綠色金融與發(fā)展中心-中國“一帶一路”倡議倡議2023年投資報(bào)告（英）-2024.2

China

BeltandRoadInitiative(BRI)InvestmentReport2023ChristophNedopilFebruary20242China

BeltandRoadInitiative(BRI)Investment

Report

2023ChristophNedopil3Aboutthis

PublicationThisbriefis

producedby

the

GriffithAsia

Institute(GAI)at

GriffithUniversity,Brisbane,AustraliaincollaborationwiththeGreenFinance&DevelopmentCenter

(GFDC)of

theFanhaiInternationalSchoolofFinanceat

FudanUniversity,Shanghai,P.R.China.ThebriefaimstoprovideavehicleforpublishingpreliminaryresultsontopicsrelatedtotheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI)toencouragediscussion

and

debate.Thefindings,interpretations,and

conclusions

expressed

inthis

paperareentirelythoseoftheauthor(s)andshould

notbeattributed

inanymanner

to

GriffithUniversity,FISForFudanUniversity,toitsaffiliatedorganisations,orto

membersofitsBoardofExecutiveDirectors.Citationand

theuseof

materialpresented

inthis

brief

should

takeintoaccountthis

provisionalcharacter.Pleaseciteas:Nedopil,Christoph,2024,ChinaBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI)InvestmentReport2023,GriffithAsia

Institute,GriffithUniversity(Brisbane)and

GreenFinance&DevelopmentCenter,FISFFudanUniversity

(Shanghai)?2024GriffithUniversityandGreenFinance&DevelopmentCenter,FISFCover

picture:

Imageby

usertrmkonFreepik4Acronyms

andabbreviationsAEIAmericanEnterpriseInstituteAIIBAsianInfrastructureInvestmentBankAssociationof

SoutheastAsianNationsAviationIndustryCorporationASEANAVICBRIBeltandRoadInitiativeBRIGCCATLCGITCNCECCNCECCNOOCCNPCCPECCRRCEBRDEIABeltand

Road

InitiativeInternationalGreenDevelopmentCoalitionContemporaryAmperex

TechnologyCo.,LimitedChina

GlobalInvestmentTrackerChina

NationalChemicalEngineeringCorporationChina

NationalChemicalEngineeringCorporationChinaNationalOffshoreOil

CorporationChina

NationalPetroleumCorpChina

PakistanEconomicCorridorChina

RailwayRollingStockCorporationEuropeanBankfor

Reconstructionand

DevelopmentEnvironmentalImpact

AssessmentsEnvironmentalandsocial

risk

managementEuropeanUnionESMSEUEVElectronic

vehiclesFDIForeigndirectinvestmentsFISFFanhaiInternationalSchoolofFinanceGriffithAsia

InstituteGAIGCFGreenClimateFundGFDCGIPGreenFinance&DevelopmentCenterGreenInvestmentPrinciplesGWGigawattICBCICTIndustrialandCommercialBankofChinaInformationCommunicationTechnologyMinistryofEcologyandEnvironmentMinistryofCommerceMEEMOFCOMMoUMWMemorandumof

UnderstandingMegawattOBORPGIOneBeltOneRoadPartnership

forGlobalInfrastructureSustainableDevelopmentGoalsChina

Petroleum

and

ChemicalSingaporeManagementUniversityState-owned

enterprisesSDGSINOPECSMUSOEUAEUnitedArab

EmiratesUNUnited

NationsUNCTADUNDPUSDUnited

Nations

Conferenceon

Trade

and

DevelopmentUnitedNationsDevelopment

ProgrammeUnitedStatesDollar5ContentsChina’s

financeand

investments

intheBRIShareof

investments

inChina’s

BRIhighestonrecordDealsizesaregettingbigger

again,particularlyfor

investmentsRegionaland

countryanalysisof

ChineseBRIengagementSector

trends

of

BRIengagement89101012141718Energy-related

engagementin

theBRIatlowlevels

butwithgreengrowthincluding

transmissionTransportengagementintheBRIMajorplayersinBRIinvestmentsChina’sBRIinvestmentsinaglobalcomparisonOutlookfor

BRIfinanceand

investmentsRecommendations192021Appendix1:AbouttheBRI232425262627Appendix

2:Countries

of

theBRIAbouttheauthorAboutGriffithAsia

InstituteAbouttheGreenFinance&DevelopmentCenterNotes

and

referencesListof

?guresFigure1:Figure2:China's

BRIconstructionengagementand

investments

2013-2023Shareof

constructionandinvestmentengagementintheBRI2013-202399Figure3:Figure4:Figure5:Dealsizeof

ChineseengagementintheBRI2013-2023ChineseengagementindifferentBRIregions

since20131010Trends

of

ChineseBRIengagementacrossdifferentcountries

2023and

comparisonof2022and

2023investments

and

constructionengagement111213131415Figure6:

BRIinvestments

indifferentsectors

2013-2023Figure7:

ChineseBRIengagementindifferentsectors

throughconstructionand

investmentsince2013Figure8:

Technologyrelated

BRIinvestmentin2023Figure9:

ChineseBRIengagementinmetals

andmining2013

–2023H1Figure10:

ChinesetotalenergyengagementintheBeltand

Road

Initiative(BRI)2013-2023Figure11:

Chineseenergyengagementthroughinvestmentand

constructionintheBRI2013-2023bysubsector16161718Figure12:

EnergyengagementacrossthesupplychainFigure13:

Chineseenergyengagementin

theBeltand

Road

Initiative(BRI)bycountryin2023H1Figure14:

ChineseengagementinBRItransportinfrastructure2013-2023Figure15:

FDItrends

in2023,globalandbyregion(billionUSDandpercentagechangecompared

to2022)

19Figure16:

5-stepframeworkforacceleratinggreenBRIinvestmentsafterCOVID-19

206Key

?ndings?10years

after

theannouncementof

the

BRI,

cumulative

BRI

engagement

breached

the

USD1trillion

mark

(USD1.053trillion),withaboutUSD634inconstructioncontracts,andUSD

419innon-financialinvestments;?China’s

energyrelated

engagementin2023werethegreenestinabsoluteand

relativetermsinanyperiod

sincetheBRI’s

inceptionreaching

USD7.9billion;??China

isincreasinglyinvesting

inelectricitytransmission(over

USD7billion);BRI

finance

and

investments

has

picked

up

in

2023

withabout212deals

worthUSD92.4billioncomparedtoaboutUSD74.5billionin2022;?Investments

asa

share

of

BRI

engagement

reached

record

levels

atover52percent,indicatinghigher

ownership

and

risk

takingof

Chineseenterprises;??In2023,particularlythetechnology(+1046percent)1

andmetalsandmining(+158

percent)grew.Chinese

companies

strongly

invest

in

metals

and

mining,

which

areparticularlyrelevant

tothegreentransition(e.g.,lithium)

and

batteries

for

electric

vehicles.???Engagementrelated

tobatteries

reachedaboutUSD8billion;Africa

becamethelargestrecipientof

Chineseengagement,

overtakingMiddleEasterncountries;19

countries

sawa

100

percent

drop

in

BRI

engagement,

includingTurkey,and

Kenya;

Russiasawonedealin2023,after

no

engagements

in2022;?BRIinvestments

in2023continuetobedominated

by

private

sector

enterprises,

includingHuayao

Cobalt

and

CATL,

while

constructioncontractsweredominatedby

state-ownedenterprises(SOEs);???Inglobalcomparison,Chineseoverseas

engagementgrew,

while

global

FDI

into

emergingeconomies

in

2023

dropped

significantly;For

2024,

we

see

further

growth

of

Chinese

BRI

engagement

withastrongfocusonBRIcountrypartnerships

inrenewableenergy,miningand

related

technologies;Potentialfutureengagements

canbeexpected

in

six

project

types:

manufacturinginnewtechnologies

(e.g.,batteries),

renewableenergy,trade-enablinginfrastructure(includingpipelines,roads),

ICT(e.g.,datacenters),resource-backeddeals(e.g.,mining,oil,gas),highvisibilityorstrategicprojects(e.g.,railway).7China’s

finance

and

investments

inthe

BRICumulative

BRI

engagement

in

thefull

10

years

since

theannouncement

of

the

BRI

in

2013

breachedtheUSD

1trillion

mark

to

reach

USD

1.053

trillion,

about

USD

634in

construction

contracts,

and

USD

419

in

non-financialinvestments.ThiscomparestoUSD74.5billionBRIengagementinallof2022—anincreaseof

18

percent).Ofthe2023

engagement,aboutUSD44.6billionwasthroughinvestmentandUSD

43.7billionthroughconstructioncontracts

(partlyfinanced

byChineseloans).China’soverallengagementshowsasteadydevelopmentsince2020from

theonsetof

COVID-19(seeFigure1).Preliminary

data

on

Chinese

engagement

throughfinancial

investments

and

contractual

cooperation

for2023

in

the

149

countries

ofthe

BRI2

show

about

212deals

worth

USD

92.4

billion.About

the

data:InNovember

2023,theMinistryofCommerce(MOFCOM)released

newBRIengagement

statisticscoveringtheperiodofJanuary

toOctober

2023.3Accordingtothesedata,Chineseenterprises

invested

about

USD25.85billioninnon-financialdirectinvestments

incountries

“alongtheBeltand

Road”(a

year-on-year

increaseof20.1percent).Atthesametime,thevalueof

newly-signed

projectcontracts

by

Chineseenterprises

inthe"Beltand

Road"countrieswasUSD128.42billion,ayear-on-yeardecrease

of5

percent.Forthis

report,thedefinitionof

BRIcountries

includes

150countriesthathadsignedacooperationagreementwithChina

toworkunder

theframeworkof

the

BRIbyDecember

2023.Thisanalysisis

derivedfrom

andpresentsnumbersverysimilar

totheChina

GlobalInvestmentTracker(CGIT),published

bytheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute4.Weexpandthosedatawithourowndatabased

onresearch

at

Griffith

AsiaInstituteandat

theGreenFinance&DevelopmentCenter

affiliatedwithFISFFudanUniversity,Shanghai.Specifically,T=theCGITincludesdealswithasize

ofoverUSD100million.Weexpand

thedata

withmoreresearchandgranularityfor

sub-sectorsandsub-sectorsandadjust,includeorexclude

projects

basedonourowninformation.WedefineBRIengagements

asthoseChineseconstruction

and

investmentdealsincountries

thathadweidentifyashavinganMoUwithChinatocooperateunder

theBRIatthetimeofthereport(thus,iftheSyrianRepublicsignedaBRIMoUin2022,wealsocountpriorinvestmentsintoSyriaasBRIinvestments).Aswithmostdata,theytendtobeimperfectand

need

regular

updating.8Figure1:

China's

BRI

construction

engagement

and

investments

2013-2023Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).Figure2:

Share

of

construction

and

investmentengagement

in

the

BRI

2013-2023Share

of

investments

in

China’s

BRIhighest

on

recordTheshareof

ChineseengagementintheBRIthroughinvestments

comparedtoconstructionhas

seenitshighestlevels

in2023:investmentsreached

about52percentof

BRIengagementcomparedto29percentin2021.2023isthefirsttimethatmorethan50percentof

theBRIengagementis

throughinvestments

whereChineseinvestors

takeequity

stakes

withhigher

risks.Thiscomparestoconstructioncontractsthataretypicallyfinanced

throughloans

providedbyChinesefinancialinstitutions

and/or

contractors

withtheprojectoftenreceivingguarantees

throughthehostcountry’s

governmentinstitutions

(seeFigure2).Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).9Deal

sizes

are

getting

bigger

again,particularly

for

investmentsRegional

and

country

analysis

ofChinese

BRI

engagementTheaveragedealsizefor

investments

has

morethandoubledfrom

aloworUSD

354millionin2020toUSD772millionin2023.Thisisthe

second

highestdealsizesincetheBRI’s

inceptionin2013(2018hadinvestmentdealsizesofUSD

749million).Africaisthelargestrecipientof

BRIengagement

withstronggrowthalsoinCentralAsia.ChineseBRIengagementwas

notevenlydistributed

amongallregions.BRIcountries

inAfricasawa

47

percentincreaseinChineseconstructioncontractsanda114percentincreaseininvestments.Inconsequence,Africa

asa

continentbecamethe

largestrecipientofChineseengagementworthUSD

21.7billion,overtakingMiddleEasterncountries

thatsaw

USD15.8billioninengagement.Forconstructionprojects,thedealsizein2023

wasthesecond

lowestsincetheBRIwas

announced

in2013,withaboutUSD394(seeFigure3).Comparedtothepeakin2017,thisisa22percent

decrease.Particularlyfor

constructionprojects,thistrend

islikelyinline

withtheambitiontohave“smallorbeautifulprojects”intheBRIpropagated

throughofficial

channels.Another

reasonis

thatChinaadjusteditsriskmanagementstrategiestoadjustforBRIcountryrisksthataremorepronounced,e.g.,duetosovereigndebtissues.Nevertheless,MiddleEastern

countries

continued

tobemajorrecipients

of

Chineseconstructionengagement,receiving36.7percentof

totalBRIconstructionengagementin2023,agrowthof31percentfrom2022.EastAsianBRI

countries,meanwhile,expanded

theirintakeof

Chineseinvestments

by94percenttoUSD6.8billionin2023(seeFigure4).Figure3:Dealsizeof

ChineseengagementintheBRI2013-2023Interestingly,

Latin

American

BRI

countries

saw

verylittle

construction

engagement

in

2023,

justUSD180million(justaheadofPacificBRI

countriesreceivingUSD170constructionengagement).

Yet,LatinAmericanBRIcountries

sawanincreaseof

92percentfortheir

investments

toreceiveabout5.5billionininvestments,taking20.5percentofallChineseBRIoverseas

investments.Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).10Figure4:ChineseengagementindifferentBRIregionssince2013Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).China’sfinancingandinvestmentspread

across

61BRIcountries

in2023(upfrom60in2022),with37countries

receivinginvestments

and45withconstructionengagement.Figure5:

Trends

of

Chinese

BRI

engagementacross

different

countries

2023

and

comparison

of2022and

2023

investments

and

constructionengagementThecountrywiththehighest

constructionvolumein2023wasSaudi

Arabia,withaboutUSD5.6billion(upfrom2.6billionin2022),followedbySriLanka(USD4.5billion),Tanzania(aboutUSD3.1billion)andUAE(USD2billion).RegardingBRIinvestments,Indonesiawas

thesinglelargestrecipientwithaboutUSD7.3billionininvestments,followed

by

Hungary(USD4.5billion)andPeru(USD2.9billion).19

countries

sawa

100

percent

dropin

BRIengagement

compared

to

2022,

including

Kenya,Myanmar,

Turkey.China’s

engagementinPakistanfortheChinaPakistan

EconomicCorridor(CPEC)dropped

by

about74percent(seeFigure5).Thecountries

withthelargest

growth

of

BRIengagementwereSouthKorea(+577

percent),Bolivia

(+493percent),Namibia(+457percent),Tanzania(+415percent),and

Uzbekistan(+375percent).After

Russia

did

notreceiveanyChineseengagementin2022,China

NationalChemicalEngineeringCorporation(CNCEC)joinedAEONCorporationtobuildamethanolplantinVolgograd.5Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).11Sector

trends

of

BRI

engagementIn2023,particularly

thetechnology(+1046percent)andmetalsandmining(+158percent)grewcomparedto2022.About

technology:in

2023,

we

summarised

all

electric

vehicleand

car-related

investments

intoThefocusof

China’soverseasBRIengagementcontinued

tobeoninfrastructure,particularlyinenergy(31percent)andtransport(16percent),whichis

a

significantreduction,particularlyintheenergysector

(downfrom45percentin2022).Theminingsectorovertookthetransportsector,constituting

21percentof

Chineseoverseasengagement(seeFigure6).technology,

which

were

previously

partlylocatedin

the

transport

sector.Thefinance,utilities

and

healthsectorssawsignificantdrops.Figure6:

BRI

investments

in

different

sectors

2013-2023Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).WhenlookingatChina’s

engagementstrategyinthesesectors

distinguished

byconstructionandinvestment,itbecomes

clearthatinvestmentwithequityshares

and

thus

higher

riskwithintheChineseorganisationsbecomes

an

increasinglyimportantstrategyparticularlyinmining,

technology,andtransport(seeFigure7).12Figure7:

Chinese

BRI

engagement

in

different

sectors

through

construction

and

investment

since

2013Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).One

important

growth

sector

is

technology

whichreached

over

USD

14.3

billion

in

engagement

inBRIcountrieswithafocusonbattery,carparts,EVmanufacturing,aswell

as

telecoms

(seeFigure8).Somenoteworthy

engagements

includeinvestmentsintoelectric

vehicles,suchasbatteryproductionwithZhejiangHuayouCobaltincollaborationwithLGinSouthKorea,or

ZhejiangHezhong’s

EVcarAmanufacturingplantrelatedtorenewableenergytechnologywas

theGoldwind

agreementfor

theimplementationofawindturbineindustrialunitwortharoundUSD36million,whichwillgenerateabout1,100directandindirectjobs.6InIndonesia,TriaSolar,

Sinar

Mas,

AgraSuryaEnergiand

Indonesia’s

government-ownedpowercompanyPLN

agreedtoconstructIndonesia’slargest

solar

cellandsolarpanelfactoryinCentralJava.7manufacturinginThailand.Outsideof

theBRI,BYDestablishedacarmanufacturinginBrazil.Another

important

growth

area

of

strategicimportance

is

China’s

engagement

in

metals

andmining

reachingUSD

19.4

billion.

Engagementinthesectorhasgrownby

158

percentcompared

to2022and

reached

thehighestlevel

since2013.Themineralsandmetalsare

particularlyrelevanttothegreentransition(e.g.,lithium)

and

batteries

forelectric

vehicles.Engagement

has

beenstronginvariousAfricancountries,BoliviaandChileinLatinAmerica,andIndonesia.Chinaalreadyholdssignificantshares

of

globalminingsources

(e.g.,over80percentof

globalgraphiteresources),and

evenmorecontrolinmaterialprocessing(whereacrosslithium,nickel,cobaltand

graphite,China

owns

morethan50percentofglobalcapacity).8Figure8:

Technology-related

BRI

investment

in2023Examples

includeverticalintegrationinvestments

bytheworld’s

largestbatterymanufacturer

CATL,whichboughttheshare’s

for

anickelminingconcessioninIndonesiafromPT

AnekaTambangTbk(Antam).9OthersarealithiumminingoperationinMalibyJiangxiGanfengor

throughHainanMining’sacquisitionofKodalMineralspartofalithiummineinMali10,acopper

processingplantagreementin

SaudiArabia11,andacommissioningofalithiumprocessingplantinZimbabwe12

(seeFigure9).Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).13Figure9:

Chinese

BRI

engagement

in

metals

and

mining

2013

–

2023

H1Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).Energy-related

engagement

in

the

BRI

at

low

levels

but

with

green

growthincluding

transmissionChina’s

energy-related

engagement

in

2023

wasthe

greenest

since

the

BRI’s

inception

in

2013:

in2023,China’s

green(solar,wind)energyengagementwasaboutUSD7.9billion,about28percentofenergyengagement,plus

anadditional6percent(USD1.6billion)intohydropower.Chineseengagementrelated

totheenergy

sectorconstitutes

thelargestshareof

China’sBRIengagement.In2023,totalengagementintheenergysector

reachedshortof

USD30billion—whichis

thelowestBRIenergyengagementexceptfor

2020.Aparticulardevelopmentisincreasedgreenenergy(solar,

windand

biomass)engagement,

whichreached

records

ofUSD7.9billion(this

number

doesnotincludeChineseexportofsolarequipment).About

energy-related

transmission:Startingwiththis

report,weincludeenergy-related

transmissionengagement.Also,engagementindistributionsystems

(e.g.,substations,powerlines)constituted

morethan11percentof

ChineseBRIenergyengagement(seeFigure10).14Figure10:

Chinese

total

energy

engagement

in

the

BRI2013-2023Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).AmajordealwastheUSD4.5

billionengagementby

SinopecinSri

Lankato

buildan

oilrefinery,whichwas

approved

inNovember

2023.17CoalFollowingChina’s

announcementinSeptember2021to

notto

buildnewcoalfiredpowerplants,selectnewcoal-firedpowerprojectsseemtoprogress.Rumorsofan8GWgaspowerplantinYakutia,Russian

Far

East,withChina’s

PowerChinafromJune2023havenot

yetbeenconfirmed.Oil-related

investments

dropped

tozeroin2023after

years

withseveralhigher

profileprojectsinsideand

outsidetheBRI(e.g.,China’sCNOOCengaged

inaUSD1.9billionproductionsharingdealwithPetrobrastoexplore

Brazil’s

Buzlosfield).18InJanuary2024,anew380MWcoal-fired

powerplantunit,Labota

No.7builtbyChinesecompanies,startedoperation13,

the

Pakistangovernment

approveda300

MW

of

coal

firedpower

in

Gwadar,

Pakistan

in

January

2023

14

tobe

constructed

by

China.

WhilePakistanhadannounced

inDecember

2020tonotbuild

newcoal-fired

powerplants,varioussources

reportthatChinawasinterestedinprovidingfinancialandtechnicalsupportfor

theproject15—includingthedesignthatrequires

importofcoal(rather

thanusingpossiblymore

affordabledomesticcoal

inPakistan).16

However,nofinancialclosinghasbeenannounced,whichis

whythis

projectis

notincluded

inthe2023H1dataset.Atthesametime,BRIpartnersinvestedinChinatosupportoildevelopment,suchasAramco’sinvestmentina

petrochemicalcomplex

inPanjinCity,LiaolingProvince.Green

energy/hydropowerChina’stotalengagementingreenenergy(solarandwind)and

hydropoweramountedtoaboutUSD9.5billionin2023.ThiscomparestoUSD

8.1billionin2022(seeFigure10).Oil

and

gasOiland

gas

engagementfellslightlytoUSD15.7billion(52percentof

Chineseoverseas

energyengagement),USD6.4billioningasand9.3USDbillioninoil.Lookingatinvestmentonly,Chinesegreenenergyand

hydropower

investmentdecreasedtoUSD1.5billionin2023fromUSD2.1billionin2022.Meanwhile,constructionprojectsrelated

togreenenergy(includinghydropower)increasedfrom

USD5.6billionin2022toUSD8.1

billionin2023.15Figure11:

Chinese

energy

engagement

through

investment

and

construction

in

the

BRI

2013

-2023bysubsectorSource:

?

2022

GFDC

(Data

AEI,

GDFC,

MOFCOMand

others).of

whichinhydropowerandcoal).Pakistanis

followedEnergy

engagement

across

the

supplyby

Russiaand

SaudiArabia.

An

interestingcaseforChina’s

energyinvestmentisZimbabwe:afterachaincancelledcoal-firedpower

plantin2021,

ZimbabweChina’s

engagementacrossthe

energysupplychainhas

evolved

inthedataframefrom2022to2023.Whileinbothyears,energygenerationwas

mostimportantfor

China’s

BRIengagement,

exploitation(particularlyinoilandgas)has

decreasedsignificantlyfromUSD12.7billiontoUSD

6.1billion.Meanwhile,transmissionengagement,crucialfor

thegreentransition,hasincreasedfrom

USD4.5billiontooverUSD7billion(seeFigure12).sawstrongengagementin

greenenergy

throughanagreementona1GWfloatingsolar

station20

in2023.Figure12:

Energy

engagement

across

the

supplychainEnergy

engagement

in

different

countriesAnalyzingChineseenergy

engagementindifferentBRIcountries,wefind

that,SriLanka

tookthetopspotduetoSinopec’s

engagementinbuildinganoilrefinery.Similarto2022,alsoSaudiArabia

heldatopspotas

thecountrythatreceived

themostenergyengagementin2023(USD3.7billion),followedbyPeru(USD2.9billion).Contrarytothepreviousyear,SaudiArabiaalso

receivedasignificantshare(19percent)of

greenenergy

engagement.Peru,meanwhile,received

allof

itsengagementintransmissionprojects,whereChina

SouthernPowerGridInternationalboughtthedistribution,supply,andenergyservices

assets

fromItalianenergycompanyEnel19.(seeFigure12).Overall,themostimportantpartner

forChina’sBRIenergyengagementsincetheBRI’sinitiationin2013remains

Pakistan,whichhasreceivedUSD28billionthroughinvestmentand

constructioncontracts

(mostSource:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).16Figure13:

Chinese

energy

engagement

in

the

BRI

by

country

in

202

3Source:

?

2023

GAI

and

GFDC

(Data

AEI

and

others).Transport

engagement

in

the

BRITransport-relatedengagementis

keytoprovidingthemeans

totrade

betweenChina

andtheBRIAlso,ChinaengagedthroughitsCRRCtomanufacturerailwagonsand

wheelsinSaudiArabia.21countries—wheretradeis

a

corecomponentof

theBRI.Accordingly,Chinahasinvestedinandconstructedprojectsinroad,rail,aviation,shipping,andlogisticsacrosstheworld(see

Figure13).Other

noteworthyprojects

includeanagreementonthetramprojectinColombia22.Road

transport:

China

continues

toengageinroadconstructionprojects

across

manycountriesworthUSD7.5billion.ExamplesincludeatollroadinCambodiaworthaboutUSD1.623

billion.Aviation:

Twoprojects

wereannounced,includingtheupgradeof

therunwayof

HoniaraAirportinSolomonIsland

by

ChinaRailwayConstruction.Ports:

Someshippingand

port-relatedprojectinvestments

wereannounced

in2023,suchasanagreementwithSaudiArabiatosupportAramco’scorporationshippingprojects.Rail:

Totalrailengagement

was

worthUSD4.2billion(allbut