesources(primarilygas)represents13percent,whichismorethandoublethePRIallocatedtoFDIinrenewableenergy(6percent).1Additionally,projectsintheextractivesindustrymakeup8percent,withtheremaining5percentdistributedamongotherservices,manufacturingandagriculture(boxfigure2.2).

Boxfigure2.2

SectoraldistributionofMIGA’sPRIprovidedtodevelopingeconomiesandLDCs,2020–2024(billionsofdollars)

DevelopingeconomiesLeastdevelopedcountries

FinancialServicesInfrastructure

Energyproduction-nonrenewableExtractiveindustriesRenewableenergy Services ManufacturingAgriculture

0246

Source:UNTradeandDevelopmentbasedonMIGAPRIprojectdataavailableat:

https://financesone.

/miga-issued-projects/DS00988

.

1MIGAsetatargettoalign85percentofitsnewprojectswiththegoalsoftheParisAgreementstartingon1July2023,advancingto100percentby1July2025(MIGA,2024b)

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Geographicaldistribution

Between2014and2023,newPRIissuancewaspredominantlydirectedtowardsprojectsindevelopingcountries,whichaccountedfor70percentofthetotalcoverage(figure3).LDCsanddevelopedcountrieseachrepresented15percentofinsuredprojects.Privateinsurers,focusedmoreondevelopedmarkets,covering27percentofprojects,whileLDCsmadeuplessthan6percentoftheirportfolio.Incontrast,asexpected,multilateralinstitutionsallocatedasignificantshareoftheirPRIcoveragetoLDCs,withoveraquarteroftheirinsuredprojectsinthesecountries.Bilateralpublicproviders,however,focusedprimarilyondevelopingcountries,especiallyhighermiddle-incomeones,whichcomprised72percentoftheprojectstheyinsured.Only15percentoftheircoverageextendedtoLDCs.

Figure3

ShareoftotalnewPRIvolumeissuedbetween2014and2023bytypeofproviderandlevelofdevelopmentofrecipientcountryofprojects,percent

PublicbilateralMultilateralPrivate

15

10

4

7

56

78

1

12

4

10

TotalDevelopingeconomiesLDCsDevelopedeconomies

Source:UNTradeandDevelopmentbasedonBerneUnionSecretariatdata.

ThegeographicaldistributionofPRIcoveragealsovariesbytypeofprovider(figure4).Publicbilateralinstitutionsconcentrated64percentoftheircoverageinAsia,reflectingstrategicprioritiesandChina’sdualroleasamajorrecipientofPRIandaleadingprovider(tables1and2).PrivateinsurerssimilarlyfocusedonAsia,wheretheyinsurednearly40percentoftheirprojects.Incontrast,multilateralinstitutionsdedicatedalargershareoftheircoveragetoAfrica,whichaccountedfor36percentoftheirprojects(box2).TheremainderoftheircoveragewasdistributedacrossLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(26percent),developingAsia(23percent)andEurope(16percent).

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Figure4

AsiareceivesmostECAandprivatePRI,AfricamostmultilateralPRI

GeographicaldistributionofcountriescoveredbyPRI,inpercentageoftotalPRIvolumebytypeofprovider,2014–2023

AfricaAsiaEuropeLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanNorthAmericaOceaniaOtherdevelopedcountries

5

26

16

23

35

1

20

21

38

14

3

9

9

64

14

PublicbilateralMultilateralPrivate

Source:UNTradeandDevelopmentbasedonBerneUnionSecretariatdata.

ThetoprecipientsofPRIarelocatedinAsia,withKazakhstanreceivingthehighestPRIcoverageduringtheperiod2008–2023.9OtherleadingrecipientsinAsiaincludeChina,Indonesia,PakistanandVietNam.InLatinAmerica,BrazilandMexicolead,alongwithPeru,whichstandsoutforitssignificantminingprojects.TheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoandEgyptaretheonlyAfricancountriesamongthetop20recipientsofPRIin2016–2023.WhileprojectsinEgyptarerelativelydiversified,thoseintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoarefocusedonminingandarepredominantlyunderwrittenbySINOSURE.10SINOSUREalsoplaysamajorroleininsuringprojectsintheUnitedStates.11AmongLDCs,CambodiaandtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoaretheonlyonesinthetop20PRIrecipientsfor2016–2023.Cambodiahostsinsuredprojectsacrossinfrastructure,renewableenergyandmanufacturing.LaoPeople’sDemocraticRepublic,MyanmarandSierraLeone,whichwereamongtop20recipientsduringtheperiod2008–2015,droppedoutofthelistfor2016–2023.

9Sectoraldatahavebeenavailableonlysince2019,butduringtheperiod2019–2023,90percentoftheprojectscoveredinKazakhstanwereintheinfrastructuresectorandareprimarilyinsuredbybilateralECAs.

10In2023,SINOSUREaccountedformorethan90percentofthePRIprovidedforprojectsintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo.

11In2023,SINOSUREaccountedfor100percentofPRIprovidedforprojectsintheUnitedStates.

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Table2

AsiancountriesaretheleadingrecipientsofPRI

PRI,top20recipientcountries,billionsofdollars,2008-2023

2008-2015

2016-2023

Kazakhstan

61

Indonesia

33

RussianFederation

43

Kazakhstan

31

China

34

China

31

Brazil

24

VietNam

24

Indonesia

24

Peru

14

Uzbekistan

17

Pakistan

14

India

16

Brazil

12

Peru

14

SaudiArabia

12

Mexico

14

Mexico

12

Türkiye

13

Uzbekistan

11

UnitedStates

13

Egypt

11

Cambodia

10

DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo

11

Egypt

9

RussianFederation

10

Myanmar

9

India

10

SaudiArabia

8

Türkiye

9

LaosPeople’sDemocraticRepublic

7

Argentina

8

VietNam

7

Cambodia

8

Thailand

7

UnitedStates

8

Malaysia

7

Thailand

8

SierraLeone

7

Malaysia

8

Totaltop20

344

Totaltop20

286

Source:UNTradeandDevelopment,basedonBerneUnionSecretariatdata.