[中英對照] 國際法視角下的跨國征稅國際稅收體系分析 第一章 導(dǎo)論

1、第一章 導(dǎo)論是否存在國際稅收體系？ 它是否是國際法的組成部分？Introduction: is there an international tax regime? Is it part of international law?本書的觀點是存在連貫一致的國際稅收體系，它體現(xiàn)在稅收條約網(wǎng)絡(luò)和國內(nèi)法中，是國際法（包括條約及習(xí)慣法）的重要組成部分。其實際意義在于，各國不能隨意采納國際稅收規(guī)則，而只能在這個體系的范圍內(nèi)運作。當(dāng)國際法隨時間的遷移發(fā)生變化時，這個體系也會同樣發(fā)生變化。因此，單邊行動雖然不是沒有可能，但是也會受到限制，各國通常都不愿采取違反這個體系基本準(zhǔn)則的單邊行動。這些基本準(zhǔn)則是單次征

2、稅原則（即，所得只能被征一次稅既不能多次征稅，也不能不征稅）和利益原則（即，積極所得主要在來源地被征稅；消極所得主要在居民國被征稅）。This book has a thesis: that a coherent international tax regime exists, embodied in both the tax treaty and in domestic laws, and that it forms a significant part of international law (both treaty-based and customary). The practical

3、 implication is that countries are not free to adopt any international tax ru1es they please, but rather operate in the context of the regime, which changes in the same ways international law changes over time. Thus, unilateral action is possib1e, but is also restricted, and countries are generally

4、reluctant to take unilateral actions that violate the basic norms that underlie the regime. Those norms are the single tax principle (i.e., that income should be taxcd once - not rnore and not less) and the benefits principle (i.e., that active business income should be taxed primarily at source, an

5、d passive investment income primarily at residence).這個觀點存在很大爭議。一些著名國際稅收學(xué)者和執(zhí)業(yè)人土（如美國的邁克爾·格雷茲，大衛(wèi)·羅森布盧姆，朱莉·羅首，米切爾·凱恩，其他地方的如齊斯麗·德根）認(rèn)為：不存在國際稅收體系，各國可以自由適用任何對本國有利的稅法規(guī)則。另一些著名稅收學(xué)者（如休·奧爾特，亞里夫·布勞納，鮑爾·麥克丹尼爾，戴安娜·林，理查德·范恩）和執(zhí)業(yè)人士（如盧卡德拉·阿內(nèi)塞，謝伊·梅紐因，菲利普·威

6、斯特）支持我的觀點。然而，現(xiàn)在還沒有學(xué)術(shù)或?qū)崉?wù)文獻(xiàn)對這個觀點做出合理的說明。我之前發(fā)表的一些文章已經(jīng)提出過上述觀點，本書在此基礎(chǔ)上繼續(xù)試圖填補(bǔ)這項空白。This thesis is quite controversial. Several prominent international tax academics and practitioners in the United States (e.g., Michael Graetz, David Rosenbloom, Julie Roin, Mitchell Kane) and elsewhere (e.g., Tsil1y Dagan)

7、have advocated the view that there is no international tax regime and that countries are free to adopt any tax rules they believe further their own interests. Other prominent tax academics (e.g., Hugh Ault, Yariv Brauner, PauI McDaniel, Diane Ring, Richard Vann) and practitioners (e.g., Luca dell

8、9;Anese, Shay Menuchin, Philip West) have supported the view just advocated. However, there is no coherent exposition of this view in the academic or practical literature. This book is intended to fill this gap, following up on previous articles in which I developed the foregoing thesis.本章將通過三個議題來介紹

9、本書的觀點。第一存在國際稅收體系，它體現(xiàn)在主要貿(mào)易國家的稅收條約網(wǎng)絡(luò)和國內(nèi)稅法中。例如，新近發(fā)展趨勢表明美國、德國等國家一直遵守這個體系的基本準(zhǔn)則，比如非歧視原則。第二，隨著其在20世紀(jì)的發(fā)展，國際稅收體系已成為國際法的重要組成部分。特別是部分國際稅法已被看成是國際習(xí)慣法，即使沒有稅收條約，它們也具有約束力。針對轉(zhuǎn)讓定價的公平交易標(biāo)準(zhǔn)就是一個典型例證。第三，本章對國際稅收體系的結(jié)構(gòu)和基本原則單次征稅原則（亦即收人只能征一次稅，既不能多次征稅，也不能不征）和利益原則（積極所得主要在來源地征稅，消極投資所得主要在居民國征稅）做了說明。本章進(jìn)一步說明了這些基本準(zhǔn)則的規(guī)范原理并論證了美國的稅收規(guī)則是如

10、何符合這些準(zhǔn)則的。This chapter introdtices the overall thesis of the book by addressing three issues. First, the chapter argues that an international tax regime exists, embodied both in the tax treaty network and in the domestic tax laws of the major trading nations. Illustrations are provided frorn recent d

11、evelopments that show countries such as the United States and Germany complying with basic norms of the regime, for examp1e, nondiscrimination. Second, the chapter argues that the international tax regime is an important part of international law, as it evolved in the twentieth century. In particula

12、r, the chapter argues that parts of international tax law can be seen as customary international law and therefore as binding even in the absence of treaties. An example would be the arm's-length standard under transfer pricing. Finally, the chapter explains the basc' structure of the intern

13、ational tax regime and its underlying norms, the single tax principle ( income should be taxed once, no more and no less) and the bcnefits principle (active business income should be taxed primarily at source, passive investment income primarily at residence). The chapter further sets out the normat

14、ive rationale for these norms and explains how U.S, tax rules fit in with them.一、是否存在國際稅收體系？. IS THERE AN INTERNATlONAL TAX REGIME? H大衛(wèi)·羅森布盧姆1998年在紐約大學(xué)法學(xué)院所做的Tillinghast演講，是對國際稅收體系最重要的否定性聲明。在演講開始時，結(jié)合美國雙重合并虧損規(guī)則的立法過程，羅森布盧姆引用了一個有關(guān)“國際稅收制度”的論斷。然后他轉(zhuǎn)而否認(rèn)這個體系或制度的存在（“那個制度看來是虛構(gòu)的”），因為在現(xiàn)實世界中，僅有各國不同的稅法存在，而那些法

15、律之間差異巨大。The most important statement denying the existence of the international tax regirne was the l998 Tillinghast Lecture delivered by H. David Rosenbloom at the NYU law school. Rosenbloom began his lecture by quoting from the legislative history of the U.S. dual consolidated 1oss rules a stateme

16、nt referring to an “international tax system.” He then proceeded to deny the existence of this system or regime ("that system appears to be imaginary" ), because in thc real world, only the different tax laws of various countries exist, and those laws vary greatly from each other.當(dāng)然如果但就此而言

17、，這種說法是正確的，但這是全部真理嗎？事實上，像羅森布盧姆所指出的，發(fā)達(dá)國家的國內(nèi)稅法之間存在明顯的融合和共通。不僅稅務(wù)律師可以跨越國界進(jìn)行交流和溝通，并彼此理解對方所表達(dá)的內(nèi)容（存在相同的術(shù)語），同時，由于對所得征稅會面臨相似的問題，各國的稅收管轄權(quán)總是殊途同歸。例如實行綜合課稅制度（即用同一方法對來自任何地方的所得征稅）的國家現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)吸納分類課稅制的因素（如美國關(guān)于資本虧損和消極行為虧損的規(guī)則）。而實行分類課稅制（不同種類的收入適用不同的征稅方法）的國家也大部采用“其他收入”稅目，從而由此導(dǎo)入了綜合稅基（如英國）。Of course, this description is true as

18、 far as it goes, but is this the whole truth? As Rosenbloom noted, in fact, there has been a remarkable degree of convergence even in the purely domestic tax laws of developed countries. Not only can tax lawyers talk to each other across national boundaries and understand what each is saying (the te

19、rminology is the same), but the need to face similar problems in taxing income has led jurisdictions with different starting points to reach quite similar results. For example, countrtes that started off with gIobal tax systerns (i.e., tax "all income from whatever source derived" in the s

20、arne way) now have incorporated schedular elements (for example, the capital loss and passive activity loss rules in the United States), whereas countries with a schedular barkground (i.e., tax different types of income differently) have largely adopted schedules for the “other income” that lead to

21、a globle tax base (for example, the UK).這種交融在國際稅收領(lǐng)域最發(fā)達(dá)，那一點也不會令人驚訝。不同國家的稅法會互相作用，甚至產(chǎn)生直接的影響。例如，每個發(fā)達(dá)國家都試圖對本國居民的海外消極所得當(dāng)期征稅（受美國立法的啟發(fā)，通過受控外國公司和外國投資基金規(guī)則），對積極營業(yè)所得則實行免稅或允許遞延。因此，實行全球稅收管轄權(quán)和屬地稅收管轄權(quán)的國家之間，其差異已經(jīng)大大縮小。本書還將舉出其他例子，論證這種共通的趨勢。Not surprisingly, this convergence is most advanced in international tax matter

22、s, because in this case the tax laws of various jurisdictions acturally interact with each other, and one can document cases of direct influence. For example, every developed country now tends to tax currently passive income earned by its residents overseas (through controlled foreign corporations a

23、nd foreign investment funds FIF rules, which were inspired by the U.S. example), and to exempt or defer active business income. Thus, the distinction between countries that assert worldwide taxing jurisdiction and those that only tax territorially has lost much of its force. We will develop other ex

24、amples of such convergence in the course of the book.然而，國際稅收體系存在的主張靠雙邊稅收條約網(wǎng)絡(luò)支撐。正如羅森布盧姆所指出的，這個網(wǎng)絡(luò)是“國際法的勝利”。這些稅收條約內(nèi)容非常相似（甚至條文的順序都相同），它們都是基于經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織（OECD）和聯(lián)合國的稅收協(xié)定范本。在大多數(shù)國家，稅收條約的效力高于國內(nèi)稅法，對內(nèi)國稅收管轄權(quán)作出了限制；甚至在美國，條約也可以推翻與其相反的國內(nèi)法。這意味著在國際稅收領(lǐng)域中，受條約的約束，各國只能按照特定的方式行事（如不能對無常設(shè)機(jī)構(gòu)的外國賣方征稅），不能制定與條約相反的法律。The claim that

25、an international tax regime exists, however, rests mainly on the bilateral tax treaty network, which, as Rosenbloom stated, is "a triumph of international law." The treaties are of course rernarkably similar (even to the order of the articles), being based on the same Organisation for Econ

26、omic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and UN models. In most countries, the treaties have a higher status than domestic law, and thus constrain domestic tax jurisdictlon; and even in the United States, the treaties typically override contrary domestic 1aw. This means that in international tax mat

27、ters, countries typically are bound by treaty to behave in cartain ways (for exarnple, not tax a foreign seller who has no permanent estahlishment) and cannot enact 1egislation to the contrary.我認(rèn)為，數(shù)目超過2000的雙邊稅收條約組成網(wǎng)絡(luò)，并構(gòu)筑了一個具有確定原則的國際稅收體系。無論是在政策理念上，還是在語言表達(dá)上，這些條約大都很相似。而那些原則，即單次征稅原則和利益原則。既是國際稅收體系的根基，也被稅

28、收條約所普遍采納。隨后的章節(jié)會進(jìn)一步說明這些原則。簡而言之，單次征稅原則是指，對跨國交易所得應(yīng)當(dāng)僅征收一次稅（即，不多于一次也不少于一次），其稅率根據(jù)利益原則確定。利益原則將積極營業(yè)所得的課稅權(quán)主要分配給來源地國，將消極投資所得的課稅權(quán)主要分配給居民國。I would argue that the network of two thousand or more bilateral tax treaties that are largely similar in policy, and even in langguage, constitutes an international tax reg

29、irne, which has definable principles that underlie it and are comrnon to the treaties. These principles are the single tax principle and the benefits principle, which will be articuated further in later sections. In brief, the single tax principle states that income from cross-border transactions sh

30、ould be subject to tax once (that is, not more but also not less than once), at the rate determined by the benefits principle. The benefits principle allocates the right to tax actve business income primarily to the source jurisdiction and the right to tax passive investment income primarily to the

31、residence jurisdiction.對那些懷疑國際稅收體系存在的人們，讓我提出以下問題：假如你正在為一個打算首次采用所得稅的發(fā)展中國家或經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型國家做咨詢，如果這個國家希望吸引外國投資，在為這個國家起草國際稅收規(guī)則時，你認(rèn)為會有多大的自由選擇空間？我認(rèn)為，即使沒有加入任何稅收條約，為了適應(yīng)公認(rèn)的國際稅法基本原則，大多數(shù)國家在引人國際稅收規(guī)則時，它們的自由會受到嚴(yán)格限制。即使采用了與眾不同的規(guī)則，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的進(jìn)程也會迫使它發(fā)生改變。例如為了加入OECD，墨西哥不得不放棄它在轉(zhuǎn)移定價方面長期適用的公式，轉(zhuǎn)而以O(shè)ECD指南為藍(lán)本制定規(guī)則。同樣地，韓國在OECD的壓力下，改變了它對常設(shè)機(jī)

32、構(gòu)的擴(kuò)大解釋。由于美國裁定公司現(xiàn)全流量稅不可抵免，玻利維亞不得不放棄這項計劃。美國1993年試圖對聯(lián)邦稅法典第482節(jié)下的轉(zhuǎn)移定價法規(guī)做出修改，引起了國際紛爭，其最終確定的法規(guī)還是基于OECD指南。通過比較可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，連美國也不能避免這種趨同化的壓力。To those who doubt the existence of the international tax regime, let me pose the following question: Suppose you were advising a developing country or transition ecinomy that

33、 wanted to adopt an income tax for the first time. How free do you think you would be to write the international tax rules for such a country in any way you wanted, assuming that it wished to attract foreign investment? I would argue that the freedom of most countries to adopt international tax rule

34、s is severely constrained, even before entering into any tax teaties, by the need to adapt to generally accepted principles of international taxation. Even if divergent rules have been adopted, the process of integration into the world economy forces change. For example, Mexico had to abandon its lo

35、ng tradition of applying formulas in transfer pricing and adopt rules modeled after the OECD guidelines in order to be able to join the OECD. South Korea similarly had to change its broad interpretation of what constitutes a permanent establishment under pressure from the OECD. And Bolivla had to ab

36、andon its attempt to adopt a cash f1ow corporate tax bccause it was ruled not creditable in the United States. Even the United States is not immune to this type of pressure to conform, as can be seen if one compares the l993 proposed transfer pricing regulations under IRC section 482, which led to a

37、n international uproar, with the final regulations, which reflect the OECD guidelines.另外一個例證來自美國和德國關(guān)于非歧視原則適用的最新發(fā)展。非歧視原則在所有的稅收條約中均有體現(xiàn)。如資本弱化規(guī)則的主要目的在于，防止外國納稅人將國內(nèi)子公司的大量借債資本化，以減少公司稅的稅基。美國1989年首次采納資本弱化規(guī)則時，它謹(jǐn)慎地將其同時適用于外國人和本國的免稅機(jī)構(gòu)，目的是避免一種嫌疑，即利息不允許扣除僅僅針對外國人。即使資本弱化規(guī)則已被視為是國際稅收體系的一部分，即使其憲法允許推翻稅收條約，美國仍然這樣規(guī)定。德國也采用

38、資本弱化規(guī)則，但自從20O2年被歐洲法院裁定為歧視后，他們就立刻將其同等適用于本國和外國納稅人。如果沒有體現(xiàn)非歧視原則的國際稅收體系 ，美國和德國的做法就會變得難以理解了。Another illustration can be derived from recent developments in both the United States and Germany regarding the application of the priciple of nondiscrimination, which is embodied in all the tax treaties, to thin

39、capitalization rules that are designed to prevent foreign taxpayer from eliminating the corporate tax base through capitalizing domestic subsidiary corporations principally with debt. When the United States first adodoted its thin capitalization rule in 1989, it carefully applied it both to foreigne

40、rs and to domestic tax exempts, so as not to appear to be denying interest deductions only to foreigners. The United States did this even though its thin capltalization rules are an accepted part of international tax law and even though its constitutional law permits unilateral overrides of tax trea

41、ties. The Germans adopted the same rule, but when it was nevertheless struck down as discriminatory by the European Court of Justice in 2002, they responded by applying thin capitalization to all domestic as well as foreign taxpayers. Neither the United States nor the German actions are understandab

42、le in the absence of an international tax regime embodying the principle of nondiscrimination.二、國際稅收體系是國際法的組成部分嗎？. IS THE INTERNAIONAL TAX REGIME PART OF INTERNAIONAL LAW?很少有人會對雙邊稅收條約網(wǎng)絡(luò)是國際法的重要明成部分提出疑問。因此，主要問題是：這些條約和不同管轄區(qū)域的國內(nèi)稅法，能否被認(rèn)為形成了作為國際習(xí)慣法一部分的國際稅收體系？Few would dispute that the network of bilateral

43、 tax treaties forms an important part of international tax. Thus, the key issue is whether these treaties and the domestic tax laws of various jurisdictions can be said to form an international tax regime that is part of customary international law.國際習(xí)慣法是“源自各國普遍而持續(xù)的實踐，并基于法律義務(wù)意識而被遵循的”法律。國際協(xié)定為成員國創(chuàng)造法律。

44、當(dāng)各國普遍愿意遵循并實際廣泛接受時，這些協(xié)定就會演變?yōu)閲H習(xí)慣法。Customary international law is law that “results from a general and consistent practice of states folowed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” “International agreements create law for states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary internationa

45、l law when 5uch agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted."'顯然，確有國際稅收慣例被廣泛遵循，例如，為了避免雙重征稅，對來源于 國外的所得免稅，或?qū)σ鸭{外國稅款進(jìn)行抵免。而且，存在著2000多個雙邊稅收條約，它們都效仿被廣泛認(rèn)可的兩個范本之一（OECD范本或聯(lián)合國范本），本身在內(nèi)容上都很相似，并且“各國普遍愿意遵循”。這是不是足以形成一部國際稅收習(xí)慣法？There clearly are international tax

46、 practices that are widely followed, such as avoiding double taxation by granting an exemption for foreign source income or a credit for foreign taxes. Morcover, there are more than two thousand bilateral tax treaties in existence, and they all following one of two widely accepted models (the OECD a

47、nd UN model treaties), which themselves are quite similar 1o eaah other and are "intended for adherence by states generally." Is this enough to create a customary international tax law?下面，我將簡要介紹幾個例子。以我之見，它們會強(qiáng)化國際稅收體系已經(jīng)上升為國際習(xí)慣法的觀點。跟平常一樣，關(guān)鍵問題是，國家是否不僅遵從這個規(guī)則，而是出于法律義務(wù)的意識才這樣做（opinion juris）。In th

48、e following, I wlll briefly survey some examples that in my opinion strengthen the view that the international tax regime rises to the level of customary international law. As usual, the hard question is whether countries not only follow a rule, but do so out of a sense of legal obligation (opinion

49、juris).（一） 稅收管轄權(quán)A. Jurisdiction to tax一個國家可否對與其沒有聯(lián)系的非居民的外國來源所得征稅？無論是從實際可能的角度，還是從國際習(xí)慣法的角度，我認(rèn)為答案明顯都是否定的。該規(guī)則是至于一種法律義務(wù)意識的事實，可以從美國采納外國個人控股公司（FPHC）和受控外國公司（CFC）規(guī)則得到佐證。第二章將對這些規(guī)則做更為詳細(xì)的介紹。在美國居民控制外國公司的情形下，美國稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)不直接對這些公司征稅，而是對美國居民股東基于想象（推定）的應(yīng)得股息征稅。這種推定股息規(guī)則之所以被采納，完全是因為美國認(rèn)為，其受國際習(xí)慣法規(guī)則的約束，不能直接對非居民的外國來源所得征稅，即便這些所得被居

50、民所控制。現(xiàn)在，美國不再覺得應(yīng)受該規(guī)則的約束，但那是因為其他眾多國家制定了受控外國公司立法，國籍的定義因此而擴(kuò)充國際習(xí)慣法也隨之改變。1962年之后關(guān)于受控外國公司的廣泛立法，是國際習(xí)慣法可以事實上迅速改變的良好例證。Can a country simply decide to tax nonresidents who have no connection to it on foreign-source income? The answer is clearly no. both from a practical perspective and, I would argue, ftom a c

51、ustomary international law perspective. The fact that this rule is followed from a sense of legal obligation is illustrated by the behavior of the United States in adopting the foreign personal holding corporation (FPHC) and controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, which will be described in more

52、 detail in Chapter 2. In the case of corporations controlled by U.S. residents, the United States does not tax those corporations directly, but rather taxes the U.S. resident shareholders on imaginary (deemed) dividends distributed to the shareholders. This deemed dividend rule was adopted precisely

53、 because the United States felt bound by a customary international law rule not to tax nonresidents directly on forcign-source incorne, even though they are controlled by residents. The United States no longer feels bound by this rule, but that is beause enough other countries have adopted CFC legis

54、lation that expands the definition of nationality that customary internaional law has changed. The spread of CFC legislation from l962 onwarl is a good example of how rapidly customary international law can in fact change.（二） 非歧視B. Nondiscrimination非歧視準(zhǔn)則（即非居民在條約國的待回不得比其居民更差）體現(xiàn)在所有的稅收條約中，但它是國際習(xí)慣法的組成部分

55、嗎？美國對收益剝離的態(tài)度表明，它當(dāng)時認(rèn)為，即便沒有稅收條約，非歧視準(zhǔn)則也有約束力。否則，即使它不打算推翻條約，也可以對非條約國適用不同的規(guī)則（如同它在三年前征收分公司利潤稅一樣）。因此我認(rèn)為，即使沒有條約，非歧視準(zhǔn)則也是國際習(xí)慣法的一部分。The nondiscrimination norm (i.e., that nonresidents from a treaty country should not be treated worse than residents) is embodied in all tax treaties. But is it part of customary i

56、nternational law? The behavior of the United States in the earnings stripping episode just described suggests that the United States felt at the time that the nondiscrimination norm was binding even outside the treaty context. Otherwise, even if it did not wish to override treaties, it could have ap

57、plied a different rule to nontreaty country residents (as it did in the branch profits tax context three years eralier). Thus, I would argue that the nondiscrimination norm may in fact be part of customary international law even in the absence of a treaty.（三） 公平交易標(biāo)準(zhǔn)C. The arm's-length standard公平

58、交易標(biāo)準(zhǔn)在所有的稅收條約中都被采用。它專門針對轉(zhuǎn)移定價問題，決定關(guān)聯(lián)實體之間恰當(dāng)?shù)睦麧櫡峙?。這意味著稅務(wù)當(dāng)局可以調(diào)整關(guān)聯(lián)方之間的交易，使之恢復(fù)到假定當(dāng)事人之間沒有關(guān)聯(lián)時，其最終可能達(dá)成的結(jié)果。這個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)于20世紀(jì)30年代成為主導(dǎo)性規(guī)則。The standard applied in all tax treaties to the transfer pricing problem of determining the proper allocation of profits between related entities is the "arm's-length standar

59、d," which means that transactions between related parties may be adjusted by the tax authorities to the terms that would have been negotiated had the parties been unrelated to each other. This standard has been the governing rule since the 1930s.到20世紀(jì)80年代，美國意識到，在許多情況下，要找到非關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)間的可比交易，作為公平交易認(rèn)定的基礎(chǔ)，這是一件十分困難的事情。因此，美國開始修訂轉(zhuǎn)移定價相關(guān)法規(guī)。這個過程在1995年完成，兩種不太依賴可比性的新方法被采用：可比利潤法和利潤分割法（利潤分割法有時甚至對可比性沒有任何要求）。In the 1980s, the United States realized that in many circumstances it is very difficult to find comparable transactions between unrelated parties on which to base the arms-length determ