最新版巴菲特寫給股東的信中文翻譯3月16日發(fā)布.pdf

轉(zhuǎn)載請注明 ArKiller 翻譯，非常感謝！ (March 16, 2014, Version I) 1 / 48 2014 年巴菲特致股東的信 ArKiller 翻譯 Berkshires Corporate Performance vs. the S 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshires results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S figure that one out.) This weird accounting, you should understand, instantly increased Berkshires excess of intrinsic value over book value by the same $1.8 billion. 兩筆收購讓我們增加了 3 億的稅前利潤， 帶來 8 億的現(xiàn)金流。 但是去年的信中已經(jīng)講 過的， “虛幻”的會計準則要求我們以低于支付金額 18 億的價格對它入賬，于是減少 了伯克希爾的賬面價值。 （這項費用應(yīng)該記在“超過賬面價值的資本”項目下；一個 報表上沒有的項目） 。大家應(yīng)該明白，這條怪異的會計要求使得伯克希爾內(nèi)在價值和 賬面價值的差距增加了 18 億。 Our subsidiaries spent a record $11 billion on plant and equipment during 2013, roughly twice our depreciation charge. About 89% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunity resides in America. 2013 年，伯克希爾所屬企業(yè)在廠房、設(shè)備上的資本開支達到 110 億，幾乎是折舊額 的 2 倍。大約 89%的錢投在了美國。我們也在國外投資，但是投資機會的主礦脈還是 在美國。 In a year in which most equity managers found it impossible to outperform the S its better to have a partial interest in the Hope diamond than to own all of a rhinestone. 四家公司都擁有良好的業(yè)務(wù)，并由聰明而且為股東著想的經(jīng)理人掌管。在伯克希爾， 我們情愿擁有一家好公司非控制性但大比例的持股，也不愿意 100%擁有一家普普通 通的公司；寧愿擁有希望之星的一部分，也不愿要一整顆人造鉆石，同樣的道理。 Going by our yearend holdings, our portion of the “Big Fours” 2013 earnings amounted to $4.4 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive about $1.4 billion last year. But make no mistake: The $3 billion of their earnings we dont report is every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records. 以年末的持股比例計算，2013 年四大歸屬于我們的利潤 44 億。但是在利潤表上，我 們只報告了分紅大約 14 億。 但是別犯迷糊： 沒有報告的 30 億利潤每一分都和賬 上報告的一樣值錢。 The earnings that these four companies retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock a move that enhances our share of future earnings as well as for funding business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees will grow substantially over 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明 ArKiller 翻譯，非常感謝！ (March 16, 2014, Version I) 12 / 48 time. If they do, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, our unrealized capital gains will, too. (For the four, unrealized gains already totaled $39 billion at yearend.) 4 家公司留存的利潤經(jīng)常被用于回購股票這將增加未來我們所占的利潤比例， 或 者投資于有利可圖的新業(yè)務(wù)。可以預(yù)期，我們在“四大”上的每股投資利潤都會不斷 顯著增長。倘若事實的確如此，伯克希爾獲得的分紅也將隨之增加，更重要的是，我 們的未實現(xiàn)資本收益也會增長。 （截止年底，我們在“四大”上的未實現(xiàn)收益累計 390 億美元。 ） Our flexibility in capital allocation our willingness to invest large sums passively in on-controlled businesses gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Woody Allen stated the general idea when he said: “The advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.” Similarly, our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for our endless gusher of cash. 相比于那些局限于投資自身能夠運營的業(yè)務(wù)的公司， 我們在投資上的靈活性大額 進行被動投資的意愿， 讓我們擁有更多優(yōu)勢。 伍迪 艾倫說過， “雙性戀的好處就是， 周六晚上約會的概率可以提高一倍。 ”同樣，我們即投資可以自己運營的業(yè)務(wù)，又愿 意被動投資，于是我們源源不斷的現(xiàn)金找尋到合適投資機會的概率也提高了一倍。 * Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshires history. At the time, I called the transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.” 2009 年年末，在大衰退的陰影中，我們通過了買下 BNSF 的決定，伯克希爾歷史上最大的收 購。當(dāng)時我把這筆交易稱作是“完全下注于美國經(jīng)濟的賭博” 。 That kind of commitment was nothing new for us: Weve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too. Charlie and I have always considered a “bet” on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing. 當(dāng)然這對我們來說也不是新鮮事了：從巴菲特合伙公司 1965 年買下伯克希爾以來，我們一 直在下類似的賭注。以同樣充分的理由。查理和我一直認為“賭”美國長盛不衰，幾乎是一 件只賺不賠的事。 Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 237 years by betting against America? If you compare our countrys present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. And the dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. Americas best days lie ahead. 過去的 237 年里看空美國的人中誰獲益了？如果把我們國家現(xiàn)在的樣子和 1776 年作一個比 較，大家一定不敢相信自己的眼睛。而且市場經(jīng)濟的內(nèi)在機制還會繼續(xù)發(fā)揮它的魔力，美國 的好日子還在前頭。 With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshires per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明 ArKiller 翻譯，非常感謝！ (March 16, 2014, Version I) 13 / 48 increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares. Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will still be playing major roles in our economy. Insurance will concomitantly be essential for both businesses and individuals and no company brings greater human and financial resources to that business than Berkshire. 趁著順風(fēng)，查理和我希望通過以下方式更進一步增加伯克希爾的每股內(nèi)在價值：1、持續(xù)增 強各個業(yè)務(wù)公司的盈利能力；2、繼續(xù)通過補強型收購來增加它們的利潤；3、從我們投資的 公司的增長中獲益； 4、 當(dāng)伯克希爾的股價下跌到相對內(nèi)在價值有很大折扣時回購公司股票； 5、偶爾進行大型的收購。少數(shù)情況下，我們也可能通過增發(fā)伯克希爾的股票來最大化大家 的收益。這些方式都有其堅實的基礎(chǔ)。一個世紀內(nèi)，BNSF 和中美洲能源還將繼續(xù)在我們的 經(jīng)濟中扮演重要角色。無論對于公司還是個人，保險業(yè)務(wù)也依然不可或缺，在這方面，伯克 希爾投入的人力和資金超過其他任何公司。 Moreover, we will always maintain supreme financial strength, operating with at least $20 billion of cash equivalents and never incurring material amounts of short-term obligations. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your companys prospects. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management. 另外，我們依然會保持高度的財務(wù)穩(wěn)健，維持至少 200 億的現(xiàn)金及等價物，并避免承擔(dān)大規(guī) 模的短期債務(wù)。考慮到方方面面的優(yōu)勢，查理和我非常看好公司的未來。我們感到非常幸運 能夠?qū)⒇敻煌懈督o公司管理。 Intrinsic Business Value 內(nèi)在價值內(nèi)在價值 As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements one of them qualitative that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshires intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 109 - 110. 查理和我時常提到內(nèi)在價值， 但是我們很難告訴大家伯克希爾每股內(nèi)在價值的準確數(shù)字 （實 際上，其他任何股票都不能） 。2010 年的年報中，我們提出了三個基本要素其中一個是 定性的， 我們相信這些要素是衡量伯克希爾內(nèi)在價值的關(guān)鍵指標。 這些討論我們完整地收錄 在 109-110 頁。 Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2013 our per-share investments increased 13.6% to $129,253 and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 12.8% to $9,116 per share. 這里是我們對兩個定量指標的更新：2013 年，我們的每股投資增長了 13.6%至 129,253，另 外我們的非保險非投資業(yè)務(wù)每股稅前利潤增長了 12.8%至 9,116。 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明 ArKiller 翻譯，非常感謝！ (March 16, 2014, Version I) 14 / 48 Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.3% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 43-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but we will most strongly focus on building operating earnings. 1970 年來，我們的每股投資以每年 19.3%的速度復(fù)合增長，同時我們的運營利潤數(shù)增速是 20.6%。 伯克希爾的股價 43 年來以一個類似的速度增長并非巧合。 查理和我喜歡看到兩個部 分都獲得增長，但是我們會更在意運營利潤。 * Now, lets examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So well present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But dont get any ideas!) 接下來，我們看一下公司四個主要板塊的業(yè)務(wù)情況。四個板塊都有完全不同的資產(chǎn)負債表 和收入特性。所以我們把它們區(qū)別對待，這也是查理和我看待業(yè)務(wù)的方式（但是把它們在同 一個體系中運作是非常重要并且具有優(yōu)勢的） 。假設(shè)我們位置互換，我們自己是沒到場的股 東，而大家是作報告的管理層，那提供我們想要知道的信息就是以下匯報的目標。 Insurance 保險業(yè)務(wù) “Our investment in the insurance companies reflects a first major step in our efforts to achieve a more diversified base of earning power.” 1967 Annual Report “在保險行業(yè)的投資是我們形成多元化利潤來源的重要一步。 ” 1967年年報 Lets look first at insurance, Berkshires core operation and the engine that has consistently propelled our expansion since that 1967 report was published. 我們先來看保險業(yè)務(wù)，1967 年的年報發(fā)布以來不斷驅(qū)動伯克希爾前進和擴張的核心業(yè)務(wù)。 Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums money we call “float” that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows: 財產(chǎn)保險公司先收取保費，事后進行理賠支付。在一些極端情況下，比如某些工傷保險，賠 付可能發(fā)生在幾十年之后。 這種現(xiàn)在收錢， 將來賠付的模式讓我們持有大量的現(xiàn)金我們 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明 ArKiller 翻譯，非常感謝！ (March 16, 2014, Version I) 15 / 48 把它稱作“浮存金”最終它會支付到別人手中。同時，我們可以使用這些浮存金為伯克 希爾投資。 雖然單筆的保單和索賠有進有出， 但是我們持有的浮存金總額和保費收入維持一 個穩(wěn)定關(guān)系。所以，當(dāng)我們的業(yè)務(wù)擴張時，我們的浮存金規(guī)模也擴張。我們增長的速度，參 見下面的表格： Year Float (in $ millions) 1970 39 1980 237 1990 1,632 2000 27,871 2010 65,832 2013 77,240 年份 浮存金（百萬美元） 1970 39 1980 237 1990 1,632 2000 27,871 2010 65,832 2013 77,240 Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICOs float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnitys reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. (In this respect, property-casualty insurance differs in an important way from certain forms of life insurance.) 獲取更多的浮存金越來越困難了。不過 GEICO 的浮存金繼續(xù)增長基本確定無疑。在 National Indemnity 的再保險業(yè)務(wù)部門，我們流失了一些保單，浮存金也相應(yīng)下降。即便未來我們出 現(xiàn)浮存金的下降，那也會是非常輕微的每年最多不會超過 3%。相較于我們的流動性規(guī) 模，我們的保單特性保證我們不會受制于任何短期的流動性壓力。 （在這方面，財險業(yè)務(wù)和 某些形式的壽險業(yè)務(wù)有非常的區(qū)別。 ） If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money and, better yet, get paid for holding it. 如果我們的保費收入超過了總成本和最終的賠付支出， 我們會在利用浮存金投資獲得的投資 收益之外，錄得一個承保利潤。賺到這種利潤的時候，我們是在享受持有這些免費資金的好 處更好的是，我們還因為持有資金而賺到錢。這就好像你去銀行貸款，銀行還倒貼給你 利息。 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明 ArKiller 翻譯，非常感謝！ (March 16, 2014, Version I) 16 / 48 Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the countrys largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in nine of the twelve years ending in 2012 (the latest year for which their financials are available, as I write this). Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry despite the float income all companies enjoy will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns as compared to other businesses. 不幸的是， 保險公司實現(xiàn)這個美好結(jié)果的強烈愿望導(dǎo)致了激烈的競爭， 競爭如此慘烈以至于 大多數(shù)年份，財產(chǎn)保險行業(yè)整體處在嚴重的承保虧損中運行。這筆承保虧損，實質(zhì)上就是整 個行業(yè)為了獲得浮存金而支付的成本。舉個例子，State Farm，當(dāng)前美國最大且管理良好的 保險公司， 截止到 2012 年前的 12 年里有 9 年都錄得承保虧損 （依據(jù)我寫作本報告時所能獲 得的最新一年的財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)） 。保險行業(yè)有很多種虧錢的方式，而且這個行業(yè)從來不曾停止尋 找新的虧錢方式。 As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eleven consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $22 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers who know that while float is valuable, it can be drowned by poor underwriting results. 正如前一部分提到的，我們已經(jīng)連續(xù) 11 年錄得承保利潤，我們這一時期內(nèi)的稅前承保利潤 累計達 220 億美元。預(yù)計未來大部分年份中，我們依然會保持錄得承保利潤。實現(xiàn)承保利潤 是我們保險公司管理層的每日工作， 他們明白浮存金的價值， 糟糕的承保虧損將會吞噬它的 價值。 So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshires book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims some $17 billion to more than five million claimants in 2013 and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float. If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. 那我們誘人的浮存金將會如何影響內(nèi)在價值？當(dāng)伯克希爾計算賬面價值的時候， 所有的浮存 金都作為負債被扣除了，就好像我們明天就要兌現(xiàn)債務(wù)，并且再也無法補充回來。但把浮存 金當(dāng)做一種嚴格意義上的負債是錯誤的，它實際上應(yīng)該被看做一筆循環(huán)基金。2013 年，我 們平均每天賠付超過 500 多萬筆保單總計 170 億美元這減少了浮存金。 同時， 我們每天 都承接新保單從而增加浮存金。 如果浮存金是無成本并且是長期存在的， 我相信對伯克希爾 來說確實如此，那這項負債的真實價值就遠比賬面負債小得多。 A counterpart to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明 ArKiller 翻譯，非常感謝！ (March 16, 2014, Version I) 17 / 48 business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost. 我們資產(chǎn)賬面上記錄的， 對應(yīng)保險公司的 155 億 “商譽” 部分地抵消了負債賬面價值的高估。 實際上， 這些商譽代表著我們?yōu)楸ｋU公司產(chǎn)生浮存金的能力所支付的價格。 然而商譽的賬面 成本，和它的真實價值毫無對應(yīng)關(guān)系。比如說一家持續(xù)產(chǎn)生大額承保虧損的保險公司，其商 譽應(yīng)該為零，無論其歷史成本是多少。 Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation possessing float of similar quality to that we have to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason a huge reason why we believe Berkshires intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value. 幸運的是，伯克希爾的情況不是那樣。查理和我相信，我們保險公司的真實商譽我們愿 意為購買一家能產(chǎn)生類似質(zhì)量的浮存金的保險公司所支付的價格遠超過賬面上記錄的 歷史成本。 浮存金的價值是我們認為伯克希爾的內(nèi)在價值明顯超過賬面價值的一個原因 一個重要原因。 * Berkshires attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess strong, hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units. 伯克希爾優(yōu)越的經(jīng)濟特性之所以存在， 是因為我們有一群卓越的經(jīng)理人經(jīng)營我們拿手的業(yè)務(wù)， 并且這些業(yè)務(wù)模式基礎(chǔ)強健并且難以復(fù)制。讓我將給大家介紹一些主要的公司。 First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega catastrophe a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. And we would remain awash in cash, looking for large opportunities if the catastrophe caused markets to go into shock. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency. 首先，浮存金規(guī)模排在第一的是伯克希爾哈撒韋再保險集團，由 Ajit Jain 領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。Ajit 對其他 人都不愿意承保，或者沒有足夠資本進行承保的風(fēng)險進行承保。他的公司集能力、速度、果 斷，以及最重要的，保險專業(yè)智慧于一身。他從未讓伯克希爾暴露于與我們的資源不相稱的 風(fēng)險之下。實際上，我們比多數(shù)大保險公司在規(guī)避風(fēng)險方面都更加謹慎。舉例來說，如果保 險行業(yè)因某項巨災(zāi)遭遇了 2500 億美元的虧損這是歷史上所發(fā)生過最大規(guī)模虧損的 3 倍 伯克希爾當(dāng)年整體上依然能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)盈利， 因為它有如此多的利潤來源。 我們一直會攥滿 現(xiàn)金， 等待巨災(zāi)沖擊市場這樣的好機會。 而其他的大保險公司和再保險公司則可能會出現(xiàn)大 額的虧損，有些甚至將面臨破產(chǎn)。 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明 ArKiller 翻譯，非常感謝！ (March 16, 2014, Version I) 18 / 48 From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $37 billion and a large cumulative underwriting profit, a feat no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. Ajits mind is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment. 從 1985 年開始，Ajit 已經(jīng)創(chuàng)立了一個浮存金 370 億美元，實現(xiàn)巨額累計承保利潤的再保險 公司，這是一項任何其他保險公司的 CEO 都難以望其項背成就。Ajit 的大腦就想一個創(chuàng)意工 廠，無時不刻搜尋著任何可以擴展他現(xiàn)有業(yè)務(wù)的機會。 One venture materialized last June when he formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly accepted by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. These professionals recognize that no other insurer can match the financial strength of Berkshire, which guarantees that legitimate claims arising many years in the future will be paid promptly and fully. 去年 6 月一項新業(yè)務(wù)成行，Ajit 組建了伯克希爾哈撒韋專業(yè)保險公司（ “BHSI” ） 。這是我們首 次進入商業(yè)保險領(lǐng)域， 全國主要的保險經(jīng)紀人和企業(yè)風(fēng)險管理人都非常認可我們。 這些專業(yè) 人士明白， 在財務(wù)穩(wěn)健方面沒有任何其他保險公司可與伯克希爾相比， 這保證了它們未來多 年的任何合法索賠都會得到及時的全額賠付。 BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. Peter has assembled a spectacular team that is already writing a substantial amount of business w