發(fā)展中和轉(zhuǎn)型中國家的物業(yè)稅改革【外文翻譯】

1、本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯外文文獻(xiàn)譯文標(biāo)題：發(fā)展中和轉(zhuǎn)型中國家的物業(yè)稅改革資料來源：usaid作者：roy bahl財產(chǎn)稅收征管效率國家將如何來認(rèn)識，其財產(chǎn)稅收征管效率？事實上，行政成本取決于許多 因素，包括至少收集收入的金額，資產(chǎn)的評估，稅收結(jié)構(gòu)本身的復(fù)雜性，以及 政府為建設(shè)一個健全的財產(chǎn)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施稅收征管所付岀的投資。確定為總體成 本的一個規(guī)范，并通過本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行國家間的比較，不是一個簡單問題。一些研究已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)向跨國比較，嘗試并取得總體的平均成木估計。這些研究主 要集中在經(jīng)合組織國家中，有一些比較“規(guī)范”。然而，almy (2004)研究顯 示，“ 每年的行政費(fèi)用在2至5%的收入的范圍內(nèi)的往往是西方

2、發(fā)達(dá)國家。超過10%的比例是對癥的問題?！?(almy,第25頁)如果片面估計發(fā)展中國家和轉(zhuǎn)型國家的物業(yè)稅的行政費(fèi)用，他/她可能已無 所獲。在每一個部門，負(fù)責(zé)與房地產(chǎn)稅收征管中的各種步驟所花費(fèi)的實際金額 是成本比率的分子。分母是收集的收入量。低的比率可以說明一些行政效率， 但它也可能表明一個在稅收征管的非常低的支岀。也許更可以得到從名義的測 算，這是一個假設(shè)的收集有針對性的規(guī)范評估效率，收繳率，以及其他因素的 基礎(chǔ)上收入的一定量的成本計算。這最好是在一個國家的案例研究范圍內(nèi)進(jìn)行 即使以價值為基礎(chǔ)的稅收管理，也不能作為一種相對有效的收入依據(jù)，這主 要是因為財產(chǎn)鑒定和估價的高固有的成本。與扣繳所得

3、稅或增值稅專用發(fā)票不 同，很少有客觀證據(jù)確定所謂的物業(yè)稅關(guān)系。名義的評估是必要的。此外，因 為很少能自愿遵守，收集信息的成本會較高?？梢钥隙ǖ氖牵飿I(yè)稅的征收成本可以通過采取措施，增加自愿遵守，提高登 記手續(xù)，并提供一個準(zhǔn)確的數(shù)據(jù)定期流的銷售值的展性來降低，但成本仍然會 相較于一般消費(fèi)稅，消費(fèi)稅或非農(nóng)就業(yè)稅高。物業(yè)稅在發(fā)展中國家或轉(zhuǎn)型國家 的稅收制度，要通過自身的特點來設(shè)計農(nóng)村地區(qū)的物業(yè)稅盡管他們的收入潛力低，但在很多情況下，農(nóng)村地方政府財產(chǎn)稅在規(guī)模較 小的地方政府幾乎作為收入的重耍來源。它也可以用來開發(fā)一些民選的地方官 員的問責(zé)制度，為納稅人提供服務(wù)的質(zhì)量。近年來，許多發(fā)展中國家重新考慮 他

4、們對農(nóng)村當(dāng)?shù)卣斦杖胝{(diào)集系統(tǒng)的結(jié)構(gòu)，減少這些地方政府對政府間轉(zhuǎn) 移支付的依賴。但在實踐中有太多變化。物業(yè)稅實際上是印度的村政府收入的 唯一來源。在巴西，是從城市房地產(chǎn)稅分離作為一個獨(dú)立的稅種征收的。印度 尼西亞免除坦桑尼亞農(nóng)村財產(chǎn)不征稅。如果財政分權(quán)延伸到農(nóng)村的部門，甚至 一個小的收入也是重要的一環(huán)。這些稅往往非常簡陋，通常是面積的基礎(chǔ)上， 甚至每一個房子的基礎(chǔ)上，而不是一個價值的基礎(chǔ)上，征收。收益率往往非常 低，因為稅基小，因為稅收通常并不包括所有的屬性，同時收繳率很低。然而, 這是因為農(nóng)村的房產(chǎn)稅的管理不善，如果在確定計稅依據(jù)上做出改善，可能會 增加大量相應(yīng)的收入。在一些發(fā)展中國家和轉(zhuǎn)

5、型國家的政府，也在重新考慮在對農(nóng)地征稅可能會有 顯著受益。理由是在許多國家能把對農(nóng)業(yè)部門的稅收負(fù)擔(dān)，提高到其他部門的 水平。農(nóng)業(yè)戶往往免征所得稅，所以在任何給定的收入水平他們的勞務(wù)收入比 非農(nóng)戶面臨著一個更高的稅收負(fù)擔(dān)。尤其當(dāng)有大量的在農(nóng)業(yè)部門就業(yè)的個人， 是一個嚴(yán)重的不公平。盡管上面所述，農(nóng)村財產(chǎn)稅收勢必呈現(xiàn)和當(dāng)大的挑戰(zhàn)，從征稅農(nóng)業(yè)的政治阻 力,以確定如何最好地管理。rajaraman （2004年）稱其為“最難稅”部門的 稅收。一個合理的改革方案制定和執(zhí)行的農(nóng)業(yè)土地稅。事實上，這是在一些國 家的法律，通常分配給地方政府的收入。根據(jù)rajaraman （2004年），bahl, wallac

6、e和cyan （2008）討論的做法，引入推定稅根據(jù)土地面積和作物。這樣 的征費(fèi)將從不同作物的顯著差凈獲得回報（可以說是差的土地生產(chǎn)率）。這項 稅收可能會涉及到一定的面積大小以上所有農(nóng)場。如果農(nóng)業(yè)用地的全面調(diào)查到 位，并不斷更新，評估就便于管理。展望物業(yè)稅物業(yè)稅已被誤解多年，作為一個管理不好的稅，在發(fā)展中國家和轉(zhuǎn)型國家難 以充分發(fā)揮其潛力。在很多方面也預(yù)示了這點。政府繼續(xù)忽視管理的物業(yè)稅， 結(jié)果，它己經(jīng)更年久失修下降。納稅人己經(jīng)失去了信心，作為一個公平的稅收。 是否有出路，或者是最好的辦法，來集中對國民收入和消費(fèi)稅，以此來逐步提 升管理和提高的有效稅率幸運(yùn)的是，有一個物業(yè)稅改革的前進(jìn)方向。同時

7、這是一個值得考慮的道路， 因為物業(yè)稅作為能夠分散地方政府提供服務(wù)的融資來源的這一顯著優(yōu)勢。通過 兒個“渠道”的改革，可能會導(dǎo)致一個顯著的收入和提高稅收公平。當(dāng)然，這 個方法取得成功的必要條件是政府的政治意愿實現(xiàn),并最終保持更好的物業(yè)稅。外文文獻(xiàn)原文title: property tax reform in developing and transition countriesmaterial source: usaidauthor: roy bahlmeasuring administrative successhow would a country come to know that its

8、 property tax administration is efficient? the fact is that administrative costs depend on many factors, including at least the amount of revenue collected , the assessment equity that is achieved, the complexity of the tax structure itself .and the investment that government has made in building th

9、e infrastructure for a sound property tax administration. identifying a norm for the cost of collections, and comparing countries by this standard, is no straightforward matter.some research has turned to cross country comparisons to try and gain an estimate of the average cost of collections. these

10、 studies have mostly focused on oced country and have given some comparative “norms". however, as almy (2004) indicates, ".annual administrative costs in the range of 2 to 5 percent of revenues often are achieved in developed western countries- ratios in excess of 10 percent are symptomati

11、c of problems： (almy , p. 25).if one went through the exercise of estimating administrative costs for the property tax based on evidence from a cross section of developing and transition countries, s/he might learn little. the numerator of the cost ratio would be the amount actually spent in each of

12、 the departments charged with the various step in property tax administration. the denominator would be the amount of revenues collected. a low ratio could indicate some efficiency in the administration, but it also could indicate a very low expenditure on tax administration. perhaps more could be g

13、ained from a notional determination一that is, a hypothetical calculation of the cost of collecting a given amount of revenue based on targeted norms for assessment efficiency, collection rate, and other factors. this could best be done in the context of a country case studyseven if a value-based tax

14、is well administered, it will not come off as a relatively efficient revenue collector this is mostly because of the inherently high cost of property identification and valuation. unlike income tax withholding or vat invoices, there is little objective evidence that can be called on for determining

15、property tax liability. notional assessment is necessary. moreover, collection costs can be high because of low rates of voluntary complianceto be sure, collection costs for the property tax can be loweredby taking measures to increase voluntary complianee, by improving registration procedures, and

16、by providing for a regular flow of accurate data on the sales value of propertiesbut the costs will still be high by comparison to general consumption taxes, excise taxes or taxes on payrolls. the place of the property tax in the revenue system in a developing or transition country will need to be j

17、ustified by one of its many other desirable characteristicsproperty taxes in rural areasdespite their low revenue potential, there is a strong case to be made for rural local government property taxes. this is virtually the only significant source of revenue open to smaller local governments. it cou

18、ld also be used to develop some accountability of elected local officials to taxpayers for the quality of services provided in recent years, many developing countries have rethought the structure of their system of rural local government revenue mobilization with an eye toward making these local gov

19、ernments less dependent on intergovernmental transfersthere is much variation in the practice. the property tax is virtually the only source of own revenues for indians village (gram panchayat) governments. in brazil, it is levied as a separate tax from the urban property tax. indonesia exempts most

20、 improvements in rural areas tanzania does not tax rural property at all. if fiscal decentralization is to extend to the rural sector, even a small own source revenue is an important part of the equation these taxes tend to be very primitive and usually are levied on an area basis or even a per hous

21、e basis, rather than on a value basis the yield tends to be very low because the tax base is small, because the tax roll usually does not cover all properties, and because collection rates are low. yet, this poor administration of the rural property tax suggests that relatively small improvements in

22、 identifying the tax roll and in valuation could potentially add large proportionate increases to own source revenuesgovernments in some developing and transition countries also might benefit significantly from rethinking their approach to taxing agricultural land. certainly there is justification i

23、n many countries for bringing the tax burden on the agricultural sector up to the level found in other sectors. agricultural income is often exempt from income tax, so non-farm households at any given income level face a higher tax burden on their labor income than do agricultural households. this c

24、an be a particularly egregious inequity when there are large numbers of (above subsistence) individuals employed in the agricultural sectorthe above notwithstanding，rural property taxation is bound to present considerable challenges, from navigating the political resistance to taxing agriculture, to

25、 determining how best to administer a tax on what rajaraman (2004) has termed the "hardest to tax" sector. one reasonable reform option is to adopt and enforce an agricultural land tax. in fact, this is provided for in the law in some countries, with revenues usually assigned to subnationa

26、l governments. an approach, discussed in rajaraman (2004) and in bahl, wallace and cyan (2008), is to introduce a presumptive tax based on land area and crop. such a levy would capture the significant differential net returns from different crops (and arguably the differential productivity of the la

27、nd). all farms above a certain acreage size could be subject to this tax. assessment would seem manageable, if a full survey of agricultural land was in place and kept up to datethe way forward?the property tax has been maligned for years as a badly administered tax that has not lived up to its potential in developing and transition countries. in many ways, the prophecy has been self-fulfilled. governments have continued to neglect the administration of the property tax and ravaged its base