國際法律委員會述評-情勢變遷問題 外文翻譯

文獻翻譯原文：IntlLawCommissionCommentary---TheQuestionofRebusSicStantibus.-----TheInternationalLawCommissionCommentary.[ondraftofeventualArt.SeeViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,Article62]EuropeanCourtofJusticeholdsthatcontinuedfightinginformerYugoslaviafundamentallyundermined1980preferentialcustomsagreementwithSerbiathatjustifiedECCouncilinsuspendingitunderinternationallawprincipleofrebussicstantibusBetweenNovember1990andApril1992,A.RackeGmbH&Co.,aGermanfirm,hadimportedwinesintoGermanyfromSerbiaandhadclearedthemwithcustomsforstorageinitsprivatecustomswarehouse.WhenthewineswentintocirculationinMay1992,Rackeinvokedtheprogramofpreferentialcustomsratessetupbya1980Co-operationAgreementbetweentheMemberStatesoftheEuropeanCommunityandtheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(the"Agreement").ByRegulation314/83,theEChadalsoapprovedit.TheGermancustomsauthorities,however,calleduponRacketopaythedifferencebetweenthethirdcountryrateandthelowerrateundertheAgreement.TheycontendedthatthetradeconcessionsonwhichRacketriedtorelynolongerappliedsinceRegulation3300/91(theRegulation)hadsuspendedtheAgreementinNovember1991.TherecitalstotheRegulationexplainedthat,despiteanappealbytheECanditsMemberStatesforobediencetotheHaguecease-fireagreementofOctober4,1991,thepartieskeptonfighting.Rackebroughtsuitagainstthecustomsagency,challengingitsdenialofpreferentialtreatmentundertheAgreement.AstoanywineRackehadimportedafterNovember1991,thecourtdismissedtheaction.RackeappealedtotheGermanfederalcourt.Itarguedthattheinternationallawdoctrineofrebussicstantibusor"fundamentalchangeofcircumstances"asformulatedinArticle62(1)oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties[May23,1969,U.N.Doc.A/CONF.39/27]didnotjustifytheunilateralsuspensionoftheAgreement.TheGermanfederalcourt,however,ruledthatthedisintegrationofYugoslaviaintoseveralnewstatesplustheviolenthostilitiesthatfollowedcouldamounttoafundamentalchange.Ontheotherhand,thisdidnot,inthecourt'sview,radicallyaltertheextentoftheparties'obligationstowardseachotherunderArticle62(1).ThecourtthenreferredthequestionoftheArticle177.TheECJfirstupholdsitsjurisdictiontorespondtothereference.TheCourthasthepowertoreviewallchallengestothevalidityofECmeasuresincludingthosebasedonincompatibilitywithinternationallaw.TheEChastorespectinternationallawwhenitexercisesitspowersundertheRomeTreaty,asamended.ThisclearlyincludesthepresentchallengetotheRegulation.TheCourtthenpointsoutthattheViennaConventiononTreatiesdoesnotitselfbindtheECorallofitsMemberStates.[EditorialNote:AsofNovember1998,France,Ireland,LuxembourgandPortugalwerenotparties].Article62,however,doesembodyabindingruleofcustomaryinternationallawonsuspensionoftreaties.HencetheprincipleofrebussicstantibusbindsECinstitutionsaspartoftheCommunitylegalorder.Thenextquestionwaswhetherthisprovisionofatreaty,althoughwithanon-memberstate,isdirectlyapplicablewithintheEClegalorder.Inotherwords,mayanECcitizenbringaprivatelawsuitinaMemberStatecourtbasedonrightsconferredbythetreatyprovision?Thisinturndependsonwhetherthetreatysetsforthaclearandconcisedutythatwasnotcontingentontheadoptionofanysubsequentmeasure.Article22(4)oftheAgreementrequiredtheECtopreciselycomputecustomdutiespursuanttodetailedruleswithnodiscretioninvolved.HencetheAgreementwasdirectlyapplicable.Onpreliminaryreference,thetestforvalidatingaregulationasagainstrulesofcustomaryinternationallaw,iswhethertheCouncilmadeclearerrorsofassessmentastotheconditionsforapplyingthoserules.Article62setsforthtwoessentials.ThefirstiswhethertheprevailingcircumstancesatthetimeoftheAgreementconstitutedanessentialbasisfortheparties'assent.TheAgreementdeclaredthatitaimedtocontributetotheeconomicandsocialdevelopmentofformerYugoslavia.Thefailuretokeepthecease-fireagreementandthecontinuedwarfaremadeitimpossibletomeetthiscondition.Thesecondconditioniswhetherthechangehadradicallyalteredtheparties'obligations.WhentheCouncilrecitedintheRegulationthatthecontinuedpursuitofhostilitieshadunderminedtheobservanceoftheAgreement,itdidnotmakeamanifesterrorofassessment.IntlLawCommissionCommentary：(1)Almostallmodernjurists,howeverreluctantly,admittheexistenceininternationallawoftheprinciplewithwhichthisarticleisconcernedandwhichiscommonlyspokenofasthedoctrineofrebussicstantibus.Justasmanysystemsofmunicipallawrecognizethat,quiteapartfromanyactualimpossibilityofperformance,contractsmaybecomeinapplicablethroughafundamentalchangeofcircumstances,soalsotreatiesmaybecomeinapplicableforthesamereason.Mostjurists,however,atthesametimeenterastrongcaveatastotheneedtoconfinethescopeofthedoctrinewithinnarrowlimitsandtoregulatestrictlytheconditionsunderwhichitmaybeinvoked;fortheriskstothesecurityoftreatieswhichthisdoctrinepresentsintheabsenceofanygeneralsystemofcompulsoryjurisdictionareobvious.Thecircumstancesofinternationallifearealwayschanginganditiseasytoallegethatthechangesrenderthetreatyinapplicable.(2)TheCommissionconcludedthattheprinciple,ifitsapplicationwerecarefullydelimitedandregulated,shouldfindaplaceinthemodernlawoftreaties.Atreatymayremaininforceforalongtimeanditsstipulationscometoplaceanundueburdenononeofthepartiesasaresultofafundamentalchangeofcircumstances.Then,iftheotherpartywereobdurateinopposinganychange,thefactthatinternationallawrecognizednolegalmeansofterminatingormodifyingthetreatyotherwisethanthroughafurtheragreementbetweenthesamepartiesmightimposeaseriousstrainontherelationsbetweenthestatesconcerned;andthedissatisfiedstatemightultimatelybedriventotakeactionoutsidethelaw.Thenumberofcasescallingfortheapplicationoftheruleislikelytobecomparativelysmall.AspointedoutinthecommentarytoArticle,themajorityofmoderntreatiesareexpressedtobeofshortduration,orareenteredintoforrecurrenttermsofyearswitharighttodenouncethetreatyattheendofeachterm,orareexpresslyorimplicitlyterminableuponnotice.Inallthesecaseseitherthetreatyexpiresautomaticallyoreachparty,havingthepowertoterminatethetreaty,hasthepoweralsotoapplypressureupontheotherpartytoreviseitsprovisions.Nevertheless,theremayremainaresidueofcasesinwhich,failinganyagreement,onepartymaybeleftpowerlessunderthetreatytoobtainanylegalrelieffromoutmodedandburdensomeprovisions.Itisinthesecasesthattherebussicstantibusdoctrinecouldserveapurposeasalevertoinduceaspiritofcompromiseintheotherparty.Moreover,despitethestrongreservationsoftenexpressedwithregardtoit,theevidenceoftheacceptanceofthedoctrineininternationallawissoconsiderablethatitseemstoindicatearecognitionofaneedforthissafety-valveinthelawoftreaties.(3)TheCommissionalsorecognizedthatjuristshaveinthepastoftenlimitedtheapplicationoftheprincipletoso-calledperpetualtreaties,thatis,totreatiesnotmakinganyprovisionfortheirtermination.Thereasoningbywhichthislimitationoftheprinciplewassupportedbytheseauthoritiesdidnot,however,appeartotheCommissiontobeconvincing.Whenatreatyhadbeengivenadurationoften,twenty,fifty,orninety-nineyears,itcouldnotbeexcludedthatafundamentalchangeofcircumstancesmightoccurwhichradicallyaffectedthebasisofthetreaty.Thecataclysmiceventsofthepresentcenturyshowedhowfundamentallycircumstancesmaychangewithinaperiodofonlytenortwentyyears.Ifthedoctrinewereregardedasanobjectiveruleoflawfoundedupontheequityandjusticeofthematter,theredidnotseemtobeanyreasontodrawadistinctionbetween“perpetual”and“l(fā)ongterm”treaties.Moreover,practicedidnotaltogethersupporttheviewthattheprinciplewasconfinedto“perpetual”treaties.出處:Treaties.IntlLawCommissionCommentary---TheQuestionofRebusSicStantibus.[J]InternationalLawUpdate,Jun99,Vol.5,p71譯文：國際法律委員會述評---情勢變遷問題-----國際法委員會述評[關(guān)于藝術(shù)的最終草案。見維也納公約條約法第62條]歐洲法院認為,在前南斯拉夫的繼續(xù)爭論從根本上破壞了1980年關(guān)稅優(yōu)惠協(xié)定，塞爾維亞歐盟委員會有理由根據(jù)國際法在暫停使用情勢變遷原則。在1990年11月和1992年4月之間,A.拉克有限公司---一家德國公司,已經(jīng)清除了為德國從塞爾維亞進口葡萄酒和他們海關(guān)的其私人海關(guān)儲存?zhèn)}庫。在1992年5月當葡萄酒進入流通,拉克的優(yōu)惠關(guān)稅稅率程序援引了歐洲社會和社會主義聯(lián)邦共和國成員國之間的1980年合作協(xié)定(“協(xié)議”)。歐盟委員會已經(jīng)批準的第314卷83號。然而,德國海關(guān)當局根據(jù)該協(xié)要求拉克支付與第三國之間的率和低費率差別。他們認為,,拉克試圖靠貿(mào)易讓步不再適用自1991年11月已暫停第330091(監(jiān)管)協(xié)議。委員會的規(guī)例解釋說,盡管呼吁歐共體及其成員國,順從1991年10月4日的海牙停火協(xié)議的,但是各方仍然保持著戰(zhàn)斗。拉克公司提起訴訟海關(guān)機構(gòu),挑戰(zhàn)其拒絕的優(yōu)惠待遇協(xié)議。法院駁回拉克在1991年11月后任何進口酒的訴訟。拉克呼吁德國聯(lián)邦法院,在國際法情勢變遷理論的根本改變的情況下制定的《維也納公約》的第62（1）條約法[1969年5月23日,聯(lián)合國doc.A/39/27]，單方面并沒有理由暫停該協(xié)定。但是,德國聯(lián)邦法院裁定,南斯拉夫解體加上幾個新國家暴力敵對行動,可能造成一個根本的改變。另一方面,法院認為,根據(jù)第62(1)從對每一個根本上改變各方的義務(wù)的程度，就是法院所指的177條的問題。第一,歐洲法院堅持參考其管轄權(quán)的回應(yīng)。法院有權(quán)審查所有有效性挑戰(zhàn)的EC措施,包括那些不符合國際法的。歐盟委員會遵守國際法的羅馬條約條來行使它的權(quán)力。這顯然挑戰(zhàn)了目前的規(guī)例。法院指出,《維也納公約》條約本身并不受EC或其所有成員國的約束。[編者按:截至11月1998年,法國、愛爾蘭、盧森堡和葡萄牙非締約國]。但是,第62,暫停了體現(xiàn)有約束力的國際法習慣規(guī)則的條約。因此,情勢變遷的原則作為社會的一部分法律秩序來約束EC機構(gòu)。下一個問題是雖然有一個非成員國提供一個這種條約,直接適用于歐盟法律秩序。換言之,可使歐盟公民根據(jù)所賦予的權(quán)利的條約的規(guī)定在成員國法院私人訴訟。這又反過來取決于該條約提出了明確的責任,并不取決于隨后進行的任何措施。第22(4)的協(xié)議要求選舉委員會,根據(jù)詳細規(guī)則準確地計算關(guān)稅,而沒有決定權(quán)。因此,該協(xié)議是直接適用的。就初步參考測試證實了一條國際法的習慣規(guī)則,是安理會明確作出了實施這些規(guī)則的評估錯誤的條件。第62條規(guī)定了兩個必要條件:第一是當前的情況下的當時協(xié)議,通過雙方的批準是一個重要基礎(chǔ)?！秴f(xié)定》宣布,它旨在促進前南斯拉夫的經(jīng)濟和社會發(fā)展。未能保持?；饏f(xié)定和續(xù)戰(zhàn),無法滿足這一條件。第二個條件是能否從根本上改變了各方的義務(wù)。當安理會遵守協(xié)議的規(guī)定,損害了繼續(xù)追求的敵對行動,并沒有明顯的評估錯誤。國際法律委員會述評：（1）幾乎所有的現(xiàn)代法學家，承認存在此