股市金融全球化中英文對(duì)照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)

股市金融全球化中英文對(duì)照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)股市金融全球化中英文對(duì)照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)(文檔含英文原文和中文翻譯)外文:TakingStockSeriously:Equity-MarketPerformance,GovernmentPolicy,andFinancialGlobalizationMosley,LaynaSinger,DavidAndrewAreequitymarketsjustanotherfacetofglobalfinance,oraretheyuniqueintheirresponsesto—andinfluenceson—governmentpoliciesandinstitutions?Recentworkhasexploredtheimpactofpoliticalfactorsonbondmarketbehaviorandforeigndirectinvestment,butlittleattentionhasbeenpaidtostockmarkets.Onthebasisoftheparticularconcernsofequityinvestors,wehypothesizeapositiveassociationbetweenstock-marketvaluationsandlevelsofdemocracy,shareholderrights,legaltraditions,andcapital-accountliberalization,anegativeassociationwithrealinterestrates,andnoassociationwithfiscaldeficitsorsurpluses.Weassessourexpectationsbyanalyzingthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofaggregateprice-to-earningsratiosforasampleofupto37countriesfrom1985to2004,usingbothcross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectionalanalyses.Wefindsupportformost,butnotall,ofourhypotheses.Ourfindingssuggestthatwemustdisaggregatetheeffectsofdifferentassetmarketstounderstandtheimpactofeconomicglobalizationongovernmentpolicies.Howdogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsaffectequity-marketperformanceacrosscountries?Asstockmarketsgrowbroaderanddeeperinboththedevelopedanddevelopingworlds,thisquestionbecomesmorecritical.In2004,globalstock-marketcapitalizationstoodat$37.2trillion,comparedtoglobalGDPof$41.3trillion.Whilethisfigurewasslightlylessthanglobalcommercialbankassets,itmarkedlyexceededthetotalsizeofoutstandingpublicdebtsecurities,whichwere$23.1trillion.1Thebulkofglobalstock-marketcapitalizationrepresentsdeveloped-countryequitymarkets,butlessdevelopedcountrymarkets—whichaccountedfor14percentoftotalcapitalizationin2004—arequicklygainingground.Someemergingmarketcountries,suchasMalaysia,Singapore,andSouthAfrica,havetotalstock-marketcapitalizationsthatexceedtheirrespectivegrossdomesticproducts.Equitymarketsenhancecorporateefficiency,spurinnovation,andprovideavaluablesourceofcapitalforlong-termeconomicdevelopment.Theyalsoprovideausefulmechanismforgovernmentstoraisecapitalthroughthesaleofstate-ownedenterprises.Moreover,equity-marketinvestmentsconstituteanimportantelementofindividuals’assets,particularlyasgovernmentsshifttheirpensionsystemstowardtheprivatesector.Inshort,itisclearthatequitiesconstituteanincreasinglyimportantcapitalmarketintheworldeconomy.However,wecurrentlyknowverylittleabouthowgovernmentpolicychoicesandpoliticalinstitutionsinfluenceequityinvestors’decisions.Thefewextantanalysesofstockmarketsandpoliticstendtofocusononeortwodevelopedcountries,oronsectoralvariationwithinaparticularmarket,ratherthanonthedeterminantsofnational-levelmarketoutcomesinabroadercross-countrycontext.Forinstance,DavidLeblangandBumbaMukherjeeconsidertheimpactofgovernmentpartisanshipandelectionsonstockmarketoutcomesintheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain.Inawiderstudy,FionaMcGillivray(2003)considerstheimpactofpartisanchangesandelectoralinstitutionsonstock-marketoutcomesinfourteenadvanceddemocracies.Heranalyses,however,focuslargelyonindustry-levelvariation,arguingthatshiftsinpoliticalconstellationschangeinvestors’expectationsregardingwhichsectorswillbenefitfrompublicpolicies.Indeed,McGillivrayisinterestedlessinequity-marketoutcomespersethaninusingsuchoutcomesasaproxymeasureoftheexpectationsofeconomicactorsregardingpoliticaldecisions.Similarly,WilliamBernhardandDavidLeblangconsidertheimpactofpoliticsandpoliticaluncertaintyondailymarketbehaviorinseveraladvanceddemocracies.Unlikemostanalyses,theirsconsidersoutcomesinmultipleassetmarkets,includingcurrencies,equities,andgovernmentbonds.BernhardandLeblang’saim,however,istoexploretheconsequencesofdiscretepoliticalevents—suchaselectionsandcabinetformations—oncapitalmarkets,ratherthantoassessthebroaderimpactofpublicpolicyandinstitutionsoncapitalmarketoutcomes.Thisarticleseekstoroundouttheliteratureonfinancialglobalizationbyexploringthelinkagesbetweenequity-marketoutcomesandnationalgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions.Itscontributionisboththeoreticalandempirical.Theoretically,weelaborateonthepoliticsofequity-marketperformance,focusinginparticularontheeffectsofgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsonstockmarketvaluations.Werelyontherelativelydevelopedliteratureonforeigndirectinvestmentandsovereignbondmarketstounderscorethedistinctivenessofequity-marketreactionstogovernmentpolicies.Empirically,weconductanovelevaluationofthecorrelatesoftotal-market,price-to-earningsratios(P?E)forasampleofupto37developedandemergingmarketcountriesduringthe1985–2004period.Cross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectional(TSCS)analysesrevealthatlevelsofdemocracy,marketliquidity,shareholderrights,andcapital-accountliberalizationarepositivelyassociatedwithequity-marketvaluations,whilerealinterestratesarenegativelyassociated.Wealsofindthatinvestorsarepositivelydisposedtowardequitymarketsinemerging-marketcountries,andnegativelydisposedtowardmarketswithhighdividendpayoutratios.Interestingly,manyofthepoliticalandeconomicfactors—includinginflation,andfiscalpolicy—deemedhighlysalienttoinvestorsinotherfinancialmarketsarenotstatisticallyassociatedwithstock-marketvaluations.Theseresultsarerobusttotheinclusionofanumberofcontrolvariables,includingcapital-assetpricingmodel(CAPM)factorsandalternativepricingmodelconsiderations.Notethattheresponsesofinvestorstopoliciesandinstitutionsalsohaveimplicationsforfuturegovernmentpolicychoices.Forinstance,ifanation’seconomyreliesmoreheavilyonFDIthanonsovereignlendingorbankfinancing,itsgovernmentmayfacefewpressurestoreducepublicspending.Ontheotherhand,ifagovernmentreliesheavilyonthebondmarkettofinanceitsexpenditures,buthasarelativelylowlevelofstock-marketcapitalization,itmayfacegreaterpressuresforfiscalandmonetarytightening.Andifacountryreliesonavariedmenuoffinancialinflows,asmostdo,assetholderswillexpressdiversepreferencesoverpublicpolicy.Untanglingthevariousfinancial-marketinfluencesongovernmentpolicymakingisclearlyalongtermresearchproject.Thisarticle,whichfocusesonthepoliticaldeterminantsofequityinvestors’behavior,complementssimilaranalysesofsovereignbondmarketsandforeigndirectinvestment.Onceweunderstandhowinvestorsineachmarketreacttogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions,wecanthenadvancetoabroaderanalysisoftheimpactoffinancialmarkets—alongwithdomesticinstitutions,interestgroups,andotherfactors—ongovernmentpolicymakingandinstitutionaldesign.Stock-marketperformanceisincreasinglyatargetofanalysisbypoliticalscientists,becauseequityinvestorsmaybehighlysensitivetotheeffectsofcertaingovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsontheirinvestments.Equityinvestmentsaregenerallyveryliquid,andthetimehorizonsofequityinvestorsareoftenrelativelyshort.Asaresult,changesingovernmentpoliciescantriggeraswiftresponsebyinvestors.Governmentpoliciesthatenhanceinvestorconfidence—eitherdirectly,byprovidingshareholderprotectionsandeaseofexit,orindirectly,byexpandingtheeconomyandimprovingcorporateearnings—willberewardedbyhigherstockpricesandmarketvaluations.Ontheotherhand,investorscanquicklywithdrawtheirfundsifgovernmentschoosemarket-unfriendlypolicies,therebygeneratingdownwardpressureonstockpricesandvaluations.Stockmarkets,inshort,areavaluableindicatoroffinancialactors’preferencesovergovernmentinstitutionsandpolicyoutcomes.Afittingalternativemeasureofperformanceistheratioofthestockpricetocompanyearnings—or,inotherwords,thepricethatequityinvestorsarewillingtopayforanexpectedstreamofprofits.Aswithstockprices,theseratiosreflectinvestors’expectationsaboutfutureearnings,buttheyalsosignalinvestors’preferencesovertime-varyinggovernmentpolicyandlargelyinvariantpoliticalinstitutions.Becauseofthelatter,cross-nationalvariationinP?Eratiospersistsevenwhennationalstockmarketsarehitsimultaneouslybyglobalpriceshocks.Theextantliteratureonthelinkagesbetweenglobalizationanddomesticpoliticshaspaidscantattentiontothediversewaysinwhichcountriesareintegratedintotheworldeconomy.Byassumingthatfinancialmarketsimposeaunifiedinfluenceongovernmentpolicies,priorstudieshaveoverlookedthestarkvariationinthepreferencesofinvestorsacrossdifferenttypesoffinancialassets.Inthisarticle,wearguethatequityinvestorsarebecominganincreasinglyinfluentialforceintheglobaleconomy,andthattheirpreferencesdivergefromthoseofotherfinancialactorsinimportantways.Toillustratethisdivergence,wepresentempiricalanalysesofthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofequitymarketperformanceacrossasampleofdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Amongthemostinterestingfindingsarethatmarketvaluationsaresignificantlyassociatedwithcapital-accountopenness,shareholderprotections,levelsofdevelopment,andalternativedomesticinvestments.Inaddition,equityinvestorsappearindifferenttowardgovernmentfiscalbalancesandthepartisanorientationsofgovernmentleaders.Giventhatcountriesareintegratedintotheglobalfinancialsystemindifferentways,thesefindingsleadtothequestionofhowgovernmentpolicymakersmightreconcilethecompetinginterestsofdifferenttypesoffinancialinvestors.譯文：股市嚴(yán)重性討論：股權(quán)市場(chǎng)現(xiàn)象，政府政策與金融全球化在政府的政策和體制影響中，股市是另一個(gè)全球金融市場(chǎng)，還是有其獨(dú)特的反應(yīng)？最近的工作探討了政治因素對(duì)債券市場(chǎng)的行為和外國(guó)直接投資的影響，但很少注意到股票市場(chǎng)。在股票投資者特別關(guān)注問(wèn)題的基礎(chǔ)上，我們假設(shè)股市估值與它的平均水平之間呈正相關(guān)，股東權(quán)利，傳統(tǒng)法律，以及資本賬戶自由化，與實(shí)際利率之間呈負(fù)相關(guān)，無(wú)財(cái)政赤字和盈余。通過(guò)我們?cè)u(píng)估的政治和體制因素的期望值分析，從1985年到2004年，以37個(gè)國(guó)家的總價(jià)格為樣本，橫軸為時(shí)間序列，縱軸為市盈率。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)這支持大多數(shù)人的說(shuō)法，但不是所有的。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，我們必須集合不同資產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的影響來(lái)了解經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化對(duì)政府政策的影響。通過(guò)各國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)的政策和機(jī)制表現(xiàn)，它是如何影響政府的？隨著市場(chǎng)更廣泛的發(fā)展，股票在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家的逐漸深入，這個(gè)問(wèn)題變得更加重要。2004年全球股票市值為38.4億萬(wàn)美元，全球國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值為41.3億萬(wàn)美元。雖然這一數(shù)字略低于全球商業(yè)銀行資產(chǎn)，但他明顯超過(guò)了其他公共債券的總規(guī)模23.1億萬(wàn)美元。全球股票市值占大部分發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的股票市場(chǎng)，但欠發(fā)達(dá)的國(guó)家市場(chǎng)也取得很大的進(jìn)展，其中在2004年占總市值得14%。股票市場(chǎng)提升企業(yè)的效率，鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)新，是提供資金的長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的重要來(lái)源。他們還使各國(guó)政府通過(guò)提高國(guó)有企業(yè)銷(xiāo)售資金的有效機(jī)制。此外，股票市場(chǎng)的投資構(gòu)成是個(gè)人資產(chǎn)的重要組成部分，特別是各國(guó)政府轉(zhuǎn)向私營(yíng)部門(mén)的養(yǎng)老金制度?？傊?，很顯然的，股票構(gòu)成在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中是一個(gè)日益重要的資本市場(chǎng)。不過(guò)，我們目前所知甚少，對(duì)于政府如何選擇政策和政治體制是由股票投資者決定的。對(duì)股市和一些現(xiàn)實(shí)政治的分析往往集中在一個(gè)或兩個(gè)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，那是某一特定市場(chǎng)部門(mén)內(nèi)部的變化，而不是在更廣泛的范圍內(nèi)國(guó)家一級(jí)市場(chǎng)因素決定的結(jié)果。例如，在美國(guó)和英國(guó)DavidLeblang和BumbaMukherjee考慮到政府的黨派和選舉對(duì)股市影響的結(jié)果。在更廣泛的研究中，菲奧娜麥克基利夫雷（2003）認(rèn)為，先進(jìn)的民主國(guó)家選舉機(jī)構(gòu)黨派變化對(duì)股市的影響。然而，她的分析在很大程度上基于行業(yè)水平的變化，她認(rèn)為政治群體的變化，改變了投資者對(duì)哪些行業(yè)受益于公共政策的預(yù)期。事實(shí)上，麥克基利夫雷很感興趣，作為對(duì)決定政治經(jīng)濟(jì)行為者的期望的結(jié)果沒(méi)有比股票本身的市場(chǎng)效果大。同樣的，在一些先進(jìn)的民主國(guó)家的正常政治上，威廉和大衛(wèi)考慮到政治的影響和市場(chǎng)的行為是不穩(wěn)定的。不同于大多數(shù)分析的結(jié)果，他們認(rèn)為是在多個(gè)資產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的，包括貨幣，股票和政府債券市場(chǎng)。然而，Bernhard和Leblang旨在探討的是政治事件，如選舉和內(nèi)閣離散的后果，，而不是更廣泛的評(píng)估資本市場(chǎng)公共政策和機(jī)構(gòu)影響的結(jié)果。在國(guó)家政府的政策和機(jī)構(gòu)中，本文旨在探討金融全球化的文獻(xiàn)與完善股票的市場(chǎng)的成果之間的聯(lián)系。它的貢獻(xiàn)是理論和實(shí)證兩個(gè)方面。從理論上講，我們?cè)敿?xì)說(shuō)明股票的市場(chǎng)對(duì)政治的表現(xiàn)，特別是側(cè)重于股市估值對(duì)政府政策和體制的影響。我們依靠豐富的文獻(xiàn)對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資和主權(quán)債券市場(chǎng)的比較，強(qiáng)調(diào)了股票的市場(chǎng)