斯洛文尼亞后私有化時(shí)代的管理層持股與公司業(yè)績(jī)文獻(xiàn)翻譯

PAGE原文：ManagerialOwnershipandCorporatePerformanceinSlovenianPost-PrivatizationPeriodAbstractWhileSlovenianpost-privatizationperiodhasbeencharacterizedbyadeclineintheownershipofthenon-managerialowners(employees),managershavebeenincreasingtheircontrol.Moreover,giventhattheoptimalownershipstake(asstatedbythemanagers)intheyear2002exceededtheiractualshareby10.8percentagepoints,weexpectthemanagerstocontinueconsolidatingtheirownershipalsointhefuture.TheaimofourpaperistodescribethemaintrendsintheownershipofSloveniancorporationsinthepost-privatizationperiodandtoprovideananswertothebasiceconomicquestion:whatistheinfluenceoftheongoingconsolidationofmanagerialownershipontheperformanceofSlovenianfirms.Theempiricalanalysistestingthisrelationshipisbasedonapanelof182Slovenianfirmsintheperiod1995-99anddoesnotproviderelevantevidenceonpositiveeffectsoftheincreasingmanagerialcontrolontheperformanceofSlovenianfirms.Ifany,positiveincentiveeffectisobservedonlyinthefirmswithmanagers’holdingsexceeding10-percent,onlywithregardstofirmfinancialperformance(butnottotalfactorproductivity)andonlyinfirmsthatarenotlistedonthecapitalmarket.Furthermore,thenegativeeffectofthecurrentgapbetweentheoptimalandactualmanagerialownershipseemstoprevailoveranypositiveincentiveeffectarisingoutofmanagerialownership.IntroductionTheincreasingmanagerialownership,apartfromthereductionintheownershipofState-controlledfundsandemployees,representoneofthemainfeaturesthatcharacterizetheownershipchangesintheSlovenianpost-privatizationperiod.Mostprominentaretheincreasesinmanagerialstakesinnon-listedfirms,inwhichthetransferofownershiprealizesatrelativelylowpricesandmostlyremainpubliclyundisclosed.Moreover,giventhatSlovenianmanagersstillclaimtobeunsatisfiedwiththeircurrentownershipstakes(attheendof2002theoptimalownershipstakeofanaverageSlovenianmanagerexceededhisactualownershipstakeby10.8percentagepoints),weexpecttheobservedtrendsintheevolutionoftheownershipandcontrolofSloveniancorporationstocontinueinthesamedirectionalsothefuture.TheaccumulationofownershipinthehandsofmanagersisfurthermotivatedbytherelativelylowtransparencyoftheownershiptransfersinSlovenia.Inanycase,itisnottheaimofthispapertodiscussthefairnessoftheobservedredistributionoftheprivatizedcapital,neithertodealwiththeimportanceofsuchredistributionforthepreservationofthedomesticownership，butrathertoprovideananswertothebasiceconomicquestion,namelytodeterminetheimpactoftheobservedincreasesinthemanagerialownershipontheperformanceofSlovenianfirms.Westartinthesecondsectionwithanoverviewofthemanagerialownershipasacorporategovernancemechanisminthedevelopedmarketeconomies.ThirdsectionprovidesfurtherevidenceontheroleofthemanagerialandinsiderownershipintransitioneconomiesandespeciallyinSlovenia(section4).FifthsectionstatesthemainhypothesesontheinfluenceofthemanagerialownershiponfirmperformanceinSlovenia.Themainempiricalmodelsunderlyingtheanalysisoftherelationbetweenmanagerialownershipandfirmeconomicefficiencyandfinancialperformancearepresentedinthesixthsection.Thelastsectionstatesthemainempiricalresultsandconcludes.ManagerialownershipasacorporategovernancemechanismBlockholdingsrepresentoneofthemainfactorsofdistinctionbetweentheinsider(ContinentalEuropean)andoutsider(Anglo-Saxon)systemsofcorporategovernance.WhiletheownershipandcontrolstructureofmostofthecorporationslistedintheUnitedKingdomandintheUnitedStatesstillmostlyreflectthetypicalBerleandMeanscorporationandthemarketforcorporatecontroloneofthemainmechanismsalleviatingtheconflictofinterestsbetweenthemanagers(agents)andowners(principal),largeblockholdersintheContinentalEuropegaincontrolovertheiragentsthroughconcentratingtheirownershipandvotingrights.Inanycase,blockholderscanbefoundintheoutsidergovernancesystemaswell.Forexample,halfofthefirmslistedontheNewYorkandNASDAQStockExchangesonaveragehavethreeshareholderswithatleast5percentownershipblocks.However,onthecontrarytotheContinentalEurope,institutionalinvestorsorboardmembersholdmostoftheseblocks.Whiletheformerusuallystaypassiveanddon’tinterveneinthefirms’decision-making,managersnormallyholdbetween20and40percentofthevotingrightsanddecisivelyparticipateinthegovernanceandconsequentlyinfluencetheperformanceofthefirmstheyown(Becht,2001;HoldernessandSheehan,2001).Similarly,forasampleof4200USAlistedcorporationsHolderness,KrosznerandSheehan(1999)report21percentaveragemanagerialstakes;since1935theshareofcapitalheldbythemanagersincreasedbyapproximately8percentagepoints.Otherempiricalstudiesconfirmthat,uponthepracticeofboardremunerationswithsharesandstockoptions,managerialownershipcharacterizesmostoftheUSAcorporations.Moreover,managerialblockholdingscanbefoundinEuropeaswell;boardmembersofthefirmslistedontheLondonStockExchangeforexamplerepresentthesecondmostimportantgroupofblockholdersand,assuch,onaveragehold11percentofthevotingrights,amongwhichabout65percentisheldbychiefexecutives(GoergenandReeneboog,2001).Theinfluenceofmanagerialownershiponfirms’valueisrelatedtotheperspectivethatfirms’valuedependsonthedistributionofownershipbetweenmanagersandotherowners,firstunderlinedbytheBerleandMeans(1932)andJensenandMeckling(1976).Withinthiscontestandtheso-called‘incentiveargument’,givingmanagerscorporatesharesmakesthembehavelikeshareholders.Inanextremecase(JensenandMeckling,1976),wewouldhaveafirmwithasingleowner-managerandtheagencycostsreducedtotherelationshipbetweentheowner-manageranditscreditors，thatisnoequity-relatedagencycosts.Theoutstandingperformanceofthefirmswith100%ownershiphasbeenrecentlyconfirmedbyMueller,E.andSpitz,A.(2002);theyarguethattheoutstandingperformancemightnotonlybeduetoincentivesbutalsoduetoother,psychologicalreasons.Thetheoryoftheentrepreneurshipfurtherpromotestheideathatmanagers,whicharealsoblockholders,betterperceivenewbusinessopportunities;assuch,thistheorysomehowcomplementstheincentivetheorysinceitprovidesanexplanationtothepositiveeffectofthemanagerialownershipinthefirmswithrelativelydispersedownershipstructure.Bull(1989)forexamplefindsthat,duetothis‘entrepreneureffect’,firmsperformbetteraftermanagementbuy-outs;whentheybecomeowners,managersconcentrateonthemaximizationofthecashflows(ratherthatonthemeremaximizationofthecurrentprofitsasbefore).Ontheotherhand,uponincreasingtheirownershipandvotingstakes,managersalsogaintheopportunitytoexpropriatesomecorporatefundsontheirownbehalfandontheexpenseoftheminorityshareholders,namelytogainsome‘privatebenefitsofcontrol’.AccordingtoBarclayandHolderness(1991),privatebenefitsofcontrolareoneofthemainreasonsfortheexistenceofblockholdersintheworld.Ifthedesiretoobtainthesebenefitsoverrulestheincentiveeffect,managerialownershipcouldactuallyreducefirms’value(‘theentrenchmenteffect’).Excessivemanagerialownershipcanfurthermorereducetheprobabilityofasuccessfultakeoverandleadto‘positionalconflicts’(Stulz,1988).HoldernessandSheehan(1988)reportfirmswithmajoritymanagrialownershippayhighercompensationtotheirmanagersthanfirmswherethemajorityofthesharesareintheownershipofoutsideowners.Upontheinfluenceofthestatedeffects,empiricalstudiesmostlyevidenceanon-monotonicrelationshipbetweenmanagerialownershipandfirms’performance.Mork,ShleiferandVishny(1988)findthatfirmperformance(measuredwiththeTobinQ)risesasthemanagerialownershipincreasesupto5%,fallsuptothe25%levelandthenslightlyrisesagain.McConnellandServaesfor1173(1976)and1093(1986)firmslistedonheNYSEandAMEXfindasimilarrelation(evenwhencontrollingforthefirms’size,industryandoutliers);theperformancerisesupto37%oftheshares,decreasesbetween37and50%,whileafterwardstherelationbecomeslessclear.Similarly,HubbardandPalia(1999)alsoreportaquadraticformoftherelationbetweenownershipandperformancewiththemaximumat58%,whileforasampleofsmallerfirmsinGermany,MuellerandSpitz(2002)reportapositiveeffectofmanagerialownershipuptoan80percentlevel.Again,otherauthors(e.g.,DemsetzandLehn,1985)arguethatthereisnorelationshipbetweenmanagerialownershipandfirmvaluesincetheownershipstructureisanendogenousoutcomeofcompetitiveselectioninwhichvariouscostadvantagesanddisadvantagesarebalancedtoarriveatanequilibriumorganizationofthefirm.Moreover,managers’ownershipisnotexogenous,butratheranendogenousvariabledeterminedbydifferentvariablesreflectingthebusinessenvironment,firmcharacteristics,differencesinthemanagerialcontractingenvironmentand,mostimportantly,thefirmperformanceitself(DemsetzandLehn,1985;Cho,1987).Empiricalstudiesbasedonaframeworkofsimultaneousequations,whichtakeintoaccounttheendogeneityofthemanagerialownership(AgrawalandKnoeber,1996;HubbardandPalia,1999;MuellerandSpitz,2002)findnostrongsupporttotheassumptionthatmanagerialownershippositivelyeffectsfirmperformance.ManagersandinsiderownershipintransitioneconomiesPrivatizationinthemajorityoftheCentralandEasternEuropean(CEE)countriescreatesanewgroupofowners,theinsideowners.Insiderdistributionandemployeebuy-outshaveinfactrepresentedthemainprivatizationmethodin12outof22CEEcountriesandthesecondmostimportantprivatizationmethodinother4countries(EBRD,1998).SlovenianPrivatizationLaw(1992)introducestheinternaldistributionandbuyoutasoneofthemethodsofownershiptransformation;attheconclusionofprivatization,insideowners(managers,employees,formeremployeesandtheirrelatives)infactgainedthemajoritystakein802firms(61.3percentoffirmsintheprocessofownershiptransformation)employing45.7percentofemployeesand(only)22.9percentofallthecapital.Atanyrate,insiderownershipinSloveniaandinothertransitioncountries(seeWright,2002;Kalmi,2001)hasbeendeclining,partlytothebenefitofincreasedmanagerialownership.AccordingtoWrightetal.(2002),thepersistenceofemployeeownershipismainlydeterminedbyemployeesfeelinglikeownersandconsequently,bythewaysthroughwhichinsiderownershiphasbeenobtained;non-ownersinterestsandhencelowerefficiencyofinsideownershiparemostevidentinthefirmswheresharesweredistributedtotheemployeesforfreeandinthefirmswithcompleteabsenceofanyoutsideshareholdercontrol.ForRussianfirmsforexample,Wrightetal.(2002)observeanonsignificanteffectofinsideownershiponfirmrestructuringandonthereductionoftheexcessemployment,whilethelatterisbeingpreservedinthefirmswithrelativelyhighermanagerialownership;thereluctanceofmanagerstodismissemployeesinfirmsundertheircontrolis,accordingtotheauthors,thereflectionofthemanagers’efforttogainsupportfromtheemployeesandhencepreserveandfurtherstrengthentheirprivilegedposition(privatebenefitsofcontrol).Firmswithhighermanagerialownershiparefurthercharacterizedbylowermanagerialturnoverandlowerefficiencywithrespecttothefirmswithprevalentinsideroroutsiderownership.TheinefficiencyofmanagerialownershipinRussianfirms,corruption,politicalmotivesandincentivestoexpropriateprivatebenefitsofcontrolhavebeenreportedasrelatedtomanagerialownershipalsobyotherstudies(e.g.Boyckoetal.,1994and1996).Ontheotherhand,analternativegroupoftheoreticalmodelsseestheinsiderownershipasanobvioustransitoryphase,whichtakesintoaccountpoliticallimitationsandhenceensurestheacceptabilityandsuccessofprivatizationsonalongterm(DewatripontandRoland,1995).FortheexamplesofBulgaria,Hungary,SlovakiaandSloveniaWalshandWhelan(2001)showthatpoliticallimitations,arisingoutofthefirms’positiononthemarkets(thatistheorientationtowardsWesternorEasternmarkets)mostlyinfluencedthechoicebetweentheState,insiderandoutsiderownershipinprivatization.Theauthorsclaimthat,ratherthanapoliticaldistortionleadingtofirminefficiency,thesedecisionswereguidedbythesearchforpubliclyacceptablesolutions,leadingtowardslong-termsuccess.Ontheotherhand,theoftencitedstudybyFrydmanetal.(1999)reportsstrongpositiveeffectsofprivatizationonfirmperformanceonlyintheoutsider-dominatedfirms,whilenosucheffectisreportedforthefirmsintheinsideownership.Thestudyfurtherfindsthattheimpactofagivenprivatizationmethodvariesaccordingtothechosenmeasureoffirmperformanceandconfirmstheendogeneityofthefirmownershipstructure.ThelatterfacthasbeenobservedalsoinSlovenia;empiricalresearchconfirmsthatinsidershaveendedupowningbetterperformingfirms(Smithetal.,1997;Simonetietal.,2003a).Source:MarkoSimonetiandAleksandraGregoric,2004.“ManagerialOwnershipandCorporatePerformanceinSlovenianPost-PrivatizationPeriod”.FinanceWorkingPaper.April,pp.5-7.譯文：斯洛文尼亞后私有化時(shí)代的管理層持股與公司業(yè)績(jī)摘要斯洛文尼亞私營(yíng)化后期已經(jīng)具有以下特征：非管理所有者（雇員）的所有權(quán)下降，管理者提高控制力。此外，考慮到2002年最佳所有權(quán)股份超過(guò)了他們實(shí)際配額10.8個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，我們期望管理者將來(lái)繼續(xù)鞏固他們的所有權(quán)。這篇文章旨在描述在私有化后期斯洛文尼亞公司所有權(quán)的主要趨勢(shì)，為基本經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題提供答案：管理者所有權(quán)的持續(xù)鞏固對(duì)斯洛文尼亞公司效益有什么影響？測(cè)試這個(gè)關(guān)系的經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析是在1995-1999年時(shí)期的182個(gè)斯洛文尼亞公司進(jìn)行，沒(méi)有提供相關(guān)的證據(jù)證明管理控制增加對(duì)斯洛文尼亞公司效益的積極影響。若要有的話，積極的激勵(lì)影響只產(chǎn)生在擁有管理者所持股份超過(guò)百分之十的公司，僅僅關(guān)于公司金融能力（而不是全要素生產(chǎn)率），和在資本市場(chǎng)沒(méi)有上市的公司。此外，當(dāng)前存在在最佳所有權(quán)和實(shí)際所有權(quán)之間缺口的負(fù)面影響看起來(lái)超過(guò)由管理所有權(quán)引起的任何積極激勵(lì)影響。簡(jiǎn)介管理層持股的增長(zhǎng)除了國(guó)有控股資金和雇員所有權(quán)的減少，代表了斯洛文尼亞后私有化時(shí)期所有權(quán)改變主要特征之一。最顯著的是非上市公司管理股份的增加，所有權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓以相當(dāng)?shù)蛢r(jià)和非公開(kāi)形式實(shí)現(xiàn)。此外，斯洛文尼亞管理者仍然對(duì)現(xiàn)行所有權(quán)分配不滿意（到2002年末，斯洛文尼亞管理者平均最佳所有權(quán)股份超過(guò)實(shí)際所有權(quán)股份10.8個(gè)百分點(diǎn)）。我們預(yù)測(cè)斯洛文尼亞公司所有權(quán)和控股的演變趨勢(shì)將以同樣的方向持續(xù)，并且在將來(lái)也會(huì)如此。在斯洛文尼亞所有權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移的低透明度將推動(dòng)管理者手中所有權(quán)的積累。無(wú)論如何，這篇文章的目的不是討論調(diào)查。私有資產(chǎn)的重新分配的公正性，既沒(méi)有解決國(guó)有股份保留再分配的重要性，也沒(méi)有提供基本經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題的答案，也就是決定了管理層持股增長(zhǎng)對(duì)斯洛文尼亞公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響。我們?cè)诘诙糠珠_(kāi)始管理層持股的概述，作為發(fā)達(dá)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)中的公司治理機(jī)制。第三部分提供了關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型中管理層和內(nèi)部人持股作用的進(jìn)一步證據(jù)，特別在斯洛文尼亞（第四部分）。第五部分闡述了在斯洛文尼亞管理層持股對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)影響的主要假設(shè)。第六部分展現(xiàn)了分析管理層持股和公司經(jīng)濟(jì)效益、財(cái)務(wù)狀況之間關(guān)系的主要實(shí)證模型。最后一部分闡述了主要的實(shí)證結(jié)果和結(jié)論。管理層持股作為公司治理機(jī)制股份制代表內(nèi)部（歐洲大陸）和外部（盎格魯撒克遜）的公司治理制度區(qū)別的主要因素之一。雖然大部分在英國(guó)和美國(guó)上市的公司的所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)仍然主要反映了典型的伯利和米恩斯公司，市場(chǎng)作為公司控制權(quán)的主要機(jī)制之一減輕了經(jīng)理人（代理人）和所有者（委托人）之間的利益沖突，在歐洲大陸，大股東通過(guò)集中過(guò)他們的所有權(quán)和投票權(quán)獲得對(duì)其代理者的控制。在任何情況下，在治理制度之外也可以發(fā)現(xiàn)大股東。例如，在紐約證券交易所和納斯達(dá)克交易所上市的公司中有一半平均有三個(gè)股東至少持有5%的所有權(quán)份額。然而，歐洲大陸的情況卻是相反的，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者或者董事會(huì)成員持有這些份額的大部分。雖然前者通常停留在被動(dòng)狀態(tài)，不干預(yù)公司的決策，管理人員通常持有20%至40%的表決權(quán)，果斷地參與治理，從而影響他們自己的公司的業(yè)績(jī)（拜克特，2001；霍爾德內(nèi)斯和希恩，2001）。同樣地，霍爾德內(nèi)斯，庫(kù)洛內(nèi)爾和希恩（1999）對(duì)于美國(guó)的4200家樣本上市公司報(bào)告了平均有21%的管理股份；自1935年以來(lái)，管理人員的資本占有率增加了約8個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。其他的實(shí)證研究證實(shí)，通過(guò)股票和股票期權(quán)的董事會(huì)報(bào)酬實(shí)踐，高管持股成為美國(guó)大多數(shù)公司的特征。此外，在歐洲也可以發(fā)現(xiàn)股份制。以倫敦證券交易所上市的公司為例，董事會(huì)成員代表了大股東的第二個(gè)最重要的群體，因此，平均持有11%的投票權(quán)，其中，約有65%被行政總裁持有（喬耿和瑞納伯格，2001）。管理層持股對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值的影響與遠(yuǎn)期企業(yè)價(jià)值有關(guān)，取決于管理者和其他所有者之間的所有權(quán)分配，首次由伯利和米恩斯(1932)，詹森和麥考林(1976）提出。在這篇名為“激勵(lì)評(píng)論”的文章中，給管理人員公司的股份使他們成為股東履行責(zé)任。在一個(gè)特例中（詹森和麥考林，1976），我們會(huì)有一個(gè)只有獨(dú)立管理者的公司，代理成本簡(jiǎn)化為獨(dú)立管理者與債權(quán)人之間的關(guān)系，這就不需要股權(quán)相關(guān)代理費(fèi)用。穆勒，E.和斯皮茨，A.（2002）最近已證實(shí)100%控股權(quán)的公司出色業(yè)績(jī)；他們認(rèn)為出色的業(yè)績(jī)可能不僅是由于激勵(lì)機(jī)制，或許還由于其它原因，如心理原因。創(chuàng)業(yè)學(xué)的理論，進(jìn)一步促進(jìn)了管理人員也是大股東的思想，能使他們更好地感知新的商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)；因此，本理論補(bǔ)充了某種激勵(lì)理論，因?yàn)樗鼮樵谒袡?quán)相對(duì)分散的公司的管理層持股的積極效果結(jié)構(gòu)提供了一個(gè)解釋。以伯爾（1989）為例表明，由于“企業(yè)家效應(yīng)”，在管理層收購(gòu)后公司會(huì)有更好的業(yè)績(jī)；當(dāng)他們成為所有者，管理者專注于現(xiàn)金流最大化（而不是像以前一樣僅僅是當(dāng)前利潤(rùn)上的最大化）。另一方面，一旦增加他們的所有權(quán)和參加表決的股份，管理者也會(huì)代表他們自己，犧牲掉小股東而獲得爭(zhēng)取公司基金的機(jī)會(huì)，也就是獲得一些“控制權(quán)私有收益”。根據(jù)巴克萊和霍爾德內(nèi)斯（1991），控制權(quán)私有利益是世界大股東存在的主要理由之一。如果希望獲得這些利益沒(méi)有產(chǎn)生激勵(lì)效益的渴望，管理層持股可能實(shí)際上減少了企業(yè)的價(jià)值（“管理防御效益”）。過(guò)多的管理所有權(quán)可以進(jìn)一步減少成功收購(gòu)的可能性，并導(dǎo)致“定位沖突”（斯圖爾茲，1988）。霍爾德內(nèi)斯和希恩（1988）指出，擁有多數(shù)管理所有權(quán)的公司支付管理者更高的賠償，在外部擁有者所有權(quán)中股東