外文翻譯--“公共池塘資源”中“按比例縮減”的效力與局限性

出處： Gardner R, Herr A, Ostrom E, et al. The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resourcesJ. Journal of Development Economics, 2000, 62(2): 515-533 中文 3400字 附件 1: 外文資料翻譯譯文 “公共池塘資源 ”中 “按比例縮減 ”的效力與局限性 摘要 : 本文調(diào)查了 “按比例縮減 ”(proportional cutbacks) 作為一種改進(jìn) “公共池塘資源 ”(CPRs)性能的分配規(guī)則的優(yōu)點(diǎn)以及局限性，并對(duì)這兩個(gè)方面的案例加以分析。對(duì)于對(duì)稱的公共池塘資源， 我們已經(jīng)建立了提高效率的 “按比例縮減 ”，但隨之帶來的各種復(fù)雜因素引起了 “按比例縮減 ”閉聯(lián)集的不對(duì)稱。這種不對(duì)稱將效率提高于 “納什均衡 ”(Nash equilibrium) 之上。 將 “公共池塘資源 ”這個(gè)線性二次方程模型用于調(diào)整全球二氧化碳的排放，其按比例縮減 -正如京都議定書中所體現(xiàn)的，達(dá)到了高效、合理分配的效果。 1、導(dǎo)言 公共池塘資源 (CPRs)是一種自然或人工的資源。 但很顯然，由于其中自然的或體制上的障礙，所以其排他性也是非比尋常的，并且收益將會(huì)減少。一個(gè)普遍的假定是，適合于 CPRs 的個(gè)人會(huì)陷于社會(huì)意義上的兩難境地，這將不可避免地造成資源的浪費(fèi)與破壞 (cordon, 1954; Hardin,1968)。近幾年， 學(xué)者們備有大量田野設(shè)置數(shù)據(jù)，它們主要記錄了個(gè)體所面對(duì)的，很多復(fù)雜的，源于 CPR 設(shè)置的占有問題。盡管很多研究與這一有關(guān)過度使用的悲觀假設(shè)一致， 但越來越多的研究證明了資源使用者的能力，即創(chuàng)造并內(nèi)在地維持公 共機(jī)構(gòu)， 以便使這些資源的使用更有效率。 實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果中出現(xiàn)的 CPR 兩難境地的有限重復(fù)結(jié)構(gòu)，從理論上支撐了田野調(diào)查的發(fā)現(xiàn)。當(dāng)主題 (subject) 被放置于獨(dú)立做出決定的設(shè)置中時(shí)，他們的集體行為就與對(duì)資源使用的平衡預(yù)測(cè)保持一致。另一方面，當(dāng)被允許使用或溝通其他合作機(jī)制時(shí)， 主題通常采用與效率和可支持的資源使用一致的維持協(xié)議 (Ostrom et al., 1994; Walker et al., 1991)。 即使在參與者的資產(chǎn)不對(duì)稱的案例中， 面對(duì)面的交流也使得參與者接近最優(yōu)先性。 (Hackett et al., 1994) 在很多例子中，資源使用者僅僅在超過了可忍耐的極限時(shí)才認(rèn)識(shí)到他們的過度使用。 因而，一些形式上的減少是必需的。在那些資源使用者整合他們的占有行為的情況下，一種十分簡(jiǎn)單的機(jī)制便開始實(shí)施了 -這就是 “按比例縮減 ” (proportional cutbacks)。在這種情況下， 所有的資源使用者都同意以相同的比例減少其占有行為。在使用者的用途相同的事例中， 利益減少了，并導(dǎo)致支出。這種機(jī)制具有非常強(qiáng)的吸引力，因?yàn)?“按比例縮減 ”造成了積極的后果。 然而， 在使用者的用途不同的事例中， 這種機(jī)制 會(huì)導(dǎo)致明顯的分配沖突。 某些情況下， “按比例縮減 ”也會(huì)造成資源使用率的下降。 當(dāng)一小部分使用者通過對(duì)所有使用者的占有水平的限制從而獲得利益時(shí)， 這一小部分人將會(huì)組織起以長(zhǎng)期的共同協(xié)議， 用來支持他們對(duì)一個(gè)資源的使用。比如，他們可能愿意為了達(dá)成共識(shí)而付出大部分交易費(fèi)， 從而減少甚或假定他們費(fèi)用的大部分。毋庸置疑，當(dāng)使用者是主權(quán)國(guó)的時(shí)候，達(dá)成共識(shí)所帶來的復(fù)雜性遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)比單個(gè)的、 處于各自的主權(quán)國(guó)的使用者要大。這樣的情況具有先天的不對(duì)稱性。 由于國(guó)際共識(shí)往往受到政治關(guān)注，同時(shí)，最近的理論工作也有很大進(jìn)展， 因此各種異質(zhì)成分對(duì)于取得更為有效辦法的影響成為了一個(gè)豐富的研究主題。兩篇重要的文章(Baland and Platteau 1997) 說明了財(cái)富的不均可能會(huì)促進(jìn)或阻礙 CPRs的有效使用。在沒有規(guī)范化的設(shè)置中，用于抽樣的技術(shù)是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素。在凸起的生產(chǎn)技術(shù)的設(shè)置中 (正如我們下面模構(gòu)的那樣 )，財(cái)富的不均會(huì)加劇效率低下。當(dāng)它們是一些的表面不凸起的技術(shù)設(shè)置 (暗示著不可分割或極限現(xiàn)象 ) 的時(shí)候，財(cái)富的不均會(huì)提高 CPRs 的使用效率。Baland and Platteau(1998) 這本書還說，當(dāng)使用者中的不平衡 增加時(shí)，從規(guī)則調(diào)節(jié)中所獲得的效率會(huì)更低。 Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan(1998) 在考察了不平衡的財(cái)富分配對(duì)于效益的影響之后， 他們發(fā)現(xiàn)財(cái)富的不平衡與效率下降有著密切聯(lián)系。另一方面，一旦涉及到實(shí)質(zhì)上不平衡的案例，一個(gè)游戲者的資產(chǎn)的進(jìn)一步增長(zhǎng)會(huì)將參與者推向最優(yōu)先性。一個(gè)關(guān)于資產(chǎn)不平衡和經(jīng)濟(jì)效率的曲線關(guān)系被安置。 為了更好地理解 “按比例縮減 ”機(jī)制如何在這個(gè)領(lǐng)域中產(chǎn)生并維持， 第 2 部分給我們提供了關(guān)于正反兩個(gè)方面的案例，一是 “蒙特利爾協(xié)定 ” (the Montreal Protocol)，在這個(gè)例子當(dāng)中這一機(jī)制得到了 成功的貫徹與監(jiān)控 ; 第二是 “歐洲漁業(yè)縮減 ” (EU fishing cutbacks)， 在這個(gè)例子中， 這一機(jī)制的運(yùn)作是否成功還有待證實(shí)。在案例分析之后，第 3 部分主要分析了 “按比例縮減 ”的理論基礎(chǔ)，這一理論基礎(chǔ)提高了 CPR的性能。我們建立了一系列的 “按比例縮減 ”， 以便將使用者從低效率的博弈平衡導(dǎo)向一個(gè)更好的結(jié)果 -在某些例子中，甚至是導(dǎo)向一個(gè)最好的結(jié)果。同時(shí)，對(duì)它的基本判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是 : 在我們明確給定的范圍之內(nèi)， “按比例縮減 ”的數(shù)量不能過大。在第 4 部分，一個(gè) CPR 的變量級(jí)模型將推導(dǎo)出，并且進(jìn)一步闡明以上這些結(jié)果。 我們將使用一個(gè)對(duì)于這個(gè)模型的具體校對(duì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)， 研究京都議定書這個(gè)案例當(dāng)中， “按比 例縮減 ”是如何運(yùn)作的。 第 5 部分將我們對(duì) “一次性博弈 ” (one-shot games) 的分析，延伸到對(duì)時(shí)效性的 CPR 情況的研究，在這種情況下，使用者們?cè)诶婧皖A(yù)先占有權(quán)等方面有很大的不同。第 6部分得出結(jié)論。 2.“按比例縮減 ”的應(yīng)用 70 年代末，衛(wèi)星圖像顯示了最初在北極出現(xiàn)的，后來也在南極上空出現(xiàn)的臭氧層空洞。氣象學(xué)家立即著手研究它的原因，以及臭氧空洞對(duì) 地球上生物的影響。臭氧層作為對(duì)宇宙射線的屏障， 其消失可造成對(duì)地球生物圈的致命影響。 更糟糕的是， 據(jù)觀察， 臭氧空洞還在進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大 -在南半球的冬季， 南極上空的臭氧空洞幾乎覆蓋了整個(gè)南極洲， 然而北極上空的臭氧空洞卻相對(duì)小一些了。 1985 年，大氣化學(xué)研究者給出了一個(gè)關(guān)于臭氧空洞的解釋 : 當(dāng) chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)作為氣溶膠罐的促進(jìn)物和空調(diào)、 冰箱的冷凍劑使用時(shí)， 這種物質(zhì)就造成了臭氧空洞現(xiàn)象。 每一個(gè)排放到大氣中的 CFC 分子， 會(huì)在臭氧層破壞掉至少 4000 個(gè)臭氧分 子，因此，當(dāng) CFC 因商業(yè)目的而廣泛使用時(shí)，它在短期內(nèi)就對(duì)臭氧層造成了很嚴(yán)重的破壞。 鑒于以上的原因， 國(guó)際上開始討論并制定限制商業(yè) CFC 排放量的條約。實(shí)質(zhì)上，這種限令是 “按比例縮減 ”局限性的一個(gè)典型事例 -100%的縮減。這種縮減增加了空調(diào)、冰箱的生產(chǎn)成本，其價(jià)格也相應(yīng)提高了。 此外， 開發(fā)出氣溶膠罐促進(jìn)劑的替代品又要花數(shù)以萬計(jì)的金錢。這些減縮帶來的后果在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家體現(xiàn)得尤為集中， 發(fā)展中國(guó)家也會(huì)受到一定影響。 條約的協(xié)商在 1987 年有了結(jié)果，當(dāng)年 125 個(gè)國(guó)家簽署的蒙特利爾協(xié)定旨在減少全球破壞 臭氧物質(zhì)的排放量，在 10 年之內(nèi)逐步淘汰 CFCs 物質(zhì)的生產(chǎn)與銷售 -于是氟利昂 就在美國(guó)的空調(diào)與冰箱中消失了。 (UNEP,1991). 在臭氧空洞這個(gè)事例中， “按比例縮減 ”的應(yīng)用確實(shí)是成功的。臭氧空洞停止擴(kuò)大了，盡管可能還要等一百年它才會(huì)完全消失。這種 “按比例縮減 ”為地球的生活基本條件所帶來的利益遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于 CFC 生產(chǎn)者和消費(fèi)者付出的代價(jià)。事實(shí)上，后者在不對(duì)大氣造成危害的前提下成功替代了 CFCs。 但并不是所有國(guó)際上對(duì) “按比例縮減 ”的使用都那么成功，歐盟的漁業(yè)政策就是一個(gè)反面例子。 歐洲海域內(nèi)的過渡 捕撈使得很多魚類瀕臨滅絕，比如鱈魚、鯡魚、沙丁魚、鮭魚等等。 這樣持續(xù)地捕撈肯定是不行的，在使這些魚類滅絕的同時(shí)也會(huì)帶來歐洲魚類 貿(mào)易的停止。這個(gè)問題實(shí)際上牽連到很多歐盟和非歐盟國(guó)家的共同利益 (UK vs. Iceland, France vs. Canada, Spain vs. Canada)， 也會(huì)增加歐盟成員國(guó)的緊張關(guān)系。 歐洲委員會(huì)在 1996 提議在 6 年之內(nèi)逐步實(shí)施 40%的 “按比例縮減 ”， 以解決歐洲漁業(yè)的問題。 但這一決議受到許多國(guó)家的反對(duì)， 因此委員會(huì)不得不撤銷這個(gè)決議。 關(guān)于它的討論顯 示出漁業(yè)強(qiáng)國(guó)和漁業(yè)小國(guó)的區(qū)別 -西班牙、葡萄牙并不希望有任何捕撈限制，而英國(guó)則希望對(duì)上述兩國(guó)有更大的限制。 1997 年 4 月， 歐洲委員會(huì)制定了一個(gè) “按比例縮減 ”的修正計(jì)劃。在這個(gè)計(jì)劃當(dāng)中， 捕魚船隊(duì)將根據(jù)其過度捕撈的程度進(jìn)行縮減。對(duì)于那些 “極為瀕危 ”的魚類，捕魚船隊(duì)將在 5 年內(nèi)減少 30% ，其中包括大西洋鮭魚， 以及大西洋旗魚 ; 而對(duì)于那些屬于 “過度捕撈 ”類型的魚類， 捕撈數(shù)量將減少 20%; 對(duì)于所有其他的魚類，捕魚船的尺寸被嚴(yán)格限制。 歐洲議會(huì)按照多數(shù)原則制定了這個(gè)修正計(jì)劃 。 雖然法國(guó)和英 國(guó)至今還反對(duì)這一計(jì)劃， 但為數(shù)更多的國(guó)家所投的贊成票使得他們得以最終勝出 (Pesca, 1998)。 在 40 余年的過度捕撈之后， 現(xiàn)在還很難斷定歐盟所采取的多種 “按比例縮減 ”方法是否可以有效地復(fù)興當(dāng)?shù)貪O業(yè)。 在這一點(diǎn)上， 加拿大有著類似經(jīng)驗(yàn)。 該國(guó)也采取了類似的 “按比例縮減 ”， 以挽救其處于危險(xiǎn)中的鱈魚捕撈業(yè)。盡管漁業(yè)政策已實(shí)行 25 年， 但目前加拿大的鱈魚捕撈業(yè)在商業(yè)上已經(jīng)消亡。 (Finlayson and McCay, 1998). 從國(guó)際性的角度考慮， 歐洲面臨的困難比加拿大還要大。比如， 目前的國(guó)際協(xié)議已經(jīng)明文規(guī)定，對(duì)瀕危魚類 -大西洋旗魚的捕撈每年不能超過 13300 噸， 因?yàn)橹挥羞@樣才能保持對(duì)這一魚類資源的持續(xù)使用。然而， 實(shí)際的捕撈量是每年 16000，其中有一半還是非歐盟成員捕撈的。 世界上相關(guān)的國(guó)家 (USA, Canada, Japan, EFTA members)都在呼吁對(duì)大西洋旗魚捕撈的 “按比例縮減 ”，即減少 30%的捕撈以使魚的數(shù)量恢復(fù)到協(xié)議規(guī)定的指標(biāo)。但即使歐洲把他們的捕撈減少 30%，也就是 8000 至 5600 噸，對(duì)大西洋旗魚的保護(hù)問題依然得不到完全的解決。 附件 2: 外文原文 The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources Abstract This paper examines the success and limitations of proportional cutbacks as an alloca-tion rule for improving the performance of common-pool resources_CPRs. Two fieldcases, one success and one failure, motivate the analysis. For symmetric CPRs, we establish the existence of efficiency-enhancing proportional cutbacks. We then introduce complications that arise in the presence of asymmetries, which induce a continuum of proportional cutbacks that raise efficiency above Nash equilibrium. Calibrating a linearquadratic CPR model to global carbon dioxide emissions, the efficiency anddistributional consequences of proportional cutbacks like those embodied in the Kyoto Protocol are derived. q2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 1. Introduction Common-pool resources_CPRs.are natural or man-made resources in which_a. exclusion is nontrivial due to significant physical or institutional barriers and_b. yield is subtractable _Ostrom et al., 1994. The general presumption is that individuals appropriating from CPRs are trapped in social dilemmas, leading inevitably to overuse and destruction of those resources _Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968. In recent years, scholars have documented a large number of field settings in which individuals face complex appropriation issues arising in CPR settings. Although many of these studies are consistent with the pessimistic presumption of overuse, a growing number of studies document the capabilities of resource users to create and maintain institutions endogenously in order to facilitate more efficient use of the resources they use in common.1 The results from laboratory experiments, with the structure of finitely repeated CPR dilemmas, support the findings from the field. When subjects are placed in settings in which decisions are made in isolation, with minimal institutional structure, their aggregate behavior is generally consistent with equilibrium predictions of inefficient resource use. On the other hand, when allowed to communicate or use other coordinating mechanisms, subjects often adopt and maintain agreements consistent with efficient and sustainable resource use_Ostrom et al., 1994; Walker et al., 1991. Even in cases where the assets of participants are asymmetric, face-to-face communication allows participants to approach optimality_Hackett et al., 1994. In many cases, resource users recognize their overuse only after the total of all of their withdrawals exceeds a sustainable level. Thus, some form of cutback is needed. In situations in which groups of resource users have coordinated their appropriation activities, a very simple institution has frequently been implemented - proportional cutbacks. Under such an institution, all resource users agree to reduce their appropriation activities by the same proportion. In cases where users are homogeneous in current usage, benefits received, and costs incurred, such an institution has strong appeal because a proportional cutback exists that leads to an optimal outcome. However, in cases in which users are heterogeneous with respect to important attributes related to use _current appropriation levels, benefits, costs, etc., such an institution can lead to significant distributional conflict. In some circumstances, a proportional cutback can also lead to a decrease in efficiency in resource use. When a few users obtain major benefits from restrictions on the appropriation levels of all users, the few face strong incentives to organize agreements to achieve long-term sustainable use of a resource. As such, they maybe willing to bear most of the transaction costs of achieving an agreement to cutback andror even assume a large proportion of the costs of a cutback themselves.Needless to say, when the users are sovereign nation states, the complicationsinvolved in reaching and sustaining any agreement are even greater than when the users are all individuals living within a single sovereign state. Such situations are inherently asymmetric. The impact of various kinds of heterogeneities on the likelihood of achieving more efficient results is now becoming a rich topic for analysis, both because of major policy concerns related to international agreements, but also because of recent theoretical work. In a pair of important articles, Baland and Platteau_1997. demonstrate that wealth inequality may promote or discourage efficient use of CPRs. In unregulated settings, the technology used for extraction is a key factor.In settings with convex production technologies_as we model below., wealth inequality is likely to exacerbate inefficiencies. When there are nonconvexities _implying indivisibility or threshold phenomena., wealth inequality can promote efficient use of the CPR. Baland and Platteau_1998.also demonstrate that the efficiency gains from regulation will be lower as inequality among users increases. Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan_1998.examine the impact of unequal distribution of assets on the efficiency of outcomes. They find that increasing asset inequality is associated with increased inefficiency. On the other hand, once substantial inequality is the case, still further increases in the assets of one player may push participants closer to optimality. A curvilinear relation between asset inequality and economic efficiency is posited. To better understand how a proportional cutback institution can arise and be maintained in the field, Section 2 provides a summary of two field cases, one _the Montreal Protocol. in which such an institution was successfully implemented and monitored, and another_EU fishing cutbacks.in which the success of the institution is yet to be proven. Moving from the case studies, Section 3 examinesm the theoretical basis for proportional cutbacks to improve CPR performance. In particular, we establish the existence of a range of proportional cutbacks to move users from an inefficient game equilibrium to an improved outcome - in some cases, even an optimum. The basic criterion is that the proportional cutback be not too large, for which we give an explicit bound. Section 4 develops a model for a parametric class of CPR situations to illustrate these results. We apply a specific calibration of the model to study the workings of proportional cutbacks in the Kyoto Protocol. Section 5 extends our analysis of one-shot games to time-dependent CPR situations, where users are heterogeneous in benefits and prior appropriation rights to the CPR are present. The Section 6 offers concluding comments. 2. Proportional cutbacks in the field In the late 1970s, satellite photos revealed for the first time the presence of ozone holes in the earths atmosphere over the North and South Poles. Atmo spheric scientists immediately began researching probable causes for the ozone holes, as well as their likely implications for life on the planet. Since atmospheric ozone shields life on the planet from lethal radiation from space, the complete disappearance of ozone from the atmosphere would have catastrophic consequences for the biosphere. Even worse, the ozone holes were observed to be expanding - with the ozone hole over the South Pole covering almost the entire continent of Antarctica during the Southern Hemispheres winter, and the hole over the North Pole somewhat smaller. By 1985, atmospheric chemists had provided a causal explanation for the ozone holes beyond any reasonable doubt: chlorofluorocarbons_CFCs.used as propellants in aerosol cans and as coolants in air conditioners and refrigerators were the culprits. Each molecule of CFC, released at the earths surface, had the capacity to rise to the ozone layer and chemically unbind over 4000 molecules of ozone. CFCs, which had come to commercial prominence in this century, had in a short time created the ozone holes. In response to the ozone situation, negotiations began on an international treaty to ban the commercial production of CFCs by all countries. In essence, this ban represents the limiting case of a proportional cutback - a 100% cutback. Such cutbacks would certainly increase costs of refrigeration and air conditioning, both for producers and consumers. Moreover, new propellants would have to be developed for the multibillion-dollar aerosol-can industry worldwide. The costs of these cutbacks would be concentrated in the developed countries, but they would also be felt in the developing countries. Treaty negotiations moved swiftly, culminating in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted by over 125 countries in 1987. The Montreal Protocol phases out the production and distribution of CFCs over a 10-year period - freon is just now disappearing from refrigerators and air conditioners in the United States _UNEP, 1991. In the case of the ozone holes, the use of proportional cutbacks must be counted a considerable success. The holes themselves have stopped growing, although it is estimated it will take at least a century before they disappear altogether. The benefits to the quality of life on earth outweigh the losses to CFC producers and consumers. Indeed, the latter have succeeded in developing close substitutes for CFCs without serious atmospheric consequences. Not all international attempts to use proportional cutbacks are as successful as the Montreal Protocol. To cite just one example, consider the common fisheries of the European Union_EU. Persistent overfishing of EU waters has led to serious declines in the population of species such as cod, herring, mackerel, sole, sardines, and salmon. Fishing at current levels is clearly unsustainable, and could lead to commercial extinction of all the above species in EU waters. Indeed, the problem has been so severe as to lead to international incidents involving EU member countries and other countries _UK vs. Iceland, France vs. Canada, Spain vs. Canada., as well as tensions between EU members. In an attempt to address the situation, the European Commission in 1996 proposed a proportional cutback of 40% in the fishing fleets of all EU member countries, to be phased in over 6 years. These cutbacks were attacked by various countries, and the Commission withdrew the plan rather than see it vetoed. The discussion exhibited a sharp difference between rich and poor fishing countries - with Spain and Portugal wanting little if any reduction in their fleets, while the UK wanted even larger reductions in Spanish and Portuguese fleets. In April of 1997, the European Commission brought forward a revised proportional cutbacks plan. Under this plan, fishing fleets are to be differentially reduced, depending on the severity of the overfishing. For species in the category most endangered, fishing fleets are to be cut back by 30% over the next 5 years. This category includes Atlantic salmon and Atlantic swordfish. For species in the category overfished, fleets are to be cut back by 20% over that same period. For all other species, the size of the fishing