并購(gòu)支付方式在歐洲的選擇【外文翻譯】

1、本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）外 文 翻 譯原文：the choice of payment method in european m & aglobal m&a activity has grown dramatically over the last ten years, bringing with it major changes in the organization and control of economic activity around the world. yet, there is much about the m&a process that we do not fully un

2、derstand, including the choice of payment method. given the large size of many m&a transactions, the financing decision can have a significant impact on an acquirers ownership structure, financial leverage, and subsequent financing decisions. the financing decision can also have serious corporate co

3、ntrol, risk bearing, tax and cash flow implications for the buying and selling firms and shareholders. in making an m&a currency decision, a bidder is faced with a choice between using cash and stock as deal consideration. given that most bidders have limited cash and liquid assets, cash offers gene

4、rally require debt financing. as a consequence, a bidder implicitly faces the choice of debt or equity financing, which can involve a tradeoff between corporate control concerns of issuing equity and rising financial distress costs of issuing debt. thus, a bidders m&a currency decision can be strong

5、ly influenced by its debt capacity and existing leverage. it can also be strongly influenced by managements desire to maintain the existing corporate governance structure. in contrast, a seller can be faced with a tradeoff between the tax benefits of stock and the liquidity and risk minimizing benef

6、its of cash consideration. for example, sellers may be willing to accept stock if they have a low tax basis in the target stock and can defer their tax liabilities by accepting bidder stock as payment. on the other hand, sellers can prefer cash consideration to side step the risk of becoming a minor

7、ity shareholder in a bidder with concentrated ownership, thereby avoiding the associated moral hazard problems. unfortunately, due to data limitations, this seller trade off can not be easily measured.under existing theories of capital structure, debt capacity is a positive function of tangible asse

8、ts, earnings growth and asset diversification and a negative function of asset volatility. firms with greater tangible assets can borrow more privately from banks and publicly in the bond market. since larger firms are generally more diversified, we expect them to have a lower probability of bankrup

9、tcy at a given leverage ratio and thus, greater debt capacity. these financing constraint and bankruptcy risk considerations can also reduce a lenders willingness to finance a bidders cash bid, especially in relatively large deals. in assessing potential determinants of an m&a payment method, our fo

10、cus is on a bidders m&a financing choices, recognizing that targets can also influence the final terms of an m&a deal. however,if a targets financing choice is unacceptable to the bidder, then the proposed m&a transaction is likely to be aborted or else the bidder can make a hostile offer on its own

11、 terms. for a deal to succeed, the bidder must be satisfied with the financial structure of the deal. bidder and target considerations:* corporate control bidders controlled by a major shareholder should be reluctant to use stock financing when this causes the controlling shareholder to risk losing

12、control. assuming control is valuable, the presence of dominant shareholder positions should be associated with more frequent use of cash, especially when the controlling shareholders position is threatened. to capture this effect, we use the ultimate voting stake held by the largest controlling sha

13、reholder. a bidder with diffuse or highly concentrated ownership is less likely to be concerned with corporate control issues. in line with this argument, martin (1996) documents a significantly negative relationship between the likelihood of stock financing and managerial ownership only over the in

14、termediate ownership range. therefore, we incorporate the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the method of payment and the voting rights of a bidders controlling shareholder by estimating both a linear and cubic specification for the ultimate voting control percentage of the bidders la

15、rgest shareholder. in our robustness analysis, we also estimate a spline function for this variable.corporate control concerns in m&a activity can manifest themselves in more subtle ways. concentrated ownership of a target means that a stock financed acquisition can create a large blockholder, threa

16、tening the corporate governance of the acquirer. if the seller is closely held or is a corporation disposing of a division, then ownership concentration tends to be very concentrated. this implies that financing the m&a deal with stock can create a new blockholder in the bidder. while the risk of cr

17、eating a new bidder blockholder with stock financing is higher when a target has a concentrated ownership structure, this is especially ture when relative size of the deal is large. to capture the risk of creating a large blockholder when buying a target with stock financing, we employ control loss,

18、 the product between the targets control block and the deals ralative size. the relative deal size is computed as the ratio of offer size (excluding assumed liabilities) to the sum of a bidders equity pre-offer capitalization plus the offer size. the targets controlling blockholder is assumed to hav

19、e 100 % ownership for unlisted targets and subsidiary targets. * collateral, financial leverage and debt capacitywe use the fraction of tangible assets as our primary measure of a bidders ability to pay cash, financed from additional borrowing. collateral is measured by the ratio of property, plant

20、and equipment to book value of total assets. myers (1977) argues that debtholders in firms with fewer tangible assets and more growth opportunities are subject to greater moral hazard risk, which increases the cost of debt, often making stock more attractive. hovakimian, opler and titman(2001) find

21、that a firms percentage of tangible assets has a strong positive influence on its debt level.we also control for a bidders financial condition with its leverage ratio, finl leverage. since cash is primarily obtained by issuing new debt, highly levered bidders are constrained in their ability to issu

22、e debt and as a consequence use stock financing more frequently. a bidders financial leverage is measured by the sum of the bidders face value of debt prior to the m&a announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the book valve of total assets prior to the an

23、nouncement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities). this captures the bidders post-deal leverage if the transaction is debt financed. this measure differs from martin(1996) who uses a pre-deal bidder leverage measure adjusted for industry mean and reports an insignificant effect.bidder s

24、ize is likely to influence its financing choices. larger firms are more diversified and thus, have proportionally lower expected bankruptcy costs. they also have lower flotation costs and are likely to have better access to debt markets, making debt financing more readily available. thus, cash finan

25、cing should be more feasible in the case of larger firms. larger firms are also more apt to choose cash financing in smaller deals due to its ease of use, provided they have sufficient unused debt capacity or liquid assets. further, the use of cash allows the bidder to avoid the significant costs of

26、 obtaining shareholder approval of pre-emptive rights exemptions and authorizations and the higher regulatory costs of stock offers. we measure bidder assets size by the log of pre-merger book value of assets in dollars(total assets). in addition to bidder control and financing considerations, we ne

27、ed to take into account several other bidder characteristics.* relative deal size, bidder stock price runup and asymmetric informationhansen (1987) predicts that bidders have greater incentives to finance with stock when the asymmetric information about target assets is high. this information asymme

28、try is likely to rise as target assets rise in value relative to those of a bidder. yet, stock is used in relatively larger deals, it produces more serious dilution of a dominant shareholders control position. finally, as bidder equity capitalization rises, concern about its financing constraint fal

29、ls, since there is a relatively smaller impact on its overall financial conditon. we proxy for these effects with rel size, which is computed as the ratio of deal offer size (excluding assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the deals offer size plus the bidders pre-offer market capitalization at

30、the year-end prior to the bid.both myers and majluf (1984) and hansen (1987) predict that bidders will prefer to finance with stock when they consider their stock overvalued by the market and prefer to finance with cash when they consider their stock undervalued. as uncertainty about bidder asset va

31、lue rises, this adverse selection effect is exacerbated. martin (1996) finds evidence consistent with this adverse selection prediction. for a sample of publicly traded targets, travlos (1987) finds that stock financed m&a deals exhibit much larger negative announcement effects than cash financed de

32、als. he concludes this is consistent with the empirical validity of an adverse selection effect. we use as a proxy for bidder overvaluation (or undervaluation), calculated from a bidders buy and hold cumulative stock return over the year preceding the m&a announcement month.in addition to bidder con

33、siderations, we need to take into account typical target considerations. these preferences are related to risk, liquidity, asymmetric information and home bias.t1. unlisted targets and subsidiary targetswe use an indicator variable, unlisted target, to control for listing status where the variable t

34、akes a value of one if the target is a stand-alone company, not listed on any stock exchange and is zero for listed targets and unlisted subsidiaries. when an m&a deal involves an unlisted target, a sellers consumption/liquidity needs are also likely to be important considerations. these sellers are

35、 likely to prefer cash given the illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio holdings and the often impending retirement of a controlling shareholder-manager. likewise, corporations selling subsidiaries are often motivated by financial distress concerns or a desire to restructure toward thei

36、r core competency. in either case, there is a strong preference for cash consideration to realize these financial or asset restructuring goals. a likely consequence is a greater use of cash in such deals, since bidders are frequently motivated to divest subsidiaries to finance new acquisitions or re

37、duce their debt burden. as noted earlier, these two target ownership structures are also likely to elicit bidder corporate control concerns given their concentrated ownership. thus, bidders are likely to prefer cash financing of such deals, especially as they become relatively large.t2. cross-indust

38、ry deals and asymmetric informationseller reluctance to accept bidder stock as payment should rise as the asymmetric information problem worsens with greater uncertainty about bidder equity value and future earnings. this problem is also likely to be more serious for conglomerate mergers. in contras

39、t, sellers are more apt to accept a continuing equity position in an intraindustry merger, where they are well acquainted with industry risks and prospects. t3. cross-border deals, local exchange listing and home biasin cross border deals, selling stock to foreign investors can entail several proble

40、ms. we are concerned with the possibility that investors have a home country bias in their portfolio decisions as documented in coval and moskowitz (1999), french and poterba (1991) and grinblatt and keloharju(2001), among others. this can reflect a foreign stocks greater trading costs, lower liquid

41、ity, exposure to exchange risk and less timely, more limited access to firm information. t4. bidder investment opportunitieshigh growth bidders can make an attractive equity investment for selling shareholders. mktto-book, defined as a market value of equity plus book value of debt over the sum of b

42、ook value of equity plus book value of debt prior to the bid, measures a bidders investment in growth opportunities.we expect a higher market to book ratio to increase a bidder stocks attractiveness as m&a consideration. high market to book is also correlated with high levels of tax deductible r&d e

43、xpenditures, along with low current earnings and cash dividends. these firm attributes lower a bidders need for additional debt tax shield, making cash financing less attractive. these attributes are also attractive to high income bracket sellers due to their tax benefits. jung, kim and stulz (1996)

44、 document a higher incidence of stock financing for higher market to book buyers.source: mara faccio and ronald w.masulis, 2005 “the choice of payment in european mergers & acqusitions”.the journal of finance, volume 60 issue 3, pp. 1345-1388.譯文：并購(gòu)支付方式在歐洲的選擇在過(guò)去的十年，全球并購(gòu)活動(dòng)已顯著增長(zhǎng),同時(shí)帶來(lái)組織的重大改變和在世界各地的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的

45、控制。然而,有很多的并購(gòu)的過(guò)程,我們并不完全理解,包括支付方式的選擇。鑒于許多公司并購(gòu)交易規(guī)模大,融資決策可能對(duì)收購(gòu)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、財(cái)務(wù)杠桿率產(chǎn)生重大的影響,以及之后的融資決策。融資決策也會(huì)有嚴(yán)重的公司控制，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)能力，稅務(wù)和現(xiàn)金流以及影響買(mǎi)賣公司和股東。在作出并購(gòu)貨幣決策時(shí),收購(gòu)方面臨一個(gè)選擇,是用現(xiàn)金還是股票交易的考慮。鑒于大多數(shù)收購(gòu)方有有限的資金和流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)，現(xiàn)金一般需要提供債務(wù)融資。因此,收購(gòu)方暗中地面臨著舉債或發(fā)行股票融資的選擇,它包含了發(fā)行權(quán)益之間以及越來(lái)越多地發(fā)行債務(wù)的企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)困境成本控制問(wèn)題的權(quán)衡。因此,收購(gòu)方的并購(gòu)貨幣決定,可以強(qiáng)烈地影響其債務(wù)能力和現(xiàn)有的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿的作用。它也可以強(qiáng)

46、烈地影響管理層的愿望，以維持現(xiàn)有的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。與此相反,賣方可能面對(duì)股票之間的稅收優(yōu)惠和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最小化的流動(dòng)性和現(xiàn)金代價(jià)利益的權(quán)衡。例如,賣方可能愿意接受股票，如果他們?cè)谝粋€(gè)目標(biāo)股價(jià)低稅率基礎(chǔ)上,能推遲他們的稅務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)通過(guò)接受收購(gòu)方的股票作為支付手段。另一方面,賣家可能更偏愛(ài)于現(xiàn)金考慮，以避開(kāi)成為一個(gè)小股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)在集中所有人的收購(gòu)方，從而避免了相關(guān)的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。不幸的是,由于數(shù)據(jù)的限制,賣方權(quán)益不容易衡量。在現(xiàn)行資本結(jié)構(gòu)的理論下,償債能力是有形資產(chǎn)、收益增長(zhǎng)和資產(chǎn)多樣化的積極作用和資產(chǎn)的波動(dòng)性的負(fù)面作用。公司擁有更大的有形資產(chǎn)可以從銀行或公開(kāi)的債券市場(chǎng)私底下里借到更多。由于大公司一般來(lái)說(shuō)更

47、多元化,我們期望在給定的杠桿率的基礎(chǔ)上它們會(huì)有一個(gè)較低的破產(chǎn)概率,還有更大的負(fù)債能力。這些融資約束和破產(chǎn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素也可以減少借款人愿意資助一個(gè)收購(gòu)方的現(xiàn)金收購(gòu),尤其是在相對(duì)較大的交易中。在評(píng)估并購(gòu)支付方式的潛在因素時(shí),我們的重點(diǎn)是收購(gòu)方的并購(gòu)融資選擇,認(rèn)識(shí)到目標(biāo)也能影響到一個(gè)并購(gòu)交易的最終條款。然而,如果一個(gè)目標(biāo)的融資是不能被收購(gòu)方接受的,那么所提出的并購(gòu)交易可能會(huì)被中止,否則該收購(gòu)方能夠用自己的方式進(jìn)行敵意收購(gòu)。為了達(dá)成交易的成功,該收購(gòu)方必須對(duì)該次交易的資本結(jié)構(gòu)滿意。收購(gòu)方和目標(biāo)要考慮的問(wèn)題:*公司的控制權(quán)被大股東所控制的收購(gòu)方不情愿使用股票融資，這將導(dǎo)致持有控股權(quán)的股東有失去控制的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

48、假設(shè)控制是有價(jià)值的,那么具有支配權(quán)的股東將更頻繁地使用現(xiàn)金,尤其是當(dāng)控股股東的位置已經(jīng)受到威脅的時(shí)候。為了達(dá)到這個(gè)結(jié)果,我們使用最終投票的股份，股份由最大的控股股東持有。有廣泛或高度集中所有權(quán)的收購(gòu)方是不太可能對(duì)公司控制問(wèn)題表示關(guān)注的。按照這種觀點(diǎn),馬丁(1996)評(píng)述了只能通過(guò)一系列的中間所有權(quán)之間的股權(quán)融資和管理所有權(quán)之間可能的顯著地負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。因此,我們提供可能的非線性關(guān)系的支付方式和收購(gòu)方的控股股東的投票權(quán)，通過(guò)線性和立體來(lái)預(yù)測(cè)該收購(gòu)方的最大股東的最終投票控制百分比。在我們的穩(wěn)定分析中,我們也估計(jì)了這個(gè)變量樣條函數(shù)。公司控制權(quán)的并購(gòu)活動(dòng)可能會(huì)以更加微妙的方式顯示他們。一個(gè)目標(biāo)所有權(quán)的集

49、中意味著股票融資收購(gòu)可以創(chuàng)造一個(gè)大股東來(lái)威脅收購(gòu)方的公司治理。如果賣方持有公司的一個(gè)部門(mén),那么股權(quán)集中度往往是非常集中的。這意味著并購(gòu)融資與股票收購(gòu)可以創(chuàng)建一個(gè)新的大股東的收購(gòu)方。當(dāng)目標(biāo)企業(yè)有一個(gè)集中的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)時(shí)，盡管建立一個(gè)新的收購(gòu)方與大股東股權(quán)融資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高，但是當(dāng)相對(duì)規(guī)模較大時(shí)這是特別真實(shí)的。為了獲得通過(guò)股票融資來(lái)購(gòu)買(mǎi)企業(yè)的大股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，我們使用失去控制，在目標(biāo)的控制區(qū)和交易的相關(guān)大小的產(chǎn)品。相對(duì)交易規(guī)模計(jì)算為發(fā)行規(guī)模比率（不包括承擔(dān)的負(fù)債）向收購(gòu)方的權(quán)益預(yù)先提供資本，加上發(fā)行規(guī)模的總和。假設(shè)目標(biāo)的控股大股東有非上市子公司100的所有權(quán)。*抵押,財(cái)務(wù)杠桿和債務(wù)能力我們用有形資產(chǎn)的一部分

50、作為衡量一個(gè)收購(gòu)方支付現(xiàn)金，額外的資金借貸的主要方式。抵押品用其財(cái)產(chǎn)，廠房和設(shè)備總資產(chǎn)的賬面價(jià)值來(lái)衡量。邁爾斯(1977)指出持債者用更少的有形資產(chǎn)和更多的發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)的方式會(huì)受到更大的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，增加負(fù)債的成本，容易導(dǎo)致股票更有吸引力。hovakimian,opler和titman(2001)發(fā)現(xiàn)公司有形資產(chǎn)的比例對(duì)其債務(wù)水平有很強(qiáng)的正面影響。我們還用其杠桿比率控制了收購(gòu)方的財(cái)務(wù)狀況。由于獲得的現(xiàn)金主要是通過(guò)發(fā)行新債，高杠桿收購(gòu)方被他們的能力所限制，因此發(fā)行債券和股票融資越來(lái)越頻繁。收購(gòu)方的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿被用來(lái)衡量收購(gòu)方在并購(gòu)宣布之前的債務(wù)的票面價(jià)值的總和，加交易的總價(jià)值(包括承擔(dān)的負(fù)債)除以并購(gòu)宣布之

51、前的總資產(chǎn)的賬面價(jià)值，加上交易價(jià)值(包括承擔(dān)的債務(wù))。如果交易是債務(wù)融資那么就抓住了收購(gòu)方交易之后的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿率。這個(gè)方式不同于馬丁(1996)，使用交易前收購(gòu)方的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿率來(lái)調(diào)整，且報(bào)告具有無(wú)關(guān)緊要的作用。收購(gòu)方大小可能會(huì)影響其融資的選擇。大企業(yè)的形式更加多樣化,因此，有較低的預(yù)期破產(chǎn)成本比例。同時(shí)，他們也有較低的浮選成本，且有可能有更好的途徑進(jìn)入債務(wù)市場(chǎng)，使債務(wù)融資更加容易。因此，現(xiàn)金融資在大公司更可行。大公司也由于現(xiàn)金的易用性而更傾向于選擇規(guī)模較小的交易，只要有足夠的未使用的債務(wù)能力或流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)。此外允許使用現(xiàn)金，收購(gòu)方避免重大的成本，獲得批準(zhǔn)股東權(quán)利豁免和授權(quán)先發(fā)制人,較高的調(diào)節(jié)性花費(fèi)的股票報(bào)價(jià)