員工激勵(lì)問題及對策外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)

員工激勵(lì)問題及對策外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)員工激勵(lì)問題及對策外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)(文檔含中英文對照即英文原文和中文翻譯)原文：Researchdirection:staffmotivationproblemsandCountermeasures1.IntroductionAsrecognizedinthelaw(e.g.,theSarbanes-OxleyActof2002),professionalriskframe-works(CommitteeofSponsoringOrganizationsoftheTreadwayCommission[COSO]1992,2004),auditingstandards(AmericanInstituteofCerti?edPublicAccountants[AICPA]2007;PublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoard[PCAOB]2007),accountingtextbooks(Redingetal.2007;RomneyandSteinbart2009),andmanagementbestpractices(MerchantandVanderStede2007),formalcontrolsserveavitalroleinsafeguardingacompany’soperationalprocesses,information,andassetsandinprovidingreasonableassuranceregard-ingthereliabilityof?nancialreporting.Althoughcriticaltoacompany’ssuccess,relativelylittleisunderstoodabouthowandwhyspeci?ctypesofformalcontrolareeffective.Priorresearchinaccountingandeconomicsexamineshowformalcontrolsin?uenceemployeebehavior,often?ndingthatformalcontrolscanhavenegativeconsequences,suchasloweremployeeeffortand?rmpro?t.Recently,researchhasbeguntofocusonhowemployees’responsetoformalcontrolscanbein?uencedbyspeci?caspectsoftheimposedcontrol(e.g.,Christ,Sedatole,andTowry2011).Thisstudyextendsthislineofresearchbyprovidingevidenceastohowandwhytwotypesofformalcontrols,preven-tivecontrolsanddetectivecontrols,affectemployeeperformanceandmotivation.RomneyandSteinbart(2009:200)de?nepreventivecontrolsascontrolsthat‘‘deterproblemsbeforetheyarise’’anddetectivecontrolsascontrolsdesignedto‘‘discoverprob-lemsaftertheyoccur’’.Thesetypesofformalcontrolsdifferintwofundamentalways.First,preventivecontrolsrestrictemployees’autonomybyprohibitingcertainbehaviors(e.g.,employeescannotenterdataormakeapaymentunlessauthorizedtodoso).Alter-natively,detectivecontrolsmaintainthedecisionrightsofemployeesandthereforedonotlimittheirautonomy(Christ,Sedatole,Towry,andThomas2008).Second,thefeedbackprovidedbypreventivecontrolsisneverdelayed,whereasdetectivecontrolscanprovideimmediateordelayedfeedback.Importantly,companiescanoftenchoosetoimposeeitherpreventiveordetectivecontrolstoaddressthesamecontrolobjective.Forexample,withrespecttotheexpenditurecycle,differenttypesofcontrolscanbeimplementedtoensurethatonlyauthorizedcashdisbursementsaremade.Speci?cally,managementcouldimplementeachofthefollowingtypesofcontrols:(1)preventive:estab-lishauthorizationlimitsprohibitingemployeesfrominitiatingdisbursementsaboveapre-speci?edamount;(2)detectivewithimmediatefeedback:analertisactivatedonanemployeeand?orsupervisor’scomputermonitorwhenadisbursementaboveaprespeci?edamounthasbeenentered;or(3)detectivewithdelayedfeedback:areportofalldisburse-mentsovertheprespeci?edamountisproducedperiodically(e.g.,monthly).Ourresearchexaminesdifferentialcostsandbene?tsofthesethreetypesofcontrols,whichshouldenablemanagerstomakemoreinformedcontroldecisions.Weexamineseveralofthecostsandbene?tsofthesetypesofformalcontrolsinaset-tinginwhichmanagementhasimplementedanincompletecontract.Speci?cally,onedimensionoftheemployees’responsibilitiesisdirectlycompensated(i.e.,compensatedtaskdimension)andtheotherdimensionisnotcompensated,butissubjecttoaformalcontrolimposedbymanagement(i.e.,controlledtaskdimension).Weexaminetheeffectsoffor-malcontrolonthecompensatedandcontrolleddimensionsofthetaskseparatelysothatwecanisolateformalcontroleffectsfromtheincentivecontracteffects.Werelyonpsychologyresearchonsalience,norms,andintrinsicmotivationtoformourpredictionsregardinghowpreventiveanddetectivecontrolswillaffectemployeeper-formanceandmotivation.Weexpectthatwhenaformalcontrolisactivated,itwillincreasethesalienceoftheemployee’sgoaltocomplywithvariousgoalsoftheorganiza-tionforwhichs?heisnotexplicitlycompensated,despitethefactthatitmaycon?ictwiththeemployee’sgoaltoperformstronglyonthecompensateddimensionsofhis?hertask.Wehypothesizethatreductionsinautonomycausedbyacontrolandincreasesinthetimelinessofcontrolfeedbackwillincreasethesalienceofthecontrolobjective.Thus,weexpectemployeessubjecttopreventivecontrolstoexhibitstrongerperformanceonthecontrolleddimensionthanemployeesintheothercontrolconditions.Employeesworkinginconditionswithdetectivecontrolswithimmediatefeedbackshouldbethenextbestper-formersonthecontrolleddimensionofthetaskfollowedbyemployeesworkingincondi-tionswithdetectivecontrolswithdelayedfeedbackandemployeesoperatingwithoutcontrols,respectively.Motivationalframingresearchfurthersuggeststhatitisdif?cultforindividualstohavemultiple(potentiallycon?icting)goals?framesactivatedatthesametime(Lindenberg2001).Wethereforepredictthatwhenemployeesfocusonthegoalofperformingwellonthecontrolledtaskdimension,theywillfocuslessonthegoaltoexcelonothertaskdimensions(e.g.,thecompensateddimensioninourstudy)andwillconsequentlyperformworseonthosedimensions.Thissuggestsareverseorderofhowemployeesfacingthesecontroltypeswillperformonthecompensateddimensionofthetaskrelativetotheirper-formanceonthecontrolleddimension.Totestthesepredictions,weuseasimpli?eddataentrytaskinanexperimentalsettinginwhichparticipantsare?nanciallymotivatedtoenterdataasquicklyaspossible(com-pensateddimension).Importantly,participantsareinformedthatthecompanyvaluesbothdataentryspeedandaccuracy.However,ratherthanalsocompensatingparticipantsforaccuracy,thecompanyimplementsaformalcontroltoencourageaccuracy(controlleddimension).Ourresultsrevealthatparticipantsexposedtopreventivecontrolsordetectivecontrolswithimmediatefeedbackperformsigni?cantlybetteronthecontrolleddimensionofthetask(dataentryaccuracy)thanparticipantsinthedetectivecontrol-delayedfeedbackcon-dition.Thissuggeststhatthetimelinessofcontrolfeedbackisthesalientfeaturein?uenc-ingperformance.Wedonot?nddifferencesintheoverallperformanceonthecompensateddimension(dataentryspeed),suggestingthatexplicitincentivesstillprovideapowerfulmotivationdespitetheactivationofformalcontrolsdirectingattentiontootherdimensionsofthetask.Inadditiontoexamininghowformalcontrolsaffectemployeeperformance,weaddtothegrowingliteratureontheunintendedcostsofformalcontrolsbyexamininghowdifferentformalcontroltypesaffectemployees’intrinsicmotivationtoperformthetask.Weexpectthatbecausepreventivecontrolsrestrictautonomy,whichlikelywillbeperceivedbyemployeesas‘‘controlling’’,theywillbemoredetrimentaltoemployees’intrinsicmotivationthandetectivecontrols.Consistentwithourexpectations,theresultsshowthatpreventivecontrolssigni?cantlyreduceintrinsicmotivationrelativetobothtypesofdetectivecontrols.Thissuggeststhattheextenttowhichformalcontrolsrestrictemployees’autonomy,andnotthetimelinessofthefeedbacktheyprovide,in?uencesemployees’intrinsicmotivationtoperformtheirresponsibilities.Further,wecon?rmresultsfrompriorresearchfindingthatlowerintrinsicmotivationleadstolowerperformanceonalldimensionsofthetask.Takentogether,ourresultssuggestthatdetectivecontrolsthatprovideimmediatefeedbackcanbejustaseffectiveatproducinghighemployeeperformanceaspreventivecontrols(andmoreeffectivethandetectivecontrolswithdelayedfeedbackornocontrols),withoutcausingadecreaseinintrinsicmotivationthatisexhibitedbyemployeessubjectedtopreventivecontrols.Therefore,organizationscanlikelyachievemanyoftheircontrolobjectivesbyincreasingthetimelinessoffeedbackfromdetectivecontrols,withoutbearingthecostsassociatedwithpreventivecontrols.Thisstudyprovidesseveralimportantpracticalandtheoreticalcontributions.First,thisstudycaninformpractitioners,auditors,andregulatorswhodesign,implement,andevaluateformalcontrolsaboutsomeofthepotentialcostsandbene?tsofvarioustypesofformalcontrols.Formalcontrolsplayacriticalroleinpromotingef?ciency,reducingriskofassetloss,ensuringthereliabilityof?nancialstatements,andpromotingcompliancewithlawsandregulations(COSO1992).Ourstudysuggeststhatpractitionerscanbetterachievemanyofthesecontrolobjectivesbyimplementingformalcontrolsthatprovideimmediatefeedback.Furthermore,thisstudysuggeststhatformalcontrolswhichrestrictemployeeautonomyreduceemployees’intrinsicmotivation,andpractitionerswouldthere-forebenefitinmanysituationsbyimplementingformalcontrolsthatprovideimmediatefeedbackbutdonotrestrictuserautonomy.Second,thisstudycontributestoseveralstreamsofacademicresearchonformalcon-trols.Toourknowledge,oursisthe?rststudytoexaminethedifferentialimpactofpre-ventiveanddetectivecontrolsonemployeeperformanceandmotivation.Further,thisstudyalsocontributestoagrowingbodyofliteratureexaminingsomeoftheunintendedconsequencesofformalcontrols(e.g.,Frey1993;DasandTeng1999;TenbrunselandMessick1999;Christetal.2008;TaylerandBloom?eld2011).Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2providestheoreticaldevelopmentofourhypotheses.Insection3wedescribeourexperiment.Weprovideourresultsinsection4andconcludeanddescribepotentialavenuesforfutureresearchinsection5.2.LiteraturereviewandhypothesesdevelopmentClassi?cationsandimportanceofformalcontrolsFormalcontrolscantakemanyforms,including,butnotlimitedto,policiesandproce-dures,segregationofduties,performance-basedcompensation,supervisoryreviews,com-puterizededitchecks,andsoon.Academicshavedevelopedavarietyofcontrolframeworkstoclassifythemanydifferenttypesofcontrols.Somefocusontheobjectofcontrol(e.g.,behaviorvs.output)(MerchantandVanderStede2007),whileothersfocusonthecontrolmethod(e.g.,boundarysystems,beliefsystems,etc.)(Simons1990).How-ever,practicingaccountantsandauditorsgenerallyclassifycontrolsaspreventiveordetec-tive,basedonhowriskismitigated(COSO1992,2004;AICPA2007;PCAOB2007).Whendeterminingthespeci?cformalcontroltypetoimplement,managementwouldbene?tfromunderstandinghowdifferentcontroltypesin?uenceemployeeperformanceandmotivation.Further,prioracademicresearchrevealsthatformalcontrolsoftenhaveunintendedconsequences,whichcanultimatelybedetrimentaltotheorganization(e.g.,DasandTeng2001).Therefore,managementshouldalsoconsiderthepotentialrepercus-sionsoftheircontroldesignchoiceswhendesigningformalcontrols.Inthisstudy,weexamineasimpli?edworkenvironmentinwhichwemanipulatetheformalcontroltypeandmeasureemployeeperformanceandintrinsicmotivation.Similartotherealworld,weuseaworkenvironmentinwhichmanagementemploysanincompletecontract(e.g.,Williamson1985;Ittner,Larcker,andRajan1997),usingformalcompensationcontractstoencouragecertaintypesofbehaviorwhileimplementingformacontrolstoencourageothertypesofbehavior.Thus,weexaminehowdifferentformacontroltypesimpactemployees’performanceonbothcompensatedandcontrolleddimensionsoftheirresponsibilities.Thecontrolenvironmentusedinourexperimentisdesignedtoisolatetheeffectofvariousformalcontroltypesfromtheeffectsoftheincentivecontract.Therefore,weexplicitlydonotcompensatetheemployeesbasedonalltaskdimensions,butratherallowtheformalcontroltoinducecertaindesiredbehavior.EffectofformalcontrolsoncontrolledtaskdimensionsStandardeconomictheorypredictsthatindividualsareself-interestedandthereforepri-marilymotivatedbyexplicitincentives.Followingthislogic,employeesareexpectedtorespondonlytothe?nancialincentivesdescribedintheirformalemploymentcontract.However,agrowingbodyofresearchonindividuals’preferencesforsocialnormsandsit-uationalframingsuggeststhatthereareotherwaystodirectemployees’behaviortowardsthebestinterestsoftheorganization(e.g.,Evans,Hannan,Krishnan,andMoser2001;CamererandFehr2004;OsterlohandFrey2004;Hannan2005;Hannan,Rankin,andTowry2006;FischerandHuddart2008).Asubstantialbodyofresearchhasdevelopedindicatingthatindividualsarestronglymotivatedbystatedgoalsandobjectives(e.g.,Locke,Shaw,Saari,andLatham1981;LockeandLatham1990;Locke1996).Indeed,speci?cperformancemeasuresareincorpo-ratedintoemploymentcontractstoalignemployees’goalswiththegoalsoftheorganiza-tionsothatemployeeswillfocustheireffortsonactivitiesbene?tingtheorganization(Farrell,Kadous,andTowry2008).Onereasongoalsprovidesuchpowerfulmotivationisthattheycanchangethewayasituationisframed.Lindenberg(2003)describestwoframeslinkedtoemployees’goalsthat,together,canprovidestronggovernance:thegainframeandthenormativeframe.Thegainframerelatestoone’sgoaltoimproveone’sresources(i.e.,earnmoney).Thenormativeframeisrelatedtoone’sgoalto‘‘a(chǎn)ctappropriately’’,whichcanbedefinedasadheringtoinstitutionalizedrulessuchaspoliciesandpro-cedures(MarchandOlsen1995).Whenanemployeeisfacedwithanexplicitcontracttyingspeci?caspectsofhis?herperformanceto?nancialincentives,itislikelythatthegainframewillbedominantandanyothergoalswillbesecondary(Lindenberg2003).However,individuals’behaviorcanberedirectedorrefocusedwhenastimulusisintro-duced.Inthispaper,wearguethattheactivationofaformalcontrolissuchastimulus.翻譯：研究方向：員工激勵(lì)問題及對策1.引言公認(rèn)的法律(如。,2002年的薩班斯-奧克斯利法案),職業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)框架(行動(dòng)委員會(huì)贊助組織委員會(huì)(COSO)1992年,2004年),審計(jì)準(zhǔn)則(美國注冊會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)(會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì))2007;公眾公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督委員會(huì)(PCAOB)2007),會(huì)計(jì)教科書(雷丁etal.2007;羅姆尼和Steinbart2009),和管理最佳實(shí)(MerchantandVanderStede2007),正式的控制有重要作用在維護(hù)公司的操作流程,信息,資產(chǎn)和提供合理的保證regard-ing財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的可靠性。雖然對公司的成功至關(guān)重要,相對較少的理解如何以及為什么特定類型的正式控制是有效的。先前的研究在會(huì)計(jì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究正式控制如何影響員工的行為,經(jīng)常發(fā)現(xiàn)正式的控制可以有負(fù)面影響,如降低員工的努力和公司的利潤。最近的研究已經(jīng)開始關(guān)注如何影響員工應(yīng)對正式控制的特定方面實(shí)施控制(如。2011年,SedatoleTowry)。本研究擴(kuò)展了這一行的研究提供的證據(jù)是如何以及為什么兩種類型的正式控制,遠(yuǎn)程控制和偵探控制,影響員工績效和動(dòng)力。羅姆尼和Steinbart(2009:2009)預(yù)防控制定義為控制,阻止之前就出現(xiàn)問題,偵探控制作為控制設(shè)計(jì)為“發(fā)現(xiàn)難題后發(fā)生”。這些類型的正式控制不同在兩個(gè)基本方面。首先,預(yù)防控制限制禁止某些行為(如員工的自主權(quán)。,員工不能輸入數(shù)據(jù)或付款除非授權(quán)這樣做)。也可,偵探控制維護(hù)員工的決策權(quán),因此不限制他們的自主權(quán)(基督,Sedatole、Towry和托斯·2008)。第二,預(yù)防控制提供的反饋是從來沒有推遲,而偵探控制可以提供立即或延遲反饋。重要的是,企業(yè)通?？梢赃x擇實(shí)施預(yù)防性或偵探控制地址相同的控制目標(biāo)。例如,對于支出周期,不同類型的控制可以確保只有經(jīng)過授權(quán)的實(shí)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金支付。具體來說,管理可以實(shí)現(xiàn)以下類型的控制:(1)預(yù)防:建立授權(quán)限制禁止員工發(fā)起支付高于預(yù)先規(guī)定的數(shù)量;(2)與即時(shí)反饋偵探:警報(bào)被激活員工和?或上司的電腦顯示器時(shí)支付指定金額已經(jīng)進(jìn)入以上;或(3)偵探延遲反饋:所有支付超過指定數(shù)量的報(bào)告是定期(如。、每月)。我們研究了微分的成本與效益這三種類型的控制,這應(yīng)該使管理者做出更明智的控制決策。我們檢查一些成本和收益的這些類型的正式控制set-ting管理實(shí)現(xiàn)了一個(gè)不完整的合同。具體地說,一維的直接補(bǔ)償(即員工的責(zé)任。,補(bǔ)償任務(wù)維度)和其他維度不是補(bǔ)償,但正式的控制(即實(shí)施管理?？刂迫蝿?wù)維度)。我們檢查的影響對于控制任務(wù)的補(bǔ)償和控制維度分別,這樣我們可以隔離正式控制效果的激勵(lì)契約的影響。我們依靠卓越心理學(xué)研究,規(guī)范和內(nèi)在動(dòng)機(jī)形成我們的預(yù)測預(yù)防和偵探控制如何影響員工由于和動(dòng)力。我們希望當(dāng)一個(gè)正式的控制被激活時(shí),它能夠提升員工的卓越的目標(biāo)符合各種目標(biāo)集聚的年代?他是沒有明確補(bǔ)償,盡管它可能與員工的目標(biāo)沖突表現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勁的補(bǔ)償尺度?她的任務(wù)。我們假設(shè)減少引起的自主控制,提高控制反饋的及時(shí)性將增加顯著的控制目標(biāo)。因此,我們期望員工須預(yù)防控制在控制維度表現(xiàn)出更強(qiáng)的性能比其他員工的控制條件。員工工作條件與偵探控制即時(shí)反饋應(yīng)該是下一個(gè)最好的先前成型機(jī)任務(wù)的控制維度緊隨其后的是員工為對象與偵探與延遲反饋控制和員工操作沒有控制,分別。激勵(lì)框架研究進(jìn)一步表明,個(gè)人很難有多個(gè)(可能是相互沖突的)目標(biāo)?幀同時(shí)激活(Lindenberg2001)。因此,我們預(yù)測,當(dāng)員工關(guān)注的目標(biāo)表現(xiàn)良好控制任務(wù)維度,他們會(huì)更少關(guān)注目標(biāo)在其他任務(wù)維度(如excel。,在我們的研究)和補(bǔ)償維度將因此對這些維度執(zhí)行更糟。這說明員工們?nèi)绾蚊鎸@些控制類型的倒序?qū)?zhí)行任務(wù)的補(bǔ)償尺寸相對于由于控制尺寸。測試這些預(yù)測,我們使用一個(gè)簡化的數(shù)據(jù)錄入任務(wù)參與者在實(shí)驗(yàn)環(huán)境下的經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)機(jī)盡快輸入數(shù)據(jù)(補(bǔ)償維度)。重要的是,參與者被告知公司價(jià)值觀數(shù)據(jù)輸入的速度和準(zhǔn)確性。然而,而不是也為精度補(bǔ)償參與者,該公司實(shí)現(xiàn)了一個(gè)正式的控制,鼓勵(lì)精度(尺寸控制)。我們的研究結(jié)果顯示,參與者暴露預(yù)防控制與即時(shí)反饋表現(xiàn)得明顯更好或偵探控制任務(wù)的控制維度(數(shù)據(jù)錄入準(zhǔn)確性)的參與者偵探控制反饋。這表明影響控制反饋的及時(shí)性是顯著特征的性能。我們沒有找到補(bǔ)償?shù)目傮w性能的差異維度(數(shù)據(jù)錄入速度),建議明確激勵(lì)仍然提供了一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的動(dòng)機(jī)盡管正式激活控制指揮注意任務(wù)的其他維度。除了檢查正式控制如何影響員工的表現(xiàn),我們增加了文學(xué)在正式的意想不到的成本控制通過檢查不同的正式控制類型如何影響員工的內(nèi)在動(dòng)機(jī)來執(zhí)行任務(wù)。我們預(yù)計(jì),由于預(yù)防控制限制的自主權(quán),這可能將員工視為“控制”,他們將更不利于員工的內(nèi)在動(dòng)機(jī)比偵探控制。與我們的預(yù)期一致,結(jié)果表明,預(yù)防控制顯著降低內(nèi)在動(dòng)機(jī)相對于兩種類型的偵探控制。這表明正式的控制在多大程度上限制員工的自主權(quán),而不是他們