英國小企業(yè)CEO薪酬與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系研討(doc 11頁)

1、 淮 陰 工 學(xué) 院畢業(yè)設(shè)計(論文)外文資料翻譯系 （院）：經(jīng)濟管理學(xué)院專 業(yè)：財務(wù)管理姓 名：高施佳學(xué) 號：3062106438外文出處：(用外文寫)ves+work%3f附 件：1.外文資料翻譯譯文；2.外文原文。指導(dǎo)教師考語： 外文資料與課題相關(guān)性較強,翻譯符合原文意思,語言表達順暢,格式規(guī)范,符合外文翻譯要求。年月日簽名： 注：請將該封面與附件裝訂成冊。附件1：外文資料翻譯譯文 市場是否對高管有作用？英國小企業(yè)CEO薪酬和公司業(yè)績關(guān)系研究Martin J. ConyonDaphne Nicolitsas摘要：本文介紹了我們對中小型制造業(yè)公司的勞動力市場管理運作情況的調(diào)查結(jié)果。在研究過程

2、中我們使用大約40家的公司來作為研究薪酬與公司業(yè)績敏感性的樣本。在這類型的企業(yè)管理中首席執(zhí)行官的6位數(shù)薪酬遠遠低于大型上市公司,但即使如此也比我們預(yù)期的要高很多。研究分析過程中,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了一些數(shù)據(jù),表明在小企業(yè)中任職期間的CEO薪酬與其自身業(yè)績相關(guān),CEO薪酬與公司業(yè)績敏感性較強。1 引言在英國,高級管理人員的薪水上漲已經(jīng)引起社會民眾的輿論,同時也引起了其他國家的關(guān)注。而在對這個問題上,真正的關(guān)注點不在于薪金水平的高低,而是他們未能反映薪酬與業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系。（經(jīng)濟學(xué)家報紙,1995年6月3日）在合理的市場環(huán)境下,薪酬的上升趨勢,可以通過調(diào)整勞動給予曲線來穩(wěn)定,也就是可通過左移或向上移動勞動給予

3、曲線來實現(xiàn)。因為由于管理培訓(xùn)和商學(xué)院的課程擴散,提供給社會的合格管理人員人數(shù)就可能得以增加,勞動給予曲線就有可能轉(zhuǎn)移到了右側(cè),因此,在一定范圍內(nèi)至少有一個管理人員愿意增加薪水的數(shù)量來做這項工作；而對于上移需求曲線時,管理人員的邊際產(chǎn)品必須增加,也就是說,管理者必須要更加富有成效。管理者為提高他們的生產(chǎn)力可以通過控制更多的資源或通過控制一個常數(shù)實現(xiàn)。為了給“市場是否對高管期作用？”的問題提供一個參考答案,我們在這里要探討以下方面：也就是我們機構(gòu)測試的雙重假設(shè)模式：（一）行政賠償和經(jīng)濟績效呈正相關(guān)；（二）業(yè)績越差的公司,其CEO更迭的可能性越大。英國和美國同時對前一個命題進行了測試,總的來說 ,使

4、用的數(shù)據(jù)都來自大型上市公司。本文強調(diào)了在過去研究中受到較少關(guān)注的問題,英國小企業(yè)中就執(zhí)行確定薪水為重點的薪酬戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)驗（一個破例：斯托里,沃森,威尼司克,1995年）。其次,是創(chuàng)新CEO薪酬的焦點。受詹森和墨菲（1990）論文的影響,以美國大公司的數(shù)據(jù)為研究基礎(chǔ),說明了提供統(tǒng)一的就業(yè)解雇規(guī)范化行為對管理人員和所有者造成了威脅。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)：公司高管薪酬與業(yè)績關(guān)系比代理理論預(yù)測的更大。然而,已發(fā)表的證據(jù)證明：在英國小企業(yè)中缺乏薪酬業(yè)績關(guān)聯(lián)的執(zhí)行機制,此外,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)實中存在大量比小公司更有效的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)。目前的研究階段是希望通過增加對勞動力市場管理紀律的了解,評估小公司的經(jīng)理在公司業(yè)績不佳的情況下,薪酬

5、上漲的可能性。本文的其余部分組織如下：第節(jié)進行分析；第節(jié)簡要介紹使用的數(shù)據(jù),并提出管理人員的薪酬和公司規(guī)模關(guān)系的一些事實問題；第節(jié)介紹使用的框架和性能；第節(jié)介紹公司業(yè)績與薪酬之間的關(guān)系。2 分析框架上世紀六十年代開始關(guān)注對高管薪酬的理論研究,但是隨著信息經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展,它只持續(xù)了一段時間。從羅森（1990）的研究分析中可以找到所涉及問題的最佳解釋和發(fā)展的模型。本文以大量的工作理論為基礎(chǔ),夠建了實證分析的框架。2.1 企業(yè)規(guī)模與高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系從CEO是公司的最高管理員的角度講,羅森（1990）從高管經(jīng)營業(yè)績水平較低的實證研究中表明了高管的薪酬與組織規(guī)模大小的緊密關(guān)聯(lián)性。我們對人才內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)做出假設(shè)

6、：CEO薪酬是與控制在每個層次（s）和對層（不適用若干層跨度增加）參與,這樣就更能提高個人層次對這種結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。因此,所期望的是有更多的管理信息是反映高管薪酬與企業(yè)規(guī)模大小是呈正相關(guān)的。（見羅森,1990）。這種假設(shè)已經(jīng)在對數(shù)形式的線性回歸模型研究中得到了驗證： ln Wit =a + b 1n xit + gt + dj + ui + hit (1)其中：i表示該公司,t表示時間；W表示CEO實際薪酬;x表示衡量的大小,一般是由其總就業(yè)人數(shù),實際資產(chǎn)總額或?qū)嶋H銷售組成;t表示假設(shè)的受時間控制的總變化量;j表示假設(shè)某一行業(yè)的生產(chǎn)僅限于受企業(yè)規(guī)模大小控制；Ui表示企業(yè)受不確定性因素的影響;it表

7、示是由企業(yè)規(guī)模和時間帶來的無法預(yù)測的影響。2.2 薪酬和能力之間的關(guān)系在研究模型中,我們一開始假設(shè)高管的個人能力對于高管薪酬的影響是不可預(yù)測的,可見,個人業(yè)績的表現(xiàn)過程對薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)是有很重要的影響的。所以設(shè)W,一些業(yè)績表現(xiàn)；Y,特別是努力（e）和自然狀態(tài)（e）作用于CEO的薪酬（尤其見：哈特,1995函數(shù)）。其中,“自然狀態(tài)”表示大環(huán)境相近,即有類似的企業(yè)規(guī)模與生產(chǎn)力。 W = f(Y); f ¢ > 0 (2) Y = f(e, e); f¢1 > 0, f¢2 ? 0 (3)思考過程是這樣的：由于是自然狀態(tài)下的企業(yè),所以受管理者個人業(yè)績以外因素作用的

8、差異程度就顯得相對較小,這樣也就更利于體現(xiàn)個人能力對企業(yè)的影響力程度。但是這個問題比較復(fù)雜,因為即使某一個行業(yè)可能受到宏觀經(jīng)濟環(huán)境影響程度類似,但接觸不利沖擊的程度的大小卻是一個由不同管理決定而導(dǎo)致。所以,這個設(shè)計就應(yīng)該要達到薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)風(fēng)險的權(quán)衡和激勵的最佳狀態(tài)兩方面的要求。通過對上面（1）公式的實證研究分析 ,可估算確定薪酬和績效之間的關(guān)系如下： ln Wit = ai + b1 1n vi, t 1 + b2 1n xi, t 1+ gt ´ t + dj ´ t + uit (4)其中：I 表示特定企業(yè)中固定不變的影響（常量）；vi, t 1表示一些業(yè)績指標（如每名雇員

9、帶來的利潤,會計收益率,股東回報率,銷售,企業(yè)的利潤相對于行業(yè)的利潤水平）；xi, t 1 表示實施范圍,uit表示是有關(guān)企業(yè)和個人時期都無法觀察到的影響。其余的變量在方程（1）段中已經(jīng)說明。自從我們這一年來的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),業(yè)績與薪酬的關(guān)系越來越緊密,這很有可能他們之間存在著內(nèi)源性。也就是說,薪酬反作用于企業(yè)績效。此外,也可能是CEO的薪酬決策是在本財政年度結(jié)束之前決定,這就表明了利用右移變量可以使得內(nèi)部更合理化。2.3 營業(yè)額與業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系股東可以通過利用薪酬與績效之間的關(guān)系,進行激勵管理。就像在引言中指出的一樣,在對英國的樣本研究中表明,英國一直關(guān)注股東利益的最大化條件下,薪酬和績效之間薄弱

10、的聯(lián)系可能導(dǎo)致公司的激勵管理機制失效。然而,可以通過其他手段來規(guī)范管理行為。進一步來說,是所有者可以通過評價CEO在過去所作出的業(yè)績來進行管理。 這個假設(shè)的結(jié)果是通過CEO輪換制來實現(xiàn)的：如果在任期間業(yè)績表現(xiàn)良好,那么應(yīng)該得到相應(yīng)回報,反之亦然,不管其他原因,公司業(yè)績差將直接導(dǎo)致首席執(zhí)行官的更換。換言之,CEO將面臨被解雇的威脅（見詹森,墨菲 1990; 威斯巴赫 1988）。一個基本的模式是如下的形式： Pr(DCEOit) = F(xb) =exp(xb)/(1 + exp xb) (5)其中：CEOit表示一位首席執(zhí)行官以新的或其他方式存在；在x向量中包括了在過去的P時期公司的平均表現(xiàn)；

11、 加權(quán)是表示首席執(zhí)行官的特點,qkt,一些不隨時間變化的（如出生日期, 國籍）和有些是隨時間變化（如選擇任用,教育）的量。關(guān)于預(yù)期業(yè)績計量的符號為負。然后,現(xiàn)任首席執(zhí)行官的業(yè)績好,就獲得嘉獎；業(yè)績差,就必須受到懲罰,也就意味著將重新選舉新的首席執(zhí)行官。在第4部分和第5部分將使用數(shù)據(jù)進一步驗證以證明上面的假設(shè)。2.4 最近的薪酬和營業(yè)額的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)下面我們將提供一個最新研究數(shù)據(jù),主要是關(guān)于英國薪酬和營業(yè)額調(diào)查的研究,這有助于證明我們的研究結(jié)果。卡尼歐,格雷格和梅欽（1995年）審查了關(guān)于董事支付與公司治理的一些最新數(shù)據(jù)。這項研究中的大樣本大多關(guān)系到上市公司。研究得出的主要結(jié)論是：高收入的董事和其采

12、取的公司治理措施,薪酬與個人業(yè)績聯(lián)系很少。例如,格雷格,梅欽和斯曼斯基（1993年）使用的樣本是1983年至1988年期間288個英國上市公司找到的一個股東回報期間的彈性薪酬為0.03。而對于1989-91年期間相同的取樣結(jié)果顯示企業(yè)的這個彈性為零。結(jié)果表明符合美國研究的結(jié)論。詹森和墨菲（1990）有影響的論文中也報告說,薪酬與績效之間的敏感度低,股東財富每增加1000美元CEO的財富增加 3.25美元。在上述研究中存在著的一個不足之處就是：在表明業(yè)績向下的關(guān)系時,可能是因為董事?lián)蜟EO時股票期權(quán)是不算在薪酬尺度之內(nèi)引起的,這就說明存在著薪酬的偏置區(qū)間。布魯斯和巴克（1996）使用1990年

13、60家大公司的FT-SE100指數(shù)進行研究,他們發(fā)現(xiàn),當以包括期權(quán)的價值作為薪酬時,管理人員的薪酬與業(yè)績關(guān)系表現(xiàn)還是比較敏感的。附件2:外文原文(復(fù)印件)Does the Market for Top Executives Work ?CEO Pay and Turnover in Small U.K. CompaniesMartin J. ConyonDaphne NicolitsasABSTRACT. This paper presents the results of our investigation into the operation of the managerial labou

14、r market in small and medium sized manufacturing companies. Using a sample of some 40 or so companies we study the sensitivity of managerial pay and tenure to company performance. Managerial pay in this type of firms is much lower than the six digit figures quoted for large public companies and CEO

15、turnover is much higher than we expected. We find some evidence to suggest that pay in small companies is sensitive to sales growth and that CEO tenure in public companies responds to the growth in sales.1. IntroductionThe soaring pay of top executives has caused a public outcry in Britain, and rumb

16、lings of discontent in other countries. The real problem is not the level of salaries, but their failure to reflect performance. The Economist Newspaper, 3 June 1995 (Our emphasis added)Within the context of a market environment an upward trend in pay could be justified either by an upward shift of

17、the labour demand curve with a constant labour supply curve, or by a shift to the left of the labour supply curve. The supply of suitably qualified managers has probably increased given the proliferation of management training and Business School courses. So the labour supply curve is likely to have

18、 shifted tothe right. Thus at least within a certain wage range there is an increase in the number of managers willing to do the job. For the demand curve to have shifted upwards the marginal product of managers must have increased; that is, managers must have become more productive. Managers can in

19、crease their productivity either by controlling more resources or by controlling a constant amount of resources more effectively. We here address the following question: Does the market for top executive work? In order to provide an answer to this we test the twin predictions of the agency model tha

20、t (i) executive compensation and economic performance are positively correlated and (ii) that poor company performance results in a higher probability of CEO turnover. The former proposition has been tested for both the U.K. and the U.S. using, in general, data for large quoted companies. A recent r

21、eview of this literature is presented in Conyon, Gregg and Machin (1995).This paper augments the U.K. empirical literature on the determination of top pay by focusing on executive wage setting in small companies; an area that has received comparatively little attention (an exception is Storey, Watso

22、n and Wynarczyk, 1995). The second innovation herein is the focus on CEO turnover. The influential paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990), based on data for large U.S. firms, illustrates that the discipline provided by the threat of job dismissal acts to align the objectives of managers and owners. They

23、find that management turnover is greater in companies with poor economic performance as predicted by the agency theory. There is, however, a paucity of published evidence on the executive turnover mechanism in U.K. companies. Furthermore, the studies that do exist relate to large rather than small f

24、irms (see Cosh and Hughes, 1995).The current paper hopes to add to the understanding of managerial labour markets by assessing whether managers in small firms are disciplined for poor company performance by increased probability of turnover.The rest of this paper is organised as follows; Section 2 s

25、ets out the framework used in the analysis, Section 3 briefly describes the data used and presents some facts on the issues of interest, Section 4 looks at the relationship between management pay and company size and performance. Section 5 presents information on the relationship between turnover an

26、d company performance. Section 6 concludes.2. A framework for analysisTheoretical interest in the market for top executives started in the 1960s but only took off recently in the last decade or so following developments in information economics. The best exposition of the issues involved and the dev

27、elopment of the appropriate models can be found in Rosen (1990). This section draws heavily on this work to outline the theoretical framework which forms the basis for the empirical analysis.2.1. The relationship between executive pay and firm sizeStarting from the premise that firms are organized i

28、n a hierarchical structure with the CEO at the top, Rosen (1990) has shown that executive pay and organisation size are positively correlated since the marginal product of the CEO is reproduced at each lower level. Assuming that the distribution of talent is such that more able individuals are highe

29、r up the hierarchy the implications of this structure are that CEO pay is increasing with the span of control at each layer of the hierarchy (s) and the number of layers (n) involved. So, the expectation is that executive compensation and company size are positively correlated reflecting the greater

30、 managerial talent of those at the apex of the company (see Rosen, 1990).In empirical work this hypothesis has been investigated using log-linear regressions of the form.Ln Wit =a + b 1n xit + gt + dj + ui + hit (1)where:i represents the firm, and t the year;W is CEO real pay;x represents size measu

31、red, in general, by total employment, total real assets or real sales;gt are time dummies to control for aggregate variations;dj are industry dummies to control for factors specific to the industry in which the firm belongs;ui are unobservable firm-specific effects; andhit represents unobservable ef

32、fects pertaining to both individual firms and time periods.2.2. The relationship between pay and performanceIn modelling the pay of top executives we start with the presumption that managers effort is unobservable. Thus pay has to be linked with a performance measure which in turn is a function of e

33、ffort. Thus W, the CEOs pay is a function of some performance measure Y which, in turn, is a function of, inter alia, effort (e) and the state of nature (e) (see, inter alia, Hart, 1995). Where thstate of nature represents both firm-level and industry-wide shocks.W = f(Y); f ¢ > 0 (2)Y = f(e

34、, e); f¢1 > 0, f¢2 ? 0 (3)The idea is that the state of nature affects all firms and thus differences in relative performance reveal information about the managers effort. The issue is more complicated, however, since although it is not possible for a single firm to influence the macroe

35、conomic environment, the level of exposure to different adverse shocks is a management decision. The design of the payment scheme should thus achieve the optimal trade-off between risk and motivation.In the empirical analysis the interest is in identifying the relationship between pay and performanc

36、e by estimating equations of the form.1ln Wit = ai + b1 1n vi, t 1 + b2 1n xi, t 1+ gt ´ t + dj ´ t + uit (4)where: ai represents firm-specific unobservable fixed effects;vi, t 1 represents some measure of performance (e.g. profits per employee, accounting rates of return, shareholder rate

37、 of return, sales, firm profits relative to industry profits);xi, t 1 measures size, uit represents unobservable effects pertaining to both individual firms and time periods. The rest of the variables are as in equation (1) above.The performance and size variables are lagged by a year since we are i

38、nterested in the sensitivity of remuneration to past achievements whereas the current value of size and performance is likely to be endogenous. That is, corporate performance could also be affected by pay. Additionally, since it is likely that the pay of the CEO is decided before the end of the curr

39、ent financial year this provides an additional rationale for using lagged right hand side variables.2.3. The relationship between turnover and performanceThe relationship between pay and performance is only one way by which the shareholders can motivate management. Since, as noted in the introductio

40、n, the evidence for the U.K. suggests that the link between compensation and performance has been at best weak, this has led to concerns that the incentive structure faced by managers at leading U.K. companies in pursuing shareholders interests may not be effective. It is, however, possible to regul

41、ate management behaviour by other means. More specifically the owners could monitor management by making tenure a function of past performance.The proposition under scrutiny then is whether good performance is rewarded by re-electing the CEO and, vice versa, whether bad company performance leads to

42、replacement of the CEO. In other words the issue is whether the threat of dismissal could act as a discipline device (see Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Weisbach, 1988).A basic model is thus of the form:Pr(DCEOit) = F(xb) =exp(xb)/(1 + exp xb) (5)where:DCEOit indicates the presence or otherwise of a new C

43、EO;The x vector includes a measure of average firm performance during the last p periods;, and CEO characteristics, qkt, some of which are time invariant (e.g. date of birth, nationality) and some of which are time varying (e.g. alternative appointments, education).The expected sign on the performan

44、ce measure is negative. That is good performance is rewarded by re-electing the current CEO and bad performance is punished by bringing in a new CEO.Sections 4 and 5 use the data described next to test the above hypotheses.2.4. Some recent evidence on pay and turnoverBelow we present a succinct review of some