公司的核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力-外文翻譯

外文翻譯原文TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporationMaterialSource:HarvardBusinessReview,May-June,1990P79-93Author:C.K.PrahaladandGaryHamelC.K.PrahaladisprofessorofcorporatestrategyandinternationalbusinessattheUniversityofMichigan.GaryHamelislecturerinbusinesspolicyandmanagementattheLondonBusinessSchool.TheirmostrecentHBRarticle"StrategicIntent"(MayJune1989),wonthe1989McKinseyAwardforexcellence.ThisarticleisbasedonresearchfundedbytheGatsbyCharitableFoundation.TheRootsofCompetitiveAdvantageThedistinctionweobservedinthewayNECandGTEconceivedofthemselvesaportfolioofcompetenciesversusaportfolioofbusinesseswasrepeatedacrossmanyindustries.From1980to1988,Canongrewby264%,Hondaby200%.ComparethatwithXeroxandChrysler.AndifWesternmanagerswereonceanxiousaboutthelowcostandhighqualityofJapaneseimports,theyarenowoverwhelmedbythepaceatwhichJapaneserivalsareinventingnewmarkets,creatingnewproducts,andenhancingthem.Canonhasgivenuspersonalcopiers;Hondahasmovedfrommotorcyclestofourwheeloffroadbuggies.Sonydevelopedthe8mmcamcorder,Yamaha,thedigitalpiano.Komatsudevelopedanunderwaterremotecontrolledbulldozer,whileCasio'slatestgambitisasmallscreencolorLCDtelevision.Whowouldhaveanticipatedtheevolutionofthesevanguardmarkets?Inmoreestablishedmarkets,theJapanesechallengehasbeenjustasdisquieting.Japanesecompaniesaregeneratingablizzardoffeaturesandfunctionalenhancementsthatbringtechnologicalsophisticationtoeverydayproducts.Japanesecarproducershavebeenpioneeringfourwheelsteering,fourvalve-percylinderengines,incarnavigationsystems,andsophisticatedelectronicenginemanagementsystems.Onthestrengthofitsproductfeatures,Canonisnowaplayerinfacsimiletransmissionmachines,desktoplaserprinters,evensemiconductormanufacturingequipment.Intheshortrun,acompany'scompetitivenessderivesfromtheprice/performanceattributesofcurrentproducts.Butthesurvivorsofthefirstwaveofglobalcompetition,WesternandJapanesealike,areallconvergingonsimilarandformidablestandardsforproductcostandqualityminimumhurdlesforcontinuedcompetition,butlessandlessimportantassourcesofdifferentialadvantage.Inthelongrun,competitivenessderivesfromanabilitytobuild,atlowercostandmorespeedilythancompetitors,thecorecompetenciesthatspawnunanticipatedproducts.Therealsourcesofadvantagearetobefoundinmanagement'sabilitytoconsolidatecorporatewidetechnologiesandproductionskillsintocompetenciesthatempowerindividualbusinessestoadaptquicklytochangingopportunities.Seniorexecutiveswhoclaimthattheycannotbuildcorecompetencieseitherbecausetheyfeeltheautonomyofbusinessunitsissacrosanctorbecausetheirfeetareheldtothequarterlybudgetfireshouldthinkagain.TheprobleminmanyWesterncompaniesisnotthattheirseniorexecutivesareanylesscapablethanthoseinJapannorthatJapanesecompaniespossessgreatertechnicalcapabilities.Instead,itistheiradherencetoaconceptofthecorporationthatunnecessarilylimitstheabilityofindividualbusinessestofullyexploitthedeepreservoiroftechnologicalcapabilitythatmanyAmericanandEuropeancompaniespossess.Thediversifiedcorporationisalargetree.Thetrunkandmajorlimbsarecoreproducts,thesmallerbranchesarebusinessunits;theleaves,flowers,andfruitareendproducts.Therootsystemthatprovidesnourishment,sustenance,andstabilityisthecorecompetence.Youcanmissthestrengthofcompetitorsbylookingonlyattheirendproducts,inthesamewayyoumissthestrengthofatreeifyoulookonlyatitsleaves.(Seethechart"Competencies:TheRootsofCompetitiveness.”)Corecompetenciesarethecollectivelearningintheorganization,especiallyhowtocoordinatediverseproductionskillsandintegratemultiplestreamsoftechnologies.ConsiderSony'scapacitytominiaturizeorPhilips'sopticalmediaexpertise.Thetheoreticalknowledgetoputaradioonachipdoesnotinitselfassureacompanytheskilltoproduceaminiatureradionobiggerthanabusinesscard.Tobringoffthisfeat,Casiomustharmonizeknowhowinminiaturization,microprocessordesign,materialscience,andultrathinprecisioncasingthesameskillsitappliesinitsminiaturecardcalculators,pocketTVs,anddigitalwatches.Ifcorecompetenceisaboutharmonizingstreamsoftechnology,itisalsoabouttheorganizationofworkandthedeliveryofvalue.AmongSony'scompetenciesisminiaturization.Tobringminiaturizationtoitsproducts,Sonymustensurethattechnologists,engineers,andmarketershaveasharedunderstandingofcustomerneedsandoftechnologicalpossibilities.Theforceofcorecompetenceisfeltasdecisivelyinservicesasinmanufacturing.Citicorpwasaheadofothersinvestinginanoperatingsystemthatallowedittoparticipateinworldmarkets24hoursaday.Itscompetenceinprovidedthecompanythemeanstodifferentiateitselffrommanyfinancialserviceinstitutions.Corecompetenceiscommunication,involvement,andadeepcommitmenttoworkingacrossorganizationalboundaries.Itinvolvesmanylevelsofpeopleandallfunctions.Worldclassresearchin,forexample,lasersorceramicscantakeplaceincorporatelaboratorieswithouthavinganimpactonanyofthebusinessesofthecompany.Theskillsthattogetherconstitutecorecompetencemustcoalescearoundindividualswhoseeffortsarenotsonarrowlyfocusedthattheycannotrecognizetheopportunitiesforblendingtheirfunctionalexpertisewiththoseofothersinnewandinterestingways.Corecompetencedoesnotdiminishwithuse.Unlikephysicalassets,whichdodeteriorateovertime,competenciesareenhancedastheyareappliedandshared.Butcompetenciesstillneedtobenurturedandprotected;knowledgefadesifitisnotused.Competenciesarethegluethatbindsexistingbusinesses.Theyarealsotheenginefornewbusinessdevelopment.Patternsofdiversificationandmarketentrymaybeguidedbythem,notjustbytheattractivenessofmarkets.Consider3M'scompetencewithstickytape.indreamingupbusinessesasdiverseas"Postit"notes,magnetictape,photographicfilm,pressuresensitivetapes,andcoatedabrasives,thecompanyhasbroughttobearwidelysharedcompetenciesinsubstrates,coatings,andadhesivesanddevisedvariouswaystocombinethem.Indeed,3Mhasinvestedconsistentlyinthem.Whatseemstobeanextremelydiversifiedportfolioofbusinessesbeliesafewsharedcorecompetencies.Incontrast,therearemajorcompaniesthathavehadthepotentialtobuildcorecompetenciesbutfailedtodosobecausetopmanagementwasunabletoconceiveofthecompanyasanythingotherthanacollectionofdiscretebusinesses.GEsoldmuchofitsconsumerelectronicsbusinesstoThomsonofFrance,arguingthatitwasbecomingincreasinglydifficulttomaintainitscompetitivenessinthissector.Thatwasundoubtedlyso,butitisironicthatitsoldseveralkeybusinessestocompetitorswhowerealreadycompetenceleadersBlack&Deckerinsmallelectricalmotors,andThomson,whichwaseagertobuilditscompetenceinmicroelectronicsandhadlearnedfromtheJapanesethatapositioninconsumerelectronicswasvitaltothischallenge.Managementtrappedinthestrategicbusinessunit(SBU)mindsetalmostinevitablyfindsitsindividualbusinessesdependentonexternalsourcesforcriticalcomponents,suchasmotorsorcompressors.Butthesearenotjustcomponents.Theyarecoreproductsthatcontributetothecompetitivenessofawiderangeofendproducts.Theyarethephysicalembodimentsofcorecompetencies.HowNottoThinkofCompetenceSincecompaniesareinaracetobuildthecompetenciesthatdeterminegloballeadership,successfulcompanieshavestoppedimaginingthemselvesasbundlesofbusinessesmakingproducts.Canon,Honda,Casio,orNECmayseemtopresideoverportfoliosofbusinessesunrelatedintermsofcustomers,distributionchannels,andmerchandisingstrategy.Indeed,theyhaveportfoliosthatmayseemidiosyncraticattimes:NECistheonlyglobalcompanytobeamongleadersincomputing,telecommunications,andsemiconductorsandtohaveathrivingconsumerelectronicsbusiness.Butlooksaredeceiving.InNEC,digitaltechnology,especiallyVLSIandsystemsintegrationskills,isfundamental.Inthecorecompetenciesunderlyingthem,disparatebusinessesbecomecoherent.ItisHonda'scorecompetenceinenginesandpowertrainsthatgivesitadistinctiveadvantageincar,motorcycle,lawnmower,andgeneratorbusinesses.Canon'scorecompetenciesinoptics,imaging,andmicroprocessorcontrolshaveenabledittoenter,evendominate,marketsasseeminglydiverseascopiers,laserprinters,cameras,andimagescanners.Philipsworkedformorethan15yearstoperfectitsopticalmedia(laserdisc)competence,asdidJVCinbuildingaleadingpositioninvideorecording.Otherexamplesofcorecompetenciesmightincludemechantronics(theabilitytomarrymechanicalandelectronicengineering),videodisplays,bioengineering,andmicroelectronics.Intheearlystagesofitscompetencebuilding,Philipscouldnothaveimaginedalltheproductsthatwouldbespawnedbyitsopticalmediacompetence,norcouldJVChaveanticipatedminiaturecamcorderswhenitfirstbeganexploringvideotapetechnologies.Unlikethebattleforglobalbranddominance,whichisvisibleintheworld'sbroadcastandprintmediaandisaimedatbuildingglobal"shareofmind,”thebattletobuildworldclasscompetenciesisinvisibletopeoplewhoaren'tdeliberatelylookingforit.Topmanagementoftentracksthecostandqualityofcompetitors'products,yethowmanymanagersuntanglethewebofalliancestheirJapanesecompetitorshaveconstructedtoacquirecompetenciesatlowcost?InhowmanyWesternboardroomsisthereanexplicit,sharedunderstandingofthecompetenciesthecompanymustbuildforworldleadership?Indeed,howmanyseniorexecutivesdiscussthecrucialdistinctionbetweencompetitivestrategyatthelevelofabusinessandcompetitivestrategyatthelevelofanentirecompany?Letusbeclear.Cultivatingcorecompetencedoesnotmeanoutspendingrivalsonresearchanddevelopment.In1983,whenCanonsurpassedXeroxinworldwideunitmarketshareinthecopierbusiness,itsR&DbudgetinreprographicswasbutasmallfractionofXerox's.Overthepast20years,NEChasspentlessonR&DasapercentageofsalesthanalmostallofitsAmericanandEuropeancompetitors.Nordoescorecompetencemeansharedcosts,aswhentwoormoreSBUsuseacommonfacilityaplant,servicefacility,orsalesforceorshareacommoncomponent.Thegainsofsharingmaybesubstantial,butthesearchforsharedcostsistypicallyaposthocefforttorationalizeproductionacrossexistingbusinesses,notapremeditatedefforttobuildthecompetenciesoutofwhichthebusinessesthemselvesgrow.Buildingcorecompetenciesismoreambitiousanddifferentthanintegratingvertically,moreover.Managersdecidingwhethertomakeorbuywillstartwithendproductsandlookupstreamtotheefficienciesofthesupplychainanddownstreamtowarddistributionandcustomers.Theydonottakeinventoryofskillsandlookforwardtoapplyingtheminnontraditionalways.(Ofcourse,decisionsaboutcompetenciesdoprovidealogicforverticalintegration.Canonisnotparticularlyintegratedinitscopierbusiness,exceptinthoseaspectsoftheverticalchainthatSupportthecompetenciesitregardsascritical.)譯文公司的核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力資料來源:《哈佛商業(yè)評(píng)論》1990，5-6，P79-93作者：普拉哈拉德和哈默爾編者按：普拉哈拉德是美國(guó)密歇根大學(xué)研究公司策略和國(guó)際商務(wù)的教授。哈默爾是倫敦商學(xué)院研究企業(yè)政策和企業(yè)管理的講師。他們最近的《哈佛商業(yè)評(píng)論》文章《戰(zhàn)略意圖》（1989，,5-6），贏得了1989年的麥肯錫卓越獎(jiǎng)。這篇文章是在比慈善基金會(huì)的資助下完成的。競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的根源

NEC和GTE兩家公司的差別在于，前者把自己看成是一些能力的組合，而后者則把自己視為一些業(yè)務(wù)的組合。這類情形在很多行業(yè)屢見不鮮。從1980年到1988年，與美國(guó)的施樂與克萊斯勒相比，日本的佳能公司增長(zhǎng)了264％，本田公司增長(zhǎng)了200％。如果說西方的經(jīng)理們以前是為日本低價(jià)格，高質(zhì)量的進(jìn)口貨而擔(dān)憂，那么他們現(xiàn)在恐怕要驚嘆日本對(duì)手在創(chuàng)造新市場(chǎng)、發(fā)明新產(chǎn)品和改進(jìn)提高方面的驚人速度了。佳能公司推出了個(gè)人復(fù)印機(jī)，本田把業(yè)務(wù)從摩托車擴(kuò)展到了四輪越野車，索尼開發(fā)出了8毫米的攝像機(jī)，雅瑪哈推出了數(shù)字鋼琴，小松公司研制了水下遙控推土機(jī)，而卡西歐的最新產(chǎn)品則是一種小屏幕彩色液晶電視機(jī)。誰曾預(yù)料得到會(huì)演化出這樣一些前衛(wèi)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)?

在較為成熟的市場(chǎng)上，日本公司的挑戰(zhàn)也同樣令人不安。它們掀起了一場(chǎng)改進(jìn)產(chǎn)品特點(diǎn)和功能的風(fēng)暴，把尖端的技術(shù)引入到了人們的日用品中。比如，日本汽車制造商率先嘗試了四輪驅(qū)動(dòng)、每缸四汽閥發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)，車內(nèi)導(dǎo)航系統(tǒng)以及尖端的電子引擎管理系統(tǒng)。佳能憑借其產(chǎn)品的性能，在傳真機(jī)、臺(tái)式激光打印機(jī)甚至半導(dǎo)體生產(chǎn)設(shè)備等市場(chǎng)都謀得了一席之地。

在短期內(nèi)，一個(gè)公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)源于現(xiàn)有產(chǎn)品的性價(jià)比特性。但是在第一輪全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中存活下來的企業(yè)，無論是西方公司還是日本公司，現(xiàn)在都已趨向于采用相似的嚴(yán)格的產(chǎn)品成本和質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。達(dá)到這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)實(shí)際上已經(jīng)成為繼續(xù)留在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)隊(duì)伍中的最低要求，它們對(duì)于形成差異化優(yōu)勢(shì)的重要性已越來越小。從長(zhǎng)期來看，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)將取決于企業(yè)能否以比對(duì)手更低的成本和更快的速度構(gòu)建核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，這些核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力將為公司催生出意想不到的產(chǎn)品。管理層有能力把整個(gè)公司的技術(shù)和生產(chǎn)技能整合成核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，使各項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)能夠及時(shí)把握不斷變化的機(jī)遇，這才是優(yōu)勢(shì)的真正所在。

有些高層經(jīng)理宣稱他們無法打造核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，因?yàn)闃I(yè)務(wù)單元的自主性是不可侵犯的，或者因?yàn)樗麄儽痪o張的季度預(yù)算束縛住了手腳。這些人應(yīng)該反省。在很多西方企業(yè)中，問題并不是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層在能力上遜于日本同行，或者企業(yè)的技術(shù)能力比日本公司差一大截，而是這些企業(yè)的管理層死抱著一個(gè)陳舊的公司概念。這個(gè)陳舊的概念，限制了業(yè)務(wù)部門的能力，使它們無法充分利用很多歐美公司所擁有的技術(shù)能力寶藏。

多元化公司就好比一棵大樹