IMF-汽車與綠色轉(zhuǎn)型：歐洲工人面臨的挑戰(zhàn)與機(jī)遇（英）

CarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkersOyaCelasun,GalenSher,PetiaTopalova,

andJingZhouWP/23/116IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.2023JUN?2023InternationalMonetaryFundWP/23/116IMFWorkingPaperEuropeanDepartmentCarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkersPreparedbyOyaCelasun,GalenSher,PetiaTopalova,andJingZhouAuthorizedfordistributionbyOyaCelasunJune2023IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.

TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,or

IMFmanagement.ABSTRACT:Reducingtransportsectoremissionsisan

importantpillarofthegreentransition.However,thetransitiontoelectricvehicles(EV)portendsmajorchangesinvehiclemanufacturingactivity,onwhichmanylivelihoodsinEuropedepend.UsingtheheterogeneityacrossEuropeancountriesinthespeedoftransitiontoEVproductionandvariationinsectoralandregionalexposuretotheautomotivesector,thispaper

offersearlyevidenceofthelabormarketimplicationsoftheEVtransition.Ourresultssuggest

thatthetransformationoftheautosectorisalreadyhavinganadverseimpactonemploymentintheaffectedsectorsandregions,whichcanbeexpectedtogrowatleastinthenearterm.Manyoftheaffectedworkerswillbeabletoretireandouranalysissuggeststhatthosewhowillhavetotransitiontonew“greener”jobshaveafairchance

todosowhencomparedtootherworkersinthemanufacturingsector.

Furthermore,wefind

evidencethatactivelabormarketpolicies,specificallytraining,canhelptoreducetheadjustmentcostsfortheaffectedworkers.RECOMMENDEDCITATION:

Celasun,Oya,GalenSher,PetiaTopalova,andJingZhou.2023.“CarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkers”IMFWorkingPaper23/116,InternationalMonetaryFund,Washington,DC.JELClassificationNumbers:Keywords:E24,Q52,Q55Electricvehicle;employment;greentransition;labormarketpolicyOCelasun@,GSher@,PTopalova@,andJZhou@Author’sE-MailAddress:WORKINGPAPERSCarsandtheGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkersPreparedby

OyaCelasun,GalenSher,PetiaTopalova,

andJingZhou11

Theauthorswouldliketothank

SabihaMohonaforexcellentresearchassistance.OyaCelasunocelasun@;GalenShergsher@;PetiaTopalovaptopalova@;JingZhoujzhou@.

TheviewsexpressedinthispaperdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoardorIMFmanagement.IMFWORKINGPAPERSCarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkersContentsI.Introduction

......................................................................................................................................................3II.TheTransitiontoEVs

.....................................................................................................................................5III.EvidenceonEmploymentEffects..............................................................................................................10EvidenceBasedonDifferentSectoralExposurestotheAutomotiveSectorElectrification.........................11EvidenceBasedonDifferentRegionalExposurestotheAutomotiveSectorElectrification........................14IV.TheRoleofPolicies.....................................................................................................................................19V.ReallocationProspectsoftheAdverselyAffectedSectors.....................................................................20VI.Conclusion

...................................................................................................................................................22FIGURES1.ExportsofElectricVehicles...............................................................................................................................62.NewRegistrationsandSalesofElectricVehicles.............................................................................................73.ElectricVehicleChargingStations....................................................................................................................84.CountriesinEuropewithOfficial

Targetsfora100PercentPhaseOutofICEVehicleSales

........................95.RRF-FundedSpendingDedicatedtotheAutomotiveSector..........................................................................106.EmploymentofAutomotive-Related................................................................................................................127.NumberofAutomotiveEmployees(FTE)byRegion,2015

............................................................................148.EmploymentintheAutomotiveSectorinEuropeanRegions,2015...............................................................159.ChangeinEmploymentRate,2015–19

..........................................................................................................1710.ProspectsofSwitchingtoaGreenJob:Germany

........................................................................................22TABLES1.LaborMarketOutcomesandExposuretoElectrification:SectoralEvidence.................................................132.LaborMarketOutcomesandExposuretoEVProduction:RegionalEvidence..............................................163.ScenariosoftheNumbersofEUWorkersaffectedbytheEVTransition

.......................................................164.UnemploymentRateandExposuretoEVProduction:TheRoleofWorkers’Education...............................185.UnemploymentRateandExposuretoEVProduction:TheRoleofWorkers’Age

.........................................196.LaborMarketOutcomesandExposuretoEVProduction:TheRoleofPolicies

............................................20AnnexI.DataSourcesandVariableConstruction........................................................................................24References.........................................................................................................................................................25INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND2IMFWORKINGPAPERSCarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkersI.IntroductionVehiclemanufacturingisundergoingitsmostprofoundtransformationinhistory.

Acombinationofrisingdemandforenvironmentallyfriendlyvehiclesand

regulatoryrestrictionson

emissionsissteeringtheindustrytoproducezero-emissionvehicles,especiallyvehiclespoweredbyelectricity(EVs).Withtheirpaint,frames,wheels,steeringsystemsandinteriors,EVsmaylooksimilartotraditionalinternalcombustionenginevehicles(ICEVs).However,EVsneedbatteries,morewiring,andsimplerelectricmotors,whileICEVshavemorecomplexenginesandneedstarters,fueltanks,exhaustpipesandgears.Asaresult,theamountoflaborinputandcomponentsrequiredtoproduceanEVcouldbesignificantlylowerfromtherequirementsoftraditionalICEVs—aproductwithoneofthelongestandmostcomplexsupplychains.EVswillalsotransformenergymarkets:EVswillincreasedemandforelectricity,requiringmorepowerplantsandhigher-capacitytransmissionlines,andwillreducedemandforgasolineanddieselrefiningandfillingstations.AsDanielYerginnotes,“Today,theEVhasbecomeanexistentialquestionfortheglobalautomotiveindustry.”1

AndtheEUautomotiveindustryandconsumershaverespondedinan

astoundingmanneroverthepast5-6yearstostricterregulatoryrequirements,shiftingconsumerpreferencesand

evolvingfinancialincentives.RegistrationsofnewEVsrosefrom150thousandtonearly2millionintheEUfrom2015to2022.AndmostmajorautomakersarephasingoutnewinvestmentinICEandannouncingnew,ambitious,targetsforEVproductioninEuropeanmarkets.IntheEuropeanUnion,thetransformationoftheautomotivesector

couldhaveprofoundeffectsonemployment.Morethan14?millionpeople(or7percentoftheworkforce)dependon

theautomotivesectordirectlyorindirectlyfortheirlivelihood.Inseveralcountries,theautomotivesectorismacro-critical.Forinstance,inGermany—thelargestcarproducerinEurope—thesectorconstitutesabout20percentofmanufacturing,12percentofemployment,and10percentofgoodsexports.InsomecountriesinCentral,Eastern,andSoutheasternEurope,suchastheCzechRepublicandtheSlovakRepublic,ithasanevenlargerfootprint.Totheextentthatareduceddemandforworkersintheautomotivesectorbecauseofthetechnologicaltransformationisnotoffsetbyhigherlabordemandinotherpartsoftheeconomyand/orthedisplacedautoworkerscannoteasilyreallocatetogrowingeconomicsectorsorregions,theswitchtoEVproductionmaybringsignificantadjustmentcosts,atleastintheshorttomediumrun.Tominimizethepotentiallossfromtheautomotivesector’stransition,manycountriesaroundtheworldareimplementingpoliciestoretainorattractEVmanufacturersandEVcomponents’suppliers,suchastheChipsActintheEU,theInflationReductionAct(IRA)intheUS,andProductionLinkedIncentivesSchemesinIndiaamongothers.The2022USIRA,inparticular,willprovidesubsidiesfor

EVsthatmeetcertain“domesticcontent”requirements,includingassemblyintheUnitedStates,likelyputtingEUfirmsatacostdisadvantageandtriggeringfirmstorelocatetheirproductionto

theUnitedStates.TheEUisconsideringadoptinga“GreenIndustrialPlan”inresponse,which

couldrelaxcompetitionrulestemporarilytoallowforexpandedsubsidiestofirms,inparttoneutralizetheproduction-shiftingincentivesprovidedbytheIRA.Eventhoughthereisconsiderableconcernaboutthelabormarketimplicationsoftheautomotivetransition,westillknowverylittleabouthowthisprocessmightplayout.AsarguedbyGalgóczi(2019)regardingtheemploymenteffectsoftheautosector

transformation,“theonlycertaintyisthatthechangeswillbemassiveandthatalmostalljobsintheindustrywillbeaffectedtosomeextent.”Studiestodatehavemodelledthe1

Yergin,Daniel“TheNewMap:Energy,ClimateandtheClashofNations.”Chapter37TheElectricCharge.INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND3IMFWORKINGPAPERSCarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkerspotentialemploymenteffectsofthetransitiontoEVsthroughbottom-uportop-downapproaches(explainedbelow).Thesestudieshavepresentedawiderangeofestimatesofthepotentialjoblosses(orgains)fromtheautomotivesectortransitiontoEVsdependingonassumptionsaboutEVdemand,thedistributionofproductionofcarpartsandtheirassemblyacrosscountries,andpolicyresponses.However,tothebestofourknowledge,thereisnoempiricalevidencethusfarontheimpactoftheswitchtoEVproductiononautomotivesectorworkersandregionallabormarkets,duenotleasttotherelativenewnessofelectricvehicleproductioninEurope.ThispaperaimstofillthisgapintheliteraturebyexaminingempiricallythelinkbetweenemploymentandproductionofEVsusingdatafromtheEU.Todoso,wetakeadvantageofthe

rapidexpansionofEVproductionsince2017andthecross-countryheterogeneityinthespeedofexpansionacrossEUcountriesintwosimpleandcomplementarydifference-in-differenceexercises.First,usingsectoralemploymentdata,wedemonstratethatemploymentinsectorsexposedtoICEVgrewsignificantlyslowerthaninothersectorsinEUcountrieswheretheshareofEVexportsintotalcarexportsgrewrelativelyfasteroverthe2015-19period.2WhilethisfirstpieceofevidenceissuggestiveofthedragtheswitchtoEVproductionmighthaveonemploymentinICE-relatedsectors,itdoesnotspeaktotheoveralllabormarketconsequencesoftheautomotivesector’stransformation.Ifworkersthatmighthavebeenemployedintheautomotivesector

–wereitnotfortheswitchtoEVproduction–caneasilyfindjobsinothersectors(forexample,intheexpandingindustriesthatprovideEVuseinfrastructure),thenoverallemploymentmightnotbeadverselyaffected.Oursecondempiricalexercise,however,suggeststhiswasnotthecase.Usingsub-regionalemploymentdataacrossEUcountries,weshowthatregionswithinacountrythatweremoreexposedtocarmanufacturingthroughtheiremploymentmixpriortotheEVtake-offexperiencedrelativeemploymentlosses(orsmalleremploymentgains)incountrieswhereEVexportsgrewrelativelyfaster.Encouragingly,thereissuggestiveevidencethatlabormarketpolicieswereabletooffsetsomeoftheseeffects.Thelinkbetweenthepotentialexposuretoelectricvehicleproductionandregionalemploymentissignificantlysmallerincountrieswithhigherspendingonworkers’training.Moreover,usingdetailed

datafromGermany,wefindthatgiventheirskills,workersintheautomotivesectorhaveafairchance

toreallocateto“green”sectors,thosewithahighshareofgreenoccupations,whicharemorelikelytoexpandduringthegreentransition.Takentogether,theresultsinthispapersuggestthatthetransformationoftheautomotivesectormayhaveadverseemploymentconsequencesforworkersinvehiclemanufacturingandICEVrelatedsectors.However,strongactivelabormarketpolicies,particularlythosefocusedonworkerstraining,couldeasetheprocess,andhelpspeedtheadjustmenttotheprofoundtransformationoftheautomotivesector.Ourpapercontributestoseveralstrandsofliterature.First,itcomplementsexistingstudiesontheramificationsofthetransformationofthecarindustryforworkersbyprovidingthefirstempiricalestimatesofthelinkbetweenEVproductionandemployment.Existingstudies,mostlyconductedbypolicyinstitutions,consultingfirmsandautomotiveindustryassociations,havegenerallyfollowedtwoapproaches.Usingthebottom-upapproachofcountingthenumberof

laborhoursneededtoproduceeachpartofavehicleandassemblethem,Baueretal.(2018)findthatbetween11and35percent(23,000-97,000)fewerworkerswouldbeneededin2030,dependingontheshareofEVsinyearlysales(25-80percent).Moreoptimistically,Küpperetal.(2020)findthatEVsrequireaboutthesamelaborefforttoproduceasICEVs,thoughlabor-hoursneededwouldbe72

Ourfindingsarerobusttoexpandingthetimehorizontoinclude2020.However,giventheCOVID-19pandemicandthedemandandsupplyshocksthatwereespeciallydisruptivefortheautosector(seeBoranovaetal.2022),ourbaselinespecificationsexcludethepost-COVID-19period.INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND4IMFWORKINGPAPERSCarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkerspercentloweriftheproductionandassemblyofbatterycellsisoutsourced.3

Bycontrast,varioustop-downapproachesappliedtoselectcountrieshaveestimatedtheeffectsoftheEVtransitiononeconomicactivity

atthenationallevel,whichthenaffectsfirms’demandforworkers.FortheUS,Barrettetal.(2021)proposescenariosforthesalesofdifferenttypes

ofvehiclesandestimate75,000joblossesovertimeiftheUSdoesnotcaptureagreatershareofglobalEVpowertrains(electricmotorsandbatteries).4

M?nnigetal.(2019)analyzescenariosofvehiclesalesinGermanyandfindthattheEVtransitionultimatelyleadstonetjoblossesof114,000by2035.Usinganalternativemodelofeconomicactivity,energyuseandgreenhousegasemissions,EuropeanClimateFoundation

(2017),ontheotherhand,predicts145,000morejobsinGermanyby2030ifnewvehiclemodelsaredevelopedthaninascenariowhereoldcarscontinuetobereplacedbycurrent,morefuel-efficientmodels,butnewmodelsarenotdeveloped,asgainsfromenergyefficiencymorethanoffsetshighercostsofvehicleproduction.5,6Ourpaperalsocontributestothegrowingempiricalliteratureontheeffectsoftechnologicalprogressonlabormarketoutcomes(see,forexample,GraetzandMichaels,2015,Gregoryetal.2016,AcemogluandRestrepo,2017,AutorandSalomons2017,2018,

Edinetal.2019,Grigoli,Kóczán,andTopalova,2020).Relativetotheexistingstudies,wefocusononeparticularsector,theautomotiveindustry,whichisnotonlymacro-criticalinmanyEuropeancountriesbutisalsoundergoingamajortechnology-enabledtransformation.Finally,ourstudyalsoaddstothegrowingliteratureontherealeconomiccostsofthegreentransitionandclimatemitigationpolicies,andthepotentialemploymentshiftsthatthesecouldimply(see,amongothers,IMF2022a;IMF,2022b;Bluedornetal.,2022).7Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.SectionIIdocuments

keystylizedfactsabouthowtheautomotivesectorischangingandthepolicyagendathatunderpinthisrapidtransformation.SectionIIIempiricallyestimatesthepotentiallabormarketconsequencesofthetransitionbyexploitingtheheterogenousimpactacross

sectorsandacrossregionswithinEurope.SectionIVfocusesontheroleofactivelabormarketpoliciesinthisprocess.SectionVexaminesthereallocationprospectsoftheworkersatriskfromthemost-hitsegmentsoftheautomotivesector,andSectionVIconcludes.II.TheTransition

toEVsTheEuropeanautomotivesectorisinthemidstofahistorictransformationand

its“futurelookselectric”(Delanoteetal.,2022).MajorautomakersarephasingoutICEinvestmentsandannouncingnewtargetsforEV3

Otherbottom-upstudiesincludeSpathetal.(2012),Baueretal.(2020),NPM(2020),andKuhlmannetal.(2021).4

Alternatively,jobgainscouldreach150,000iftheUScapturesthesamemarketshareasithasofICEVpowertrains(engineandauxiliarysystems)andincreasestheshareofdomesticallysoldvehiclesthataredomesticallyproducedfrom50to60percent.5

Othertop-downstudiesincludevondemBachetal(2020),Bernardtetal.(2022),Prandinetal.(2022),M?nnigetal.(2021),Schadeetal.(2014),andTAB(2012).6

Otherstudiesdonotuseeconomicmodels.CLEPA(2021)startfromjudgementsaboutthelikelydevelopmentofproductionindifferentsectorsandfindthat275,000jobswouldbelostovertimeinEuropeiftailpipeCO

emissionsare100percentlowerin22035andbatteriesarelocallyproduced.CountingthejobsconnectedwithICEVtechnology,Falcketal.(2021)findthat613,000jobswouldbeaffectedbytheEVtransition,thoughthisnumberexcludesjobsneededforEVproductionorinfrastructureexpansion.7

Academicstudiesoftheautoindustryhavelargelyfocusedonestimatingstructuralmodelsofdemandandsupplyandevaluatingvarioustradepolicies(Feenstra,1984,Feenstra1988,Goldberg,1995,GoldbergandVerboven,2001).Morerecently,agrowingliteratureexaminestheadoptionofEVsbyconsumersandtheeffectivenessofincentivesschemes(see,forexample,Anghel,AucielloandLacuesta,2022,AzarafsharandVermeulen,2020,ClintonandSteinberg,2019,

Jenn

etal.,2018,Merskyet

al.,2016,MuehleggerandRapson,2022,Münzeletal.,2019,Weeet

al.,2018).INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND5IMFWORKINGPAPERSCarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkersproduction.SalesofEVsandhybridsexceeded45percentofautomotivesalesin2022,fromlessthan2percentin2016,andproductionandexportsofEVshave

experiencedunprecedentedgrowthin

recentyears.EuropeanEVexportsin2020morethanquadrupled

relativeto2015,amountingto7percentoftotallight-weightpassengercarexports.

Inabsolutevalue,GermanyexportedthemostEVsamongEuropeancountriesin2020.ForcountrieslikeBelgium,Austria,andtheNetherlands,EVcontributedmorethan10percentoftotalcarexports(Figure1).Figure1.ExportsofElectricVehiclesElectricVehicleExportsShareofElectricVehicleExports

inTotalVehicleExpor(Aggregate

ofEuropeancountries)(Percentage

point,aggregate

ofEuropeancountries)876543210252015105120010008006004002000ValueValue,bn€Weight0201120132015201720192011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020Sources:Comext.Sources:Comext.ElectricVehicleExportsShareEVinTotalPassengerVehicleExports(million

Euro)(Percentage

points)2520151058765432102020

20112020

20110Sources:Comext.Sources:Comext.Alongsidethesharpincreaseinsupply,demandforEVsandhybridsrosesignificantly,supportedbysizabletaxincentivesandsubsidies.

8

InGermany,theshareofEVandhybridcarsaccountedfor

almosthalfoftotalnewcarregistrationsin2022—fivetimeshigherthanthatin2019.In2022,morethan94percentofnewcarregistrationsinNorwaywerefor

EVsandhybridcars.Sweden,theNetherlands,Finland,IcelandandDenmarkalsohadnewEVandhybridregistrationssharesabove

55percentin2022.WhiletheEUandotheradvancedEuropeancountriesareleadersintheadoptionofEVsandhybridvehicles,demandisgrowingatafastpaceinmanylargemarkets,includingChina,KoreaandtheUS(Figure2).8

ExistingstudiesshowthatEVsubsidiessignificantlyincreasetheuptakeofEVs(see,forexample,Münzeletal.,2018,forareviewoftheliteratureandMuehleggerandRapson,2022,forevidencefromtheUS).INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND6IMFWORKINGPAPERSCarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkersFigure2.NewRegistrationsandSalesofElectricVehiclesNewCarRegistrationsintheEUNewCarRegistrationsintheEU(Numberinmillion)16(Bycountry,

2022)BGRCYPLVAEVHybridPetrol/DieselOthers1412108LTUESTSVNHRVLUXSVKCZEGRCIRLEVHybridPetrol/DieselOthersROUHUNFINPRTDNKAUTBEL64POLNLDSWEESP2ITAFRADEU02014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

202201Millions23Sources:EuropeanAutomobile

Manufacturers'

Association.Sources:EuropeanAutomobile

Manufacturers'

AssociationINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND7IMFWORKINGPAPERSCarsandGreenTransition:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforEuropeanWorkersEVcharginginfrastructureisalsogrowingatafastpaceinEurope.TheexpansionofchargingstationsFigure3.ElectricVehicleChargingStations(2012to2020)outstrippedthegrowthinEVregistrationsin2010s,especiallyintheNetherlands,France,andGermany,thoughthepacehasslowedinrecentyears.Countriesalsovaryintheavailabilityofchargers.TheNetherlandshasthehighestchargingstationdensity,

butmostothercountriesarefarbehind(Figure3).ThestronggrowthinelectrificationoftheautomotivesectorinEuropewasdriventoalargeextentbychangesintheregulatoryenvironment,asEuropehassetoutambitiousgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsreductiontargets.TransportisanimportantsectorforSources:EuropeanAlternativeFuelsdecarbonization.ItaccountsforonequarterofglobalObservatory,EuropeanEnvironmentAgency.(andEU)CO

emissions,withalmosthalfofthose2comingfromlightdutyvehicles.9

Thetransitiontobattery-poweredelectricvehiclescouldplayamajorroleinreducingemissionsinthetransportsector.10

Thefulllife-cycleGHGemissionsofEVsarearoundhalfofthoseofICEV,andthegapwilllikelywidenwiththeincreasingroleofrenewablesinmanufacturingand

electricitygeneration.Forexamples,IEA(2022)estimatesafurther25percentpotentialreductioninGHGemissionsfromEVswithlow-carbonelectricity(IEA,2022).TheEUcurrentlyaimsforitsfleetofcarstoachieve

95gramsandlightcommercialvehicles(‘vans’)147gramsofCO

perkilometer(EURegulation2019/631).Thesetargetsapplytotheaverage

tailpipeemissionsofall2carsandvansregisteredforthefirsttimeintheEUeachyear.Toachievethesetargets,bindingrequirementsaresetoneachmanufactureraccordingtothe

physicalweightoftheirvehicles.Manufacturersofheaviervehicles,likeBMWandDaimler,facelowerrequirementsthantheEU-widetarget,andmakersoflightervehicles,likeFiatandRenault,facestricterrequirements,suchthatthetargetsareachievedonaverageacrossallmanufacturers.11

Ifamanufacturerexceedsitsemissionsrequirementinagivenyear,themanufacturerisliabletopayafineforeachgramperkilometerinexcessofitsrequirement.12

TheseEUtargetsaresettostrengthenovertime.By2025,carsandvansshould

emitnomorethan81and125gramsofCO

per2kilometer,respectively,andby2030,thesetargetsdropfurtherto59and101grams

ofCO

perkilometer.29

Studiesalsoestimatethatthecombustionoffossilfuelsintransportcontributesto

about242,000prematuredeathseachyearworldwide(Chamblissetal.,2014).10

Thedifficultyofdecarbonizingheavytrucks,shippingandairlinesputsextraburdenondecarbonizinglightdutypassengervehicles.11

Thereareatleasttwomaterialexemptionsintheregulationthatmakeiteasierformanufacturerstocomplywith.First,differentmanufacturerscanpooltheiremissions,effectivelybeingregulatedasoneentity.Second,theregulationoffersmanufacturersadditionalincentivestosellzero-andlow-emissionsvehicles(thoseemitting50gramsorlessofcarbondioxideperkilometer).Theseincentives,availableuntil2022,allowmanufacturerstocountsuchvehiclesmorethanonceinthecalculationoftheiremissions.12

Currently,thefineissetat€95foreachgramperkilometermorethantherequirement.Forexample,iftheemissionsofavehicleexceeditstargetby10gramsperkilometer,and100,000vehiclesofthemanufacturerwereregisteredintheEUthatyear,themanufacturermustpayapenaltyof€95million.Asof2021,theemissionsrequirementsarebasedontheworldwideharmonizedlightvehiclestestprocedure(WLTP).Topreventcheatingonemissi