被安全化的美國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)政策研究報告

2022NO.6(總第56期)復(fù)旦發(fā)展研究院復(fù)旦大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間國際治理研究基地復(fù)旦大學(xué)國家發(fā)展與智能治理綜合實驗室被安全化的美國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)政策研究報告2 1 1 3 5 6 8 10 15 16（二）中美戰(zhàn)略競爭被“簡單化”，美國將半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)塑造為對華戰(zhàn)略競爭的 20 26 28 29（二）美國在半導(dǎo)體聯(lián)盟中的影響力，不足以促使盟伴在“美國優(yōu)先”的前提 31（三）拜登政府對華半導(dǎo)體制造能力“過度封鎖”的傾向，不符合盟友及設(shè)備 33 351代化之外，美國開始逐步防范中國科技企業(yè)所謂的“網(wǎng)絡(luò)間諜”與“網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊”戰(zhàn)略競爭的框架下，進一步明確將“美國對華的科技優(yōu)勢”納入了“國家安全”濃縮成為一個對華安全競爭的符號，以能夠在國內(nèi)外發(fā)揮政治動員的杠桿作用，動政府更好的完成美國自身特定戰(zhàn)略資源的整合和完善。由此，“半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)”眼下，拜登政府的半導(dǎo)體戰(zhàn)略呈現(xiàn)出“弱他”與“自強”并重的“兩面性”2今天的美國已經(jīng)不具備三十年前的曾經(jīng)擁有過的壓倒性的國家實力與戰(zhàn)略3知以及預(yù)期塑造方面的效果最終難以實質(zhì)性的2.中美戰(zhàn)略競爭帶來的霸權(quán)地位失落誘發(fā)的國家安全焦慮加劇了美國在認(rèn)4加“簡單化”的認(rèn)定只要通過一系列政策就能在較短時間內(nèi)以較低成本“成功”5的深度嵌套，使得美國完全復(fù)制對蘇冷戰(zhàn)策略變得不可能。保障美國經(jīng)濟增速，6（JohnNegroponte）在向參議院情報特別委員會（SenateSelectCommitteeOn1“RicewarnsChinaoverbuildupofi/nation-world/rice-warns-china-over-buildup-of-its-2JohnNegroponte,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligencefortheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,February2,2006./files20060202_testimony.pdf3QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport,February6,2006./Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2006.pdf?ver=2014-06-7??4“RevisionsandClarificationofExportandReexportControlsforthePeople'sRepublicofChina(PRC);NewAuthorizationValidatedEnd-User;RevisionofImportCertificateandPRCEnd-UserStatementRequirements,”FederalRegister,June192007./docevisions-and-clarification-of-export-and-reexport-controls-for-the-peoples-republic-of-c5EvanMedeirosetal.,ANewDirectionn,2005),pp.217-218.6“N.S.A.BreachedChineseServersSe014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-per7MichaelMcConnell,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheIntelligenceCommunrvicesCommittee,27February2008./files/documents/Newsrstimony.pdf8斷增加。82011年10月，美國國家反間諜執(zhí)行局（OfficeoftheNational美國知識產(chǎn)權(quán)與經(jīng)濟利益，對國家安全最具“侵略性”的經(jīng)濟間諜（economic市場的持續(xù)滲透，并加強關(guān)注中國電信企業(yè)的不公平貿(mào)易行為。118DennisBlair,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheIntelligenceCoCommittee,10March2009.https://wwwpdf9/sites/default/files/article/attachments/us-counterintelligence-2011-foreign-spies-stealing-us-economic-secrets-cyberspace.pdf10/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20120216_SASC%20Final%20Unclassified%20-%202012%20ATA%20SFR.pdf;/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/2013_03_12_SSCI_Worldwide_Threat_Assessment.pdf;/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_SSCI_29_Jan.pdf;/files/documentASC_FINAL.pdf;/files/documents/SASC_11MikeRogers,DutchRuppersberger,“InvestigativeReportontheU.S.NationalSecurityIssuesPosedbyChineseTelecommunicationsCompaniesHuaweiandZTE,”Washington,D/sites//files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative%20report%20(final).pdf9“先入為主、絕不信任、有罪推定”的原則，并呈現(xiàn)出“嚴(yán)密監(jiān)13BruceEinhorn,“Huawei’sBusinessDealFlo14“CommitteeonForeignInvestmentintheUnitedStates(CFIUS)ConcernsCausePartiestoAbandonTransaction,”July72010./insights/publications/committee-on-foreign-iin-the-united-states-cfius-concerns-cause-parties-to-abandon-transaction-july-7-15“MotorolasuesHuaweifortradesecrettheft,”July222010./article/us-motorola-huawei-idUSTRE66L017“StatementbythePressSecretaryonH.R.933”,March26,2013.https://obamawhitehouse.archivesthe-press-office/2013/03/26/statement-press-secreta技術(shù)系統(tǒng)。18 戰(zhàn)略視閾下的中美關(guān)系日益消極，20而美國國內(nèi)對華科技實力及相關(guān)企 冷戰(zhàn)后對華實施流動策略所期待的。21即，結(jié)束對華戰(zhàn)略接觸以及放棄“塑造”18/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/933/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22HR933%22%2C%22HR933%22%5D19TheWhiteHouse,NationalSecurityStrategy,February2015,p.4.https://nssarchive.us/wp-contds/2020/04/2015.pdf.21DanBlumenthal,“TheThreeWaysWeGetChinaandItsNeighborsWrong,”htorg/articles/danblumenthal/three-ways-get-china-neighbors-wrong/;SteinRingen,“HowtheWestgotChinawrong,”/comment/insight-opinion/article/2023935/how-west-got-china-wrong些進展也為我們的對手提供了新的軍事能力……物聯(lián)網(wǎng)（IoT）正在將數(shù)十億的仍然是經(jīng)濟和軍事的核心，但由于技術(shù)高原和其他國家的投資，新一代半導(dǎo)體并稱中國通過網(wǎng)絡(luò)間諜及其他惡意行為竊取美國的專有技術(shù)和早期階段的創(chuàng)新一方面，調(diào)整美國出口管制體系，對中國整體性地擴大管制物項的范圍。foundationaltechnologies）的出口管制，旨在補充被美國政府認(rèn)為對國家安全至22DanielCoats,StatementfortheRecordWorldwideThretySenateArmedServicesCommittee,May23,2017./f23FederalRegister/Vol.82,No.163/Thursday,August24,2017./sites/dcement/301Investigations/FRN%20China301.pdf24TheWhiteHouse,NationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,December2017,p.25,http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2017.pdf.2550U.S.C.§4817(a)(b);ECRA§1758(a)(26“BISAnnouncesReviewofEmergingTechnologyControlsandSeeksPublicComment,”Novermber20,2018./bis-announces-review-of-emerging-technology-controls-and-s27/documents/2018/11/19/2018-25221/reviewhnologies28/documents/2019/05/23/2019-10778/implementation-of-certain-new-controls-on-emerging-technologies-agreed-at-wassenaar-arr29/documents/2020/06/17/2020-11625/implementation-of-the-february-2020-australia-group-intersessional-decisions-addition-30/documents/2020/10/05/2020-18334/implementation-of-certain-new-controls-on-emerging-technologies-agreed-at-wassenaar-arr業(yè)與安全局除了將38家華為的附屬公司列入節(jié)點（包括極紫外光技術(shù)）的產(chǎn)品或技術(shù)。35進入美國的國防電信網(wǎng)絡(luò);36而2018年8月，其簽署的“2019財年國防授權(quán)法”31/documents/2019/05/21/2019-10616/addition-o32/documents/2019/08/21/2019-17921/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-l33U.S.DepartmentofCommerc,“CommerceAddressesHuawei’sEffortstoUndermineEntityList,ctsProductsDesignedandProducedwithU.S.Technologies,”https://2017-2021./news/press-releases/2020/05/commerce-addresses-huaweis-efforts-undermine-entity-list-restr34U.S.DepartmentofCommerc,“CommerceDepartmentFurtherRestrictsHuaweilogyandAddsAnother38AffiliatestotheEntityList,”https://2017-2021./news/press-rels/2020/08/commerce-department-further-restricts-huawei-access-us-technology-a35/documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-entry-on-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-36/bill/115th-congress/housebill/2810?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22FY2018+NDAA%22%2C%22FY2018%22%2C%22NDAA%22%5D%7D&InvestmentRiskReviewModernizationActof2018）的通過，也委員會（CFIUS）的管轄權(quán)限，要求對中美之間涉及關(guān)鍵技術(shù)、關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、委員會以數(shù)據(jù)安全為由，阻止螞蟻金服收購美國金融科技公司速匯金普專門發(fā)布了兩道行政命令，也是以國家安全為由，禁止美國公司或個人與37/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22FY2018+NDAA%22%2C%22FY2018%22%2C%22NDAA%22%5D%7D&s=1&38“CFIUSBlocksAlibaba’sAttemptedAcquisitionofMoneyGram,CitingDataSafetyConcerns,”January2,2018./cfius-blocks-alibabas-attempted-acquisition-moneygram-citing-data-saf39“HowGrindrbecameanationalsecurityissue,”March28,2019.https://www.reuters.r-m-a-beijingkunlun-idUSKCN40https://2017-2021./the-clean-network/index.ht41/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/addressing-the-threat-posedaking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency;/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17700/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-wechat-and-taking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency而今，拜登政府繼承了特朗普執(zhí)政時期美國在關(guān)鍵與新興技術(shù)領(lǐng)域?qū)θA的打壓與強化美國本土產(chǎn)業(yè)基礎(chǔ)、供應(yīng)鏈韌性等政策目標(biāo)相互捆綁、并行推進。（whole-of-governmentapproach）評估關(guān)IPP評論》2022年8月。https://m43TheWhiteHouse,“Biden-HarrisAdministrationAnnouncesSupplyChainDisruptionsTaskForcetoAddressShort-TermSupplyChainDiscontinuities,”/briefies/2021/06/08/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-supply-chain-disruptions-task-force-to-address-short-term-supply-chain-disconti44TheWhiteHouse,“Biden-HarrisAdministrationAnnouncesSupplyChainDisruptionsTaskForcetoAddressShort-TermSupplyChainDiscontinuities,”/briefies/2021/06/08/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-supply-chain-disruptions-task-force-to-address-short-term-supply-chain-disconti45TheWhiteHouse,“TheBiden-HarrisPlantoRevitalizeAmericanManufacturingandSecupplyChainsin2022,”/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/24/the-biden-harris-plan-to-revitalize-american-manufacturing-and-secure-critical-supply-chains-in-2022/脅迫的有力支撐。（一）中美戰(zhàn)略競爭加速了美國對半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的“安全化”46數(shù)字經(jīng)濟涉及數(shù)字產(chǎn)業(yè)化、產(chǎn)業(yè)數(shù)字化兩大部分。前者涉及電子信息制造業(yè)、信息通信業(yè)、互節(jié)點主要依賴單一區(qū)域來源的供應(yīng)。例如，硅片（Siliconwafers）、光刻膠與集成器件制造商（IDM）更是合計占全球半導(dǎo)體銷售份額的近一半。47但是，47芯片類型的供應(yīng)商有三類：集設(shè)計、制造、封裝和市場銷售為一體的公司，為集成器件制造商（IDM為其他芯片供應(yīng)商制造電路芯片，稱為代工廠（Foundry做設(shè)計和晶圓市場的公司，其從晶圓工廠購買ces/global-wafer-capacity/report-contents/.te-of-the-u-s-semiconductor-indu50“STRENGTHENINGTHEGLOBALSEMICONDUCSIA./strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-sup/51CRS,U.S.SemiconductorManufacturing:IndustryTrends,GlobalCompetition,Federa/product/pd52DepartmentofDefense,DefenseScienceBoardTaskForceonHighPerformanceMicrochipSupply,December2005,pp.96./sti/pdfs/ADA435563.pdf53KirstenBaldwin,PolicyPerspective:TheCurrentandProposedSecurityFramework,DepartmentofDe54KristenBaldwin,Long-TermStrategyforDODAssuredMicroelectronicsNeedsandInnovationforionalEconomicCompetitiveness,DOD,October24,2018,p.19.https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudap/ndia/2018/systems/Wed_21335_Baldwin55/strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-chai56技術(shù)革命浪潮的增長效能由其在連接+能源+材料三重維度的技術(shù)變遷及其所形成的凈創(chuàng)造效應(yīng)所決定。在每一輪技術(shù)革命浪潮中，最先實現(xiàn)信息+能源+材料三重維度協(xié)同“合奏”的國家，則會成為新57TheWhiteHouse,“NationalStrategyforCriticalandEmergingTechnologies,”https://trumpwhitehouse./wp-content/uploads/2020/10/National-Strategy-for-C58NSTC,“CRITICALANDEMERGINGTECHNOLOGIESLISTUPD/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Upda59PCAST,EnsuringLong-TermU.S.LeadershipinSemiconductors/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_ensuring_long-term_us_leadership_in_semiconductors.pdf60CRS,Semiconductors:U.S.Industry,GlobalCompeti/product/pdf作為其總統(tǒng)任期的基石。62而美國對全球半導(dǎo)體供應(yīng)鏈及半導(dǎo)體對新一輪技術(shù)創(chuàng)新與產(chǎn)業(yè)變革的非凡價值，在這四大因素的共同促使62JosephBiden,“WhyAmericaMustLeadAgain–RescuingU.S.ForeignPolicyAfterTrump,”http://deutsch-chinesisches-forum.de/images/thinktank/20201114/Why%20America%20Must%20Lead%20Agai63美國在芯片核心技術(shù)和高端研發(fā)的控制、對主要半導(dǎo)體企業(yè)融資渠道和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)美國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的條款，在后續(xù)“2021美國創(chuàng)新與競爭法案”（UnitedStates64/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3832?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22S.22%2C%22S.%22%2C%223832%22%5D%7D&s=3&r=6；/bill/116th-congresbill/6978?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr6978%22%2C%22hr6978%22%5D%7D&s=4&65track.u66track.u67/bill/116th-cCHIPSforAmerica億美元給“美國勞動力與教育芯片基金”（CHIPSforAmericaWorkforceand若將拜登政府強化對華半導(dǎo)體制造技術(shù)的封鎖視為維持美國既有的“控制68track.us/拜登政府試圖將半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)部署在具有相同價值觀的“友好國Manufacturing,andFosterin美國應(yīng)深化與盟友、伙伴的合作，共同塑造一個彈性的半導(dǎo)體供應(yīng)鏈。69體戰(zhàn)略利益的半導(dǎo)體供應(yīng)鏈體系，而非以商業(yè)利益最大化為原則重塑半導(dǎo)體供69/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf拜登與七國集團（G7）領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人宣布啟動“全球基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和投資伙伴關(guān)系”71TheWhiteHouse,“ADeclarationfortheFutureoftheInternet,”/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Declaration-for-the-Future-for-the-Internet_Launch-Event-Signing-Version72/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/26/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-formally-launch-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and73/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-stralia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnersh74/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/quad-principles-on-technology-design-development-governance-an75/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-le76/documents/2022/04/06/2022-07211/request-for-public-comments-on-supply-chain-issues-to-support-the-us-eu-trade-and-technology-council#:~:text=With%20regard%20to%20semiconductors%2C%20on%20September%2029%2C%202021%2C,the%20supply%20chain%20through%20diversification%20an77WIPO,“GlobalInnovationIndex2021,”/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2021/cn.puary2022./files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2鉤給中美戰(zhàn)略互動造成的附帶損害。79拜登政府認(rèn)為，美國需要可以對杠桿，讓美國贏得時間采取力所能及的措施確保其技術(shù)的領(lǐng)先。79SammSacks,“China:ChallengestoU.S.Commerce,”/s9ED0E-7D00-4DDC-998E-B99B2D80/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf81JonBateman,U.S.—ChinaTechnological“Decoupling”:AStrategyandPolicypril25,2022./2022/04/25/u.s.-china-technological-decoupling-strategy-and-policy-framework-pub-86897半導(dǎo)體技術(shù)封鎖，以顯示自身依舊對華具有相當(dāng)?shù)膽?zhàn)際合作這五個方面的共同努力。83從目前的路徑看，美國主要是通過聯(lián)邦撥款，83GAO,SemiconductorSupplyChain:PolicyConsiderationsfromSelectedExpertsforReducingRisksandMitigatingShortages,Jul26,2022./products/ga84/strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-ch85/nistpubs/SpecialPubli86/publications/reports/rewire-semiconductors-and-u-間，美國所有行業(yè)的先進制造業(yè)工作崗位在私營部門中的比例從7.5%下降到的則是從事設(shè)計、研發(fā)工作的半導(dǎo)體工程師。拜登政府將美國的盟友、伙伴視為最大的戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)，并著力通過“陣營化”87/News/Releases/Release/Article/2472854/dod-releases-industrial-ca88/sites/default/files/2022-02/ICT%20Supply%20Chain%20Report_2.pdf89WillHunt,RemcoZwetsloot,TheChipmakers:U.S.StrengthsandPrioritiesforductorWorkforce,September2020./wp-contenters-SIA-slides41-Read-Only.p連開工，該項目包括建設(shè)一座新的晶圓工廠。對于美國正著手組建的“CHIP4”勞。臺積電前法務(wù)長、現(xiàn)美國科技企業(yè)Nantero獨立董事杜東佑（RichardL米及以下半導(dǎo)體制造設(shè)備的基礎(chǔ)上，美國將限制出口的技術(shù)范圍上升至生產(chǎn)1490Chi-hungWei,