歐洲央行-破產(chǎn)中的公司重組與勞動分配（英）

EUROPEANCENTRALBANK

EUROSYSTEM

WorkingPaperSeries

DianaBonfim,GilNogueiraCorporatereorganizationandthereallocationoflaborinbankruptcy

No2974

Disclaimer:ThispapershouldnotbereportedasrepresentingtheviewsoftheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB).TheviewsexpressedarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheECB.

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Abstract

Weanalyzehowcorporatereorganizationandliquidationchangelaborreallocationduring

bankruptcyusingrandomizedjudgeassignmentsandlinkedPortugueseemployer-employeeandfirmdata.Reorganizationreducesthenegativeeffectofbankruptcyonemployeeearnings,evenwithmostworkersleavingreorganizedfirms.Weexamineplausiblemechanismsandfindevidencethattheretentionofgeneralskillsandimprovedjob-matchqualitycontributemean-ingfullytothiseffect.Theaveragecostoflabormisallocationcausedbyreorganizationissmall.However,forsomeworkersintheleastproductivefilers,thiscostcanbelarge,outweighingtheeffectonearnings.

JELcodes:G33,G38,J24,J63,K39

Keywords:corporatereorganization,bankruptcy

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Non-technicalsummary

Whenafirmgoesthroughabankruptcyprocedure,theworkersofthefirmwillinevitablybeaffected.However,theconsequencesofsuchproceduresforworkersmaywidelydifferdependingonthedesignoftheprocess.Forinstance,corporatereorganizationmayyieldoutcomesthatdifferfromthoseofliquidation.However,empiricallyidentifyingthedifferencesinworkeroutcomesbetweenthetwoproceduresisnotstraightforward.

Weanalysetheseimplicationsempirically,usingcorporatereorganizationfilingsfromPortugalbetween2012and2016,alongwithadministrativeemployer-employeeandfirmdata.Thissettingoffersuniqueadvantages.Theemployer-employeedataallowustotrackworkersfromfirmsthatfileforreorganizationwhentheymovetootherjobs.FirmdatacoversallfirmsoperatinginPortugal,includingprivatefirmsandfirmsinnon-manufacturingsectors.Linkingemployer-employeeandfirmdataallowsustoexaminetheeffectofreorganizationonearnings,andtostudyhowreorganizationaffectsthereallocationofworkerstofirmswithdifferentlevelsofprofitabilityandproductivity.

Thechoicebetweenreorganizationandliquidationisnotrandom,implyingthatexternalfactorsmightcreateaspuriousrelationshipbetweenreorganizationandlabouroutcomes.Weaddressthisproblembyexploringtherandomallocationofreorganizationcasestojudgesinthesamecourt,followingtheliteratureonrandomjudgeallocation.Byexploringthefactthatjudgeshavedifferentcharacteristics,withsomebeingmorelenientthanothers,theirrandomallocationtocasesallowsforthecausalidentificationoftherelationshipbetweenreorganizationandlabouroutcomes.

Wefindthatreorganizationhasamaterialeffectonjobtransitionsbecauseitchangeswhenandhowworkersleavetheirjobs,whencomparedtoliquidation.Workersfromreorganizedfirmstakeonaverageoneyearmorethanworkersfromliquidatedfirmstoleavetheirjobs.Fiveyearsafterthefiling,reorganizedfirmsonlykeepabout20%oftheirworkforce.Additionally,reorganizationreducestheprobabilityoflayoffby37percentagepointsandincreasestheprobabilitythatworkersquitby9percentagepoints.Reorganizationreducesearningslossesincomparisontoliquidation,evenafterworkersfromliquidatedfirmsfindnewjobs.Weprovideevidencethatreorganizationimprovesearningsbothforworkerswhostayinreorganizedfirmsandforworkerswholeavefornewemployers,comparedtotheliquidationcounterfactual.

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Afterdocumentingthisfact,weexaminethemainmechanismsthatpotentiallydeterminework-ers’earningsandassesshowthesemechanismsinfluencetherelationshipbetweenreorganization,liquidation,andearnings.First,weanalysetheroleofhumancapital.Weshowthatfirm-specificskillshavealimitedimpactontherelationshipbetweenreorganizationonearnings,whereasgen-eralskillshaveasignificantimpact.Second,weinvestigatetherelationshipbetweentheimpactofreorganizationonearnings,jobmatchquality,andbargainingdynamics.Reorganizationimprovesmatchingbyallocatingworkerstojobsatfirmsandoccupationscharacterizedbyhigheraverageearnings.Thiseffectarisesatleastpartiallyfromtheeffectofreorganizationontransitionstonewjobs,sincereorganizationincreasestheprobabilitythatworkersmovetonewemployerswithhighaverageearnings.Ouranalysisdoesnotyieldsubstantialevidencesupportingthenotionthatbargainingpowercontributestoexplainingtheinfluenceofreorganizationonearnings.

Policiesthatpromotefirmcontinuation,suchasreorganization,mightleadtoaninefficientallocationofresources.Weprovideevidencethatreorganizedfirmsarelessprofitableandhavelowerlabourgapsthanthefirmswhereworkerswholeavereorganizedfirmsareemployed.Theeffectofreorganizationonlabourreallocationisnotunequivocallypositiveandprovidesevidenceofpotentiallyexcessiveretentioninreorganizedfirms.

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1Introduction

Inthispaperweanalyzetherelationshipbetweencorporatereorganizationandlaborreallocationinthecontextofbankruptcyproceedings.Whereasexistingresearchstudiestheimpactofreor-ganizationandliquidationoncreditclaimsandassetallocation(e.g.,Str?mberg(2000),Bernsteinetal.(2019b),Antill(2022)),laborreallocationfollowsdifferentdynamicsfortworeasons.First,unlikeassets,workersaccumulatehumancapital(Becker(2009)).Second,firmslacktheabilitytocontractonthehumancapitalofworkers(Titman(1984),HartandMoore(1994)),butcancontractonassetownership.Creditorsdonotcontrolworkers’humancapital,whichmeansthatworkersfrombankruptfirmsarefreetowithdrawtheirhumancapitaltootherfirms.Therefore,creditorshavenoincentivetoconsidertheeffectofchoosingreorganizationinsteadofliquidationonworkeroutcomesbecausetheycannotcapturetheworkerbenefitsofchoosingoneoutcomeovertheother.Incontrast,physicalassetsareincludedinthebankruptcyestateandtheproceedsfromtheirsaleareusedtoreimbursecreditors.Thisdifferenceintroducesuniqueimplicationsforlaborreallocationdynamicswithincorporatebankruptcydecisions.

Weanalyzetheseimplicationsempirically,usingcorporatereorganizationfilingsfromPortugalbetween2012and2016,alongwithadministrativeemployer-employeeandfirmdata.Thissettingoffersuniqueadvantages.Theemployer-employeedataallowustotrackworkersfromfirmsthatfileforreorganizationwhentheymovetootherjobs.FirmdatacoversallfirmsoperatinginPortugal,includingprivatefirmsandfirmsinnon-manufacturingsectors.Linkingemployer-employeeandfirmdataallowsustoexaminetheeffectofreorganizationonearnings,andtostudyhowreorganizationaffectsthereallocationofworkerstofirmswithdifferentlevelsofprofitabilityandproductivity.

Thechoicebetweenreorganizationandliquidationisnotrandom,implyingthatexternalfactorsmightcreateaspuriousrelationshipbetweenreorganizationandlaboroutcomes.Weaddressthisproblembyexploringtherandomallocationofreorganizationcasestojudgesinthesamecourt,followingtheliteratureonrandomjudgeallocation(e.g.,ChangandSchoar(2013),Bernsteinetal.

(2019a),Bernsteinetal.(2019b),Antill(2022)).

Reorganizationhasamaterialeffectonjobtransitionsbecauseitchangeswhenandhowworkersleavetheirjobs,whencomparedtoliquidation.Wemeasuretheeffectofreorganizationonlabor

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reallocationinafive-yearwindowafterthefiling.Workersfromreorganizedfirmstakeonaverageoneyearmorethanworkersfromliquidatedfirmstoleavetheirjobs.Fiveyearsafterthefiling,reorganizedfirmsonlykeepabout20%oftheirworkforce.Additionally,reorganizationreducestheprobabilityoflayoffby37percentagepointsandincreasestheprobabilitythatworkersquitby9percentagepoints.Reorganizationreducesearningslossesincomparisontoliquidation,evenafterworkersfromliquidatedfirmsfindnewjobs.Bythelastyearoftheanalysis,reorganizationreducesearningslossesby20%inthebaseline,withestimatesrangingfrom12%to22%underdifferentassumptions.Theintensivemargin,i.e.,workersfromreorganizedfirmshavinghigher-payingjobsthanworkersfromliquidatedfirms,explains14percentagepointsofthebaselineeffect.Weprovideevidencethatreorganizationimprovesearningsbothforworkerswhostayinreorganizedfirmsandforworkerswholeavefornewemployers,comparedtotheliquidationcounterfactual.

Afterdocumentingthisfact,weexaminethemainmechanismsthatpotentiallydeterminework-ers’earningsandassesshowthesemechanismsinfluencetherelationshipbetweenreorganization,liquidation,andearnings.Westartbyanalyzingtheroleofhumancapital.Followingthesemi-nalworkbyBecker(2009),wedistinguishbetweenfirm-specifichumancapitalandgeneralhumancapital.First,thepositiveeffectonlaboroutcomescouldresultfromthevaluationoffirm-specifichumancapitalwithinandoutsidethefirm.Byworkingatthesameemployerforalongperiodoftime,workersacquireskillsthatcannotbetransferredtonewjobs.Whileliquidationrendersfirm-specifichumancapitalvalueless,reorganizationcanpreserveitscontinuationvalue.Second,thevaluationofgeneralhumancapitalmayalsocontributetoexplainingtheresults.Skilledworkersaremorelikelytoleavedistressedfirms(Baghaietal.(2021)),andmanagersneedtoofferhigherearningstoretainthem.Atthesametime,workerswithhighgeneralhumancapital,suchashighlyeducatedindividuals,areonaveragemoreproductive(Becker(2009)),therebymakingthemmorevaluabletothereorganizedfirm.Outsideofthefirm,thereallocationofworkerstolower-qualityjobsleadstoskilldepreciation(Burdettetal.(2020)),possiblycausingpersistentearningslosses.Weprovideevidencethatfirm-specificskillshavealimitedimpactontherelationshipbetweenreorganizationonearnings,whereasgeneralskillshaveasignificantimpact.

Touncovertheroleofhumancapital,weanalyzetherelationshipbetweenworkercharacteristics,

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theprobabilitythatreorganizedfirmsretainworkers,andearningsgrowthwithinreorganizedfirmsafterthefiling.Tenureatthefirm,anindicatoroffirm-specificskills(Topel(1991)),isthefactorthatismoststronglyassociatedwithretentioninreorganizedfirms.However,workerswithlongertenureatthefirmdonothavehigherearningsgrowth.Additionally,wefindstrongevidencefortheeffectofreorganizationonearningsamongworkerswithshortemploymenttenure.

Weobservetheoppositerelationshipwitheducation,acommonlyusedproxyforgeneralskills(e.g.,LiseandPostel-Vinay(2020)).Educationisnotameaningfuldeterminantofretentioninreorganizedfirms.However,highlyeducatedworkershavehigherearningsgrowththanotherworkersinreorganizedfirms.Thisevidenceisconsistentwithreorganizedfirmsneedingtocompensatetheseskillstoretainworkersafterthefiling.Additionally,weprovideevidencethatreorganizationreducestransitionstolow-skilloccupationsandincreasestransitionstohigh-payingjobsforhigh-skillworkers,whichisconsistentwithlowerskilldepreciation.Overall,weobserveastrongrelationshipbetweenreorganizationandearningsforhigh-skillworkers,butnotforlow-skillworkers.

Job-matchqualityandbargainingaretwokeydeterminantsofearningsinlabormarkets(Roger-sonetal.(2005))thatpotentiallyaffecttherelationshipbetweenreorganizationandearnings.Duetosearchfrictions,reorganizationmightimprovejob-matchqualitybysubstitutingjobsearchduringunemploymentwithon-the-jobsearch,providingworkersmoretimetofindhigh-qualitymatches.Reorganizationmayalsograntworkersincreasedbargainingpower.Ifworkershaveaccesstoajobinthereorganizedfirm,theypossessanoutsideoption,empoweringthemwhennegotiatingwithemployers.

WeadaptthemethodologyemployedbyNekoeiandWeber(2017)toinvestigatetherelationshipbetweentheimpactofreorganizationonearnings,jobmatchquality,andbargainingdynamics.Weutilizeaverageearningsatboththefirmandoccupationlevelsasindicatorsofmatchquality,whilethedifferencebetweenaworker’searningsandtheseaveragesservesasaproxyforbargainingpower.Reorganizationimprovesmatchingbyallocatingworkerstojobsatfirmsandoccupationscharacterizedbyhigheraverageearnings.Thiseffectarisesatleastpartiallyfromtheeffectofreorganizationontransitionstonewjobs,sincereorganizationincreasestheprobabilitythatworkersmovetonewemployerswithhighaverageearnings.

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Weleveragetheexistenceofheterogeneityintermsofjobsearchfrictionstoruleoutexternalfactors,beyondbetterjobmatches,thatcouldexplainhigherearnings.Weusethenumberofworkersperoccupationandregion(labormarketthickness)asaproxyforsearchfrictions,sinceoneshouldexpecttoseefewjobpostingsforrareoccupations.Theeffectsofreorganizationonearnings,ontheprobabilitythatworkerstransitiontohigh-payingjobsinnewemployers,andonjobmatchqualityareparticularlylargeforworkersinlabormarketswithstrongsearchfrictions.Weseparatetheeffectofsearchfrictionsfromtheeffectsoflowdemandbyusingoutsideemploymentoptionsasaproxyfordemand.Wefindevidencethatreorganizationalsohasastrongeffectonlabormarketswithlowdemand.Nonetheless,theproxiesforsearchfrictionsanddemandhavenegativebutsmallcorrelation.

Ouranalysisdoesnotyieldsubstantialevidencesupportingthenotionthatbargainingpowercontributestoexplainingtheinfluenceofreorganizationonearnings.Theseresultsonbargainingpowerareconsistentwithourpreviousfindings,asreorganizedfirmsoftenlayoffalargeportionoftheirworkforce,makingitimpossibletostayinreorganizedfirmsformanyworkers.

Policiesthatpromotefirmcontinuationmightleadtoaninefficientallocationofresources(e.g.,Caballeroetal.(2008)).Sincereorganizationisapolicythatpromotesfirmcontinuation,weusefirmdatatoassesswhetherreorganizationcreatesatrade-offbetweenhigherearningsandexcessivefirmcontinuation.WeconsidertheretentionofworkersinfirmswithlowEBITDA/assetsratioandlowlaborgaps(thedifferencebetweenthemarginalrevenueproductoflaborandthecostofhiringoneadditionalworker)asindicatorsofexcessivefirmcontinuation.Thisisatentativepartialequilibriumanalysis,asitdoesnotconsideradditionalimpactssuchasaggregatedemandorcompetitioneffects.

Weprovideevidenceofpotentiallyexcessiveretentioninreorganizedfirms.TheaverageEBITDA/assetsandlaborgapofreorganizedfirmsgraduallyincreasesafterthefiling.However,firmsemploying

workerswholeavereorganizedfirmshave,onaverage,higherEBITDA/assetsandlaborgaps.Lever-agingonthefactthatearningsandthelaborgapcanbeexpressedinthesamecurrencyunits,wecomputethebenefit-to-costratioofreorganization.Forthewholesample,reorganizationhasapositive,large,andstatisticallysignificanteffectonearningsandanegativebutstatisticallyin-

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significanteffectonthelaborgap.Thebenefit-to-costratiois4.47.However,thereisconsiderableheterogeneityacrosssubsamples.Forsomeworkers,thecostofbeingallocatedtofirmswithsmallerlaborgapsoutweighsthebenefitofhigherearnings.Forexample,costsoutweighbenefitsforwork-erswithlessthanhighschool(lowgeneralskills),labormarketthicknessatorabovethemedian(lowsearchfrictions),andsmallpre-filinglaborgaps(ex-antelowproductivity).

Thepapercontributesprimarilytotheliteratureontheimpactofbankruptcyanddistressonlaboroutcomes.ThecloseststudiesarebyAraújoetal.(2023)andGrahametal.(2023).1WhileGrahametal.(2023)findthatworkersaffectedbybankruptcyhavelowerearningsthancomparableunaffectedworkers,Araújoetal.(2023)findthatemployeesinbankruptfirmswithpro-continuationbias(duetoreorganization,dismissalofliquidationcases,automaticstays,anddeadlineextensions)experiencelowerpost-bankruptcyearnings.Inoursetting,reorganizationalsoleadstofirmcontinuation,butunlikeAraújoetal.(2023),whoattributethenegativeearningseffecttoimperfectinformationandadjustmentcosts,wefindapositiveeffect.Thispapermakesthreekeycontributionstotheexistingliterature.First,weanalyzethemechanismsunderlyingthepositiveearningseffectofreorganization,focusingonhumancapital,jobmatchquality,andbar-gainingpower.Second,weisolatethepureeffectofreorganizationfromotherfactorslikeautomaticstaysbycomparingitsimpactonlaboroutcomestothatofliquidation.Finally,wemakeuseofcomprehensivefirmdataencompassingpublicandprivatefirmsoperatinginbothmanufacturingandnon-manufacturingsectors.Thisallowsustoanalyzefirmprofitability,resourcemisallocation,andthebenefitsandcostsoflaborreallocation,whichislackinginmostexistingstudies.

Thepaperestablisheskeydifferencesbetweencorporatereorganizationandjobdisplacement(e.g.,Jacobsonetal.(1993),Neal(1995),Robinson(2018),Raposoetal.(2019),Burdettetal.(2020),andJarosch(2023)).Thedisplacementliteraturetypicallycomparesoutcomesforsepa-ratedworkers(thosewholosetheirjobs)withoutcomesforworkerswhoremaininthesamefirmorforworkerswhoareemployedinotherfirms.Inoursetting,reorganizationdiffersfrompuredisplacementintwokeyways.First,itactsasafinancialshockthataffectsfirmoperationsby

influencinghowworkerstransitiontonewemployers.Thisleadstodistinctoutcomesforworkers

1Otherstudiesonlabormarkets,corporatebankruptcy,anddistressincludeBrownandMatsa(2016),Bertonetal.(2018),Babina(2020),Baghaietal.(2021),andGrindakeretal.(2021).

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fromreorganizedfirmsandliquidatedfirms,evenwithinthegroupofseparatedworkers.Second,reorganizationsignificantlytransformsthefirm,changingemploymentconditionsforretainedwork-ersinwaysthatpuredisplacementdoesnot.Therefore,themechanismsthatexplaintheeffectofreorganizationonworkeroutcomesdifferfundamentallyfromthemechanismsthatexplaintheeffectofdisplacement.

Theremainderofthepaperisstructuredasfollows.Section2describestheinstitutionalfeaturesofthePortuguesebankruptcysystem.Section3liststhedatasetsusedintheanalysisandprovidesdescriptivestatistics.Section4developstheempiricalstrategy.Section5reportstheresults,withSection6formingtheconclusion.

2ThePortuguesebankruptcysystem

Acrossmostlegalsystems,reorganizationandliquidationarethetwoproceduresthatregulatebankruptcy(Djankovetal.(2008)).2Withliquidation,thecourtsystemliquidatesassetsanddistributestheproceedstoclaimantsaccordingtoalegallyestablishedpriorityschedule.Withreorganization,firmsnegotiatethereallocationofresourceswithcreditors.Whereasfirmsmayshedalargeportionoftheirlaborandcapital,reorganizationseekstokeepfirmsopen.

In2012,PortugueselawmakersintroducedthePortuguesecorporatereorganizationsystemthatweanalyzeinthispaper.Weprovideabriefexplanationofthesysteminthissection.SectionAoftheInternetAppendixdiscussesthehistoricalbackgroundandprovidesamoredetailedexplana-tion.Figure1outlinesthereorganizationprocess.Onlyfirms(debtors)mayfileforreorganizationinPortugal.Firmsmustfilepetitionswheretheyareheadquarteredorengageinmostoftheirbusiness.Theyhavethreemonthstoagreeuponareorganizationplanwithamajorityofcred-itors.Casesarerandomlyassignedtojudgeswhoworkinthesamecourt.Judgesinterveneinthereorganizationprocesstorecognizecreditorclaimsandtoacceptorrejectreorganizationplans.Bankruptcymanagersoverseenegotiationsbetweenfirmsandcreditorswithouttheinterventionof

thejudge.Judgesinterveneonlyoncetoapproveorrejectreorganizationplans.Bankruptcyregu-

2Somecountrieshaveseparatelawsthatregulatethetransmissionofestablishmentsorfirmsasagoingconcerntonewowners.InPortugal,theliquidationprocesssubsumestheseprocedures.

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lationsgivejudgesconsiderableleewaytorejectreorganizationplans,suchasforviolationsofcourtprocedureorbecauseatleastonecreditorisconsiderablyworseoffonaccountofreorganization.Ifthereorganizationfilingisunsuccessful,thenthecasemightbedismissedorconvertedintoaliquidationcase.Ifthecaseisdismissed,thenthefirmoperatesasagoingconcern.Firmscannotsubmitnewplansafteranunsuccessfulfilingfortwoyears.

3Data

WegatherdataonbankruptcyfilingsfromCitius,arepositoryofcourtdocumentsmaintainedbythePortuguesegovernment.InSectionAoftheInternetAppendixweprovidemoredetailsabouttheprocessusedtocollectandtreatthedata,datacoverage,andvariabledefinitions.

Weusefilingsbetween2012and2016andcourtdocumentsbetween2012and2018,covering

6,680cases.Thedatasetcontainsthecasesofotherinstitutionssuchasfirmswithoutemployees,trusts,independentworkers,households,associations,andcondominiums.Eventhoughthesecasesarenotinthesample,weusethemtoestimatethetendencyofjudgestoacceptreorganizationplans.

Weusefirm-leveldatafromSistemadeContasInegradasdasEmpresas(SCIE),auniversalandcompulsoryfirmcensusperformedannuallybyBancodePortugal,theMinistryofFinance,theMinistryofJustice,andStatisticsPortugal.ThisdatasetcontainscompletefinancialstatementsforallactivefirmsinPortugal.Weuseannualdatabetween2008and2018.

WeobtainworkerdatafromQuadrosdePessoal,anemployer-employeematcheddatasetmain-tainedbythePortugueseMinistryofSocialSecurity,between2008and2018.ThisdatasetcoversallemployersregulatedbythePortugueselaborcodewithatleastoneemployeeinOctober,thereferencedateoftheadministrativedataset.QuadrosdePessoalprovidesinformationonworkerssuchasearnings,education,occupations,andhierarchies.WedefinethesevariablesinSectionBoftheInternetAppendix.

QuadrosdePessoaldoesnotcovertheuniverseofjobsinPortugal.Specifically,itdoesnotcoverindependentworkerswhoarenotownersoffirmswithatleastoneemployeeandcoversgovernmentworkersonlypartially.Additionally,thedatasetonlyprovidesemployeeearnings.Therefore,it

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providesemploymentdata,butnotearningsdataforemployers,furloughedworkers,andworkersonleave.InSection5weboundestimates,consideringothersourcesofearnings,andthepossibilitythatworkersswitchtounobservedjobs.Forthatpurpose,weuseInquéritoaoEmprego(LaborForceSurvey),anemploymentsurvey,toestimatethepercentageofjobsnotreportedinthesample,andInquéritoàsCondi??esdeVidaeRendimento(StatisticsonIncomeandLivingConditions),asurveyonlivingconditions,toestimateearningsforthesejobs.Moreover,weusefirmdatafromSCIEtoestimateearningsforemployersanddatafrompreviousyearsforfurloughedworkersandworkersonleave.WeprovidemoreinformationaboutthesedatasetsandabouttheprocedureusedtoestimateemploymentandearningsinSectionC.1oftheInternetAppendix.

Wedetectreportinggapsintheemployer-employeematcheddataset.First,somefirmsdonotsubmitdatatoQuadrosdePessoalinthelastperiodbeforethefiling(9%ofallobservations),possiblybecausetheyareclosedinthefollowingyear,whentheyshouldsubmitemployeerecords.Additionally,somefirmsfailtoreportworkerdataafterthefilingbutreporthavingmorethan100workersintheirfinancialstatements(1%ofallobservations).WediscusstheproceduresusedtoaddressthesereportinggapsinSectionC.1oftheInternetAppendix.

WecomplementtheanalysiswithinformationfromtheOccupationalInformationalNetwork(O*NET),asurveyofoccupationcharacteristics.Withthisdata,andadaptingtheprocedureemp