新增航海英語(yǔ)閱讀理解32篇

航海英語(yǔ)閱讀理解32篇

Passage1-1

AnaircraftliftonboardRFAArguswasloadedbeyonditssafeworkingloadof18.4tonnes.Therewereno

injuriestoanypersonnel,ormaterialdamagetotheshiporitsequipment.

Duringaplannedstayinport,500compressedoxygencylinderswererequiredtobelanded.Thesewere

normallystowedonalowerdeckandneededtobetransferredtotheweatherdeckbeforebeingtakenashore.

Beforethevessefsarrivalinport,theplannedoperationwasdiscussedbetweenvariousofficersandseniorratings,

oneofwhomwastosupervisefinaldischargeofthecylindersfromtheship.

Onceinport,aseniorratinggaveinstructionstothreejuniorstotransferanumberofcylinderstotheweather

deck.Hethenleftthemalonetoloadthecylindersontotheplatformofanaircraftlift.Thecylindersweighed

19.95tonnes,whichwasgreaterthantheyhadbeeninstructedtoload.Inadditiontothisexcessweighttheyadded

aforklifttruckweighing5.5tonnes.Theliftwasthenraised.

Whenitreachedtheweatherdeck,theliftwasunabletostowatthecorrectlevel.Wheninvestigateditwas

discoveredthattheloadofbothoxygenbottlesandtheforklifttruckwasgreaterthanitssafeworkingload(SWL)

andthishadpreventedthelockingcleatsattheflightdeck(weatherdeck)engaging.Theliftwastakenoutof

servicefortestingandinspection.

001Thesafeworkingloadoftheaircraftliftistonnes.

A.18.4B.19.95C.5.5D.500

002TheaircraftliftwasoverloadedbyaweightwhichismorethanitsSWL

A.1.55B.3.95C.5.5D.7.05

003Itwasthethathadpreventedthelockingcleatsattheflightdeck(weatherdeck)engaging.

A.forkliftB.cylindersC.overloadedweightD.thethreejuniors

004Itisimpliedinthepassagethat.

A.theliftshouldberaisedslowlytoavoidtheaccident.

B.theaircraftliftonboardRFAArgusshouldbedrivenbysuperpower

C.theseniorratingshouldgiveinstructionsinmoredetailtothethreejuniorstotransferanumberof

cylinderstotheweatherdeck.

D.iftheunloadingoperationwassupervisedbyanofficerwhohassufficientexperienceoftheloads,lifting

equipmentandtheoveralloperation,theaccidentwouldhadbeenavoided.

Passage1-2

TheSwedishdrycargovesselSkagern,afterpartlydischarginghercargoatHull,sailedforhernextport,

Strood,withadraughtof5.95m.Themastersoonrealised,however,thathewouldnotmakethetideforberthing

ifheproceededtotheMedwayasplanned,topickupthepilotattheNorthEastSpit.Hethereforedecidedto

changethepassageplanbyshorteningthedistanceandembarkinghispilotattheSunklightvessel.Theofficeron

watch,the2/O,wastoldtomakethenecessaryadjustmentsandlayoffthenewcourses.

The2/Omadetheoriginalplanbasedonwaypointscalculatedandenteredbyanotherofficer.Thesehadbeen

markedonthevariouschartsandhadalreadybeenenteredintotheGPSnavigator.Whenheamendedthepassage

planheusedtheGPStocalculateanewcoursefromawaypointoffLowestoftdirecttotheSunkpilotstation.In

doingso,hedidn'trealisehehadmissedoutapre-programmedwaypointintheGPSforapositiontotheeastof

theEastShipwashbuoy.

Helaidthenewcourseoffonthetwosmallerscalechartscoveringthatpartofthepassage,butdidn'tnotice

thathiscourselineintersectedthe5mdepthcontourtothewestoftheEastShipwashbuoy.The2/0cameon

watchagainfourhoursbeforethevesselwasduetoarriveatthepilotstation.OnehourbeforearrivalattheSunk,

andnowinthevicinityoftheShipwashBank,the2/0preparedtoembarkthepilot.Itdidnotoccurtohimthat

anythingmightbewrong.Shortlyafterwards,Skagemranagroundatafullspeedof14knots.Althoughtwotugs

weredispatchedfromHarwichtostandby,themasterwasabletode-ballasthisvesselandrefloathersuccessfully

withtheaidofthemainengine.Therewasnopollutionandthereappearedtobenodamage.

005ToembarkthepilotearlierSkagern.

A.speededupB.shortenedthedistancebyadjustingtheplannedpassage

C.madethetideD.engagedtradeeverytwoweeks

006Thegroundingwascausedbythereasonof

A.thesecondofficermissedawaypointwhensteamingtothepilotstation

B.thedeptharoundthepilotstationis5.95mwhichisnotsufficienttoallowthevesseltokeepalwaysafloat

C.theGPShadsomethingwrongwhencalculatingthecourse

D.thevesseldidnotmakethetideduetoherlatearrival

007Thevesselwasrefloated

A.withtheaidofrevertinghermainengine

B.herselfbypumpingoutsomeofherballast

C.withtheaidofhermainengineandthetwotugsfromHarwich

D.withtheaidoftide

008Thelessenofthisaccidentisthat

A.withoutproperplanningoftheballastingandde-ballastingprogrammethevesselislikelytobeinvolved

insuchaccidentasgrounding

B.avesselshouldbewellpreparedforgroundingwhenproceedingtowardpilotstation

C.whengrounded,avesselshouldtrytocontactthenearestcoaststationtoapplyfortheaidoftugs

D.inthisageoftheGPSandpush-buttonnavigation,itisalltooeasytobelulledintoafalsesenseof

securityandassumethepositionindicatediscorrect

Passage1-3

ThetugVegesackwastowingabargeengagedin“stone-fishing“inthevicinityoftheBeachEndbuoyin

HarwichChannel.Tugandtowwerepartofadredgingprogramme.Duringthedredgingcontract,thepractice

wasforthedredgingcraft,Vegesack,tonominatethepassingsideforvessels.Thebargewasdifficulttocontrolin

tidalandtrafficconditions,andthemasterneededtoexerciseconsiderableskillandanticipation,aswellashaving

toliaisecloselywithVTSandpassingvessels.TheGermanmasterhadbeenissuedwithapilotageexemption

certificateandhadbeenoperatinginthechannelfornearlytwomonthsbeforetheincident.

TheferryDanaAngliawasoutboundfromHarwichindaylightandgoodvisibility.Whenshewascloseto

NorthShelfbuoy,VTScalledVegesackandagreedthatVegesack,whowasinthemiddleofthechannel,would

movetothenorthside.ThiswouldenablebothDanaAngliaandBencomo,aninboundvesselcurrentlypassing

No5buoy,topasstothesouth.VTSgavethispassinginformationtothetwovessels.

WhilepassingPlattersbuoy,BencomocalledVegesack,requestinghertomovetothenorth.Vegesacksaid

shewasgoingtomovetotheHarwich(orsouth)side,andinstructedBencomotopasstothenorth.VTSthen

intervenedandconfirmedwithVegesackthatshewantedbothvesselstopasstothenorth.Atthistime,Dana

AngliawasapproachingNorthWestBeachbuoyandcouldseeVegesackheadingsouth,incontraventiontowhat

shehadbeenaskedtodoandhadagreed.

Vegesackthenstartedturningtothenorth.DanaAngliasoundedherwhistleandputherenginestofullastern.

VegesackthenpassedclosedownthestarboardsideofDanaAnglia.

009Vegesackandhertow

A.werelayingstonesintothechanneltomakethenavigationmoresafer

B.werefishinginthechannel

C.werepassingvesselsinthechannel

D.weredredginginthechannelbypicking-upstones

010Itisthethathas,inaccordancewiththepractice,therighttodeterminewhichside

topassforbothinboundandoutboundvessels

A.DanaAngliaB.BencomoC.VTSD.Vegesack

OilThesituationwasthat

A.bothDanaAngliaandBencomowereinbound

B.bothDanaAngliaandBencomowereoutbound

C.DanaAngliawasoutbound,Bencomo,inbound

D.DanaAngliawasinbound,Bencomo,outbound

012Thelessonfromthisaccidentisthat.

A.clarityoflanguageiseverythingatsea

B.DanaAngliashouldproceedinthemiddleofthechannel

C.Vegesackshouldbeawayfromanyinboundandoutboundvessel

D.itisnotnecessaryforVTStointervenewiththecommunicationbetweenvesselsinheavytrafficarea

Passage1-4

IntheearlyhoursofaNovembermorning,thefullyladen42,259gtPanamanianregisteredcontainervessel

AmbassadorBridgewasinboundtotheEnglishChannel,andhadclosedthesouthDevoncoasttoembarkapilot

offBrixham.

Inpreparingtoembarkthepilotattheportsidepilotstationsituatedsome4mabovethewaterline,aseaman

wasdetailedofftorigthepilotladderandstandbytoreceivehim.Hemadearadiocheckwiththebridgewhen

hearrived,butwhenthebridgetriedtocontacthimagainasthepilotboatapproached,therewasnoreply.An

officerwassentdowntoinvestigate.

Thechiefofficerfoundthepilotdoorwideopen,theladderunrigged,watersloshingaroundthestationdeck,

butnosignoftheseamandetailedofftopreparetheladderforembarkation.

Thebodyofaman,lateridentifiedasthedeceasedseaman,wasrecoveredfromtheseasomefourhourslater.

Hewasnotwearingalifejacket.

013AmbassadorBridgewasnot

A.aninboundvesseltotheEnglishchannelB.aPanamanianregisteredcontainervessel

C.inballastD.neartheDevoncoast

014Ofthefollowing,isnotcorrect.

A.thevesselwasreceivingherpilotwhowastocomedownfromthepilotstationwhichwas4mabovethe

sea

B.thedeceaseddidnotrigthepilotladder

C.thedeceasedreportedtothebridgeassoonasheamvedthere

D.thevesselwasreceivingherpilotatportside

015Thebodyofthedeceasedseamanwasrecoveredby

A.theC/OB.thePilotC.asalverD.someonenotmentioned

016Itcanbeconcludedthatthedeceasedseaman

A.worealifejacketbutlostitwhenoverboardintheseaB.committedsuicide

C.droppedintotheseatocatchthepilotladder

D.wasgiveninstructionsindetailbeforebeingsenttohisstation

Passage1-5

WhileberthedalongsideinTenerife,thecruiseshipArcadiawascarryingoutalifeboatdrill.Onelifeboat

wassuccessfullylaunchedandasitwasbeingrecovered,thewinchhoistingitfailed.Thelifeboatwasstill

connectedtothefallsanditdroppedbackintothesea.

Toinvestigatewhathadhappened,thecrewhadtowindthefallsbackontothewinchdrum.Thelifeboatwas

disconnectedwhilethecrewtriedtorestartthewinch.Theywereunsuccessfulbecauseofafaultonthehand

crankcutoutswitch.

Thecrewthenattemptedtowindthefallsbackonusingthehandcrank,butbecauseofthetimeandeffort

involved,thecutoutswitchwasbypassedandpowerrestoredtospeeduptheoperation.Thecrankhandlewasleft

inplace.

Thewinchwasstarted.Itbegantoturnandsotoodidthehandlewhichhitoneofthecrewoverthehead.

Theinvestigationfoundthatthewinchfailedinthefirstplacebecausetheoilusedinthewinchgearboxwas

notonerecommended.Itwastooviscoseandwouldhavepreventedthecouplinglockingmechanismfrom

operatingcorrectly.

017Itwasthefaultonthethatcausedthefailuretorecovertheliftboat

A.crankhandleB.handcrankcutoutswitchC.powersystemD.falls

018Itwasthethathitthecrewmemberonhishead.

A.fallsB.handcrankcutoutswitchC.crankhandleD.winchdrum

019Thecauseoftheaccidentwasthat

A.theoilusedinthewinchgearboxwastooviscose

B.thewinchdrumwasconnectedwiththefalls

C.thelifeboatwastooheavy

D.thebypasstothecutoutswitchwasmisusedbythecrew

020Thelessonfromthisaccidentisthat.

A.seafaringisnotallaboutfacingunforeseensituations

B.itisnotnecessarytowearhardhatstopreventsoreheads

C.thewrongoilcannothaveseriousrepercussions

D.donotstartlifeboatwinchmotorswiththecrankhandleinplace

Passage1-6

Duringthemorningof2August1999thesupplyvesselPutfordWorkerwasworkingcargoatinstallationsin

theNorthSea.Shehadcompletedoperationsatoneinstallationwithoutincident.

At1110sheapproachedthesecondinstallationandcarriedoutprecautionaryengineandsteeringtests.These

weresatisfactory,andat1115thevesselwasinpositiontoworkcargo.Themasterwasonthebridgeatthe

joystickcontrol;theweatherwasfineandtheseacalm.

Thefirstliftwasa10'x8'container.Thedeckcrewattachedthehookoftheinstallation'scranetothe

container,andmovedforwardtoasafeposition.Themasterthennoticedthatthevesselwasmovingforwardout

ofpositionandmovedthejoysticktocounteracttheaheadmovement.Hethensawthattheportpropellerwas

indicatingfullaheadpitch,sochangedfromjoysticktomanualpitchcontrolsandpromptlyputthemtofullastern.

Thisdidnotpreventthevesselmovingaheadsofarthattheattachedcontainerbedraggedoverthesternand

intothesea.Placingthemanualpitchcontrolstozerothencausedbothpropellerstoreturntoneutral.Controlof

thevesselwasregained,andtheproblemdidnotimmediatelyre-occur.Latertestsandinspectionsbyspecialist

controlengineersandthepropellermanufacturersshowednofaultwiththecontrolsystemsortheportpropeller.

However,somewearwasfoundinthefeedbacklinkagesonthecontrolsystemofthestarboardpropeller.This

wasrectified,andmanoeuvringtestscompletedsatisfactorily.

021Inthispassagethesupplyvesselis.

A.onethatsuppliesfueloilstootherdeepseavessels

B.onethatsuppliesstorestootherdeepseavessels

C.atugboatD.smallercontainervessel

022Thejoystickisadevice.

A.controllingruddersB.controllingshorecranes

C.controllingtheoperationofcargoesD.controllingthepropellers

023Onnoticingthatthevesselwasmovingforwardoutofposition,themaster.

A.movedthejoystickforwardtogotogetherwiththeaheadmovement

B.movedtheshorecranetogoaftward

C.madethecontainermoveaftwardbyoperatingthejoystick

D.operatedthejoysticktocontrolthevesselandmoveheraftward

024Itisclearlydemonstratedthat.

A.althoughthetestingofenginesandsteeringbeforeworkingcargoataninstallationfoundnothing,itisan

importantprecaution

B.thetestingofenginesandsteeringbeforeworkingcargoataninstallationwasnotfollowedbyPutford

Worker

C.thereisnovalueofmovingthedeckcrewclearoncealiftisattached

D.hadthedeckcrewnotbotheredtomoveclearfrom,theconsequencescouldhavebeenavoided

Passage1-7

Thecontractofcarriageofgoodsbyseaisusuallyconcludedasbetweentheshipperandthecarrier,either

directlyorthroughtheirrespectiveagents.Consequently,byvirtueofthehistoricprincipleofprivityofcontract,

onlytheshipperandthecarrierhavetherighttotakeactionagainstoneanotherunderthecontractofcarriage.

Theonlyclearexceptiontotherulewaswherethepartyhavingtherighttosueassignedthatrightundera

separateagreementtoanotherparty.Ontheotherhand,whengoodsaresold(astheytypicallyare)priorto

shipment,thetermsofsalegenerallyresultintheriskinthegoodspassingfromtheseller(theshipper)tothe

buyer(theconsigneeorendorsee,inthecaseofabilloflading,orthepartyentitledtotakedeliveryundera

waybill)whenthegoodscrosstheship'srailintheportofloading.Therefore,althoughthelawrecognizesthatthe

shipperalonehastherighttosuethecarrierincontractforsubsequentcargolossordamageoccurringwhilethe

carrierhadchargeoftheshipment,theshipperisnotusuallythepartywhoactuallysuffersthatloss.Frequently,

also,dependingonthetermsofsale,theshipperwillnolongerbetheownerofthegoodsatthetimewhenthe

lossordamageoccurs,andsowillbeunabletosuethecarrierintort.

025Thecontractofcarriageofgoodsbyseaisusuallyconcludedasbetween.

A.thesellerandthebuyerB.theshipperandtheconsigneeorendorsee

C.thecarrierandtheconsigneeorendorseeD.theshipperandthecarrier

026Whengoodsaresoldpriortoshipmenttheriskinthegoodspasses.

A.fromtheshippertothecarrierB.fromthesellertothebuyer

C.fromthecarriertotheshipperD.fromthebuyertotheseller

027Itisconcludedthatonlytheshipperandthecarrierhavetherighttotakeactionagainstoneanother

underthecontractofcarriage.

A.bymaritimelawsB.byamainstayofthecommonlawinparticular

C.byvirtueofthehistoricprincipleofprivityofcontractD.byshippingpractice

028Whengoodsaresoldpriortoshipmenttheshipper.

A.isnotusuallythepartywhoactuallysuffersthesubsequentloss

B.isusuallythepartywhoactuallysuffersthesubsequentloss

C.willstillbetheownerofthegoodsatthetimewhenthelossordamageoccurs

D.willberesponsibleforthelossofordamagetothecargoheshipped

Passage1-8

The56000gtOBOvesselHyphestosarrivedattheoilterminalinMalmo,Sweden,ataboutnoonon16

March1998.Visibilitywasabout1mile,therewasnowindandthecurrentwasminimal.Withanexperienced

pilotandhisapprenticepilotembarked,andthreetugsinattendance,Hyphestosenteredthebasin.Theintention

wastostoptheship,swingofftheberthandgoportsideto,withthebowpointingseawards.Thevesselwas

relativelylargeforthesizeofthebasin.

Theship'sbridgestaffconsistedofthemaster,secondofficer,ahelmsmanandadeckhand,whenentering

harbour.Therewerenotechnicalorlanguagedifficulties.OnceHyphestoshadstoppedofftheberth,theswing

wasstartedwiththeheadtugpullingthebowtostarboard,andthetractortugaftpullingthesterntoport.Athird

tugpushedonthestarboardquarter.Towardstheendofthemanoeuvre,thesterntugfoundherselfveryclosetoa

buoymarkingthefairway,andindangerofdamaginghertowingcable.Herskipperinformedthepilotofthe

problem,andwastoldtoslackenthecableand"followalong'1.Hewastoldtoawaitfurtherorders.

Withtheturnnearlycomplete,Hyphestoswascantedtowardsthejettyatanangleofabout45°andthebow

some200moffit.Toclosethedistance,thepilotordered"deadslowaheadH.For"technical'*reasonsthemaster

interpretedthisas“slowahead".Shebegantomoveaheadandthespeedbegantobuildup.Thebowtug

meanwhilecontinuedtopullahead,andbythetimethevesselwassome40-50moffthejetty,andstillheadingfor

it,Hyphestoswasmakinggoodabout2knots.Thepredicamentwasrealised,asternpropulsionwasordered,the

aheadtugchangedherdirectionoftowtobroadonthestarboardbow.Thestemtugwhichwasstill"following

along",wasorderedtopullthestemroundtoport.Nothinghappened.Theheadwaywastoogreat,andHyphestos

rammedthejettyandtwoshorecranes.

029Hyphestosoriginallyintendedtoberth.

A.starboardsidealongsidewithherbowpointingseaward

B.starboardsidealongsidewithherbowpointinginward

C.portsidealongsidewithherbowpointinginward

D.portsidealongsidewithherbowpointingseaward

030Thereasonthatthemasterinterpreted"deadslowahead"as"slowahead"wasprobablythat.

A.hedidnotunderstandthepilot'slanguageproperly

B.hedidnotbelievethepilot'sordersatthatparticularmoment

C.hesufferedaheavystresswhenhandlingsuchabigvesselintoasmallerbasin

D.heintendedtocauseanaccidenttoteachthepilotalessen

031Theskipperisa.

A.captainB.C/OC.pilotD.helmsman

032Itcanbeconcludedthattherewerepersonsonthebridgewhentheaccidentoccurs.

A.4B.5C.6D.7

Passage1-9

SealandMercury,a49,985gtcontainershipof292minlengthandmaximumdraught12.5m,sailedfrom

TrinityContainerTerminal,Felixstowe,at1343.Thetidewasflooding.Lowwaterhadbeenat1104;theheightof

tidewasnow1.8m.Shehadtwotugsmadefast,oneonherstarboardbowandanotherthroughhercentreleadaft.

Thevisibilitywasnotgoodandhadrecentlydeterioratedtoabout0.3miles.Apilotwasonboard.

DuetothepoorvisibilityandinaccordancewithHarwichHavenAuthorityguidelines,thedutyVTS

managerhadclosedupafogwatchpilotintheVTScentre.Othervesselmovementswereadjustedsothat

SealandMercury*spassagetoseawasunimpeded.

At1406shepassedNorthShelfbuoyandwasheading152°withherenginespropellingatdeadslowahead.

Shehadalreadybegunaslowturntostarboardhavingappliedstarboardhelmatabout1403whentheheadinghad

been137°.Theforwardtughadbeenletgobuttheafteroneremainedattached.Visibilityhadfurtherdeteriorated

toabout0.2miles.

At1408,knowingthatthevesselwasnotturningquicklyenough,thepilotorderedslowaheadand,soon

afterwards,halfahead.SealandMercurycontinuedtoturntooslowly,leftthedeepwaterchannelandprobably

firsttouchedbottomatabout1410.Theengineswereincreasedtofullaheadat1411inafinalattempttosteerthe

vesseltostarboardandoutofdanger.Withlittleornounderkeelclearancethiswasunsuccessfulandat1413she

cametoastophardagroundabout0.1milefromFortbuoywiththeship'shead190°.Thevesselwastowedback

intothechannelat1610whenthetidehadrisensufficiently.Subsequentinspectionsrevealedthatshehadnot

beendamaged.

033SealandMercuryassistedbytwotugs,.

A.oneonherstarboardaftandanotherthroughhercentreleadforward

B.oneonherportbowandanotherthroughhercentreleadforward

C.oneonherportbowandanotherthroughhercentreleadaft

D.oneonherstarboardbowandanotherthroughhercentreleadaft

034VTSmanagerhadusedsucheffortsasadjustingothervesselmovements.

A.tocleartheseapassageforSealandMercury

B.toimpedeSealandMercuryfromgoingoutwardinfog

C.nottoimpedethetugsfromassistingSealandMercury

D.toassistSealandMercurytospeedupwhenshewasmakingtheturn

035VTSfogwatchpilotis.

A.anautopilotemployedtocontrolthetrafficaroundthestationB.apilotusedatthestation

C.amanagerD.adeviceforcontrollingtheinwardandoutwardtraffic

036isnotthelessenfromthisaccident.

A.Thelimitationsoftheassistingtugsinfogmustbeconsidered.

B.Vesselsshouldconsiderdelayingtheiroutwardpassageintheeventofimminentdensefog.

C.ManoeuvringlargevesselsinpoorvisibilityrequiresadetailedknowledgeofthevesseFshandling

characteristics

D.Largecoursealterationsbasedonradarobservationofachannelbuoyinpoorvisibilitydoesnottendto

resultin"overshoot1'duetodelayedactioninputtingthehelmover

Passage1-10

Atabout0854onthe9March1999,the9.96mfishingvesselBeverleyAnnIIcollidedwiththeLiberian

registeredCypressPass,a42,447gtvehicleearner.Thewindwaseast-north-eastforce4to5withvisibilityat1to

2milesbutlessinsqualls.

CypressPasswasonpassagefromAmsterdamtotheRiverTyne,andmakinggoodaspeedof15.7knotson

acourseof302°assheapproachedheranchorageofftheNorthumberlandcoast.Themaster,thirdofficeranda

lookoutmannedthebridge,andpreparationswerebeingmadetoanchor.Theenginewasonbridgecontroland

theautomaticpilotengaged.

Thetwinhulled,GRP(glassreinforcedproducts)constructed,BeverleyAnnII,crewedbytheskipperanda

deckhand,wastrawlinginaneast-south-eastdirectionatjustover2knots.Theskippersawanechoappearonthe

edgeofhisradarscreenatarangeofabout3miles.Soonafterwardshesawaverylargeshipappearoutofthe

murkonhisstarboardbowheadingtowardshim.Awarethathewasindangerofbeingrundown,hestopped,and

thenreversedhistwoengines,butwasunabletoavoidcollidingwiththeportbowofthelargervessel.Itwasa

glancingblowandcausedsomeminordamage.

TheskipperofBeverleyAnnIIcalledthecoastguardonVHFradiototellthemoftheincident,andthen

calledtheship.

ThebridgeteamofCypressPasshadbeentotallyunawareoftheentireincident.

037PriortotheaccidentCypressPass*senginewas.

A.ondeadslowaheadB.stoppedC.onbridgecontrolD.engagedbyautopilot

038CypressPassdidnotdetectBeverleyAnnIIonheradar,becausethelatteris.

A.GRPconstructedB.twinhulledC.crewedbytheskipperandadeckhandD.fishing

039BeverleyAnnIIisa.

A.vehiclecarrierB.fishingboatC.coasterD.riverboat

040Accordingtothepassage,isnotcorrect.

A.Havingassessedthatriskofcollisionexists,askippershouldbearinmindthattheothervesselmightnot

havedetectedhisown.

B.Whenanothervesselisdetectedonradar,especiallyascloseas3miles,theinstinctivereactionshouldbe,

mustbe,toestablishwhetherriskofcollisionexists.

C.Themorenoticeafishingvesselskippercanhaveofanapproachingvesselthemorelikelyheistoavoida

closequartersencounter.

D.TheofficersandthelookoutinCypressPasshadseenthefishingvesseleitheronradarorvisually,but

theyfailedtotakeanyactionforthepreventionofthecollision.

Passage1-11

The32,500gtcontainervesselCapBlancowasinmid-AtlanticonpassagefromEuropewhen,at1855,the

automaticfirealarmsystemactivatedshowingafireintheaccommodationon"C"deck.Immediateinvestigation

foundafireinthecook'scabin.Theventilationtothatareawasstopped,with"C"deck,"D"deckaboveand^'B',

deckbelowelectricallyisolated.At1903,afirepartycomprisingthechiefofficer,cadet,andAB,allwearing

self-containedbreathingapparatus(SCBA)becauseofthethicksmoke,tackledthefire.Itwasextinguished

withinaminuteusingtwoportableextinguishers;onewaterandtheotherCO2.Ventilationwasthenrestartedto

cleartheareaofsmoketoallowthecausetobeinvestigated.Decks"D"and"B"werecheckedforhotspotsanda

headcounttakenofthecrew;theywereallfoundsafe.Afirecheck