布魯蓋爾研究所-維護(hù)歐洲綠色協(xié)議的新治理框架（英）

PolicyBrief

Issuen?18/23|September2023

JeanPisani-Ferry(jpf@)isaSeniorFellowandatthethe

PetersonInstitutefor

InternationalEconomics

SimoneTagliapietra

(simone.tagliapietra@)isaSeniorFellowatBruegel

GeorgZachmann(georg.

zachmann@)isaSeniorFellowatBruegel

1

bruegel

Anewgovernance

frameworktosafeguardtheEuropeanGreenDeal

JeanPisani-Ferry,SimoneTagliapietraandGeorgZachmann

Executivesummary

WiththeEuropeanGreenDeal,theEuropeanUnionadoptedambitiousclimatetargets

andawaveoflegislationtoreachthem.Butimplementationwillbepoliticallychallenging,inparticularbecausetheGreenDealhasnotupgradedtheEU’senergyandclimategovernanceframework.Weproposefiveprioritiesforgovernancereform:

1.Allemissionsshouldbemadesubjecttoemissionstrading.By2030,separateemissionstradingsystems(ETS)willcoverindustrialemissionsandbuildings/transportemissions,representingthree-quartersofallterritorialemissions.AthirdETSshouldbecreatedforsectorsnotyetcoveredandtheemissioncontrolmechanismsshouldbeunifiedby2040.

2.PreparationsshouldstartforanEUGreenInvestmentPlan.Thisshouldensurethat

afterpandemicrecoveryfundingendsin2026,EUgreengrantsremainatleastatthe

currentlevelof€50billionperyear(0.3percentofGDP).MakinguptheannualshortfallwouldrequirenewEUresourcesamountingto€180billionbetween2024and2030,

butthiswillbeimportanttotacklethepoliticalanddistributionalproblemstheEUwillincreasinglyface.Inaddition,currentlydiscussedEUeconomicgovernancereforms

shouldbeamendedtoallowcountrieswithpublicdebtexceeding60percentofGDPbutwithsustainablepublicfinancestoreducedebtataslowerpace,ontheconditionthat

additionalemissions-reducinginvestmentsaremade.

3.AEuropeanEnergyAgencyshouldbeestablished.Thiswouldprovideunbiasedreferencepointsforpolicyevaluationandpreparation.Itwouldnothavedecision-makingpowersbutwouldgatherandmakeavailabledatafordecision-making,maintainopenmodellingtools,andindependentlyassessEUandmember-statepolicies.

4.Energyandclimategovernanceshouldbeelevatedtoheadsofstateandgovernmentleveltoincreasepolicycoordinationandpoliticalownership.SpecialEuropeansummitswouldbeorganisedatleastonceayear,withpreparationsdonebyEUenergyandclimatesherpas.

5.TransmissionnetworkdevelopmentandoperationshouldbedrivenbyEuropeancost

minimisation.AnEuropeanindependentnetworksystemoperatorwouldbeabletoensurethatexistingcross-bordertransmissionisusedoptimally,alsowithaviewtofostering

investment.

TheauthorsaregratefultoGiovanniSgaravattifortheexcellentcontributionprovidedduringthepreparationofthispaper.TheyarealsogratefultoConallHeussaffandBenMcWilliams

fortheirresearchsupport,andtotheparticipantsinanApril2023workshopheldatBruegeltodiscussthisissue.ThisversionhasbenefittedfrominsightfulcommentsbyFabrizioBalassone,MiguelGil-Tertre,EricaHope,SelmaMahfouz,ZoltanMassayKosubek,ThomasPellerin-

Carlin,AndréSapir,KurtVandenbergheandJerominZettelmeyer.FinancialsupportfromtheEuropeanClimateFoundationisgratefullyacknowledged.

Recommendedcitation

Pisani-Ferry,J.,S.TagliapietraandG.Zachmann(2023)‘Anewgovernance

frameworktosafeguardtheEuropeanGreenDeal’,PolicyBrief18/2023,Bruegel

1Introduction

TheEuropeanCommissionunderUrsulavonderLeyenhassuccessfullypivotedtheEuro-

peanUniontowardsclimateneutrality.WiththeEuropeanGreenDeal,theEUhassetclear

andambitiousclimatetargetsfor2030and2050and,toreachthem,hasadoptedawaveof

legislation.HundredsofbillionsofeurosinEUgreenfundinghavebeenmobilised.WhiletheCOVID-19pandemicandRussia’sinvasionofUkraineshowedthattheclimatecrisisisnot

theonlymajorchallengeforEurope,thevonderLeyenCommissionhasmademajoreffortstotapgreenopportunitiesaspartofthemanagementofthesecrises.Theinvestmentplantoaddressthepandemic–NextGenerationEU–emphasisedclimate-relevantinvestments,whiletheREPowerEUplantominimiserelianceonenergyimportsfromRussiahasfocusedon

rolloutofgreenalternatives.

Nonetheless,difficultieslayaheadforthegreentransitioninEurope.MeetingtheEU’s

climate-changemitigationgoalswillrequireEUcountriestotakeincreasinglychallenging

decisionsinthenextfewyears(Box1).Unfortunately,theactionstheytakeareunlikelytobecommensuratewiththecommonclimate-neutralityambition,fortworeasons.

Thefirstisacoordinationfailure.ThemainclimatetargetshavebeensetatEUlevelwhileessentialpolicies–particularlyenergypolicies–remainlargelynational.Theresultisthat

collectiveactionislikelytobeinsufficient.Second,reachingtheclimatetargetsrequires

profoundchangestolifestylesandwillhavedistributionalconsequencesthatcouldleadtoapoliticalbacklash.Thisisalreadyhappening.Aheadofthe2024Europeanelections,moreandmorevoicesarespeakingoutinsupportofaslowingdownofthedecarbonisationprocess1.

SomerecentnationalelectionsinEUcountries,includingItaly,FinlandandSweden,haveseenastrengtheningofvoicescriticalofambitiousdomesticclimatepolices,totheextent

thatthesurvivalofthecurrentconsensusonclimateneutralitywithintheEuropeanCouncilcannotbetakenforgranted.

Box1:EUdecarbonisationwillbecomemorechallenging

Overthelastdecade,mostgreenhousegasemissionsreductionsintheEUhappenedin

sectorscoveredbytheEUemissionstradingsystem(ETS),mostnotablyinthepowersector.Innon-ETSsectorssuchastransportandbuildings,emissionsreductionswererelatively

small(Figure1).By2030,tomeetEUtargets,ETSemissionswillhavetodropby35percentcomparedto2022,whileemissionsfrombuildingsandtransportshouldbereducedfourtimesfasterthaninthepastdecade.

Thiswilllikelyhavetwoconsequences.First,thedistributionbetweenEUcountriesofthecostsofdecarbonisationwillchangeasdecarbonisationhastomoveswiftlytowardsharder-to-abatesectors.Second,decarbonisationwillaffecthouseholdsunequally:theburdenof

complyingwiththenewregulationsbysetdeadlines(forexample,thephase-outoffossilfuelcarsby2035)willbehighforlow-incomehouseholdsofcourse,butalsoformiddle-incomehouseholds,forwhichrenovatingpropertyorbuyinganelectriccarcouldrequireinvestmentofaboutayear’sincome(Pisani-FerryandMahfouz,2023).Policiesthathavetheeffectof

requiringtheseinvestmentscouldeasilytriggerresistanceiftheyarenotproperlydesignedandexplained.

1Forexample,on12July2023,theEuropeanPeople’sPartyvotedagainstanaturerestorationlawinthe

EuropeanParliament,indicatingthattheconservativesaretakingamorenegativeattitudetowardsambitious

environmentalrulesaheadoftheEuropeanelections.Insummer2023,oppositiontoGermanplanstobanthesaleofgasboilersgrewstronger.InItaly,pollinghasshownthat45percentofrespondentsbelievetheEUtargetsaretooambitious,comparedto22percentwhobelievetheyarecorrect;see

/you_trend/

status/1680862213286899713

.

2PolicyBrief|Issuen?18/23|September2023

Milliontonnes

Figure1:Emissionreductions2011-2021bysector(milliontonnesofCO2equivalents)

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

Power(andpublicheat)

Industry

Buildings

Transport

Agriculture

Others

201120212030target

Source:BruegelbasedonIPCCemissionsdata.

Whilethefirstproblemcaninprinciplebesolvedthroughbettercoordinationbetween

theEUanditsmembers–includingbettercommoninstitutions–thesecondwouldbe

presenteveninanEUorganisedasafederalstate.Theseproblemsarethereforeconceptuallydistinct.Atthesametime,theyarerelated:politicalresistancehappensmostlyatthenationallevel,whichfurtherweakensincentivestomaketherequirednationalefforts.

TheEUenergyandclimategovernancestructurecontainselementsthatseektoaddresstheseproblems.Butthesedonotgofarenough.Thegovernancestructureneedstobe

enhancedtodothejob.InthisPolicyBrief,wefirstprovideanoverviewofthedevelopmentandlegalfoundationofEUenergyandclimatechangemitigationpolicy2.Section2describestheEUenergyandclimategovernancestructure.Section3discusseswhythisstructure’s

shortcomings.Section4setsoutpolicyproposalstoenhancegovernanceinordertosafe-guardEUdecarbonisation.

2EUenergyandclimatepolicy:historicaldevelopmentandlegalfoundation

ThoughEUenergyandclimatepoliciesarestronglyinterdependent,thebasicprinciplesoftheirrespectivegovernanceregimesattheEUleveldiffer:

?Energypolicychoicesareanationalprerogative.JustificationsforEUinvolvementmainlyderivefromrequirementsarisingfromthefunctioningoftheinternalmarket;

?ClimatepolicyisacommonpolicyoftheEU.Restrictionstoitsscopederivefromthelim-itationsofitsinstrumentsandfromtherequirementthattheprerogativesofEUcountriesinthefieldofenergyberespected.

Thereasonsforthismisalignmentandthefundamentalgovernanceproblemitcreates,canbefoundinthehistoricalevolutionoftheEuropeanintegrationproject.

EnergycooperationplayedaprominentroleintheearlydaysoftheEuropeanintegrationprocess.WiththecreationoftheEuropeanCoalandSteelCommunityin1951,Europe’s

foundingfathersdecidedtointegratecoal–themainenergyresourceofthetime–andsteelindustriesintoasinglecommonmarket.In1957theEuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunity

2Wedonotfocusonclimatechangeadaptationpolicy,whichrequiresadedicatedanalysis;see,forinstance,Lenaertsetal(2022).

3PolicyBrief|Issuen?18/23|September2023

(Euratom)wascreated,withtheoriginalpurposeofdevelopingnuclearenergyand

distributingittoitsmemberstates.However,afterthisinitialstrongpush,effortstointegrateEurope’senergypolicylapseduntilthe1990s,whentheprocessofliberalisationofEuropeanelectricityandgasmarketsstarted.EUenergypolicymomentumreallystartedtogather

steamin2015,whentheEnergyUnioninitiativefollowedRussia’sannexationofCrimea

andtherelatedgassecurity-of-supplyfearsinEurope.Securityofsupplybecameevenmorepressingin2022,intensifyingcallsformoreintegratedEUenergypolicy.

Bycontrast,climatepolicywaslargelybornEuropean,andhasremainedakeyEUcom-petence.TheSingleEuropeanActof1987addedenvironmentalprovisionstotheEuropeanTreaty,allowingtheCounciloftheEUandEuropeanParliamenttomakeenvironmentallawsonthebasisthatcountriesfacesimilarenvironmentalproblemsandpollutionoftencrossesborders3.

However,theSingleEuropeanActintroducedastrongcaveat:pushedbyfossilfuel-

richcountries,theEUagreedaprovisionaffirmingthattheUnionwouldnotinterferewithnationalpoliciestoexploitdomesticenergyresources.ThisprovisionremainspartoftheEUTreaty(Box2).

Box2:ThelegalfoundationsofEUenergyandclimatepolicies

Energypolicy

UndertheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU),energyandclimatearesharedcompetences,meaningthattheEUanditsmembercountriescanexercisetheirau-thorityconcurrentlyinthesepolicyareas.Asinallsharedcompetenceareas,EUinstitutionsplayanimportantroleinproposingclimateandenergypoliciesandinadoptinglaws.EU

countriesmeanwhiledefinetheEU’soverallpoliticaldirectionandpriorities,andnegotiateandadoptlawstogetherwiththeEuropeanParliament.

TheTFEUestablishesthecoreobjectivesofEUenergypolicy(Art194):ensuringthefunc-tioningoftheenergymarket,ensuringsecurityofenergysupply,promotingenergyefficiencyandenergysavingandthedevelopmentofnewandrenewableformsofenergy,andpromot-ingtheinterconnectionofenergynetworks.ItalsoreaffirmsthatsuchEUmeasuresshallnotaffectanEUcountry’srighttodeterminetheconditionsforexploitingitsenergyresources,itschoicebetweendifferentenergysourcesandthegeneralstructureofitsenergysupply.

BasedontheprovisionsinArticle194,theEUhasdevelopeditsenergypolicythroughseveralcorelaws,includingtheRenewableEnergyDirective(EU2018/2001)andtheEnergyEfficiencyDirective(EU2018/2022).Itisinterestingtonotethatduringtheenergycrisisof2022,severalinitiativeswereadoptedbasedontheprovisionsofArticle122,ashappened

duringtheeurocrisis.

Climatepolicy

TheTFEUemphasisestheimportanceofintegratingenvironmentalprotectionintothe

definitionandexecutionofEUpoliciesandactivities,withtheultimategoalofpromotingsus-tainabledevelopment(Article11).Specifically,theEUisrequiredtosafeguardandenhanceenvironmentalquality,encouragetheresponsibleuseofnaturalresources,andspearhead

internationalinitiativestoaddressregionalandglobalenvironmentalissues,especiallycli-matechange(Article191).Additionally,whileEUcountriesareresponsibleforfinancingandexecutingenvironmentalpolicies,thisdoesnotdiminishtheroleoftheEUintakingappro-priatemeasures(Article192[4]).

TheEUovertimehasdevelopeditsclimatepolicyinaccordancewiththeseprovisions,

3Moreover,thegrowthoftheSingleMarketraisedconcernsaboutcompetitiondistortionsresultingfromdifferentenvironmentalpoliciesatnationallevel.TheSingleEuropeanActaimedtominimisethesedistortionsbyadoptingEuropeanrulesforenvironmentalprotection(DelbekeandVis,2016).

4PolicyBrief|Issuen?18/23|September2023

2015:

Energy

Union

Fivepillars:

energy

security;

internal

energymar-

ket;energy

efficiency;

decarbon-

isation;

innovation

2014:

2030

Climate

andEnergy

Framework

40%cutin

emissions

(from1990

levels)

32%ofEU

energyfrom

RES

32.5%

improvement

inenergy

efficiency

2019:

EuropeanGreenDeal

The

European

climatelaw

55%cutin

(from1990

levels)

Just

Transition

Fund

‘Farm

tofork'

strategy

Circular

economyactionplan

…

2007:LisbonTreaty

EUenergy

policyfor

competition,

securityand

sustainability

butwithout

prejudice

tonational

energy

sovereignty.

1960-1980s:

vacuum

2001:

FirstRES

Directive

2012:

FirstEE

Directive

1950s:the

pioneering

period

1951:

European

Coaland

Steel

Community

1957:

Euratom

1992:

Maastricht

Treaty

Energy

chapter

rejectedby

EUcounties

1996&

1998:First

Energy

Package;

liberalisation

ofelectricity

andgas

markets

1991:SAVE

Specific

Actions

forEnergy

Efficiency

1992:CO2taxfailure

Decisionto

goforsofter

tools(RES,

EE)

1990:FirstIPCCReport

EUcountries

agreeto

stabilise

emissionsat

1990levels

by2000.But

how?

Early

2000sstep

forward

European

Climate

Change

Programme

(2000)ledto

ETSin2005

DGCLIMA

createdin

2010

1993

SAVE

DirectiveinplaceforEE

ALTENER

Programme

topromote

RES

Decisiononmonitoringemissions

1987:Single

European

Act;

environmen-

talpolicy

elevatedto

Community

level

1997:KyotoProtocol

Community

entersamore

dynamic

phaseof

climate

policy.

enactingsignificantlaws,includingtheDirectiveontheestablishmentoftheEmission

TradingSystem(2003/87/EC),theCouncilDecisionendorsingtheParisAgreement(EU

2016/1841),theRegulationonthegovernanceoftheEnergyUnionandClimateAction(EU

2018/1999)andtheRegulationlayingdowntheframeworkforachievingclimateneutralityby2050,commonlyknownastheEuropeanClimateLaw(EU2021/1119).

In1990,theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange’sfirstsummaryreportsparkeddiscussionsintheEuropeanCouncilonclimatechange.EUleadersagreedtostabiliseby

2000greenhousegasemissionsat1990levels.Thistargetledtodiscussionsoncommon

policiestoachieveemissionsreductions.However,EUcountriesfailedtoagreeonanenergychaptertobeincludedinthe1992MaastrichtTreaty,becauseoftheeagernessofmember

statestopreservetheirsovereigntyoverenergypolicychoices.Lackingaclearmandateonenergypolicy,andafterafailedattempttointroduceaEuropeancarbontaxinthe1990s

(DelbekeandVis,2016),theEUadoptedsoftenergy-policyinstrumentsincludingtargets

forenergyefficiencyandrenewableenergy.Inparallel,italsostartedtosteerthecontinent’senergyprofilethroughcompetitionpolicy,inwhichtheEuropeanCommissionisthecentralEUauthority.Inthelate1990s,theFirstEnergyPackagewasadopted,startingtheprocessofliberalisationoftheelectricityandgasnationalmarkets.

Figure2:ThelongjourneyofEUenergyandclimatepolicy

2009:

2020Climate

andEnergy

Package

20%cutin

emissions

(from1990

levels)

20%ofEU

energyfrom

RES

20%im-provement inenergyefficiency

Source:Bruegel.Note:RES=renewables,EE=energyefficiency;DGCLIMA=EuropeanCommissionDirectorate-GeneralforClimateAction.

Thethen-EuropeanCommunityalsobeganformulatingstrategiestomeetthetargetsofthe

KyotoProtocol,towhichitwasparty.TheEuropeanClimateChangeProgramme(ECCP)was

launchedin2000,leadingtotheintroductionofthefirstrenewableenergysources(RES)Direc-tivein2001,andoftheEuropeanemissionstradingsystem(ETS)in2005.In2009,anewrenewa-bleenergydirectivewasadopted.ButastheTFEU,whichenteredintoforcethesameyear,madeenergyasharedcompetence,thisdirectivewasthelastEUlegaldocumentsettingbindingtargetsforthedeploymentofRESatthenationallevel.AllsubsequentlawsonRESdeployment,pub-

lishedin2018,2021and2023,haveset(increasinglyambitious)REStargetsfortheEUasawhole.

The2015ParisAgreementwasaturningpointforEUenergyandclimatepolicydevel-opment(Figure2).InNovember2018,theEuropeanCommissionpublishedthelong-term

5PolicyBrief|Issuen?18/23|September2023

vision‘ACleanPlanetforall’,whichproposedclimateneutralityby2050astheEU’scentralclimategoal,andwhichfirstshowedpotentialpathwaystogetthere.

In2019,theEuropeanCommissionthenpivotedtheEUtowardsclimateneutralitywiththeintroductionoftheEuropeanGreenDeal.Underthisflagshipinitiative,theEUhas

adoptedtheEuropeanClimateLaw–aneconomy-wideframeworklawforthegreentransi-tion–andhastightenedsectoralemissionreductiontargets.IthasalsotriggeredawaveoflegislationtostrengthenexistingEUclimateandenergypolicyinstruments(includingtheETS,emissionsstandardsforcarsandrenewableenergyandenergyefficiencytargets)andcreatenewones(suchasasecondemissionstradingsystemcoveringbuildingsandroad

transport,andtheworld-firstcarbonborderadjustmentmechanism).Finally,theEUhasmobilisedhundredsofbillionsofeurosinclimatefundingthroughaseriesofnewly-estab-lishedfacilities(seeTable1inthenextsection).

3TheEU’sclimateandenergy

governancestructure

3.1Climategovernance

ThemosteffectivetooltoreduceemissionsintheEUisundoubtfullytheETS,anEU-man-

agedandregulatedschemeforcarbonemissionallowancetradingforthemost-emitting

sectors:electricityandheatgeneration,energy-intensiveindustriesandaviationwithintheEuropeanEconomicArea4.TheETScoversabout40percentoftotalEUemissions,withabouthalfoftheallowanceshandedoutforfreetocompaniesandtheremainderauctioned.From2026,freedistributionofETSallowanceswillbegraduallyphasedoutovernineyears.In

parallelacarbonborderadjustmentmechanismwillbeintroduced,underwhichimportersofspecifiedproductsfromcountrieswherethepriceofcarbonislowerthanintheEUwillberequiredtoacquirecarboncertificates.

Theremaining60percentshareofEUemissionsnotcoveredbytheETS,includingemis-sionsfromagriculture,roadtransport,buildingsandwaste,isgovernedbytheEffortSharingRegulation(ESR).ThisgivesEUcountriesbindingbindingtargetsfornon-ETSemissions

reductions.ESRsectorssofarhavenotachievedthesamelevelofemissionsreductionseeninETSsectors5.From2027,theESRwillbecomplementedbyasecondemissionstradingsystem(ETS-2)forbuildings,roadtransportandprocessheat,accountingforaquarteroftotalEU

emissions.ETS-2willthuspushtheshareofEUemissionscoveredbyemissionstradingfrom40percentto77percentin2030:ade-factoincreaseintheEuropeanisationofclimatepolicy(Figure3).

4From2024theETSwillexpandtoshipping.

5In2020,emissionsinESRsectorwereonly16percentlowerthanin2005,against41percentforETSsectors.In2023,anewESRemissionreductiontargetof40percentby2030comparedto2005levelswasset.

6PolicyBrief|Issuen?18/23|September2023

Figure3:2021EUemissionsand2030EUtargetedemissionsbysectorandscheme

Transport

Electricityandheat

Agriculture

Buildings

Manufacturingand

construction

Industrialprocesses

Ener9industries

wasteandothers

Fugtiveemissions

2021

ETSESR

60%

40%

2030

ETSESRETS-2

39%

I

23%

38%

/

01002003004005006007000100200300400500600700

Source:BruegelbasedonEEAandEuropeanCommission.Note:theemissionreductionfactorsusedwere-62percentforETSsectors(com-paredto2005emissions),-43percentforsectorscoveredbytheETS-2(comparedto2005)and-40percentfortheremainingESRsectors.

Upto2030,theemissionscoveredbytheETS-2willremainpartoftheESR,meaningthatifthecompaniessubjectedtotheETS-2inonecountryonaggregateacquireandusemore

allowancesthanthecountry’sESRtarget,thecountrystillneedstomeetitsoverallESRtarget(Rickelsetal,2023).Thiscouldleadtotwolevelsofinter-countrytradeinthesesectors:onebetweencompaniessubjecttotheETS-2,andoneamonggovernmentssubjectedtotheESR.

TheintroductionoftheETS-2willmakeEurope’sclimatepolicymorecredibleascompa-niesfallunderarelativelyclearcomplianceregime6.TheETS-2willbeatooltomechanicallytranslateatougherclimatetargetintoatighteningcapand,allotherthingsbeingequal,

increasetheETScarbonpriceforallcountries.Forexample,thevolumeofnewEUETS

allowancesmustshrinkby4.4percentperyear–theso-calledlinearreductionfactor7.PuttingasubstantialshareofESRemissionsunderaEurope-wideemissiontradingschemeisasignif-

icantimprovementovertheESRalone,compliancewithwhichischeckedby(1)monitoring

NationalEnergyandClimatePlans(NECPs)andprovidingrecommendationstomemberstatesonthesectorswheremoreeffortisneeded;(2)Europeanlevelsector-specificregulations,suchasemissionsstandardsforcars;and(3)theobligationfornon-compliantcountriestobuyemis-sionreductionsfromover-compliantcountries.As(1)and(2)oftenonlyworkwithasignificanttimelagandinvolveuncertainty,and(3)onlyworkswhentheEUonaggregateiscompliant,theESRalonecannotguaranteecompliance.

6Penaltieswillbeimposedforeachtonneofemissionsforwhichacoveredinstallationfailstosurrenderanemissionallowance.

7Thelinearreductionfactordefinestheannualdecreaseofallowancesprovidedtothemarketeitherviafree

allocationorviaauctions.Theannualreductionwasincreasedfrom2.2%peryearbytheso-calledFitfor55

package,whichincreasedtheEU’s2030emissionsreductiontargetfrom40percentto55percent,compared

to1990.SeeCounciloftheEUpressreleaseof25April2023,

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press

-

releases/2023/04/25/fit-for-55-council-adopts-key-pieces-of-legislation-delivering-on-2030-climate-targets/

.

7PolicyBrief|Issuen?18/23|September2023

TheconsequencesofEUcountriesnotdeliveringsufficientactiontocontributetotheachievementofEUenergyand

climateobjectives

remainuntested

3.2Energygovernance

WhileEUclimatepolicyisbeingincreasinglyEuropeanised,EUenergypolicyremainshigh-

lyfragmented.EUpoliciesmuststrikeabalancebetweennecessaryactiontopursuejointly

determinedgoals(ieensuringthefunctioningoftheenergymarket,securityofsupply,promot-ingenergyefficiencyandrenewableenergy,andinterconnectionofenergynetworks),andtheTreatyrequirementtopreservetherightofEUcountriestodeterminetheirownenergymixes.Thishasledtoacomplexwebofresponsibilitiesonthestrategicandoperationallevels.

Onthestrategiclevel,EUcountrieshaveagreedtopursuesomehigh-leveltargetsonenergyefficiency(a36percentreductioninfinalenergyconsumptionby2030relativetoprojections),renewables(a42.5percentshareinEUenergyconsumptionby2030)andelectricityintercon-nectedness(atleast15percentby2030).Thesetargetshavebeenupdatedandrevisedseveraltimes.Inthecurrentset-up,therenewablestargetsareimplicitlybrokendownintodifferenti-atednationaltargets,whiletheenergyefficiencytargetsareonlybindingatEuropeanlevel.

Toensurecompliance,aGovernanceRegulation(Regulation(EU)2018/1999)adoptedin

December2018introducedNationalEnergyandClimatePlans(NECPs).Inthese,EUcountriesoutlinethepoliciesandmeasurestheyplaninordertocontributetotheEUclimateandenergytargets.TheEuropeanCommissionassessesNECPs,andmayissuerecommendationsfor

improvement.ButtheconsequencesofEUmembersnotdeliveringsufficientactionatnationalleveltocontributetotheachievementofEUenergyandclimateobjectivesremainuntested.

Infringementprocedurescanonlybeinitiatedincasesofproceduralmisconduct,suchasfail-urestodeliverNECPsandlong-termstrategiesontime.Toenforcetheactualenergytargets,asofterapproachistaken.IfashortfallisidentifiedinanNECP,policyrecommendations