IATA：2023年全球航空運輸展望報告 Global Outlook for Air Transport A local sweet spot

December2023

GlobalOutlookforAirTransport

Alocalsweetspot

2GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot

Contents

GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot3

1.Long-termtrendsarebecominglesssupportive

4

2.Airtransportationisback,butthepaceofgrowthwillslow

10

Airpassengertraffic

10

Aircargotraffic

14

3.AirlineFinancialPerformance1

6

Overview1

6

Revenuedevelopment1

8

Capitalproviders1

8

Aircraft

19

Labor2

0

Fuel2

0

Regions2

1

Risks2

3

3GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot

GlobalOutlookforAirTransportAlocalsweetspot

Thissemi-annualreporttakesabroadlookatdevelopmentsintheairlineindustry,thecontextinwhichitisoperating,andthechallengesitisfacing.

Maintakeaways:

.Thegloballong-termtrendsthatpropelledthe20th

century’sunparalleledeconomicachievementsareifnotinreverse,certainlybecominglesssupportive.Muchof

the20thcentury’ssuccesswasenabledbytheexpandeduseoffossilfuels.Thateconomicmodelhaspassedits

zenith.Itwilltakeasuccessfulenergytransitiontosettheworldonanewpathtowardssustained–andsustainable–growthandbettereconomicoutcomesforall.

.2023hasbeenayearwhenairtransportationverynearlyreturnedtoitspre-pandemicpaceofactivity,anda

yearofrenewedfinancialprofitabilityfortheindustry.Inmanyways,2023islikelytobealocalsweetspotfortheindustry,asthesamepaceofgrowthandfinancialrecoveryisunlikelytobematchedin2024andbeyond.

.Industry-widepassengertraffic,measuredinrevenue

passenger-kilometers(RPKs),grewby40.1%year-on-year(YoY)throughSeptember2023andreached92.9%of

pre-pandemiclevels.Allregions,exceptAsiaPacific,areexpectedtoreachorsurpasstheir2019trafficlevelsin

2023.Inthelongrun,globalpassengertrafficlookssettodoubleby2040.

.Thecargosectorcontinuedtofacechallengesin2023,

withaslowdownindemandduetomacro-economic

headwindsandaslowdowninglobaltrade.Despitea

declineincargotonne-kilometers(CTKs)from2022levels,signsofimprovementemergedinthesecondhalfof2023.Regionalvariationswereobserved,withLatinAmerica

achievingannualgrowthinCTKs,andNorthAmericaandAfricasurpassingtheirpre-Covidlevels.OverallindustryCTKsareexpectedtoremainbelow2022levelsin2023,withaforecast4.5%growthin2024.

.Theindustryisreturningtoprofitabilityin2023,onlythreeyearsafterthehistoriclossofnearlyUSD140billionin

2020.Thisisastunningperformanceandatestimonytotheindustry’sresilience,adaptability,andhardwork.Totalairlinerevenueisexpectedtoreach107%of2019earnings,withoperatingprofitsofUSD41billion.

.ThenetprofitforecastforthewholeindustrythisyearisUSD23.3billion.Whilethisisapositivedevelopment,thelevelsofprofitabilityarefarfrombeingexceptional.For

someperspective,nearlyhalfthisamountwasrealized

byonesingleoilcompanyinjustthethirdquarterofthisyear,whilealargetechnologycompanynearlymatched

ourfull-yearindustryprofitsinthatsinglequarter.Air

transportation’snetprofitmarginisaslim2.6%in2023,

comparedto11%and22%forthecompaniesjust

mentioned,respectively.Airlines’profitsin2023equate

toUSD5.44perpassenger–lessthanacupofcoldbrewcoffeeinGeneva.Whilestunninglyresilient,ourindustryisstilllackinginrobustness.

.Passengersaroundtheworldhaveclearlyvotedwith

theirwallets,showingtheworldthattheydeemair

transportationnecessary,eveninthefaceofrecord-highjetfuelpricesinrelationtocrudeoilprices.Passenger

satisfactionisashighas82%inasurveyof8,000

airtravelers1,and91%saythatairtransportationis

necessary2.Ourworldneedstobeconnected,andairtransportationisanecessaryandindispensableformofconnectivity.Thetoplinedevelopmentinourindustryshowshowimportantairtransportationis,andthe

industryhasbeenabletomeetexpectations,bouncingbacksorapidlyfromaneartotalhalt.

.However,theindustryremainstheweakestlinkinthe

aviationvaluechainandtheexpectednetprofitsalso

revealitsvulnerabilities.Intheshortterm,airlinesneedtoimprovetheirprofitmarginsandstrengthentheirbalancesheetsafterthepandemic.Inthelongerterm,ensuring

airtransportation’saccesstorenewableenergysourceswillallowourindustrytoplayitsfullpartincreatinga

growingglobaleconomythatissustainable,inclusive,andequitable.

1IATA2023GlobalPassengerSurvey(GPS).

2IATAPassengerTrendsandInsights2023.TheIATApassengerinsightssurveywasconducted26April26-3May2023withasampleof4,700recenttravelers.Itcovers11markets(Australia,Canada,Chile,France,Germany,India,Japan,Singapore,UAE,US,andUK).Samplesizeineachmarketwas500apartfromChile,Japan,SingaporeandUAEwhereitwas300.ThisIsMotifLtdpreparedthequestionnaireandanalysisbasedondatacollectionandtabulationbyDynata

4GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

1.Long-termtrends

arebecominglesssupportive

Takingthelongview,overupto100years,itmustbesaidthatthe20thcenturyarguablydeliveredhistory’smoststunning

progressintermsofimprovedeconomicoutcomesglobally.Thenumberofpersonslivinginpovertyfelldramaticallyandglobalincomedistributionbecamemoreequitablethaneverbefore.Thiswaspossiblethankstomanyfactors,includingtheradicaladvancesintransportationandcommunicationswhichbroughtdownthecostoftransportinggoodsand

servicesaroundtheglobe,andfacilitatedthedisseminationofknowledgeandideas.InthewakeoftheSecondWorld

War,therules-basedinternationalworldorderthatemergedalongwithenduringpeaceprovidedthebackdropagainst

whichcross-borderactivitycouldflourish.Afurtherenablingtrendwasthespreadofdemocraciesaroundtheworld

andtheeconomicpoliciesfrequentlyassociatedwiththisphenomenon(Chart1).

Fromwherewecurrentlystandinthe21stcentury,manyofthefavorableconditionsthatcontributedtothepastcentury’s

successseemtobewaning.Unhelpfullong-termtrendsarenotnecessarilydrivingthebusinesscycle,andeconomic

performancecanstillbothoverwhelmandunderwhelmat

anygivenpointintime.However,wewillbeabletoassessthebusinesscycle’soscillationswithgreaterclarityifputintothecontextoftheemergingstructuraltrends.

Politicalregimes

Whilenotanabsolutedeterminant,economicgrowthismorelikelytobesustainedunderdemocracythanunderautocracy3.Theshareofelectoralandliberaldemocraciesinalltheworld’spoliticalregimeswasashighas54.3%in2004,forinstance.

Itthendeclinedprogressivelyto50.5%in2022.Closedandelectoralautocraciesmadeuptheremaining49.5%oftheworld’spoliticalregimes.

Conflicts

TheUppsalaConflictDataProgramreportsthat2022saw

thehighestnumberofviolentconflictssincetheSecond

WorldWar.State-basedconflictsnumber56,upfroma2010lowof30.Theglobaleconomicimpactofviolencewasput

atUSD14.4trillionin2020bytheInstituteforEconomics

&Peace4.Applyingtheobservedincreaseinstate-based

conflictstothisnumber,thecostislikelytohaveexceeded

USD15trillionin2022,or15%of2022nominalworldGDP.

Inadditiontothecostinflicteduponwarringnations,thereisalsotheopportunitycostofmilitaryspending.WorldmilitaryspendingrosetoUSD2.2trillionin2022,adjustedforinflation,thehighestleveleverrecordedinSIPRIdata,andequivalentto2.2%ofglobalGDP5.Thatismoneythatcouldhavecoveredmorethanhalfoftheestimatedworldwideannualclean

energyinvestmentsneededtodelivertheenergytransition,accordingtotheInternationalEnergyAgency,nottomentionthebenefitsitcouldhavebroughttoschools,healthsystems,infrastructure,andmanymoreproductiveareas6.

Chart1:Politicalregimes

Closedautocracies

Electoralautocracies

Electoraldemocracies

Liberaldemocracies

1900191019201930194019501960197019801990200020102022

Source:OWIDbasedonLührmannetal.(2018)

3PatrickA.ImamandJonathanR.W.Temple,“PoliticalInstitutionsandOutputCollapses”,IMFWorkingPaperWP/23/36,February2023.4InstituteforEconomics&Peace,Business&PeaceReport2021:Peace:AGoodPredictorofEconomicSuccess,Sydney,May2021.

5NanTianet.Al.,“Trendsinworldmilitaryexpenditure,2022”,SIPRIFactSheet,StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute,April2023.6“NetZeroby2050”,IEA,May2021.

5GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot1.Long-termtrendsarebecominglesssupportive

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

Navelgazing

Theseevolutionswillasarulepromotemoreinward-looking

economicpoliciesorforcesuchbehavioruponeconomies

sufferingconflict.Signsthatthismightbehappeningcan

befoundinthedeclineinthereal(inflationadjusted)world

exports-to-GDPratio(Chart2).Thisratiopeakedat103%in

2008andfellbackto98%in2022.Worldtradecanofcourseslowformanyreasonsotherthanthedirectimpactsofpoliticalregimesandviolentconflict.Tradefluctuatesinresponseto

changesinthecompositionoftrade,slowerGDPgrowth,thenatureoftraderegimes,andevolutionsinglobalsupplychains,forinstance.Thesefactorstoothougharethemselvesoften

influencedbytrendsinpoliticalregimesandarmedconflicts.ItisnoteworthyinthiscontextthattheIMFcountsnearly3000newtradebarriersimposedgloballyin2022–athreefold

increasefrom1000suchmeasurestakenin20197.

Turningfromtradetocapital,theflowsofforeigndirect

investments(FDI)havebeenonadownwardtrendsince2007anddeclinedby24%in2022comparedto2021(Chart3).Bothmergersandacquisitions(M&A)andgreenfieldinvestment

projectscontributetotheweakertrendinthisformofcross-borderactivity.Moreover,M&Aactivityisfairlyconcentratedinahandfulofcountries.NearlyhalfoftotalM&Aactivityin2022concernedonlyfiveadvancedeconomies:theUK,theUS,

Australia,theNetherlands,andSweden.

SomeofthesedevelopmentshaveofcoursebeeninfluencedbytheCovidpandemic.Inthegeneraltrendtowardsmore

inward-lookingeconomicpolicies,thepandemicdisrupted

supplychainsandexacerbatedthefragmentationthatwecanobserveinbothtradeandcross-borderinvestment.

Chart2:RealWorldExports-to-GDPratio,indexed(2015=100)

110%

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

2022

2008

103%

98%

1960196519701975198019851990199520002005201020152020

Sources:WTOStatsandWorldBankWorldDevelopmentIndicators

Note:TheratioistheworldexportvolumeindexoverworldGDPinconstant2015USdollarsindex

Chart3:Globalforeigndirectinvestmentflows,USDbillion(left)and%ofGDP(right)

PercentofGDP(RHS)PercentofGDP(RHS)

200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022

Source:OECD–Globalforeigndirectinvestmentflows

7“TheHighCostofGlobalEconomicFragmentation”,IMF,August2023.

4.5%

4.0%

3.5%

3.0%

2.5%

2.0%

1.5%

0%

6GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot1.Long-termtrendsarebecominglesssupportive

Fewerofus

Simultaneously,theworldisseeingadecliningrateof

growthintheworking-agepopulation(Chart4).TheaverageglobalGDPgrowthratesincethe1970s,whentheworking

populationhitatrough,hasbeenaround3%.Allotherthingsbeingequal,adropintheworking-agepopulationwouldpointtoalowerGDPgrowthrategoingforward.Ofcourse,other

thingsarerarelyequal,andtechnologicalprogress,coupled

withthedropintransportationcostswhichacceleratedthe

disseminationofnewtechnologies,allowedoutputgrowth

tooutpacepopulationgrowthsincethe1970s.Totalfactor

productivity,ortheratioofoutputoverthecombinedinputsofcapitalandlabor,aswellastechnologyandinnovationandtheresultingimpactsonefficiency,hasflattenedoutsincetheGlobalFinancialCrisisandisweakeninginmatureeconomies(Chart5).Inthis,wecanseesignsoftheweakerinvestment

andworkingpopulationtrends.

DecliningpotentialGDPgrowth

AllthispointstolowerpotentialGDPgrowth.TheUS

CongressionalBudgetOfficeestimatestheUS’potential

growthrateat1.8%attheendof2023,downfrom6%in1952(Chart6).TheCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace

expectsChina’slong-termgrowthratetoowillbesituatedin

thevicinityof2%8.IntheEuropeanUnion,thepotentialgrowthrateislikelylower,ataround1.5%,whileinJapanitisprobablylowerstill,ataround1%9.Globally,long-termgrowthmight

bejustover2%annually10.Thatismostunfortunatebecauseofthemanychallengesthatlieahead,andnoneofthosearegreaterthanthatofclimatechange.

Climatechange

ClimatechangeitselfwilllikelyweighonthepotentialGDP

growthrate.Worseningclimateconditionslookssettoreducethenumberofhoursworkedaswellastheeffectivenessof

labor11.Naturaldisasterswillbringinfrastructurecostsin

theirwake.Asmanyas376millionpersonshavebeenforciblydisplacedsince2008becauseofclimateeventsandnaturaldisasters,witharecord32.6millionpeoplein2022alone,

accordingtotheInternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre.IEP,theInstituteforEconomics&Peace,predictsthat1.2billion

peoplecouldbedisplacedgloballyby2050duetoclimate

changeandnaturaldisasters.Thelikelyassociatedincreasedsocialtensionswillonlyreinforcethealreadydiscernable

trendsofmorepoliticalandeconomicfragmentation,cappingeconomicgrowthratesfurther.

Chart5:Totalfactorproductivity(index,1995=100)

110

105

100

95

19951999200320072011201520192023

Source:Totaleconomydatabase

Chart4:Globalworkingagepopulation,%oftotalpopulation

66%

65%

64%

63%

62%

61%

60%

59%

58%

57%

56%

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

19501960

Source:OECD

Chart6:USrealpotentialGDPgrowthrate

7%

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

19505560657075808590952000051015202025

Source:FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis,USCongressionalBudgetOffice

8MichaelPettis,“CanChina’sLong-TermGrowthRateExceed2-3%?”,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,April2023.

9ArsovandWatson,“PotentialGrowthinAdvancedEconomies”,ReserveBankofAustralia,December2019.

10“FallingLong-TermGrowthProspects:Trends,Expectations,andPolicies”,WorldBank,March2023.

11Dasguptaet.Al.,“Effectsofclimatechangeoncombinedlabourproductivityandsupply:anempirical,multi-modelstudy”,

TheLancetPlanetaryHealth,July2021.

7GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot1.Long-termtrendsarebecominglesssupportive

Restrictedpolicyspace

Withgreaterrelevancetothecurrentbusinesscycle,this

situationcouldhavebeenmitigatedbyexpansionaryfiscal

andmonetarypolicies.Theroomforfurtherfiscalexpansionislimitedgiventhattotalglobaldebt(household,corporate,andgovernment)rosetoanewrecordhighofUSD307

trillioninthefirsthalfof2023,accordingtotheInstituteof

InternationalFinance,bringingtheglobaldebt-to-GDPratioto336%12.Generalgovernmentdebthasfallensomewhatinadvancedeconomies,to112%ofGDPin2022,from123%in2020,thoughstillhigherthanthe104%ofGDPrecordedin

201913.IntheUS,theratiowas121%in2022,higherthaninFrance,Spain,andPortugal,andonly23percentagepoints

lowerthanItaly’s144%.Thenumberofcountriesindebt

distressintheworldhasdoubledfrom2015levels,aproblemthatcouldpointtolocal,ifnotglobal,financialinstability14.

China’sroomforfiscalexpansionisalsolimited,notbecauseofahighgeneralgovernmentdebttoGDPratio,77%in2022,butbecausetotalgovernmentdebtislikelyaround140%

ofGDP15.Moreover,China’staxsystemdependsuponan

investment-ledgrowthmodel,reliantonpropertytaxes,thatisnolongerdeliveringthenecessaryrevenue.Taxreform

shouldbeaddressed,butthiswouldneedtoentailnew

taxesonhouseholdsandconsumers,inturnlimitingamoreconsumption-ledeconomicgrowthmodel.Giventheglobaldebtburden,itismostlikelythatglobaltaxationwillcontinuetoincreasegoingforward.

Ifglobalfiscalexpansionislimited,itcouldhavebeenpossibletoexpectmonetarypolicytobemoreaccommodative.

However,thecombinationoftightlabormarketsandsticky

pricesislikelytokeepnominalinterestratesrelativelyhighfortheforeseeablefuture.Thisisadeparturefromtheunusual

low-interest-rateerathatfollowedtheGlobalFinancialCrisisandthatclosedwiththeUSFederalReserve’sfirstinterest-ratehikeinthiscycleinMarch2022.Real,inflation-adjusted,policyratesarestilllowinmostcountries,giventherelativelyhighratesofinflation,notablyintheUSandinEurope(Chart7).FinancialconditionshavemoreroomtoeaseinChina,

forinstance,particularlygivenChina’s0%inflationrateasofSeptember202316.However,allthetrendsdiscussedhere

pointtostructurallyhigherinflationthanthethree-decades-longlowinflationenvironmenttheworldexperiencedbroadlysincethe1990s.

Chart7:USnominalpolicy-andrealinterestrates,andinflation(CPI)

—PolicyRate,USFederalReserve_____USIn?ationRateImpliedRealInterestRate

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

197019751980198519901995200020052010201520202023

Source:MacroBond

12“GlobalDebtMonitor”,IIF,September2023.

13“FiscalMonitor”,IMF,October2023.

14“DebtDynamics”,IMFAnnualReport2022.

15QuinnandWright,“TheMythofChina’sFiscalSpace”,RhodiumGroup,August2023.

16“GlobalFinancialStabilityReport:FinancialandClimatePoliciesforaHigh-Interest-RateEra”,IMF,October2023.

8GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot1.Long-termtrendsarebecominglesssupportive

Goinggreen

Asuncertaintyincreasesandtheeconomicandpolitical

landscapebecomesmorefragmented,riskappetitewillfall,

andmoneywillflowtorelativelysaferhavens.Unlesstheworld

losesfaithintheUSeconomy,andabstractingfromfluctuations

inthebusinesscycle,theUSdollar–affectionatelycalled“the

greenback”–ismostlikelytocontinuetobetheworld’spreferred

safe-havenasset.ThiswilltendtoincreasethevalueoftheUS

dollarversusmostothercurrencies.Tradeweightedandinflation

adjusted,theUSdollarisnowaround25%strongerversusits

tradingpartners’currenciesthanin2010(Chart8).Thistootends

tohaveadampeningeffectonglobalgrowthinmostregions.

Chart8:RealEffectiveExchangeRates(2010=100)

140

130

120

120

100

90

80

Brazil

EuroArea

70

Japan

60

Turkey

UnitedKingdom

50

UnitedStates

40

Switzerland

30

2010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022

Sources:BIS,Macrobond

9GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot1.Long-termtrendsarebecominglesssupportive

Setmefree17

Insum,thelonger-termandstructuraltrendsthatweseein

theglobaleconomypointtoreducedcross-borderactivity,a

lowerGDPgrowthpotential,andgreatereconomicandpoliticalfragmentation.Theassociatedmoreinward-lookingeconomicpolicieswilllikelyleadtostructurallyhigherinflationandnominalinterestrates.Taxburdensaredestinedtogrowbecauseofthelackofeconomicgrowthandhighdebtobligations.Conflictandclimateissueswillheightentheappealofsafe-havenassets

suchastheUSdollar.Suchanoutlookbegsthequestionof

whethertheworldwillbeabletodeliverasuccessfulenergy

transitionandreplacemostofthefossilfuelsusedtodaywith

renewablefuels.Indeed,theIEA’sestimateofUSD4trillionperyearofannualinvestmentsinrenewableenergythatsuchan

outcomewouldnecessitatelooksvastlymorechallengingina

low-growtheconomy.Nevertheless,itispossible.Technologicalchangecouldsurpriseontheupsideandprogresscouldcomemorerapidlythancurrentlyexpected.Policiescouldbecome

moresupportiveoftheenergytransition,andcapitalcould

reallocatemoreswiftlythananticipated.Allstakeholdersneedtouniteintheeffort,includingtheoilandgassector.Today

onlythesmallestoffractionsoftheoilandgasindustry’s

recentunprecedentedcashflowisallocatedtocleanenergy

technologies,whiledividendsandsharebuybackshavereachedrecordhighs(Chart9).

Yetitispreciselytheenergytransitionthatcouldreversetheunhelpfullong-termtrendsandpropeltheglobaleconomy

intoaneweraofimprovedeconomicoutcomesforall.Aworldsetfreeofitsenergyconstraintwouldbesomethingutterly

unprecedented.Abundant,sustainable,andcheapenergy

accessibletoallwouldhaveaprofoundandtransformationalimpactonpoliticsandeconomicsintheworld.Tobesure,newchallengeswouldarise.Buttheenergytransitionistheone

overarchingobjectivethatallourworldleaders,regulators,andallofusmustpursuewithsingle-mindedfocus,withoutcompromise,andwithunwaveringpersistence.

Chart9:Distributionofcashspendingbytheoilandgasindustry

Oilandgascapitalexpenditure

Low-carboncapitalexpenditure

Dividendsplusbuybacksminusissuances

Netdebtrepaid

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022

Source:WorldEnergyInvestment,2023,IEA2023

17TheSupremes,“YouKeepMeHangin’On”,1967.

44.4%

40.1%

18.8%

22.9%

16.9%

1.4%

37.3%

10GlobalOutlookforAirTransport—Alocalsweetspot

2.Airtransportationisback,

butthepaceofgrowthwillslow

Airpassengertraffic

Recentdevelopmentandoutlook

Globaldemandforairtravelremainedstrongin2023,withtheindustrysteadilyapproaching2019levelsofpassengertraffic.Followingasignificant64.9%YoYupturnin2022,industry-

widepassengertraffic,measuredinrevenuepassenger-

kilometers(RPKs),surgedby40.1%inthefirstninemonths

of2023,comparedtothesameperiodinthepreviousyear.

Thisstrongperformancewasreflectedacrossallregions,

withNorthAmericancarriersleadingtherecovery,benefitingfromanearlyreopeningandrobustdomesticdemand.The

reopeningofChinesemarketsinJanuaryalsoplayedapivotalroleinacceleratingglobalpassengertrafficrecoveryin2023,particularlyrevivingtravelintheAsiaPacificregion(Chart10).

Thepassengerloadfactor(PLF),ameasureofairlineseatingcapacityutilization,hassteadilyimprovedsinceitslowpointin2020,convergingtopre-pandemiclevelsbytheendof

2022.TheglobalPLFreached82.3%duringthefirstnine

monthsof2023,whichisbroadlyinlinewiththeloadfactorachievedduringthesameperiodin2019.Thisunderscoresthedelicatebalancebetweendemandandcapacitythat

airlinesmaintainasairtravelrecoversglobally.Duringthisperiod,airlinesinAfrica,theMiddleEast,andLatinAmericasurpassedtheirrespectivepre-pandemicPLFs,indicatingenhancedoperationalefficiencyforthecarriersinthese

regions(Chart11).

Chart10:RPKsperairlineregionofregistration,year-to-date%annualchange(January–September)

Year-to-dategrowthYear-to-dategrowthvs2019

104.9%

-0.3%

-5.7%

-3.2%

-7.1%

-8.5%

-15.8%

AsiaPaci?cAfricaEuropeMiddleEast