gao-State Department - Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations Should Better Track Its Performance-此為英文文檔

UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice

ReporttoCongressionalRequesters

June2024

STATE

DEPARTMENT

BureauofConflictandStabilization

OperationsShouldBetterTrackIts

Performance

GAO-24-106238

UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice

Highlightsof

GAO-24-106238,

areporttocongressionalrequesters

WhyGAODidThisStudy

Conflict,instability,andviolence

continuetoposethreatsaroundtheworld,includingtoU.S.national

securityinterests.In2011,State

establishedCSOtofocusonconflictprevention,crisisresponse,and

stabilization.In2015,State’s

InspectorGeneral(IG)reportedthatCSOhadnotresolvedfundamentalissuesrelatedtoitsmission,

structure,andstaffingthattheIGhadidentifiedayearearlier.

GAOwasaskedtoreviewCSO’s

operations.Thisreportexamines(1)howCSO’sroleshavechangedsinceFY2016,(2)theextenttowhichCSOfollowedperformancemanagementpractices,and(3)relevantU.S.

agencies’perspectivesonCSO’s

collaborationeffortssince2021.GAOanalyzedStatedataandreviewed

agencydocumentssuchasstrategiesandpolicies.GAOalsointerviewed

29officialsfromState,USAID,and

DODontheirexperiencescollaboratingwithCSO.

WhatGAORecommends

GAOismakingtwo

recommendations,thatState(1)

requireatargetforeachofits

performanceindicatorsand(2)fully

documentitsperformance

managementprocess,suchasthe

annualassessmentsoftargetsanddatareliability.Statepartiallyagreedwithrecommendation1andagreedwithrecommendation2.GAO

maintainsthatStateshouldsettargetsforallofitsperformanceindicators.

View

GAO-24-106238.

Formoreinformation,contactNagla'aEl-Hodiriat(202)512-7279or

elhodirin@.

June2024

STATEDEPARTMENT

BureauofConflictandStabilizationOperationsShouldBetterTrackItsPerformance

WhatGAOFound

Inrecentyears,theDepartmentofState’sBureauofConflictandStabilization

Operations(CSO)hastakenaleadingroleinimplementinglawsandstrategiesonconflictprevention.Specifically,CSOhasanewrolecoordinatinginteragencyplanningandimplementationofa2020strategytopreventconflictandstabilizeconflict-affectedareasabroadover10years.CSOofficialssaidthisstrategyisatoppriorityforthebureau.CSOhasfocuseditsexistingefforts—dataanalysis,staffdeployments,programming,andplanning—onthestrategy’s

implementation.Forexample,CSOhasdeployedstafftohelpimplementthestrategyinprioritycountries.

CSOfollowedsome,butnotall,keypracticesthatfederalagenciescan

implementtomanagetheirperformance.CSOdefineditsdesiredoutcomesbutdidnotfullyimplementotherpracticesrelatedtomeasuringperformanceand

usingperformanceinformation.Forexample,CSOdidnotsetfiscalyear(FY)

2022targetsforeightofits25performanceindicators,suchasthenumberof

timesusersviewedtheInstabilityMonitoringandAnalysisPlatform.Withatargetforeachindicator,CSOwouldbebetterpositionedtofullyassessits

performanceandidentifyanygaps.CSOalsodidnotfullydocumentitsannualperformancereview.Forexample,CSOdidnotdocumenthowitreviewedthetargetsforitsperformanceindicatorsinFY2022,includingitsreasonsfor

decidingnottochangeanyofthem,eventhoseithadmet.SuchdocumentationwouldallowCSOtopreserveknowledgeofitsanalysesanddecisions,bebetterpositionedtoactonthisknowledge,andmaintainconsistencyinitsannual

reviews.

OfficialsfromState,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),andtheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)identifiedfactorsthataffectedtheir

collaborationwithCSO.Forexample,27officialssaidthattheexpertiseCSO

providedtorelevanteffortsfacilitatedeffectivecollaboration.Inanotherexample,13officialssaidthatCSO’sroleswerenotclearlydefinedinexperienceswherecollaborationcouldhavebeenimproved.CSOrequestsandcollectsfeedbackonitscollaborationeffortstounderstandthefactorsthatfacilitatedorhindered

collaboration.CSOcollectssuchfeedbackthroughemployeeperformanceevaluationsandsurveys,amongothertools.

TopThreeFactorsThatFacilitatedorHinderedCollaborationwithCSO,asIdentifiedinaNumberofInterviewswithState,USAID,andDODOfficials

PageiGAO-24-106238StateDepartment

Contents

Letter

Background

CSOHasHadaLeadingRoleImplementingRecentLawsonConflictPreventionwithGenerallyConsistentEffortsandVaryingResourcessinceFY2016

CSOFollowedSomeKeyPerformanceManagementPractices

butDidNotFullySetTargetsorDocumentItsAnnualReviews

State,USAID,andDODOfficialsWeInterviewedIdentified

FactorsThatFacilitatedorHinderedCSO’sCollaborationinSelectedCountries

Conclusions

RecommendationsforExecutiveActionAgencyCommentsandOurEvaluation

1

4

8

22

29

38

38

38

AppendixI

Objectives,Scope,andMethodology

41

AppendixII

DepartmentofState’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations’OrganizationalStructure

50

AppendixIII

U.S.AgencyPerspectivesontheBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations’CollaborationEfforts

51

AppendixIV

CommentsfromtheDepartmentofState

55

AppendixV

CommentsfromtheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment

58

AppendixVI

GAOContactandStaffAcknowledgments

59

Tables

Table1:PrimaryU.S.GovernmentAgencies’RolesRelated

toConflictPreventionandStabilization7

PageiiGAO-24-106238StateDepartment

Table2:ExamplesofState’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations’(CSO)EffortsbyFocusArea

Table3:ExamplesofState’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations’(CSO)EffortstoImplementU.S.StrategiesRelatedtoConflictPrevention

Table4:AssessmentofState’sBureauofConflictand

StabilizationOperations’(CSO)Performance

ManagementProcessesComparedwithKeyPerformanceManagementStepsandPractices

Table5:FactorsMostFrequentlyIdentifiedin28InterviewsasFacilitatingEffectiveCollaborationwithState’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations(CSO)

Table6:FactorsMostFrequentlyIdentifiedin24InterviewsasHinderingEffectiveCollaborationwithState’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations(CSO)

Table7:FactorsIdentifiedin28InterviewsasFacilitatingEffectiveCollaborationwithState’sBureauofConflictand

StabilizationOperations(CSO)

Table8:FactorsIdentifiedin24InterviewsasHinderingEffectiveCollaborationwithState’sBureauofConflictand

StabilizationOperations(CSO)

Table9:SuggestionsfromOfficialsonHowState’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations(CSO)Could

ImproveasaCollaborationPartner

14

16

23

30

33

52

53

54

Figures

Figure1:State’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations’

(CSO)ElectoralViolenceRiskDashboard11

Figure2:FundsObligatedforState’sBureauofConflictand

StabilizationOperations’(CSO)CurrentPrograms,asof

November202313

Figure3:FundsforState’sBureauofConflictandStabilization

Operations(CSO),FiscalYears2016–202317

Figure4:FundsforState’sBureauofConflictandStabilization

Operations(CSO)forForeignAssistanceProgramming

andRelatedActivities,FiscalYears2016–202319

Figure5:State’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations’

(CSO)AuthorizedFull-TimeEquivalentPositionTypes,

FiscalYears2016–202320

PageiiiGAO-24-106238StateDepartment

Figure6:State’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations’

(CSO)AuthorizedandFilledFull-TimeEquivalent

Positions,FiscalYears2016–202321

Figure7:ElementsandExamplesfromState’sBureauofConflict

andStabilizationOperations’(CSO)FunctionalBureau

Strategy24

Figure8:State’sBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations’

(CSO)OrganizationalChart,asofNovember202350

Abbreviations

AtrocityPreventionStrategy

2022U.S.StrategytoAnticipate,Prevent,andRespondtoAtrocities

bureaustrategy

FunctionalBureauStrategy

CSO

BureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations

DOD

DepartmentofDefense

ElieWieselAct

ElieWieselGenocideandAtrocitiesPreventionActof2018

FTE

full-timeequivalent

FY

fiscalyear

GFA

GlobalFragilityActof2019

GTM

BureauofGlobalTalentManagement

StabilityStrategy

2020U.S.StrategytoPreventConflictandPromoteStability

TaskForce

WhiteHouse-ledAtrocityPreventionTaskForce

USAID

U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment

ThisisaworkoftheU.S.governmentandisnotsubjecttocopyrightprotectionintheUnitedStates.ThepublishedproductmaybereproducedanddistributedinitsentiretywithoutfurtherpermissionfromGAO.However,becausethisworkmaycontain

copyrightedimagesorothermaterial,permissionfromthecopyrightholdermaybenecessaryifyouwishtoreproducethismaterialseparately.

441GSt.N.W.

Washington,DC20548

Page1GAO-24-106238StateDepartment

June11,2024

TheHonorableGregoryMeeks

RankingMember

CommitteeonForeignAffairsHouseofRepresentatives

TheHonorableSaraJacobsRankingMember

SubcommitteeonAfrica

CommitteeonForeignAffairsHouseofRepresentatives

Conflict,instability,andviolencecontinuetoposethreatsaroundthe

world.Conflictimposeshumanandfinancialcostsrangingfromfood

insecuritytodisplacementthatundermineglobalpeace,security,and

sustainabledevelopment.Conflictiswidespread,affectingatleast50

countriesandoneinsixpeopleasofJanuary2024,accordingtothe

ArmedConflictLocationandEventDataProject.

1

Preventingconflictandpromotingstabilityinfragileandconflict-affectedcountriesremain

importanttoU.S.nationalsecurityinterests.Forexample,persistent

armedconflictscreateinstabilitythatterroristandcriminalorganizationscanexploit,directlyaffectingtheinterestsoftheU.S.anditsallies.

2

In2011,theDepartmentofStateestablishedtheBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations(CSO)tofocusonconflictprevention,crisis

response,andstabilization.

3

CSO’smissionistoanticipate,prevent,andrespondtoconflictthatunderminesU.S.interests.CSOistocollaborate

1ArmedConflictLocationandEventDataProject,ACLEDConflictIndex(Jan.2024),accessedMarch15,2024,

/conflict-index/.

TheArmedConflict

LocationandEventDataProjectconductsdisaggregateddatacollection,analysis,andcrisismapping.

2DepartmentofState,U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,andDepartmentof

Defense,StabilizationAssistanceReview:AFrameworkforMaximizingtheEffectivenessofU.S.GovernmentEffortstoStabilizeConflict-AffectedAreas(2018).

3StateestablishedCSOtobe“theinstitutionallocusforpolicyandoperationalsolutionsforcrisis,conflict,andinstability”asdirectedbythefirstQuadrennialDiplomacyand

DevelopmentReview.SeeDepartmentofStateandU.S.AgencyforInternational

Development,LeadingthroughCivilianPower:TheFirstQuadrennialDiplomacyand

DevelopmentReview(2010).CSOsubsumedState’sOfficeoftheCoordinatorfor

ReconstructionandStabilization,whichStateestablishedin2004toplan,implement,andcoordinatewhole-of-governmentreconstructionandstabilizationefforts.

Page2GAO-24-106238StateDepartment

withotherStatebureausandoffices,theU.S.AgencyforInternational

Development(USAID),theDepartmentofDefense(DOD),andotherU.S.governmententitiestofulfillthismission.

In2014,State’sInspectorGeneralreportedweaknessesinitsinspectionofCSOandissued43recommendations.

4

CSOhastakenstepsto

addressmanyoftheweaknessesidentifiedand,since2015,has

addressedtherecommendationsissuedintheinspectionandfollow-upreport.

5

However,morethan10yearsafterCSO’sestablishment,

questionsremainaboutitsoperationsandrole.

YouaskedustoreviewCSO’soperations.Thisreport(1)examineshow,ifatall,CSO’sroles,efforts,andresourceshavechangedsincefiscal

year(FY)2016;(2)assessestheextenttowhichCSOfollowedkey

practicestoassessandimproveitsperformancemanagement;and(3)

examinesrelevantU.S.agencies’perspectivesoncollaborationwithCSOsince2021inselectedcountries.

Toexaminehow,ifatall,CSO’sroles,efforts,andresourceshave

changedsinceFY2016—buildingonState’sInspectorGeneral’s2015

follow-upreport—werevieweddocumentssuchasCSO’sFunctional

BureauStrategies(bureaustrategy),whichare4-yearplansthatoutlinethebureau’spriorities.

6

WealsoanalyzedStatedataonCSO’sfundsandstafffromFYs2016through2023.Toassessthereliabilityofthesedata,wereviewedthemformissingentries,revieweddocumentationaboutthedata,andinterviewedStateofficials.Wefoundthedatatobesufficientlyreliableforthepurposesofourreportingobjectives.

ToassesstheextenttowhichCSOfollowedkeypracticestoassessandimproveitsperformancemanagement,wecomparedCSO’sperformancemanagementprocessesfrom2021through2023tokeyperformance

managementstepsandrelatedpracticesthatwehadidentifiedinprior

4DepartmentofStateOfficeofInspectorGeneral,InspectionoftheBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations,ISP-I-14-06(Arlington,VA:March2014).

5In2015,State’sInspectorGeneralconductedafollow-upreviewofCSOandreportedthatCSOhadnotresolvedfundamentalissuesrelatedtoitsmission,organizational

structure,andstaffing.SeeDepartmentofStateOfficeofInspectorGeneral,ComplianceFollow-UpReviewoftheBureauofConflictandStabilizationOperations,ISP-C-15-13

(Arlington,VA:February2015).

6CSOhasupdateditsbureaustrategyfourtimessinceFY2016,theperiodcoveredbyourreview.

Page3GAO-24-106238StateDepartment

work.

7

SinceCSOworkswithawiderangeofpartners,weincludeda

practiceoninvolvingstakeholdersindefiningmissionsanddesired

outcomesthatwehadidentifiedinotherpriorwork.

8

WefocusedonthistimeperiodbecauseCSOreviseditsbureaustrategyandindicators

duringitsfirststrategicannualreviewin2021,accordingtoCSOofficials.WereviewedStatedocuments,includingCSO’smostrecentbureau

strategyin2022,guidancerelatedtothebureaustrategyand

performancemanagement,andCSO’sdocumentationofitsperformancemanagement.WealsointerviewedofficialsfromState’sFunctional

BureauStrategySupportTeamfromtheOfficeofForeignAssistanceandtheBureauofBudgetandPlanning.

ToexaminerelevantU.S.agencies’perspectivesoncollaborationwith

CSOsince2021inselectedcountries,weconductedsemi-structured

interviewswithanon-generalizablesampleof29agencyofficialstolearnabouttheirexperiencescollaboratingwithCSO.WeinterviewedofficialsfromotherStatebureaus,USAID,andDOD—theprimaryagencies

implementingtheU.S.government’sconflictandstabilizationefforts.WefocusedonCSO’scollaborationeffortssince2021sothatofficialscouldproviderecentexamples.Inidentifyingofficialstointerview,wefocusedonCSO’scollaborationwithStateandUSAIDeffortsrelatedtoColombia,Ethiopia,andMozambique.WeselectedthesecountriesonthebasisoftheirgeographicregionandwhethertheyarethelocationofCSOand

interagencyin-countryefforts,amongotherfactors.ToidentifyDODofficials,wefocusedonCSO’scollaborationwiththeOfficeofthe

UndersecretaryofDefenseforPolicyandfourgeographiccombatantcommandswhereCSOhasassignedlong-termadvisors.

9

WeidentifiedandselectedofficialsfromotherStatebureaus,USAID,andDODtoobtainarangeof(1)officesandlocations,(2)topicsof

7GAO,CoastGuard:AdditionalActionsNeededtoImproveCommercialFishingVessel

SafetyEfforts,

GAO-23-105289(

Washington,D.C.:Nov.2,2022).GAO,ExecutiveGuide:EffectivelyImplementingtheGovernmentPerformanceandResultsAct,

GGD-96-118

(Washington,D.C.:June1996)Inthisguide,weidentifiedthreekeystepsandadditionalpracticeswithineachstepthatfederalagenciescanimplementtoimprovetheiroverallperformance.Thestepsandpracticesidentifiedwithinthisguideweredrawnfromourpreviousstudiesofleadingpublicsectororganizationsthatweresuccessfullypursuingmanagementreforminitiativesandbecomingmoreresultsoriented.

8GGD-96-118

andGAO,Evidence-BasedPolicymaking:PracticestoHelpManageand

AssesstheResultsofFederalEfforts,

GAO-23-105460(

Washington,D.C.:July12,2023).

9ThefourgeographiccommandsareU.S.AfricaCommand,U.S.CentralCommand,U.S.EuropeanCommand,andU.S.Indo-PacificCommand.

Page4GAO-24-106238StateDepartment

collaborationwithCSO,and(3)frequencyofcollaborationwithCSO

since2021.Weanalyzedinformationfromtheseinterviewstoidentify

factorsthatfacilitatedorhinderedcollaborationwithCSO.Wealso

comparedofficials’perspectiveswithselectedleadingcollaboration

practicesidentifiedinourpriorwork.

10

OurfindingsarenotgeneralizablebutprovideavarietyofperspectivesonCSO’scollaborativeefforts.

WeinterviewedCSOofficialsforallthreeobjectives.SeeappendixIformoreinformationaboutourscopeandmethodology.

WeconductedthisperformanceauditfromSeptember2022toJune2024inaccordancewithgenerallyacceptedgovernmentauditingstandards.

Thosestandardsrequirethatweplanandperformtheaudittoobtainsufficient,appropriateevidencetoprovideareasonablebasisforour

findingsandconclusionsbasedonourauditobjectives.Webelievethattheevidenceobtainedprovidesareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbasedonourauditobjectives.

Background

U.S.Approachesto

Variouspolicies,laws,andstrategieshaveframedU.S.approachesto

PreventConflictand

preventingconflictandstabilizingconflict-affectedareasovertime.For

StabilizeConflict-Affected

Areas

example:

10Wespecificallyaskedagencyofficialswhetherthefollowingselectedleading

collaborationpracticeswerealignedwiththefactorsthatfacilitatedorhinderedeffectivecollaborationwithCSO:definecommonoutcomes,ensureaccountability,clarifyrolesandresponsibilities,andincluderelevantparticipants.WedeterminedthesepracticeswerethemostrelevanttoCSO’scollaborationeffortsonthebasisofissuesraisedinourpreviousinterviewswithagencyofficialsaboutCSO’scollaboration.Formoreinformationontheseandotherleadingcollaborationpractices,seeGAO,GovernmentPerformance

Management:LeadingPracticestoEnhanceInteragencyCollaborationandAddressCrosscuttingChallenges,

GAO23-105520

(Washington,D.C.:May24,2023).

Page5GAO-24-106238StateDepartment

Stabilization

Stabilizationisapoliticalendeavorinvolving

anintegratedcivilian-militaryprocessto

createconditionswherelocallylegitimate

authoritiesandsystemscanpeaceably

manageconflictandpreventtheresurgenceofviolence.Stabilizationmayincludeeffortstoestablishsecurity,provideaccesstodispute

resolution,delivertargetedbasicservices,andestablishafoundationforthereturnof

displacedpeopleandlonger-termdevelopment.

Source:DepartmentofState,U.S.AgencyforInternational

?StabilizationAssistanceReview.State,USAID,andDODreviewedpaststabilizationeffortsinconflict-affectedareasandissuedthe

StabilizationAssistanceReviewin2018asanewpolicyframeworktoimprovetheeffectivenessofU.S.effortstostabilizeconflict-affectedareas.CSOledthereviewwiththeOfficeofForeignAssistanceonbehalfofState.Thereviewidentifiedprinciplesthatenableeffectivestabilizationefforts,includingsettingrealistic,analyticallybacked

goals;usingdataandevaluationstoassessprogress;anddeployingcivilianstabilizationexpertstoworkwithdeployedmilitaryelements.

?TheElieWieselGenocideandAtrocitiesPreventionActof2018

Development,andDepartmentofDefense,Stabilization

AssistanceReview:AFrameworkforMaximizingthe

EffectivenessofU.S.GovernmentEffortstoStabilizeConflict-AffectedAreas(2018).|GAO-24-106238

(ElieWieselAct).

11

TheElieWieselActbecamelawin2019and

statesitisU.S.policytoregardthepreventionofatrocitiesasinthenationalinterest.

12

InresponsetotheElieWieselAct,the2022U.S.

StrategytoAnticipate,Prevent,andRespondtoAtrocities(Atrocity

PreventionStrategy)outlinesawhole-of-governmentapproachto

prevent,respondto,andrecoverfromatrocities.

13

TheWhiteHouse-ledAtrocityPreventionTaskForce(TaskForce)coordinateswhole-of-governmentatrocitypreventionandresponseefforts,includingthis

strategy’simplementation.

14

NationalSecurityCouncilstaffleadtheTaskForce,whichisanInteragencyPolicyCommitteecomposedofofficialsfromState,USAID,DOD,theDepartmentsofHomeland

Security,Justice,andtheTreasury,theFederalBureauof

Investigation,andtheIntelligenceCommunity.

15

Accordingtothe

AtrocityPreventionStrategy,theTaskForcedirectsitseffortsinupto30prioritycountriesithasidentifiedtobemostatriskforatrocities.

?TheGlobalFragilityActof2019(GFA).

16

TheGFAbecamelawin

2019andstatesitisU.S.policytoseektostabilizeconflict-affected

11Pub.L.No.115-441,132Stat.5586(Jan.14,2019).

12Atrocitiesaredefinedaswarcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,andgenocide,undertheElieWieselAct.

13TheElieWieselActprovidesthatitshallbethepolicyoftheU.S.topursuea

government-widestrategytoidentify,prevent,andrespondtotheriskofatrocities.

14TheTaskForcewasformerlyknownastheAtrocityPreventionBoardandtheAtrocityEarlyWarningTaskForce.

15TheNationalSecurityCouncil’sInteragencyPolicyCommitteesmanagethe

developmentandimplementationofnationalsecuritypoliciesbymultipleU.S.governmentagencies,accordingtoa2021NationalSecurityMemorandum.

16Pub.L.No.116-94,Div.J,TitleV,133Stat.3060(Dec.20,2019).

Page6GAO-24-106238StateDepartment

areasandpreventviolenceandfragilityglobally.

17

TheGFAalso

establishedtwofundsintheU.S.Treasurytosupportsuchefforts.

18

The2020U.S.StrategytoPreventConflictandPromoteStability

(StabilityStrategy)establishesanewframeworkforU.S.governmenteffortstopreventconflict,stabilizeconflict-affectedareas,and

addressglobalfragilityinresponsetotheGFA.

19

This10-year

strategyprovidesanoverarchingconflictpreventionandstabilizationframeworkthatintegratesotherwhole-of-governmentapproaches,

suchastheStabilizationAssistanceReview.Stateistheleadagencyforexecutingthisstrategyandchairsaworking-levelinteragency

secretariatcomposedofState,USAID,andDODofficials.

20

TheU.S.haspartneredwiththefollowingprioritycountriesandregionto

implementthisstrategy:(1)Haiti,(2)Libya,(3)Mozambique,(4)

PapuaNewGuinea,and(5)agroupingofcountriesintheCoastal

WestAfricaregioncomposedofBenin,C?ted’Ivoire,Ghana,Guinea,

andTogo.

U.S.GovernmentState,USAID,andDOD,representingdiplomacy,development,and

Agencies’Rolesdefense(“the3Ds”),respectively,aretheprimaryU.S.agencieswith

17Fragilityreferstoacountry’sorregion’svulnerabilitytoarmedconflict,large-scaleviolence,orotherinstability,includinganinabilitytomanagetransnationalthreatsorsignificantshocks,accordingtotheU.S.StrategytoPreventConflictandPromoteStability.

18GFAestablishedthePreventionandStabilizationFundtobeadministeredbyStateandUSAIDtosupportstabilizationofconflict-affectedareasandtomitigatefragility,includingthroughtheGlobalFragilityStrategy,andauthorizedupto$200millionannuallyforthe

fundforFYs2020through2024.ThisfundreplacedtheReliefandRecoveryFund.GFAalsoestablishedtheComplexCrisesFundtobeadministeredbyUSAIDtosupport

programsandactivitiestopreventorrespondtoemergingorunforeseeneventsoverseas,includingtosupporttheGlobalFragilityStrategy,andauthorized$30millionannuallyforthefundforFYs2020through2024.

19In2020,State,USAID,DOD,andTreasurysubmittedtheStabilityStrategytoCongressinresponsetosection504(a)ofGFA,whichrequiredthedevelopmentofa10-yearGlobalFragilityStrategy.

20TheSecretariatwillprovideadministrativefunctionstoadvancethestrategy’s

implementationundertheguidanceofaseniorlevelSteeringCommittee.ThecommitteeisconvenedbytheNationalSecurityCounciloritsdesigneeandcomprisesState,USAID,DOD,Treasury,andtheOfficeofManagementandBudget,accordingtotheStability

Strategy.

Page7GAO-24-106238StateDepartment

rolesrelatedtoconflictpreventionandstabilization.

21

Table1describestheseagencies’rolesasdescribedintheStabilizationAssistanceReviewandStabilityStrategy.

Table1:PrimaryU.S.GovernmentAgencies’RolesRelatedtoConflictPreventionandStabili