周小川關(guān)于推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化的若干思考及譯文

1、周小川：關(guān)于推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革的若干思考 【編者按】近日，人民銀行召開工作會(huì)議，傳達(dá)中央經(jīng)濟(jì)工作會(huì)議和全國(guó)金融工作會(huì)議精神，部署下一階段人民銀行重點(diǎn)工作。周小川行長(zhǎng)先后接受了部分國(guó)內(nèi)媒體采訪，對(duì)若干經(jīng)濟(jì)金融熱點(diǎn)問題進(jìn)行了闡述，其中提出要進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革，國(guó)內(nèi)外媒體對(duì)此廣泛關(guān)注。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，人民銀行積極推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革，并取得了明顯成效。目前，進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化的條件基本具備，下一步人民銀行將按照中央會(huì)議精神繼續(xù)積極推進(jìn)。在此過程中，人民銀行將充分考慮當(dāng)前國(guó)內(nèi)外經(jīng)濟(jì)金融形勢(shì)，以及各方面的條件和影響因素?，F(xiàn)將周小川行長(zhǎng)去年初所發(fā)表的關(guān)于推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革的若干思考一文再次刊出，供大家研究

2、、參考。周小川：關(guān)于推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革的若干思考黨的十七屆五中全會(huì)提出的關(guān)于“十二五”規(guī)劃建議中，專門有一段談金融體制改革。其中，第一句話是“構(gòu)建逆周期的金融宏觀審慎管理框架”，對(duì)此前天我在北京大學(xué)做了一些分析和闡釋。今天，我想就其中的第二句話“逐步推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革”談幾點(diǎn)看法。一、為什么要推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革一是利率市場(chǎng)化是發(fā)揮市場(chǎng)配置資源作用的一個(gè)重要方面。1992年，我國(guó)確立了建立社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的改革目標(biāo)，要讓市場(chǎng)在資源配置中起基礎(chǔ)性作用，以此實(shí)現(xiàn)資源配置優(yōu)化。利率作為非常重要的資金價(jià)格，應(yīng)該在市場(chǎng)有效配置資源過程中起基礎(chǔ)性調(diào)節(jié)作用，實(shí)現(xiàn)資金流向和配置的不斷優(yōu)化。同時(shí)，利率也是其他

3、很多金融產(chǎn)品定價(jià)的參照基準(zhǔn)。二是利率市場(chǎng)化的要點(diǎn)是體現(xiàn)金融機(jī)構(gòu)在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性市場(chǎng)中的自主定價(jià)權(quán)。我國(guó)市場(chǎng)化改革從一開始就強(qiáng)調(diào)尊重企業(yè)的自主權(quán)，其中最主要的一條是尊重企業(yè)定價(jià)權(quán)。在金融業(yè)，除個(gè)別政策性金融機(jī)構(gòu)外，目前我國(guó)金融機(jī)構(gòu)都是按照企業(yè)來(lái)運(yùn)行的，反映金融企業(yè)自主經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的一個(gè)重要環(huán)節(jié)正是其對(duì)自身產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的自主定價(jià)權(quán)。三是利率市場(chǎng)化也反映客戶有選擇權(quán)。金融機(jī)構(gòu)的客戶既有居民，也有企業(yè)，還有各種各樣的其他類型實(shí)體。這些客戶在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性市場(chǎng)中有選擇權(quán)，他們對(duì)金融機(jī)構(gòu)提供的服務(wù)和價(jià)格，可以表示滿意或不滿意，可以選擇這家或那家，也可以選擇不同價(jià)格的類似金融產(chǎn)品作為替代。通過利率市場(chǎng)化，金融機(jī)構(gòu)會(huì)提供各不相同的多

4、樣化的金融產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)。四是利率市場(chǎng)化反映了差異性、多樣性金融產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的供求關(guān)系以及金融企業(yè)對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的判斷和定價(jià)。在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下，就像其他商品一樣，金融產(chǎn)品會(huì)出現(xiàn)更多的差異化，同類產(chǎn)品可能有不同的品牌、規(guī)格和目標(biāo)群體。同時(shí)，不同金融機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)同一項(xiàng)目、同一客戶的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)判斷也會(huì)出現(xiàn)差異，這些差異在其金融產(chǎn)品的定價(jià)中會(huì)得到反映。五是利率市場(chǎng)化反映了宏觀調(diào)控的需要。宏觀調(diào)控，特別是在我國(guó)社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下以間接調(diào)控為基本特征的中央銀行貨幣政策，需要有一個(gè)順暢、有效的傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制，并對(duì)市場(chǎng)價(jià)格的形成產(chǎn)生必要的影響。二、我國(guó)的利率市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程利率市場(chǎng)化是一個(gè)過程，這個(gè)過程中的進(jìn)展是承上啟下的。亞洲金融危機(jī)之后，

5、我國(guó)利率市場(chǎng)化有這樣幾個(gè)內(nèi)容可以回顧一下。第一，外幣存貸款利率。分幾步放開國(guó)內(nèi)外幣存貸款利率，這主要發(fā)生在2004年之前。第二，擴(kuò)大銀行的貸款定價(jià)權(quán)和存款定價(jià)權(quán)。2003年之前，銀行定價(jià)權(quán)浮動(dòng)范圍只限30%以內(nèi)，2004年貸款上浮范圍擴(kuò)大到基準(zhǔn)利率的1.7倍。2004年10月，貸款上浮取消封頂；下浮的幅度為基準(zhǔn)利率的0.9倍，還沒有完全放開。與此同時(shí)，允許銀行的存款利率都可以下浮，下不設(shè)底。第三，在企業(yè)債、金融債、商業(yè)票據(jù)方面以及貨幣市場(chǎng)交易中全部實(shí)行市場(chǎng)定價(jià)，對(duì)價(jià)格不再設(shè)任何限制。隨著各種票據(jù)、公司類債券的發(fā)展，特別是otc市場(chǎng)和二級(jí)市場(chǎng)交易不斷擴(kuò)大使價(jià)格更為市場(chǎng)化，很多企業(yè)，特別是質(zhì)量比較

6、好的企業(yè)，可以選擇發(fā)行票據(jù)和企業(yè)債來(lái)進(jìn)行融資，其價(jià)格已經(jīng)完全不受貸款基準(zhǔn)利率的限制了。第四，擴(kuò)大商業(yè)性個(gè)人住房貸款的利率浮動(dòng)范圍。2006年8月，浮動(dòng)范圍擴(kuò)大至基準(zhǔn)利率的0.85倍；2008年5月汶川特大地震發(fā)生后，為支持災(zāi)后重建，人民銀行于當(dāng)年10月進(jìn)一步提升了金融機(jī)構(gòu)住房抵押貸款的自主定價(jià)權(quán)，將商業(yè)性個(gè)人住房貸款利率下限擴(kuò)大到基準(zhǔn)利率的0.7倍。但是，我們也看到，實(shí)際上金融企業(yè)并不是特別地愿意自己對(duì)住房抵押貸款定價(jià)。三、進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革的條件利率市場(chǎng)化改革與其他改革都有關(guān)聯(lián)，下一步推進(jìn)這一改革需要討論一下，應(yīng)培育哪些條件，在哪些方面建立配合關(guān)系。一是利率市場(chǎng)化是在市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中產(chǎn)生的，

7、因此要有一個(gè)充分公平的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境。金融機(jī)構(gòu)在正當(dāng)?shù)氖袌?chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)條件下通過競(jìng)爭(zhēng)來(lái)定價(jià)，雖然定價(jià)可能會(huì)有偏差，但是因?yàn)橛懈?jìng)爭(zhēng)，有多樣化、多元化的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)，有多個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)，總體來(lái)講會(huì)產(chǎn)生合理的均衡價(jià)格。市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)首先一個(gè)條件是要有財(cái)務(wù)硬約束，而不是軟約束。有財(cái)務(wù)硬約束的企業(yè)與只有軟約束的企業(yè)放在一起競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，會(huì)出現(xiàn)大量問題。2003年2004年間，我們?cè)懻撨^，如果有的銀行是政策性銀行，另外一部分雖稱之為商業(yè)銀行，但尚不服從資本充足率的約束，它們與合規(guī)銀行之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)會(huì)有問題。商業(yè)銀行和現(xiàn)存政策性銀行的財(cái)務(wù)約束完全不一樣，有補(bǔ)貼的機(jī)構(gòu)和沒有補(bǔ)貼的機(jī)構(gòu)之間、受資本約束和不受資本約束的機(jī)構(gòu)之間是沒有辦法放在一起公平

8、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的，因此首先一個(gè)條件是財(cái)務(wù)硬約束。特別是我國(guó)，優(yōu)勝劣汰的市場(chǎng)退出機(jī)制尚未建立起來(lái)，市場(chǎng)約束并不是十分有效，對(duì)存款人的隱性擔(dān)保還普遍存在。除了硬約束，還要防止“病號(hào)型”或者“重病型”競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，就是有問題的機(jī)構(gòu)可能更加冒險(xiǎn)，用不正常的利率進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。通過這次金融危機(jī)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，一些金融機(jī)構(gòu)在出現(xiàn)問題時(shí)，往往通過高息攬儲(chǔ)或發(fā)行一些高收益產(chǎn)品獲取資金，以掩蓋資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表出現(xiàn)的問題，企圖繼續(xù)殘喘，并寄希望未來(lái)有機(jī)會(huì)緩過氣來(lái)。在危機(jī)中有很多這樣的機(jī)構(gòu)，我國(guó)也出現(xiàn)過類似現(xiàn)象。如過去一些證券公司出問題后，大量發(fā)行柜臺(tái)債，利息很高，但這是違規(guī)的。這屬于“病號(hào)型競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”，擾亂了正常的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)秩序。二是銀行的客戶要接受和認(rèn)可

9、利率市場(chǎng)化。在一般商品市場(chǎng)，消費(fèi)者對(duì)價(jià)格差異和自主選擇已習(xí)以為常。人們?nèi)ド痰曩?gòu)買物品時(shí)，如果不滿意產(chǎn)品價(jià)格，可以“貨比三家”，到其他商店看看，比比價(jià)格。但在金融市場(chǎng)上，由于過去多年的計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)體制，一些客戶還沒有適應(yīng)銀行服務(wù)的差別化定價(jià)。如果客戶對(duì)銀行某一定價(jià)不滿意，仍習(xí)慣于馬上向政府表達(dá)或歸罪于政府，希望政府來(lái)干預(yù)。政府如果回歸到大規(guī)模干預(yù)，市場(chǎng)化定價(jià)就得走回頭路，還可能導(dǎo)致金融產(chǎn)品定價(jià)成為商業(yè)銀行的“政治表現(xiàn)”，而不是市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的結(jié)果，利率市場(chǎng)化所需要的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制和自主定價(jià)權(quán)的條件就不具備。三是商業(yè)銀行要敢于承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)定價(jià)的責(zé)任。商業(yè)銀行要對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)作出獨(dú)立判斷，并以此確定價(jià)格。在此過程中，定價(jià)高

10、了，就可能導(dǎo)致客戶流失，損失市場(chǎng)份額。對(duì)此，商業(yè)銀行要做好自主定價(jià)和維系客戶（涉及市場(chǎng)份額）之間的權(quán)衡，而客戶也不再簡(jiǎn)單地把價(jià)格的對(duì)與錯(cuò)推到央行或政府身上。從國(guó)際發(fā)展趨勢(shì)看，商業(yè)銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)重點(diǎn)已從追求客戶數(shù)量、追求市場(chǎng)份額轉(zhuǎn)向其他更為綜合的目標(biāo)。從我國(guó)的情況看，客戶數(shù)量和市場(chǎng)份額仍是商業(yè)銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的主要目標(biāo)。這一狀況應(yīng)該有所改變，否則銀行即使有更大的定價(jià)權(quán)，也會(huì)擔(dān)心承擔(dān)責(zé)任而不去運(yùn)用。四是要推動(dòng)整個(gè)金融產(chǎn)品與服務(wù)價(jià)格體系的市場(chǎng)化。價(jià)格歷來(lái)是一個(gè)體系，很多價(jià)格互相關(guān)聯(lián)。在一般商品領(lǐng)域，企業(yè)定價(jià)面對(duì)的是一個(gè)包括了多個(gè)上、下游產(chǎn)品和可替代產(chǎn)出品的價(jià)格體系。如果這個(gè)價(jià)格體系中有些價(jià)格是固定的，或者由政府高

11、度管制的，而有些價(jià)格是市場(chǎng)化的，企業(yè)就難以真正進(jìn)行市場(chǎng)化定價(jià)。同樣，商業(yè)銀行在經(jīng)營(yíng)中要逐步降低利差收入在總收入中的比重，就需要不僅考慮存貸款利率的確定，還要考慮與存貸款有關(guān)聯(lián)或有替代性的中間業(yè)務(wù)金融產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的定價(jià)。對(duì)于一些中間產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的定價(jià)，總有些人主張要繼續(xù)進(jìn)行高度管制，或者一些客戶出于對(duì)定價(jià)的不滿而批評(píng)銀行，并寄希望于找政府干預(yù)。因此，如果利率名義上市場(chǎng)化了，而與中間業(yè)務(wù)相關(guān)的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)定價(jià)卻不放開，則會(huì)出現(xiàn)新的扭曲，商業(yè)銀行也沒有足夠的激勵(lì)去發(fā)展中間業(yè)務(wù)?？梢姡时旧硎巧婕坝啥喾N價(jià)格構(gòu)成的整體，涉及很多相關(guān)金融產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的價(jià)格，利率市場(chǎng)化需要事前有思想準(zhǔn)備對(duì)這個(gè)相互關(guān)聯(lián)的定價(jià)體系進(jìn)

12、行改革。五是需要進(jìn)一步完善貨幣政策傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制。無(wú)論是在正常經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境下，還是在危機(jī)時(shí)期，只有當(dāng)中央銀行貨幣政策得到充分有效的傳導(dǎo)，政策意圖作用于金融系統(tǒng)和實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)的路徑才會(huì)通暢，才能實(shí)現(xiàn)微觀利益與宏觀、整體利益的相互協(xié)調(diào)，社會(huì)效果才能最大化，負(fù)作用也最小化。六是利率市場(chǎng)化還涉及過去推進(jìn)銀行改革過程中的成本分?jǐn)倖栴}。銀行改革成本如何承擔(dān)、消化，與利率市場(chǎng)化改革有很大關(guān)系。把歷史問題解決好了，就為進(jìn)一步改革創(chuàng)造了條件。七是利率市場(chǎng)化過程中政府和媒體的作用也非常重要。四、進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革的幾點(diǎn)考慮“十二五”時(shí)期如何進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革？目前對(duì)此已經(jīng)有一些討論，“十二五”規(guī)劃綱要也正在制定過程

13、中。這里我初步談幾點(diǎn)考慮。一是選擇具有硬約束的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，讓它們?cè)诟?jìng)爭(zhēng)性市場(chǎng)中產(chǎn)生定價(jià)，在一定程度上把財(cái)務(wù)軟約束機(jī)構(gòu)排除在外。前面提到過，2003年開始推進(jìn)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行改革時(shí)，由于改革進(jìn)程不同，各家銀行的自我約束很不一樣：部分銀行已經(jīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)重組，資本充足率較高，資本約束較強(qiáng)；而有的銀行資本充足率為負(fù)數(shù)，也不受資本約束。在這種情況下，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)就很成問題?，F(xiàn)在經(jīng)過這一輪大規(guī)模的金融機(jī)構(gòu)改革，情況已有很大變化。幾乎所有大中型商業(yè)銀行不僅資本得到了補(bǔ)充，而且已成為上市公司，公司治理也得到了很大的改善。2010年，農(nóng)業(yè)銀行、光大銀行上市后，商業(yè)銀行財(cái)務(wù)重組和股份制改革取得階段性成果，這為我們推進(jìn)下一輪的利率

14、市場(chǎng)化改革奠定了重要基礎(chǔ)。二是按照宏觀審慎管理的要求，確立達(dá)標(biāo)金融企業(yè)必須具備的硬約束條件，不達(dá)標(biāo)的企業(yè)就是約束程度不夠。利率市場(chǎng)化過程中，對(duì)于軟約束的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，或者一些“病號(hào)型”、“重病型”金融機(jī)構(gòu)，暫時(shí)還不能給予過大的定價(jià)權(quán)，否則還是缺乏自我約束，還會(huì)出現(xiàn)高息攬儲(chǔ)、攪亂市場(chǎng)等問題。這就是說，只有達(dá)到自我約束標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)方可給予更多的定價(jià)權(quán)。那么，達(dá)到自我約束有什么標(biāo)準(zhǔn)呢？可以結(jié)合這一輪改革方向，把宏觀審慎性幾項(xiàng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)作為一個(gè)標(biāo)尺，建立一個(gè)適應(yīng)宏觀審慎管理需要的穩(wěn)健性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，同時(shí)還要區(qū)別系統(tǒng)重要性機(jī)構(gòu)和非系統(tǒng)重要性機(jī)構(gòu)，也要區(qū)分資本類型和質(zhì)量，這關(guān)系到公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的基礎(chǔ)和損失吸收能力。對(duì)于達(dá)到宏觀

15、審慎性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的金融企業(yè)，就應(yīng)該有更大的自主定價(jià)權(quán)。三是要有實(shí)現(xiàn)正當(dāng)公平的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)主體，既包括銀行，也包括客戶等市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者。在選擇具備正當(dāng)公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力的市場(chǎng)主體時(shí)，還要審視其是否還有未消化的歷史包袱和未暴露的表外包袱。無(wú)論是銀行還是客戶，如果還有若干歷史問題沒有消化，這些機(jī)構(gòu)的定價(jià)行為就可能有違真正的公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，需要被排除在選擇范圍之外。四是要考慮逐步放開替代性金融產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格。這也許無(wú)法一步到位，但總體而言，利率市場(chǎng)化改革應(yīng)整體推進(jìn)，在放開存貸款利率的同時(shí)，其他一系列上、下游產(chǎn)品和替代產(chǎn)品的定價(jià)權(quán)也應(yīng)同時(shí)交由市場(chǎng)決定。這還涉及行政與監(jiān)管當(dāng)局對(duì)套戥行為的態(tài)度。五是盡量避免銀行產(chǎn)品的過分交叉補(bǔ)貼。有的金融機(jī)

16、構(gòu)為了在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中保持市場(chǎng)份額，采取業(yè)務(wù)交叉補(bǔ)貼的做法，表面上某種產(chǎn)品定價(jià)是按規(guī)矩確定的，但同時(shí)通過其他手段對(duì)這一價(jià)格進(jìn)行補(bǔ)貼，從而獲得不正當(dāng)?shù)母?jìng)爭(zhēng)力，擾亂定價(jià)體系。產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)也有類似的情況，表面上某種產(chǎn)品的定價(jià)沒有問題，但如通過配件或易耗品價(jià)格對(duì)產(chǎn)成品價(jià)格實(shí)施補(bǔ)貼，就會(huì)導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)的定價(jià)和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)出現(xiàn)問題。六是要大力加強(qiáng)對(duì)客戶的宣傳教育。除了一些大型客戶對(duì)金融產(chǎn)品具有一定議價(jià)能力外，多數(shù)中小企業(yè)和居民客戶只是價(jià)格的接受者，他們要去適應(yīng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性市場(chǎng)的價(jià)格形成，也要讓他們了解他們有自主選擇和自我保護(hù)的權(quán)利，而不是指望政府行政干預(yù)來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)自己的期望值。這與證券市場(chǎng)上的投資者教育是一個(gè)道理。這里還要講一下，中央銀

17、行征信系統(tǒng)能夠?yàn)榇税l(fā)揮作用，這個(gè)系統(tǒng)包含了客戶信息和進(jìn)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)定價(jià)的判據(jù)。需要進(jìn)一步解決的問題，第一，健全系統(tǒng)本身；第二，系統(tǒng)中如果有些信息出了問題，要有一個(gè)合適的糾正機(jī)制?，F(xiàn)在是網(wǎng)絡(luò)時(shí)代，往往由于難以確知的差錯(cuò)來(lái)源而出現(xiàn)一些錯(cuò)誤信息并被來(lái)回復(fù)制，最后很難澄清，使得客戶不滿意。而這些信息關(guān)系到銀行與具體客戶之間有關(guān)產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的價(jià)格確定。七是建立健全自律性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)秩序。怎么能夠達(dá)到公平、公正的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)及其所形成的價(jià)格呢？當(dāng)然也需要有人維持秩序，也需要考慮到有些時(shí)候競(jìng)爭(zhēng)會(huì)是不正當(dāng)?shù)?，有時(shí)候競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是惡性的，有時(shí)候會(huì)用交叉補(bǔ)貼的辦法來(lái)從事不正當(dāng)?shù)母?jìng)爭(zhēng)，也仍有可能在經(jīng)濟(jì)下滑的階段，會(huì)有一些機(jī)構(gòu)陷入困難，它們會(huì)采用“

18、病號(hào)型”或者“重病型”的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)方式。自律組織的作用和自律管理在這方面具有無(wú)法替代的功能，自律性管理能夠在一定程度上管理正常的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)區(qū)間，制約違規(guī)行為。八是進(jìn)一步確立市場(chǎng)定價(jià)權(quán)，使金融機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)一步增強(qiáng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)定價(jià)的能力。要為金融機(jī)構(gòu)實(shí)現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)硬約束和自主經(jīng)營(yíng)、自擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提供正向激勵(lì)機(jī)制，促使其健康地朝這一方向發(fā)展，更好地推動(dòng)利率市場(chǎng)化?？傊幸?guī)劃、有步驟、堅(jiān)定不移地推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革。我國(guó)還是轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟(jì)，可能仍然還存在著一定程度上的財(cái)務(wù)軟約束，政府的角色定位也有一個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)型的過程，貨幣政策傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制還不充分暢通和健全，一些客戶對(duì)某些金融產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)定價(jià)的理解還不到位等問題，進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)利率市場(chǎng)化改革也要求在多個(gè)領(lǐng)

19、域互動(dòng)和相互促進(jìn)，這些都是整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)軌過程中必須面對(duì)的問題。要把這些相關(guān)問題的解決看成是利率市場(chǎng)化改革過程的組成部分，強(qiáng)調(diào)它們之間的相互聯(lián)系。在下一步討論“十二五”規(guī)劃綱要過程中，需要在劃定范圍、提供激勵(lì)、加強(qiáng)自律的思路下，把利率市場(chǎng)化改革向前推進(jìn)。譯文：promoting interest rate marketizationgradually promoting interest rate marketization in the 12th five-year plan takes on a special meaning, and some obvious progress may be

20、 made.by zhou xiaochuan / governor of the peoples bank of chinatwo months ago, the party central committee held the fifth plenary session of the 17th central committee. the session produced a blueprint for the 12th five-year plan. the financial part of this blueprint addresses in particular the deve

21、lopment and reform of the financial system, and its principal tasks during the 12th five-year plan. in addition, the agricultural, market and opening to the outside policy parts of this blueprint all mention financial reform. i think we should discuss these parts one by one.promoting interest rate m

22、arketization has taken place over many years. gradually promoting interest rate marketization in the blueprint of the 12th five-year plan. we will make obvious progress during the 12th five-year plan.why marketize interest rate?the first problem is why to promote interest rate marketization.first, i

23、nterest rate marketization reflects the effect of resource allocation optimization. in 1992, china determined to establish a socialist market economy, which is supposed to give the market a fundamental role in optimizing resource allocation. interest rate is a very important price. therefore, intere

24、st rate marketization shall play a fundamental role in coordination with market and resources, in order to optimize resource allocation. interest rate is also a reference price for many other products.second, the reform process shall respect the enterprises decision-making powers, among which the pr

25、incipal pricing right. except for financial policy institutions, the majority of financial institutions operate under the standards set up for common enterprises. in addition, an important aspect reflecting enterprise financial autonomy is their pricing right.third, interest rate marketization shows

26、 respect for the clients rights to choose. the clients of banks include residents, enterprises and various other types of entities which have selecting rights in the market. they can show satisfaction or dissatisfaction to the enterprises providing financial services. they can select one or another,

27、 and at the same time they can select products with different prices.fourth, it reflects the requirement of difference and diversity (of the market) as well as judgments of risks. in market, financial products, just like other commodities, will differentiate from one another. the risk control is bas

28、ed on judgment. each client, bank and financial institution have their own judgments. their different risk control abilities may usher in different pricing consideration.fifth, interest rate marketization can by and large reflect the requirement of macro control. macro control includes the currency

29、policy of the central bank. there should be a smooth and effective transmission mechanism to influence market prices as well as market pricing.progress of interest rate marketizationinterest rate marketization takes time. some progress has been made in recent years. we can review below the progress

30、made in interest rate marketization after the recovery from the asian financial crisis:first, we liberated incrementally the interest rate of foreign currency deposit/loan rates in the domestic market mainly in 2003 and 2004.second, the right to price enterprise loans has kept exapnding. the floatin

31、g range was only around 20% in the very beginning. afterwards, the upward range expanded by 1.7 times, and finally the maximum ceiling loan float disappeared. the prime interest rate of 0.9% was the downward floor point, and it has not been completely liberated. in 2004 and 2005, deposit rates are e

32、ntitled to floated down.third, market prices of enterprise debt and commercial notes, and there was no limit to the price. along with the development of various notes and bonds issued by all kinds of companies in various markets especially the otc market, many enterprises, especially good-quality on

33、es, are never limited by the primary interest rate when choosing issuing notes or enterprise debt for finance.fourth, after the wenchuan earthquake, enterprises were given more decision-making powers on housing mortgage loan interest rates. because we wanted to rebuild houses in the wenchuan area as

34、 soon as possible, the floating range on loans offered there was enlarged, so as to support the reconstruction of the disaster area. however, we have seen that enterprises are actually unwilling to price housing mortgage loans.interest rate marketization needs cooperation of related areasinterest ra

35、te marketization is related to other reforms. in the process of promoting interest rate marketization reform, we shall discuss what conditions should be cultivated and in what avenue cooperation is needed.firstly, interest rate marketization is generated through market competition. it means the fina

36、ncial institutions price is set through competition in a normal market. pricing may have deviations, but with competition, variety and diversity, and the participation of many institutions, generally speaking, the market can operatenormally.second, the first condition for market competition is that

37、there should be hard financial rationing instead of soft rationing. when hard rationing enterprises compete with soft rationing enterprises, many problems arise. in 2003 and 2004, some banks were basically policy banks, and others are commercial banks. allowing them to compete with each other would

38、be problematic. finance rationing conditions for commercial banks and existing policy banks are different, and there is no way to allow those with subsidies and those without subsidies to compete.hard rationing means a fair and self-restrained competition. besides hard rationing, we shall introduce

39、a concept, which i call patient competition. it is actually a phenomenon in financial circles. in this financial crisis, we observed that when a financial institution had a problem, it usually struggled, solicited depositors with high-interest rates, and issued tools with high prices to cover balanc

40、e sheet problems with a hope to recover in the future. we have seen a lot of such institutions.in china, this condition exists too. when the securities companies that i handled at china securities regulatory commission had problems, they issued counter debts in large quantities. some debts were agai

41、nst regulations, and the interest rates were high. at that time, they had to be considered as patients, even critically-ill patients. this condition may very likely disturb the normal competition order, and at the same time result in many unfavorable phenomena in the process of interest rate marketi

42、zation.bank clients shall select service providers by themselves. at present, except very large clients, common clients dont have pricing right. no matter they are satisfied or not, they have to accept the prices set by banks. when going shopping, if the customers are not satisfied with the price, t

43、hey may go to another one. however, due to our long-term tradition of planned economy and of the so-called fixed pricing, some clients with dissatisfaction will complain to it immediately, thinking that the government is to blame. actually we should regard that as regular shopping. banks provide com

44、petitive market services, and clients have the right to choose. if we blame the government for these things, there will be a problem. commercial banks set up their own prices according to their own risk judgment. if the clients view this behavior as government driven, it will hinder interest rate ma

45、rketization reforms.third, an improved currency policy transmission mechanism needs to be put in place. under the condition that interest rate marketization develops further, we can ensure the efficiency of the currency policy transmission of the central bank will continue to be effective. it should

46、 be more effective, not only during normal times, but also during crisis periods too.fourth, commercial banks should prepare for possible losses, and be brave enough to take the responsibility of risk pricing. namely, the commercial banks will judge risk premiums by themselves before setting their o

47、wn prices. the so-called bearing losses by the commercial banks will not necessarily mean economic losses, but if their pricing is different from that of their peers, they may lose clients and market share. from an international perspective, the focus of competition among commercial banks is moving

48、away slowly from market shares and clients to other more comprehensive standards. however, in china, the market share is still the main internal index for mutual competition among banks. this will change. at present, banks already have some pricing rights in some aspects, but these rights are not fu

49、lly used. one major fear held by the banks is losing market share. the banks would thus rather match their pricing with that of others, rather than stand out. this issue needs to be improved.fifth, another issue connected with interest rate marketization is the marketization of pricing across a rang

50、e of financial products. pricing has always been a highly inter-connected system. we can imagine that, if the prices of an enterprise抯 upstream/downstream products, raw materials and replaceable products are fixed or strictly controlled by the government, these products will have many connections wi

51、th other products and may be easily replaced by others. under this condition, their own marketization may be restrained.therefore, what we need to do now is ask commercial banks to gradually reduce the proportion of interest margin income in the total income, or of the created profit in the operatio

52、n process.however, in order to achieve this, many pricing problems of other financial services must be solved. there are always those who advocate that strict control over financial services should continue, and those who, if they are dissatisfied with pricing, would directly criticize the governmen

53、t.therefore, under such conditions, interest rate has many variations. there can be over ten or twenty main interest rates plus other related financial services. additionally, prices of many intermediary businesses are to a certain extent related to interest rates. with the development of bank servi

54、ces, interest rate price is a system instead of a single numerical value.sixth, in the process of interest rate marketization, the reaction of the government and reaction of the medias are also very important.seventh, interest rate marketization reform also involves the reform of the long-standing b

55、ank cost apportionment problem. how the cost is shouldered and digested is directly related to interest rate marketization reform and is needed to create conditions for interest rate marketization reform.suggestion on interest rate marketization for the 12th five-year planthe blueprint of the 12th f

56、ive-year plan is being prepared, and i would like to talk about some views on interest rate marketization:first, if we want financial institutions to generate pricing in the competitive market, we should select financial institutions with hard rationing first. we should liberate their pricing right,

57、 and exclude to a certain extent the soft rationing institutions.when interest rate marketization advanced to a certain degree, why didn抰 we see a very obvious acceleration? at that time, some policy banks had nominally become commercial banks, but were still associated with financial subsidy policy

58、, and maintained their policy bank credentials.beginning from 2003 or 2004, in the reform process of large and medium financial institutions, the capital adequacy ratios of banks were different, because the financial restructuring progress was different. under these conditions, some enterprises were

59、 restrained by their capital adequacy ratio. some enterprises capital adequacy ratios were too low and unrestrained. some enterprises were even defined as commercial financial institutions on the surface, despite showing obvious soft rationing. self-rationing degrees were different, and consequently competition was problematic.in the round of financial restructuring reform of financial institutions, the situa