股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)

股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)(文檔含中英文對(duì)照即英文原文和中文翻譯)原文：SOEExecs:GetReadyForStockIncentivesTANWEIStockoptionincentiveplanwillsoonbeavailabletostate-ownedenterpriseexecutives,butwillitleadtogreaterprosperityornewproblems?Atrailblazingnewschemetoinfusestate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)withincentivestockoptionsisunderway.It’saplanthatmaybolstercompanyperformance,butit’snotwithoutrisks.OnAugust15,LiRongrong,MinisteroftheState-ownedAssetsSupervisionandAdministrationCommission(SASAC),disclosedthataftercarefulstudy,astockoptionincentivetrialplanwillbecarriedoutinthelistedSOEs.Accordingtothetrialplan,about102A-sharelistedSOEsareexpectedtobethetrialcompanies.Theshortlistofsomeofthoseexpectingtoparticipateincludes:ChinaUnicom,CiticGroup,KweichowMoutai,ChinaMerchantsBankandBeijingFinancialStreetHoldingCo.Stockoptionincentiveplanisdesignedtoenticeexecutivestoworkhardforthelong-termdevelopmentoftheircompanies.Asstocksrisebasedoncompanyperformance,theytoogainthroughthisprofitsharingarrangement.Thiskindofincentiveplanispopularinforeigncountries,especiallyintheUnitedStates,wherestockoptionscanaccountforashighas70percentofaCEO’sincome.Further,manyeconomistsbelievethestockoptionincentiveplanoptimizescorporategovernancestructure,improvemanagementefficiencyandenhancecorporatecompetitiveness.Ontheotherhand,aftertheMeasuresontheAdministrationofStockIncentivePlansofListedCompanieswasissuedearlythisyear,someofthecompaniesturnedouttohavemisusedtheincentivestockoptions.Theresultwasinsiderdealings,performancemanipulationaswellasamanipulationofthecompanystockprice.“Althoughthestockoptionincentiveschemeisafrequentlyusedtooltoencouragetopmanagement,itcouldalsobeadouble-edgedswordespeciallyinanimmaturemarketeconomy,”Lisaid.TheSASACisthereforetakingacautiousapproach,placingexplicitrequirementsoncorporategovernance,thetargetandextentoftheincentivemeasures,Liadded.Listatedthattheoverseas-listedSOEswouldbethefirstfewcompaniesthatwillimplementthemechanismbecauseoftheirsoundmanagementstructureandlaw-abidingnature.ThenthedomesticlistedSOEswillhavethechancetoembraceincentivestockoptions,whichwouldbepromotedifthetrialresultsweregood.Executiveface-liftAsformorethan900listedSOEs,thepersonnelstructureoftheboardsofdirectorswillprobablyfacesubstantialchange.That’sbecausetheplanstatesthatifthestockoptionincentivemechanismisgoingtobeimplementedinlistedSOEs,externaldirectorsshouldaccountforhalfoftheboardofdirectors.Thetrialplanintroducedtheconceptofexternaldirectorsforthefirsttime.TheexternaldirectorshouldbelegallyrecommendedbydirectorsoflistedSOEs,andshouldnotbeworkinginthelistedSOEsorinaholdingcompany,saidtheplan.However,currently,mostofboardsofdirectorsoflistedSOEsarenotincompliancewiththerequirement.Theyhavetoreadjustthestructureofboardofdirectorstofitinwiththenewmechanism.“FormostoftheSOEswhicharelistedintheA-sharemarket,theirboardsofdirectorsaremadeupofnon-externaldirectorsandindependentdirectors,whichmeansthatapartfromindependentdirectors,membersofboardofdirectorsareallworkingforthelistedcompanyorforthelargeshareholder,”saidZhuYongmin,aneconomistwiththeCentralUniversityofFinanceandEconomics.“Ifthestockoptionincentivemechanismistobecarriedoutinthosecompanies,alarge-scalerestructuringofboardofdirectorsisunavoidableandexternaldirectorsmustbeintroducedintotheboard.”ChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommission(CSRC)stipulatesthatanindependentdirectorisonewhodoesn’tholdanotherofficebeyondhisjobasadirector,andhasnosuchrelationswithmajorshareholderthatwouldinterferewiththeexerciseofindependentandobjectivejudgment.“Currently,theindependentdirectorsoflistedcompaniescanbecategorizedasexternaldirectors,”Zhusaid.“However,thedefinitionofexternaldirectorismuchbroaderthanindependentdirector.Thosewhoworkforacompanywhichhasbusinesstieswithalistedcompany,thoughtheydonotmeettherequirementsofbeinganindependentdirector,butcanbeconsideredanexternaldirector.”Additionally,thetrialplanalsostipulatesthatthesalarycommitteeoflistedSOEsthatexercisethestockoptionincentivemechanismshouldbecomposedofexternaldirectors.However,formostofthelistedcompanies,therearestillnon-externaldirectors.Asaresult,aconsiderablenumberoflistedSOEsneedtotransformtheirsalarycommitteetofulfilltheprerequisitesofthestockoptionincentivemechanism.Avoidingover-compensationOver-compensationissomethingthatthetrialstockplanistryingtoavoidaswell.Therefore,thetrialplanstatesthatdomesticlistedSOEs’executivesshouldreceivenomorethan30percentoftheirtotalsalary(includingoptionsanddividends).Butasfortheoverseas-listedSOEs,themaximumincentiveis40percentofthetargetsalary.Thetrialplanalsofixesthevolumeofincentivestockoptions.Thetrialplanstatesthatthevolumeofincentivestockoptionsshouldbefixedinaccordancewiththescaleofthelistedcompanyandthenumberofincentiveobjectives.Thenumberofshareallocatedmaynotexceed10percentofthecompany’stotalsharecapitalandnolessthan0.1percent.Infact,BeijingReviewwasinformedbytheCSRCthatsome20listedSOEsalsobeganexploringstockoptionincentiveschemesinthefirsthalfofthisyear.ButnoneofthemreceivedapprovalfromtheCSRCbecausetheirschemesrevealedsharpcontrastwiththetrialplanintermsofthescaleofincentivestockoptionsoffered.Results-orientedUnderthetrialplan,betterperformanceisamusttoobtainstockprivileges.ThenumberofincentivestockoptionsthatseniorexecutivesinlistedSOEscangetdependsontheirannualperformance.Iftheycannotfulfillthetargetedobjectives,thelistedcompanymayhavetherighttotakebacktheincentivethestockoptionsorpurchasethembackatthepriceatwhichtheyweresoldtotheexecutives.ZhuYongminnotedthatthestockoptionincentiveplanisnotinvariable.Thedirectorsoflistedcompanies,seniorexecutives,andcoretechnologicalandmanagementpersonnelmaynotgetthetargetstockoptionsiftheyfailtoachieveasatisfactoryperformance.NofreebiesForsure,statestockswon’tbegiventoexecutivesforfree,underthetrialplan.“Thestatestockshaveprices,”Zhengsaid.“Iftheywerepaidtoseniorexecutivesforfreeinthenameofincentivestocks,itisequaltoalossofstateassets.Toelaborate,theincentivestocksshouldbetheincrementofstocksthatareearnedbytheexecutivesforlistedSOEsaftertheimplementationofthetrialplan,andshouldnotbepreviousstockinventory.Inshort,thepastispast.Onlyfuturestockincreasescanbeusedasincentivestocks.”Further,“TheincentivestocksshouldnotbepaidonlybytheSASAC,whichisthelargestshareholderofallthecentralSOEs,”saidZhengPeimin,ChairmanofShanghaiRealizeInvestmentConsultingCo.,whotookpartindraftingthetrialplan,.“Theincentiveplanshouldbeajointactionofallshareholdersofacompanyandtheyshouldshoulderthesameresponsibilityandenjoyequalbenefit.”Already,shareholderspayforsalariesofdirectors,seniorexecutivesandtechnologymanagementstaff.“Theincentivestocksshouldalsobepaidbyallshareholders.”Zhengsaid.“Forinstance,ifthegovernment,orastateownedenterprise,holds60percentofalistedSOE,theyshouldonlypay60percentoftheincentivestocksand40percentshouldbepaidbyothershareholders.”譯文：國(guó)有企業(yè)高管：準(zhǔn)備迎接股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃譚衛(wèi)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃將很快應(yīng)用于國(guó)有企業(yè)管理人員，但這會(huì)帶來(lái)更大的繁榮，還是新的問(wèn)題？一個(gè)開創(chuàng)性的計(jì)劃正被引入——國(guó)有企業(yè)正在實(shí)施股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃，它可能會(huì)增強(qiáng)公司業(yè)績(jī)，但它并非沒(méi)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。8月15日，國(guó)資委部長(zhǎng)李蓉蓉透露，經(jīng)過(guò)仔細(xì)研究，股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃將要在上市國(guó)有企業(yè)試行。根據(jù)計(jì)劃，約有102家A股上市國(guó)有企業(yè)將要參與此計(jì)劃，包括：中國(guó)聯(lián)通，中信集團(tuán)，貴州茅臺(tái)，中國(guó)招商銀行和北京金融街控股股份有限公司。期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃致力于吸引企業(yè)管理人員專注于他們公司的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展。由于股票價(jià)格是在公司業(yè)績(jī)提高的基礎(chǔ)上上升的，他們也通過(guò)此來(lái)做工作安排。這種激勵(lì)計(jì)劃在國(guó)外很受歡迎，特別是在美國(guó)，那里的股票期權(quán)可以占到首席執(zhí)行官的收入的高達(dá)百分之七十之多。此外，許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，股??票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃有助于優(yōu)化公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，提高管理效率，增強(qiáng)公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。另一方面，在實(shí)施上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃管理的初期，竟然發(fā)現(xiàn)一些公司誤用激勵(lì)股票期權(quán)。其結(jié)果導(dǎo)致內(nèi)幕交易，惡意操縱該公司的股票價(jià)格?！半m然股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃是一個(gè)經(jīng)常使用的工具，但是它亦可以被稱為一把雙刃劍，尤其是在一個(gè)不成熟的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制之下。”李蓉蓉說(shuō)。因此，國(guó)資委采取謹(jǐn)慎的態(tài)度，對(duì)于實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的企業(yè)，在企業(yè)管治，目標(biāo)和獎(jiǎng)懲措施的范圍等方面提出了明確的要求，李蓉蓉補(bǔ)充說(shuō)。李指出，因?yàn)楹Ｍ馍鲜械膰?guó)有企業(yè)有可靠的管理體制和健全的法律機(jī)制，所以他們將是為數(shù)不多的幾家將實(shí)現(xiàn)此股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的公司，這一現(xiàn)象也遵從了自然規(guī)律。其后，如果他們的試行被證明是有效地，在國(guó)內(nèi)上市的國(guó)有企業(yè)將有機(jī)會(huì)實(shí)施期權(quán)激勵(lì)。整頓管理層對(duì)于上市的900多個(gè)國(guó)有企業(yè)，董事局的人員結(jié)構(gòu)可能將要面臨實(shí)質(zhì)的變化。這是因?yàn)樵撚?jì)劃規(guī)定，如果上市公司預(yù)期實(shí)施期權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制，外部董事應(yīng)當(dāng)占上市國(guó)有企業(yè)董事會(huì)全部董事人數(shù)的一半。在該次計(jì)劃的試行中，首次引入了外部董事這一概念。該計(jì)劃規(guī)定，外部董事應(yīng)當(dāng)由上市國(guó)有企業(yè)的董事通過(guò)合法程序推薦，而不應(yīng)在上市國(guó)有企業(yè)或控股公司工作。但是目前，大多數(shù)上市國(guó)有企業(yè)的董事會(huì)并不符合規(guī)定。他們必須重新調(diào)整董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)，以適應(yīng)新的機(jī)制要求?！皩?duì)于大多數(shù)在A股市場(chǎng)上市的國(guó)有企業(yè)，其董事會(huì)都是由非外部董事和獨(dú)立董事組成，這意味著，除了獨(dú)立董事，董事會(huì)成員都為上市公司工作，并且持股比例很大?！敝醒胴?cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家朱永敏說(shuō)?！叭绻善逼跈?quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制在這些公司中實(shí)施，大規(guī)模改組董事會(huì)是不可避免的，外部董事必須加入其中?！敝袊?guó)證券監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)（證監(jiān)會(huì)）規(guī)定，獨(dú)立董事是指，不在上市公司擔(dān)任除董事外的其他職務(wù)，并與其所受聘的上市公司及其主要股東不存在可能妨礙其進(jìn)行獨(dú)立客觀判斷關(guān)系的董事?！澳壳?，上市公司的獨(dú)立董事可歸類為外部董事，”朱永敏說(shuō)，“然而，外部董事的定義比獨(dú)立董事更廣泛。有些董事為某其他公司工作，而且此公司與上市公司存在業(yè)務(wù)聯(lián)系，雖然他們不符合