第六屆團(tuán)支書聯(lián)席會(huì)復(fù)習(xí)寶典2014級(jí)上學(xué)期微經(jīng)3老師版11pricing with market power

Chapter

11有市場勢力的定價(jià)

Pricing

withMarket

PowerTopics

to

be

DiscussedChapter

11Slide

2奪取消費(fèi)者剩余Capturing

ConsumerSurplus價(jià)格歧視Price

Discrimination時(shí)期間價(jià)格歧視和高峰價(jià)格IntertemporalPrice

Discrimination

and

Peak-LoadPricing前言IntroductionChapter

11Slide

3沒有市場勢力的定價(jià)(完全競爭)由市場供求決定.Pricing

without

market

power

(perfectcompetition)

is

determined

by

market

supply

anddemand.為了達(dá)到利潤最大化,個(gè)別生產(chǎn)者必須能夠預(yù)測市場,然后集中于管理生產(chǎn)(成本).The

individualproducer

must

be

able

to

forecast

the

marketand

then

concentrate

on

managing

production(cost)

to

maximize

profits.前言IntroductionChapter

11Slide

4具有市場勢力(不完全競爭)的定價(jià)不僅要求個(gè)別生產(chǎn)者管理生產(chǎn),還要求對需求的特性了解更多.Pricing

with

market

power(imperfect

competition)requires

theindividual

producer

to

know

much

moreabout

the

characteristics

of

demand

aswell

as

manage

production.侵占消費(fèi)者剩余Capturing

Consumer

SurplusQuantity$/QDMRPmaxMC若價(jià)格提高到P*之上,廠商將會(huì)失去銷量,并減少利潤.PCPC

是存在于一個(gè)完全競爭市場的價(jià)格.AQ*P1在0

和Q*之間,消費(fèi)者將付比P*更高的價(jià)格–廠商侵占(A)區(qū)域的消費(fèi)者剩余.BP*P2超過的銷量Q*,

價(jià)格將必須下跌,在需求曲線(B)區(qū)域創(chuàng)造出一個(gè)消費(fèi)者剩余.Chapter

11Slide

5侵占消費(fèi)者剩余Capturing

Consumer

SurplusP*Q*:在MC=MR,單一的P

&

QA:價(jià)格為P*的消費(fèi)者剩余B:

P>MC

&

消費(fèi)者將以較低價(jià)格購買P1:減少銷量和利潤P2

:增加銷量&減少收入和利潤PC:競爭性價(jià)格Quantity$/QDMRPmaxMCPCAQ*BP1P*P2Chapter

11Slide

6侵占消費(fèi)者剩余Capturing

Consumer

SurplusQuantity$/QDMRPmaxMCPCAQ*P1BP*P2問題Question廠商如何能夠侵占在A段的消費(fèi)者剩余并在B段的銷售有利可圖?Chapter

11Slide

7答案Answer價(jià)格歧視兩部收費(fèi)搭售Price

discriminationTwo-part

tariffsBundling侵占消費(fèi)者剩余Chapter

11Slide

8Capturing

Consumer

Surplus價(jià)格歧視是對類似物品不同的消費(fèi)者實(shí)施不同定價(jià).Price

discrimination

is

thecharging

of

different

prices

to

differentconsumers

for

similar

goods.價(jià)格歧視Price

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

9一級(jí)價(jià)格歧視First

Degree

PriceDiscrimination–

對各個(gè)消費(fèi)者分別定最高價(jià)格,或他們愿意支付的保留價(jià)格.Charge

a

separate

price

to

eachcustomer:

the

maximum

or

reservation

pricethey

are

willing

to

pay.P*Q*沒有價(jià)格歧視,產(chǎn)出為Q*,價(jià)格為P*.總利潤是在MC

&

MR之間的面積

(黃色).來自完全的一級(jí)價(jià)格歧視的利潤Additional

Profit

From

Perfect

First-Degree

PriceDiscriminationQuantity$/QPmax由于價(jià)格歧視,每個(gè)消費(fèi)者付出他們愿意支付的價(jià)格.消費(fèi)者剩余是在P*之上和0

和Q*產(chǎn)出之間的面積(粗線三角形).D

=

ARMRMC產(chǎn)出擴(kuò)大到Q**,

價(jià)格下降到PC

,在PC處,MC=MR

（新，P325

）=AR=D利潤增加了在MC之上,在舊MR

和到產(chǎn)出Q**的D之間面積(紫色)Q**PCChapter

11Slide

10P*Q*來自完全價(jià)格歧視的額外利潤$/QPmaxD=

ARMR索取價(jià)格P*

時(shí)的消費(fèi)者剩余.當(dāng)索取單一價(jià)格P*

時(shí)的總利潤.MCQ**

QuantityPC由于完全的歧視每個(gè)消費(fèi)者支付保留價(jià)格利潤增加Chapter

11Slide

11Additional

Profit

From

Perfect

First-DegreePrice

Discrimination問題Question–

為何生產(chǎn)者難以實(shí)現(xiàn)一級(jí)價(jià)格歧視?Whywould

a

producer

have

difficulty

in

achievingfirst-degree

price

discrimination?Chapter

11Slide

12Additional

Profit

From

Perfect

First-DegreePrice

DiscriminationAdditional

Profit

From

Perfect

First-DegreePrice

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

13答案Answer太多的消費(fèi)者(不現(xiàn)實(shí))Too

many

customers(impractical)不能評(píng)估每個(gè)消費(fèi)者的保留價(jià)格Could

notestimate

the

reservation

price

for

eachcustomer價(jià)格歧視Price

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

14一級(jí)價(jià)格歧視First

Degree

PriceDiscrimination這個(gè)模型的確展示在一定程度上實(shí)施價(jià)格歧視的潛在利潤(激勵(lì)).The

model

does

demonstratethe

potential

profit

(incentive)

of

practicingprice

discrimination

to

some

degree.一級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Chapter

11Slide

15不完全價(jià)格歧視的例子:賣者有能力在一定程度上把市場隔離,對同一產(chǎn)品索取不同的價(jià)格:Examples

of

imperfect

pricediscrimination

where

the

seller

has

theability

to

segregate

the

market

to

someextent

and

charge

different

prices

for

thesame

product:律師,醫(yī)生和會(huì)計(jì)師汽車推銷員(15%的利潤賺頭)學(xué)院和大學(xué)First-Degree

PriceDiscrimination

in

PracticeQuantityDMRMCChapter

11Slide

162P3P*4P5P6$/QP1P導(dǎo)致較高利潤的6種價(jià)格.只有一種單一價(jià)格P*4時(shí),,有較少的消費(fèi)者。那些現(xiàn)在付P5或者P6

價(jià)格的人有消費(fèi)者剩余.Q二級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Second-Degree

Price

Discrimination$/QACMC沒有價(jià)格歧視時(shí):P=P0和Q=Q0.有二級(jí)歧視時(shí),有三種價(jià)格P1,P2,和P3.(例如,電力)P1P0P2P3二級(jí)價(jià)格歧視:根據(jù)消費(fèi)量—或區(qū)段來定價(jià).DMRQ1Q0Q2Q3Quantity第二段第三段第一段

Second-Degree

Price

Discrimination

$/QACMCP0P1P2P3規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)允許:增加消費(fèi)者福利較高的利潤DMRQ1Q0Q2Q3Quantity第二段第三段第一段Second-Degree

Price

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

19隨著銷量增加，需求傾向于彈性更小。自然壟斷具有規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)，因此能夠以較低的平均成本生產(chǎn)更多的產(chǎn)品。降價(jià)多賣是有利可圖的。Price

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

20三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

PriceDiscrimination把市場劃分為兩組.Divides

themarket

into

two-groups.每組有自己的需求函數(shù).Eachgrouphas

its

own

demand

function.三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

Price

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

21價(jià)格歧視的最一般類型.Mostcommon

type

of

price

discrimination.例子:航空公司,酒,蔬菜,給學(xué)生和老年公民的折扣.Examples:

airlines,liquor,vegetables,discounts

to

students

and

senior

citizens.三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

Price

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

224)當(dāng)賣者可以把具有不同需求價(jià)格彈性的不同買者市場分組(例如,把航空商務(wù)旅客與一般旅客分開),三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視是可行的.

Third

Degree

Price

Discrimination

isfeasible

when

the

seller

can

separatehis/her

market

into

groups

who

havedifferent

price

elasticities

of

demand(e.g.

business

air

travelers

versusvacation

air

travelers)Price

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

23三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

PriceDiscrimination目標(biāo)ObjectivesMR1

=

MR2MC1

=MR1

和MC2

=MR2MR1

=

MR2

=

MCPrice

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

24三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

PriceDiscriminationP1:第1組價(jià)格price

first

groupP2:第2組價(jià)格price

second

groupC(Qr)=總成本total

cost

of

QT

=Q1

+Q2利潤Profit

( )

=

P1Q1

+

P2Q2

-

C(Qr)p三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

Price

Discrimination–––

設(shè)銷售給第1組消費(fèi)者的利潤增量為零.Set

incremental

p

for

sales

to

group

1

=

0D(

P1Q1)=Dp

-

DC

=

0DQ1

DQ1

DQ1=

MCChapter

11Slide

25-

DCDQ=

MRDQ1111

1D(

P

Q

)Price

DiscriminationChapter

11Slide

26三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

PriceDiscrimination第2組消費(fèi)者:Second

group

of

customers:MR2

=

MCMR1

=

MR2

=

MCPrice

Discrimination三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

PriceDiscrimination確定相對價(jià)格Determining

relative

pricesRecall

:

MR

=

P(1

+1

E

)dThen

:

MR1

=

P1

(1

+1

E1

)

=

MR2

=

P2

(1

+1

E2

)Chapter

11Slide

27Price

Discrimination三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

PriceDiscrimination–

確定相對價(jià)格Determining

relative

prices–P2

(1

+1

E1

)Chapter

11Slide

28=

(1

+1

E2

)And

:

P1三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Chapter

11Slide

29Third

Degree

Price

Discrimination–定價(jià):對較低需求彈性的一組索取較高價(jià)格Pricing:

Charge

higher

pricetogroup

with

a

low

demand

elasticity三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視Third

Degree

Price

Discrimination–

例子:Example:

E1

=-2

&

E2

=-4––

P1

應(yīng)當(dāng)高達(dá)P2

的1.5

倍.=

(1

-1

4)

=

3

4 1

2

=

1.5Chapter

11Slide

30P2

(1

-1

2)P1Third-Degree

Price

DiscriminationQuantity$/QD1

=

AR1MR1消費(fèi)者劃分為兩組,每一組有不同的需求曲線.D2

=

AR2MRTMR2Chapter

11Slide

31MRT

=

MR1

+MR2Third-Degree

Price

DiscriminationQuantity$/QD1

=

AR1MR1D2

=

AR2MRTMR2MCQ2P2QTQT:

MC

=

MRT第1組:P1Q1

;較缺乏彈性第2組:P2Q2;較富有彈性MR1

=

MR2

=MCQT

決定MCQ1P1Chapter

11Slide

32在Q1

和P1處,MC=MR1不向較小的市場銷售No

Sales

to

Smaller

MarketChapter

11Slide

33即使三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視是可行的,如果邊際成本上升,則對兩組消費(fèi)者銷售也并不見得總有好處.Even

if

third-degreepricediscrimination

is

feasible,

it

doesn’talways

pay

to

sell

to

both

groupsof

consumers

if

marginal

cost

is

rising.不向較小的市場銷售No

Sales

to

Smaller

MarketQuantityD2MR2$/QMCD1MR1Q*P*Chapter

11Slide

34有需求D1的第1組消費(fèi)者并不愿意為這種物品付多少.

他們愿意付的不足以讓價(jià)格歧視有利可圖.優(yōu)惠券和折扣經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)The

Economics

of

Coupons

and

Rebates價(jià)格歧視Price

Discrimination較之具有較小彈性需求的那些消費(fèi)者,具有較大價(jià)格彈性的那些消費(fèi)者,當(dāng)他們購買產(chǎn)品時(shí)傾向于更經(jīng)常地使用優(yōu)惠券/折扣.Those

consumers

who

are

moreprice

elastic

will

tend

to

use

thecoupon/rebate

more

often

when

theypurchase

the

product

than

thoseconsumers

with

a

less

elastic

demand.Chapter

11Slide

35優(yōu)惠券和折扣經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)Chapter

11Slide

36The

Economics

of

Coupons

and

Rebates優(yōu)惠券和折扣項(xiàng)目允許廠商實(shí)行價(jià)格歧視.Coupons

and

rebate

programs

allow

firmsto

price

discriminate.優(yōu)惠券使用者和非使用者的價(jià)格彈性PriceElasticities

of

Demand

for

Users

Versus

Nonusers

of

CouponsChapter

11Slide

37價(jià)格彈性Price

Elasticity產(chǎn)品Product非使用者使用者衛(wèi)生紙Toilet

tissue-0.60-0.66輔料/調(diào)味品Stuffing/dressing-0.71-0.96沐浴露Shampoo-0.84-1.04烹調(diào)/沙拉油Cooking/salad

oil-1.22-1.32干什錦餐Dry

mix

dinner-0.88-1.09什錦餅Cake

mix-0.21-0.43貓食Cat

food-0.49-1.13凍菜Frozen

entrée-0.60-0.95果冰Gelatin-0.97-1.25細(xì)條實(shí)心面調(diào)料Spaghetti

sauce-1.65-1.81洗潔精/調(diào)理劑Crème

rinse/conditioner-0.82-1.12湯料Soup-1.05-1.22熱狗Hot

dogs-0.59-0.77Price

ElasticityProduct

Nonusers

UsersChapter

11Slide

38Price

Elasticities

of

Demand

for

Users

VersusNonusers

of

CouponsThe

Economics

of

Coupons

and

RebatesChapter

11Slide

39什錦餅Cake

Mix優(yōu)惠券非使用者Nonusers

of

coupons:PE

=

-0.21使用者Users:PE

=-0.43The

Economics

of

Coupons

and

RebatesChapter

11Slide

40什錦餅品牌Cake

Mix

Brand(皮爾倍力

Pillsbury)8

to

10

times

cake

mix

PE–PE:8-10倍什錦餅的PE例子Example–PE

使用者Users:-4–PE非使用者Nonusers:-2The

Economics

of

Coupons

and

Rebates使用:非使用者價(jià)格應(yīng)該是對使用者價(jià)格的1.5倍.Price

of

nonusers

should

be1.5times

users–或,若一盒什錦餅賣$1.50

,折扣券應(yīng)是50美分Or,

ifcakemixsells

for

$1.50,coupons

should

be

50

centsP1

=

(1+1

E2

)P2

(1+1

E1

)Chapter

11Slide

41飛機(jī)票價(jià)Airline

FaresChapter

11Slide

42彈性不同意味著一些消費(fèi)者愿意比其他消費(fèi)者支付更高的價(jià)格.Differences

in

elasticities

implythat

some

customers

will

pay

a

higher

fare

thanothers.商務(wù)旅客很少有選擇,他們的需求彈性較小.Business

travelers

have

few

choices

and

theirdemand

is

less

elastic.臨時(shí)旅客較有選擇,更有價(jià)格敏感性.Casualtravelers

have

choices

and

are

more

pricesensitive.飛機(jī)旅行需求彈性Elasticities

of

Demand

for

Air

Travel機(jī)票種類Fare

Category彈性頭等艙無限制二等艙折扣票價(jià)格Price-0.3-0.4-0.9收入e1.21.21.8Chapter

11Slide

43飛機(jī)票價(jià)Airline

FaresChapter

11Slide

44通過對票價(jià)設(shè)定不同限制,航空公司把市場分開.The

airlines

separate

the

marketbysetting

various

restrictions

on

the

tickets.較不貴的:提前買票,周末過夜,不能退票.Lessexpensive:

notice,

stay

over

the

weekend,norefund最貴的:沒有限制Most

expensive:

norestrictions時(shí)期間價(jià)格歧視和高峰定價(jià)Intertemporal

Price

Discrimination

and

Peak-LoadPricingChapter

11Slide

45按不同時(shí)間劃分市場Separating

theMarket

With

Time一個(gè)產(chǎn)品最初出品時(shí),需求是缺乏彈性的Initialrelease

of

a

product,the

demand

is

inelastic書Book電影Movie計(jì)算機(jī)Computer一旦這個(gè)市場已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生最大化的利潤,廠商降低價(jià)格以吸引具有更大彈性需求的一般市場Once

this

market

has

yielded

amaximum

profit,firms

lower

the

price

toappeal

to

a

general

market

with

amoreelastic

demand平裝本Paper

back

books折價(jià)電腦Discount

computersChapter

11Slide

46按不同時(shí)間劃分市場Separating

the

Market

With

TimeIntertemporal

PriceDiscriminationQuantity隨著時(shí)間推移,需求變得較有彈性,廠商降低價(jià)格以吸引大眾市場.Q2MR2D2

=

AR2AC

=

MCP2Chapter

11Slide

47MR1

D1

=

AR1$/QP1Q1根據(jù)不同時(shí)間消費(fèi)者被劃分為不同的群體.起初,需求彈性較小導(dǎo)致一個(gè)P1的價(jià)格.Intertemporal

PriceDiscrimination

and

Peak-Load

PricingPeak-Load

PricingDemand

for

some

products

may

peak

atparticular

times.Rush

hour

trafficElectricity

-

late

summer

afternoonsSki

resorts

on

weekendsChapter

11Slide

48能力的限制也會(huì)提高邊際成本Capacityrestraints

will

also

increase

MC.提高了的邊際收益和邊際成本需要較高的價(jià)格Increased

MR

and

MC

wouldindicate

a

higher

price.高峰定價(jià)Peak-Load

PricingChapter

11Slide

49Intertemporal

PriceDiscrimination

and

Peak-Load

PricingPeak-Load

Pricing由于一個(gè)市場不影響另一個(gè)市場,每個(gè)市場的邊際收益并不相等.MRisnot

equalfor

each

market

because

one

marketdoes

not

impact

the

other

market.Chapter

11Slide

50Intertemporal

PriceDiscrimination

and

Peak-Load

PricingD1

=

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AR2MR2非高峰價(jià)格=

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.Q2Chapter

11Slide

51P2如何給最暢銷小說定價(jià)How

to

Price

a

Best

Selling

NovelChapter

11Slide