企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)多主體博弈分析

1、隨著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化趨勢(shì)的加劇，引發(fā)企業(yè)危機(jī)的誘因愈發(fā)多樣，而財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)作為企業(yè)危機(jī) 中最顯著、最綜合的表現(xiàn)，其預(yù)示和決定著企業(yè)的生死存亡。由此，探索企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的演 化機(jī)理和演化路徑，并以此提出切實(shí)可行的財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)控制策略，是當(dāng)前學(xué)術(shù)界和實(shí)務(wù)界亟待 解決的關(guān)鍵性問(wèn)題。目前，國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的文獻(xiàn)已比較成熟，也取得了一定的研 究成果。然而這些研究大多局限于從財(cái)務(wù)活動(dòng)本身出發(fā)探討財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的形成，而缺乏從系統(tǒng) 全局的角度考慮財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的演化過(guò)程，所以很難從根源上找出企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)的病因所在，也就無(wú) 法為企業(yè)管理者所用。由此，筆者從復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)的角度出發(fā)，通過(guò)探索企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)多主體間的演 化博弈行為，深入剖析企業(yè)財(cái)

2、務(wù)危機(jī)的演化機(jī)理，為企業(yè)在錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜的危機(jī)因素中分類(lèi)制定 對(duì)策和措施提供依據(jù)。With the intensification of global economy integration trend, cause the cause of enterprise crisis is increasingly diverse, and the financial crisis as one of the most striking enterprise crisis, the most comprehensive performance, its signal and determines the

3、survival of enterprises. Thus, exploring the evolution mechanism and evolution path of enterprise financial crisis, and put forward practical and feasible control strategy, financial crisis is the key problem urgently to be solved in the current academia and practice field. At present, the domestic

4、and foreign literature about enterprise financial crisis has been more mature, also has obtained certain research results. However, these studies mostly confined to itself from financial activities set out to explore the formation of the financial crisis, and the lack of consideration from the Angle

5、 of system global financial crisiss evolution, so it is difficult to find out the causes of corporate finance from the source, also cannot be used for enterprise managers. As a result, the author from the perspective of complex system, through the enterprise financial between multi-agent evolutionar

6、y game behavior, deeply analyzes the evolution mechanism of the enterprise financial crisis for the enterprise crisis in the complex factors in the countermeasures and measures to provide the reference for classification.二、企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)多主體博弈分析Second, the enterprise financial multi-agent game analysis企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)多主體的

7、特征分析。企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)系統(tǒng)主要包括6大子系統(tǒng)，即籌資子系統(tǒng)、投 資子系統(tǒng)、采購(gòu)子系統(tǒng)、生產(chǎn)子系統(tǒng)、銷(xiāo)售子系統(tǒng)、利潤(rùn)子系統(tǒng)，它們完成了資金的籌集、 投放、使用、收回及分配的財(cái)務(wù)循環(huán)。企業(yè)在周而復(fù)始的財(cái)務(wù)循環(huán)中，無(wú)時(shí)無(wú)刻不在與股東、 供應(yīng)商、客戶(hù)、債權(quán)人和政府等利益相關(guān)者之間發(fā)生各種財(cái)務(wù)關(guān)系。筆者界定的企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)主 體正是指企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)及其與企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)密切相關(guān)的利益相關(guān)者。其中企業(yè)為系統(tǒng)的核心，它與其 他財(cái)務(wù)主體通過(guò)物質(zhì)、信息以及資金的流動(dòng)相互作用、相互影響，構(gòu)成了各種利益點(diǎn)交織而 成的復(fù)雜巨系統(tǒng)。(a) enterprise financial characteristics analysis of mul

8、ti-agent. Enterprise financial system mainly includes the six architectural system, namely the subsystems of fund-raising, investment, procurement subsystem, subsystem subsystems of production, sales, profit, they completed the fund raise, delivery, use, recovery and distribution of the financial cy

9、cle. Enterprise in the cycle of the financial cycle, ever-present with shareholders, suppliers, customers, creditors and government relations between various financial stakeholders. The author defines the financing body is refers to the enterprise financial and closely related to enterprise financia

10、l stakeholders. The core of the enterprise for the system, it and other financial bodies through the material, information and capital flow interaction, mutual influence, and constitute the various interests interwoven into a complex giant system.根據(jù)復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)的基本原理，結(jié)合企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)主體的自身特殊性，企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)主體具有以下兩個(gè)方 面的特征：第一，企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)

11、主體具有適應(yīng)性和智能性，個(gè)體會(huì)根據(jù)環(huán)境和其他利益主體來(lái)調(diào) 整自身的狀態(tài)和行為，使自身發(fā)生適應(yīng)性變化。第二，企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)主體是有限理性人。現(xiàn)代經(jīng) 濟(jì)學(xué)表明，人的行為是不具有完全理性的，企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)主體由于在社會(huì)地位、占有資源及獲取 信息能力上的差異性和不對(duì)稱(chēng)性，并不具備做出理性決策的條件，主體之間的適應(yīng)和博弈的 決策只能是有限理性的。According to the basic principle of complex system, combined with the particularity of business finance subject, enterprise financial mai

12、n body has the characteristics of the following two aspects: first, the adaptive and intelligent enterprise financial subject, individuals according to the environment and other stakeholders to adjust their status and behavior, make its adaptability to changes. Second, the enterprise financial main

13、body is limited rational person. Modern economics shows that peoples behavior is not have fully rational, because of business finance subject in social status, resources and access to information ability and the difference of the asymmetry, does not have the conditions to make rational decisions, th

14、e adaptation between the subject and the game is only a limited rational decision.企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)多主體的博弈行為。企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)系統(tǒng)是一個(gè)開(kāi)放的復(fù)雜巨系統(tǒng)，每個(gè)主體有著各 自不同的目的和利益，在一個(gè)利益分化和利益主體多元化的系統(tǒng)中，每時(shí)每刻都在發(fā)生著各 種復(fù)雜的交易和利益沖突。因此，博弈是財(cái)務(wù)主體生存所面臨的基本環(huán)境，也是財(cái)務(wù)主體發(fā) 展的根本動(dòng)力。每個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)主體之間的博弈行為是圍繞著相關(guān)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造活動(dòng)進(jìn)行的。從價(jià)值 鏈的角度來(lái)看，企業(yè)是一個(gè)投入一產(chǎn)出的價(jià)值增值系統(tǒng)，它利用和協(xié)調(diào)價(jià)值鏈上各利益主體 的特定資源進(jìn)行投入一產(chǎn)出活動(dòng)并

15、取得回報(bào)，企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)主體在成本和收益之間必然展開(kāi)經(jīng)濟(jì) 利益的爭(zhēng)奪和博弈。如，在籌資活動(dòng)中，債權(quán)人的總收益是利息，總成本包括貸款本金和機(jī) 會(huì)成本，企業(yè)與債權(quán)人之間必然會(huì)圍繞利息展開(kāi)博弈。(2) the game behavior of enterprise financial agent. Enterprise financial system is an open complex giant system, each subject has a different purpose and interests, the interests of a differentiation and dive

16、rsification of the system, all the time in the event of a complex transactions and conflict of interest. As a result, the game is facing the existence of financial main body basic environment, also is the fundamental driving force of the development of the financial main body. Each game behavior of

17、financial main body is around the relevant value creation activities. From the perspective of value chain, the enterprise is the value of one input - output value system, it USES and the coordination of each benefit main body on the value chain of a specific resource input - output activities and pa

18、y off, the enterprise financial main body is bound to expand economic interests between costs and benefits of competition and game. Such as in the financing activities, creditors interest is the total revenue, total cost including the loan principal and opportunity cost, must be built around the int

19、erest game between enterprise and the creditors.（三）企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)主體的演化博弈機(jī)制。傳統(tǒng)博弈論中最基本的一個(gè)假設(shè)前提是參與人為完全理 性人，這要求博弈雙方都具備完美的判斷和預(yù)測(cè)能力，這種完全理性假設(shè)在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中顯然 不成立。諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主Simon認(rèn)為，博弈環(huán)境的復(fù)雜性、信息的不完全性、人類(lèi)認(rèn) 識(shí)能力的有限性都決定了人的行為理性是有限的?；诖颂岢隽搜莼┺恼摰乃枷?。演化博 弈論認(rèn)為，有限理性主體不能正確地計(jì)算自己的收益支付，做出最佳決策的能力有限，決策 者大多是通過(guò)試錯(cuò)和對(duì)較高收益策略進(jìn)行學(xué)習(xí)模仿，最終達(dá)到一種穩(wěn)定均衡狀態(tài)。因此，演 化博弈的

20、過(guò)程實(shí)際上是采用更高收益的策略的人數(shù)比率逐漸上升的動(dòng)態(tài)演化過(guò)程。同樣，企 業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)系統(tǒng)中的利益主體也都是有限理性決策人，它們之間的博弈屬于一種演化博弈。每個(gè) 財(cái)務(wù)主體不可能?chē)?yán)格按照效用最大化進(jìn)行決策，在多數(shù)情況下是通過(guò)了解博弈的歷史，通過(guò) 學(xué)習(xí)模仿其他主體來(lái)動(dòng)態(tài)調(diào)整決策。一組組單個(gè)的利益主體在尋求相互適應(yīng)中不斷發(fā)展，從 而推動(dòng)了整個(gè)企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)系統(tǒng)的發(fā)展和財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的演化。（3） the evolutionary game mechanism of business finance subject. Traditional game theory is one of the most basic as

21、sumptions in completely rational person, this requires game both sides have perfect judgment and ability to predict, such apparently completely rational assumption in the real world. Nobel prize-winning economist Simon argues that the complexity of the game environment, information incompleteness, t

22、he limitations of human cognitive ability determines a persons behavior rationality is limited. Based on this puts forward the idea of evolutionary game theory. Considered evolutionary game theory, bounded rationality subject can correctly calculate the yield of their payments, limited ability to ma

23、ke the best decision, decision makers are mostly by trial and error and imitation, the policy of higher-yielding eventually reaches a stable equilibrium state. Therefore, evolutionary game is actually the process of adopting the tactics of higher earnings ratio of the number of the dynamic evolution

24、 process of gradually rise. Also, enterprise benefit main body in the financial system are limited rational decision maker, the game belong to a kind of evolutionary game between them. Each financial bodies could not strictly according to the utility maximization decision-making, in most cases is th

25、rough understanding the history of the game, by learning to imitate other subject to dynamic adjustment decisions. The interests of the members of a single subject in seeking to adapt to each other in continuous development, so as to promote the development of the entire enterprise financial system

26、and the evolution of the financial crisis.三、基于多主體博弈的企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)演化動(dòng)因分析Third, based on the multi-agent game of evolutionary dynamics analysis of enterprise financial crisis（一）企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)演化的動(dòng)力。根據(jù)上文分析，企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)主體的演化博弈是財(cái)務(wù)系統(tǒng)運(yùn)行的 動(dòng)力。單個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)主體為了更好地適應(yīng)其他主體，在博弈過(guò)程中，會(huì)不斷地“學(xué)習(xí)”和“積累 經(jīng)驗(yàn)”，修正相互作用的模式。在接受外界信息時(shí)，按照既有的規(guī)則，如果適應(yīng)了其他主體， 則不對(duì)規(guī)則做出修改，

27、如果不能適應(yīng)，則需要對(duì)自身規(guī)則進(jìn)行修改。當(dāng)多個(gè)主體對(duì)規(guī)則進(jìn)行 修改，則通過(guò)相互作用形成網(wǎng)絡(luò)，構(gòu)成受限生成過(guò)程，形成一個(gè)新的主體、新規(guī)則、新系統(tǒng)， 從而產(chǎn)生涌現(xiàn)現(xiàn)象。從復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)理論的視角出發(fā)，企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)正是構(gòu)成企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)系統(tǒng)的多 個(gè)適應(yīng)性主體在彼此之間的財(cái)務(wù)利益博弈中，相互作用、相互影響，不斷地發(fā)展、演化，從 而使企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)系統(tǒng)不斷分化、涌現(xiàn)的結(jié)果。(a) the evolution of enterprise financial crisis. According to above analysis, the evolution of business finance subject is th

28、e power of financial system is running. A single financial main body in order to better adapt to the other subject, in the process of game, will continue to learning and experience, fixed patterns of interaction. When accept outside information, in accordance with the existing rules, if adapted to t

29、he other main body, is no rule to make changes, if you cant adapt to, you will need to modify its own rules. When multiple main body modification of the rules, through the interaction of network formation, composition and the constrained generating procedures to form a new subject, new rules, new sy

30、stems, resulting in a phenomenon to appear. From the Angle of view of the complex system theory, the enterprise financial crisis constituted enterprise financial system more adaptive main body in financial interest game between each other, interaction, mutual influence, and constantly development, e

31、volution, which makes the result of the increasing division of enterprise financial system, the emerging.(二)企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)演化的關(guān)鍵因素。根據(jù)企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)演化的動(dòng)力可知，企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)演化 的主要因素在于企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)多主體的博弈行為，根據(jù)主體的類(lèi)別不同，可將其分為內(nèi)部博弈因 素和外部博弈因素。(2) the evolution of the key factors of enterprise financial crisis. According to the dynamic evolution

32、 of enterprise financial crisis shows that the main factors of evolution of enterprise financial crisis is that enterprise financial multi-agent game behavior, according to the main body category is different, it can be divided into internal game factors and external factors.(1)內(nèi)部博弈因素。企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的內(nèi)部博弈因素主

33、要源自于企業(yè)與內(nèi)部財(cái)務(wù)主體之間的博 弈，即與股東和員工之間的博弈。首先，股東是企業(yè)的發(fā)起人，為企業(yè)提供資本支持，是企 業(yè)發(fā)展的原始動(dòng)力；股東最關(guān)注的投入回報(bào)是股利和股價(jià)。對(duì)于企業(yè)而言，它傾向于選擇留 存盈余作為首要的資金來(lái)源，因而會(huì)相應(yīng)降低股利支付水平。對(duì)于股東而言，它會(huì)通過(guò)股票 的持有和出售引起股價(jià)的波動(dòng)，從而左右企業(yè)的股利政策。因此企業(yè)與股東之間關(guān)于股利的 博弈必然導(dǎo)致股價(jià)的波動(dòng)，從而引發(fā)企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)。其次，員工是企業(yè)的主體，是企業(yè)的勞 動(dòng)力資源。員工為企業(yè)提供專(zhuān)用技能并受企業(yè)職業(yè)約束，得到固定工資、獎(jiǎng)金以及自我實(shí)現(xiàn) 感。企業(yè)為了獲取更高的收益而激勵(lì)員工，員工為了獲取豐厚的報(bào)酬而積極工作。

34、因此，企 業(yè)與員工之間關(guān)于報(bào)酬的博弈必然影響員工的工作效率，從而導(dǎo)致銷(xiāo)售和產(chǎn)量的下降。(1) the factors within the game. Internal game factors of enterprise financial crisis originated in the game between enterprises and the internal financial subject, namely, and the game between shareholders and employees. First, shareholder is the sponsor of the en