跨組織視角下的營銷渠道治理：制度環(huán)境的影響

精選優(yōu)質(zhì)文檔-----傾情為你奉上精選優(yōu)質(zhì)文檔-----傾情為你奉上專心---專注---專業(yè)專心---專注---專業(yè)精選優(yōu)質(zhì)文檔-----傾情為你奉上專心---專注---專業(yè)跨組織視角下的營銷渠道治理：制度環(huán)境的影響跨組織視角下的營銷渠道治理：制度環(huán)境的影響［Abstract］Researchesonmarketingchannelsconstituteanimportantpartofmarketingresearch.Withthechangeofthecompetitivesituationsinthemarketsandthedevelopmentofthemarketingtheories，thefocusofthemarketingchannelsresearchchangedfromemphasizingonefficiencyandbenefitstopowerandconflicts，andthentorelationshipandallianceaswellasnetworking.Mostofthepreviousmarketingchannelstudieshaveappliedanefficiency-basedtaskenvironmentperspectiveandlargelyoverlookedalegitimacy-basedinstitutionalenvironmentapproachinstudyingtheprocessofchannelgovernance.Inthepaper，Iproposethatmarketingchannelisakindofinstitutionalarrangementandinter-organizationalrelationshipinthenature.Socompaniesmustpayattentiontothedegreeofacceptanceandagreementoftheirdecisionsandbehaviorswhentheyaregoverningmarketingchannels.Thepaperfirstreviewsprevioustheoriesandstudiesonmarketingchannelgovernanceandinter-organizationalrelationships.Theauthorabsorbsvaluableideasfromthemandproposesatheoreticalframeworkandsomepropositions，andexplainsandteststheframeworkandthepropositionsthroughtwocasestudies.［摘要］營銷渠道研究是營銷研究的一個重要組成部分。隨著市場中競爭性環(huán)境的變化以及營銷理論的發(fā)展，營銷渠道研究的關(guān)注點從強(qiáng)調(diào)效率和利益轉(zhuǎn)向強(qiáng)調(diào)權(quán)力和沖突，進(jìn)而轉(zhuǎn)向聯(lián)網(wǎng)以及關(guān)系和聯(lián)盟。在研究渠道治理過程方面，以往的營銷渠道研究大多采用以效率為基礎(chǔ)的任務(wù)環(huán)境視角，而在很大程度上忽視了以合理性為基礎(chǔ)的制度環(huán)境方法。本文提出，營銷渠道從本質(zhì)上說是一種制度安排和跨組織關(guān)系。因此，企業(yè)在治理營銷渠道時，必須關(guān)注其決策和行為的接受度與認(rèn)可度。本文先是回顧了營銷渠道治理和跨組織關(guān)系方面的理論與研究，進(jìn)而從中吸收有價值的觀點，提出了理論框架和一些命題，并通過兩則案例研究進(jìn)行解釋和檢驗。［Keywords］MarketingChannels;Inter-OrganizationalPower；TheInstitutionalEnvironment［關(guān)鍵詞］營銷渠道；跨組織能力；制度環(huán)境［中圖分類號］F712［文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識碼］A［文章編號］1005-6432（2014）5-0008-101INTRODUCTIONWilkinson(2001)dividesstudiesaboutmarketingchannelsintothreestages：channelstructures，channelbehaviors，andchannelrelationships.Inthefirststage，researcherstriedtofindoutwaysofoptimizingtheefficienciesandbenefitsofmanagingmarketingchannels.Inthesecondstage，researcherstriedtounveilthepowerandconflictbetweenchannelmembers.Inthethirdstage，researcherstriedtofindoutwaysofreducingoreliminatingopportunisticbehaviorsthroughmutualcommitmentandhonest.Actually，somescholarshadbeguntostudymarketingchannelsfromtheperspectiveofnetworkgovernance.Inmostofthesestudies，manyscholarshaveusedthepoliticaleconomyframework(Achrol，ReveandStern，1983；Frazier，1999；Hutt，MokwaandShapiro，1986，SternandReve，1980).Scholarsimplicitlyhaveascribedactivechoicebehaviortochannelmemberswhilestressingefficiencyingoverningchannelrelationships.Theyhaveconsideredtheimplicationsofenvironmentaluncertaintyordependenceonenvironmentalresourcesfordyadicchannelrelationships(suchasconflictsandcooperation，Dwyer，SchurrandOh，1987)，powerbalances(suchaspower-dependencerelationships，F(xiàn)razier，1983)，andrelationshipswithentitiesoutsidethedyads(suchasregulatorsandotheractors，Dutta，HeideandBergen，1999)fromtraditionaleconomicefficiencyperspectives.Intheprocess，scholarshavelargelyoverlookedtheubiquitousinfluencesoftheinstitutionalenvironmentsandhowinter-organizationalrelationshipssuchasmarketingchannelsareembeddedinthelargersocialcontext(Granovetter，1985；Grewal&Dharwadkar，2002).Recentadvancesinorganizationtheorysuggestthatorganizationsstriveforbotheconomicfitness，whichemphasizesthecompetitionforscarceresourcesandunderscorestheimportanceofthetaskenvironment，andsocialfitness，whichstressesthepursuitoflegitimacyintheeyesofimportantsocietalstakeholdersandpinpointthesignificanceoftheinstitutionalenvironment.Thetermgovernancehasbeenbroadlydefinedasa“modeoforganizingtransactions”(WilliamsonandOuchi，1981).AmoreprecisedelineationwasofferedbyPalay(1984)，whodefinesitas“ashorthandexpressionoftheinstitutionalframeworkinwhichcontractsareinitiated，negotiated，monitored，modifiedandterminated.”Heide(1994)statesthatgovernanceisamultidimensionalphenomenonthatencompassestheinitiation，terminationandongoingrelationshipmaintenancebetweenasetofparties.Inthispaper，theauthorsproposethatmarketingchannelsareinter-organizationalrelationshipsinthenature.Whencompaniesaregoverningmarketingchannels，theyareactuallygoverninginter-organizationalrelationships.Thisisaninstitutionalprocess.Theprimarymeasuringstandardofthegoverningeffectsislegitimacy，butnotthetraditionalefficiency.2THEORETICALBACKGROUNDSANDMODELInstitutionaltheoryholdsthatacompanysinstitutionalenvironmentismadeupofthenormsandvaluesofitsstakeholders，whichincludecustomers，investors，guilds，trusteecouncils，governments，andpartners.Accordingtoinstitutionaltheory，acompanyadoptssomestructure，behaviororprocesstosatisfyotherstakeholders.Thisbehaviorofseekingexternalrecognitionistheresultoftheinstitutionalenvironmentsinfluence.Therefore，legitimacybecomesakeyconceptininstitutionaltheory.Suchman(1995)“ageneralizedassumptionorperceptionoftheactionsofanentityaredesirable，proper，andappropriatewithinsomesociallyconstructednorms，values，beliefsanddefinitions.”Legitimacyrequirescompaniesbehaviorstobeconsistentwithpubliccognitionandemotionalexpectations.Thatis，companieswilladoptthosestructures，behaviors，andprocessesthatareconsideredaseffective，appropriate，andpopular.Accordingly，companiesarenotrationallypursuingefficiencybutconformingtoexternalrulesandnorms，soastomaketheirbehaviorsbeaccepted，understood，andrecognizedbyotherstakeholders.Therefore，gaininglegitimacyisofgreatimportancetocompaniesthatoperatewithintheinstitutionalenvironment.Inordertogainlegitimacy，manyaspectsoforganizationalstructuresandbehaviorsaredesignedandperformedtobeacceptedbytheinstitutionalenvironmentbutnottopursueefficiency.Marketingchannelsgovernanceisapartofacompanysoperations.Thedecisions，behaviors，andprocessesofgoverningchannelsmustbeconsistentwiththecompanysstrategy.Theyallhavetobeaccepted，understood，andrecognizedbyotherstakeholders.Thisisaninstitutionalizedprocess.Therefore，gaininglegitimacyoftheirchannel-governingdecisions，behaviors，andprocessesisalsoofgreatimportance.Marketchannelwontbeoneofthesourcesofsustainedcompetitiveadvantagesifthedecisions，behaviors，andprocessarenotlegitimate.2.1Inter-OrganizationalStudiesInter-OrganizationalinstitutionsInstitutionaltheoryinsiststhatweshouldstudyorganizationsenvironmentssoastobetterstudyandunderstandcompaniesbehaviorsandexplainorganizationalphenomena(Meyer&Rowen，1977).Institutionaltheorydividesenvironmentsintoinstitutionalenvironmentsandtaskenvironment，whichhavedifferentinfluenceonorganizations.Organizationsshouldtakeintoaccountthetaskenvironmentandtheinstitutionalenvironmentaswell，sinceorganizationsarealwaysinfluencedbytheinstitutionalenvironmentsandtheyareinstitutionalizedorganizations.Institutionaltheorystressesthatorganizationsareabletotakeinitiativestochangetheirenvironmentssoastobettersurviveanddevelop.Accordingtoinstitutionaltheory，acompanyisoperatingwithinasocialframeworkofnormsandvalues.Theireconomicbehaviorsareconstrainedbytechnology，information，income，andsocialconstructsaswell.Beingconsistentwithsocialexpectationsisbeneficialtotheirsurvivalandsuccesses(BaumandOliver，1991；CarrollandHannan，1989；DiMaggioandPowell，1983；Oliver，1991).Organizationsimprovetheirlegitimacy，resources，andsurvivingcapabilitiesthroughfollowingupsoastogainbenefits.2.2Inter-OrganizationalImitationsInter-organizationalimitationofpracticesandstructuresplaysacentralroleinseveraltheoriesoforganizationalactions(Haunschild，1993).Forexample，theoriesoforganizationallearningarguethatorganizationscopyotherorganizations，lettingothersabsorbthecostsofexperimentationordiscovery(Dutton&Freedman，1985；Levitt&March，1988；Lant&Mezias，1990).Strategicchoicetheoriessuggestthatimitationcanbeastrategicresponsetocompetitoractivities，sosecond-moverstaketheadvantagesofthefactthattherisksassociatedwithproductdevelopmenthavebeenabsorbedbyfirst-movers(Lieberman&Montgomery，1988).Institutionalizationtheoryarguesthatorganizationscopypracticesthatadoptedbyothersinanefforttogainlegitimacy(DiMaggio&Powell，1983).Itisself-evidentthatinter-organizationalimitationsareofgreatimportance.Buthowdoorganizationsimitate？Haunschild&Miner(1997)indicatethreemodesofinter-organizationalimitation，includingfrequency-basedimitation，trait-basedimitation，andoutcome-basedimitation.Withfrequency-basedimitation，organizationstendtoimitateactionsthathavebeentakenbylargenumbersofotherorganizations.Severaltheoreticalrationaleshavebeenmarshaledtosupportfrequencyimitation，andconsiderableempiricalevidencedocumentsitsoccurrence.Accordingtoearlyinstitutionalresearch，firmsadoptpracticesandstructuresthatmanyotherfirmshaveadoptedbecausewhenmanyfirmsadoptapractice，thelegitimacyofthatpracticeisenhanced(TolbertandZucker，1983；DiMaggioandPowell，1983).Thiseffectcanoccurbecausethedesireforlegitimacyleadsfirmstoadoptlegitimatepractices(MeyerandRowan，1977).Intrait-basedimitation，organizationsmayalsoselectivelyimitatepracticesthathavebeenusedbysomesubsetofotherorganizations.Argumentsfortrailimitationhavegenerallyemphasizedtheimportanceofsocialprocesses.Earlyinstitutionaltheorists(e.g.，DiMaggioandPowell，1983)suggestedthatfirmsadoptthepracticesof“l(fā)egitimate”organizationsandthatlegitimacyisinferredfromtraitslikelargesizeandsuccess.Organizationsmayalsoseektoacquirestatusbyimitatinghigher-statusorganizations(FombrunandShanley，1990)，whichareusuallylargeandsuccessful.Withoutcome-basedimitation，organizationsusetheoutcomesthatoccurafterotherorganizationsuseapracticeorstructuretodeterminewhethertheyshouldadopt.Thus，neitherthenumbernorthecharacteristicsofothersdoingpractice“A”isimportant.Instead，itistheapparentoutcomesthatoccurafterotherorganizationsdo“A”thatdetermineswhether“A”willbeimitated.Practicesorstructuresthatproducedpositiveoutcomesforotherswillbeimitated；thosethatproducednegativeoutcomeswillbeavoided.Selectiveimitationdoesnotarisefromfeaturesofotherusersbutfromperceivedconsequencesofthepractice.Companiesarenotlimitedtoonlyoneofthethreemodes.Duringthecompetition，theimitationmodetheywillapplyvarieswiththeircompetitorsanddecisions.2.3Inter-OrganizationalPowerandDependenceThemostcomprehensivetheoreticalstatementoninter-organizationalpoweranddependencewasa1978bookbyPfefferandSalancik，whichpresentedadetailedtheoreticaldiscussionaswellastheresultsofanumberoftheauthorsearlierempiricalworks.PfefferandSalancikbeganwithfourkeypremises：organizationsarefirstandforemostconcernedwithsurvival；inordertosurvivetheyrequireresourceswhichtheycannotgenerateinternally；asaconsequence，organizationsmustinteractwithelementsintheenvironmentonwhichtheyaredepend，whichoftenincludeotherorganizations；survivalisthereforebasedonanorganizationsmanageitsrelationswithotherorganizations.Becauseorganizationsdependonelementsintheirenvironmentforresources，thosegroupscanmakeclaimsonthem，andorganizationsmayfindthemselvesattemptingtosatisfytheconcernsoftheseenvironmentalconstituencies.AccordingtoPfefferandSalancik，therearethreecrucialfactorsthatdeterminetowhichoneorganizationdependsonanother：theimportanceoftheresourcetotheorganizationssurvival，theextenttowhichaparticulargroupinsideoroutsidetheorganizationhasaccesstoordiscretionoveruseoftheresource，andtheextenttowhichalternativesourcesoftheresourceexist.OneimportantfeatureofPfefferandSalanciksdiscussionistheirpointthatdependencecanbemutual.Justasoneorganizationcandependonanother，twoorganizationscansimultaneouslydependoneachother.Power