家庭環(huán)境對(duì)小學(xué)高年級(jí)學(xué)生社會(huì)智力的影響應(yīng)用心理學(xué)外文翻譯畢業(yè)論文

1、原文：Social Intelligence社會(huì)智力Intelligence, as defined in standard dictionaries, has two rather different meanings. In its most familiar meaning, intelligence has to do with the individuals ability to learn and reason. It is this meaning which underlies common psychometric notions such as intelligence t

2、esting, the intelligence quotient, and the like. In its less common meaning, intelligence has to do a body of information and knowledge. This second meaning is implicated in the titles of certain government organizations, such as the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States, and its British

3、counterparts MI-5 and MI-6. Similarly, both meanings are invoked by the concept of social intelligence. As originally coined by E.L. Thorndike (1920), the term referred the persons ability to understand and manage other people, and to engage in adaptive social interactions. More recently, however, C

4、antor and Kihlstrom (1987) redefined social intelligence to refer to the individuals fund of knowledge about the social world.1、The Psychometric ViewThe psychometric view of social intelligence has its origins E.L. Thorndikes (1920) division of intelligence into three facets, pertaining to the abili

5、ty to understand and manage ideas (abstract intelligence), concrete objects (mechanical intelligence), and people (social intelligence). In his classic formulation: By social intelligence is meant the ability to understand and manage men and women, boys and girls - to act wisely in human relations (

6、p. 228). Similarly, Moss and Hunt (1927) defined social intelligence as the ability to get along with others (p. 108). Vernon (1933), provided the most wide-ranging definition of social intelligence as the persons ability to get along with people in general, social technique or ease in society, know

7、ledge of social matters, susceptibility to stimuli from other members of a group, as well as insight into the temporary moods or underlying personality traits of strangers (p. 44).By contrast, Wechsler (1939, 1958) gave scant attention to the concept. Wechsler did acknowledge that the Picture Arrang

8、ement subtest of the WAIS might serve as a measure of social intelligence, because it assesses the individuals ability to comprehend social situations (see also Rapport, Gill, & Shafer, 1968; Campbell & McCord, 1996). In his view, however, social intelligence is just general intelligence applied to

9、social situations (1958, p. 75). This dismissal is repeated in Paparazzos (1972, p. 209) fifth edition of Wechslers monograph, in which social intelligence dropped out as an index term.Defining social intelligence seems easy enough, especially by analogy to abstract intelligence. When it came tomeas

10、uringsocial intelligence, however, E.L. Thorndike (1920) noted somewhat ruefully that convenient tests of social intelligence are hard to devise. Social intelligence shows itself abundantly in the nursery, on the playground, in barracks and factories and salesroom (sic), but it eludes the formal sta

11、ndardized conditions of the testing laboratory. It requires human beings to respond to, time to adapt its responses, and face, voice, gesture, and mien as tools (p. 231). Nevertheless, true to the goals of the psychometric tradition, the abstract definitions of social intelligence were quickly trans

12、lated into standardized laboratory instruments for measuring individual differences in social intelligence (for additional reviews, see Taylor, 1990; Taylor & Cadet, 1989; Walker & Foley, 1973).The George Washington Social Intelligence TestThe first of these was the George Washington Social Intellig

13、ence Test, (GWSIT; Hunt, 1928; Moss, 1931; Moss, Hunt, Omak, & Running, 1927; for later editions, see Moss, Hunt, & Omak, 1949; Moss, Hunt, Omak, & Woodward, 1955). Like the Stanford-Benet Intelligence Test or Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the GWSIT was composed of a number of subtests, which c

14、an be combined to yield an aggregate score. The subtests are:Judgment in Social Situations;Memory for Names and Faces;Observation of Human Behavior;Recognition of the Mental States Behind Words;Recognition of Mental States from Facial Expression;Social Information; andSense of Humor:The first four s

15、ubtests were employed in all editions of the GWSIT. The Facial Expression and Social Information subtests were dropped, and the Humor subtest added, in later editions.Hunt (1928) originally validated the GWSIT through its correlations with adult occupational status, the number of extracurricular act

16、ivities pursued by college students, and supervisor ratings of employees ability to get along with people. However, some controversy ensued about whether social intelligence should be correlated with personality measures of sociability or extraversion (e.g., String, 1930; Thorndike & Stein, 1937). M

17、ost important, however, the GWSIT came under immediate criticism for its relatively high correlation with abstract intelligence. Thus, Hunt (1928) found that aggregate GWSIT score correlatedr= .54 with aggregate score on the George Washington University Mental Alertness Test (GWMAT), an early IQ sca

18、le (see also Broom, 1928). A factor analysis by R.L. Thorndike (1936) indicated that the subtests of the GWSIT loaded highly on the same general factor as the subtests of the GWMAT. Woodrow (1939), analyzing the GWSIT with a much larger battery of cognitive tests, found no evidence for a unique fact

19、or of social intelligence. R.L. Thorndike and Stein (1937) concluded that the GWSIT is so heavily loaded with ability to work with words and ideas, that differences in social intelligence tend to be swamped by differences in abstract intelligence (p. 282).The inability to discriminate between the so

20、cial intelligence and IQ, coupled with difficulties in selecting external criteria against which the scale could be validated, led to declining interest in the GWSIT, and indeed in the whole concept of social intelligence as a distinct intellectual entity. Spearmans (1927) model ofgafforded no speci

21、al place for social intelligence, of course. Nor is social intelligence included, or even implied, in Thurstons (1938) list of primary mental abilities.Social Intelligence in the Structure of IntellectAfter an initial burst of interest in the GWSIT, work on the assessment and correlates of social in

22、telligence fell off sharply until the 1960s (Walker & Foley, 1973), when this line of research was revived within the context of Guilfords (1967) Structure of Intellect model. Guilford postulated a system of at least 120 separate intellectual abilities, based on all possible combinations of five cat

23、egories of operations (cognition, memory, divergent production, convergent production, and evaluation), with four categories of content (figural, symbolic, semantic, and behavioral) and six categories of products (units, classes, relations, systems, transformations, and implications). Interestingly,

24、 Guilford considers his system to be an expansion of the tripartite classification of intelligence originally proposed by E.L. Thorndike. Thus, the symbolic and semantic content domains correspond to abstract intelligence, the figural domain to practical intelligence, and the behavioral domain to so

25、cial intelligence.Within Guilfords (1967) more differentiated system, social intelligence is represented as the 30 (5 operations x 6 products) abilities lying in the domain of behavioral operations. In contrast to its extensive work on semantic and figural content, Guilfords group addressed issues o

26、f behavioral content only very late in their program of research. Nevertheless, of the 30 facets of social intelligence predicted by the structure-of-intellect model, actual tests were devised for six cognitive abilities (OSullivan et al., 1965; Hoepfner & OSullivan, 1969) and six divergent producti

27、on abilities (Hendricks, Guilford, & Hoepfner, 1969).OSulivan et al. (1965) defined the category of behavioral cognition as representing the ability to judge people (p. 5) with respect to feelings, motives, thoughts, intentions, attitudes, or other psychological dispositions which might affect an in

28、dividuals social behavior (OSullivan et al., p. 4). They made it clear that ones ability to judge individual people was not the same as his or her comprehension of people in general, or stereotypic understanding (p. 5), and bore noa priorirelation to ones ability to understand oneself. Apparently, t

29、hese two aspects of social cognition lie outside the standard structure-of-intellect model.In constructing their tests of behavioral cognition, OSullivan et al. (1965) assumed that expressive behavior, more particularly facial expressions, vocal inflections, postures, and gestures, are the cues from

30、 which intentional states are inferred (p. 6). While recognizing the value of assessing the ability to decode these cues in real-life contexts with real people serving as targets, economic constraints forced the investigators to rely on photographs, cartoons, drawings, and tape recordings (the cost

31、of film was prohibitive); verbal materials were avoided wherever possible, presumably in order to avoid contamination of social intelligence by verbal abilities. In the final analysis, OSullivan et. al developed at least three different tests within each product domain, each test consisting of 30 or

32、 more separate items - by any standard, a monumental effort at theory-guided test construction. The six cognitive abilities defined by OSullivan et al. were:Cognition of behavioral units: the ability to identify the internal mental states of individuals;Cognition of behavioral classes: the ability t

33、o group together other peoples mental states on the basis of similarity;Cognition of behavioral relations: the ability to interpret meaningful connections among behavioral acts;Cognition of behavioral systems: the ability to interpret sequences of social behavior;Cognition of behavioral transformati

34、ons: the ability to respond flexibly in interpreting changes in social behavior; andCognition of behavioral implications: the ability to predict what will happen in an interpersonal situation.A later study by Chen and Michael (1993), employing more modern factor-analytic techniques, essentially conf

35、irmed these findings. In addition, Chen and Michael extracted a set of higher-order factors which largely conformed to the theoretical predictions of Guilfords (1981) revised structure-of-intellect model. A similar re-analysis of the OSullivan et al. (1965) has yet to be reported.In summary, Guilfor

36、d and his colleagues were successful in devising measures for two rather different domains of social intelligence: understanding the behavior of other people (cognition of behavioral content), and coping with the behavior of other people (divergent production of behavioral content). These component

37、abilities were relatively independent of each other within the behavioral domain, and each was also relatively independent of the non-behavioral abilities, as predicted (and required) by the structure-of-intellect model.Despite the huge amount of effort that the Guilford group invested in the measur

38、ement of social intelligence, it should be understood that the studies of OSullivan et al. (1965) and Hendricks et al. (1969) went only part of the way toward establishing the construct validity of social intelligence. Their studies described essentially established convergent and discriminant valid

39、ity, by showing that ostensible tests of the various behavioral abilities hung together as predicted by the theory, and were not contaminated by other abilities outside the behavioral domain. As yet, there is little evidence for the ability of any of these tests to predict external criteria of socia

40、l intelligence.Tests of the remaining three structure-of-intellect domains (memory, convergent production, and evaluation) had not developed by the time the Guilford program came to a close. Hendricks et al. (1969) noted that these constitute by far the greatest number of unknowns in the Structure o

41、f Intellect model (p. 6). However, OSullivan et al. (1965) did sketch out how these abilities were defined.Convergent productionin the behavioral domain was defined as doing the right thing at the right time (p. 5), and presumably might be tested by a knowledge of etiquette.Behavioral memorywas defi

42、ned as the ability to remember the social characteristics of people (e.g., names, faces, and personality traits), whilebehavioral evaluationwas defined as the ability to judge the appropriateness of behavior.智力，作為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的字典中定義的，有兩個(gè)，而不同的含義。在其最熟悉的含義，智力與個(gè)人的學(xué)習(xí)和推理能力有關(guān)。常見的心理概念，如智力測(cè)驗(yàn)，智商等就是以這個(gè)意義為基礎(chǔ)的。在另外個(gè)不太常見的意義中

43、智力與結(jié)構(gòu)化的信息和指知識(shí)相關(guān)。這第二個(gè)意思牽連具有某種性質(zhì)的政府機(jī)構(gòu)，如美國(guó)中央情報(bào)局和英國(guó)同行MI-5和MI-6。同樣地，這兩種意義都和社會(huì)智力這一概念相關(guān)。社會(huì)智力是最初由E.L.桑代克（1920）提出的概念，該術(shù)語的意思是一個(gè)人理解并成功與他人溝通相處的能力，以及成功適應(yīng)社會(huì)交際的能力。然而，最近Cantor和Kihlstrom（1987年）重新定義了社會(huì)智力這一概念，他們認(rèn)為社會(huì)智力是指?jìng)€(gè)體的社會(huì)基礎(chǔ)知1、測(cè)量學(xué)的觀點(diǎn)社會(huì)智力的測(cè)量學(xué)觀點(diǎn)是以桑代克（1920）將社會(huì)智力劃分成三個(gè)維度起源的。理解和管理想法的能力（抽象智力）、具體事物（機(jī)械智力）、人（社會(huì)智力）。在他的經(jīng)典闡述中，“社

44、會(huì)智力即是理解并管理男人女人、男孩女孩在社會(huì)關(guān)系中采取明智的行動(dòng)” （第228頁(yè)）。同樣地，莫斯和亨特將社會(huì)智力定義為“與他人相處的能力”（第108頁(yè)）。Vernon (1933) 提供了關(guān)于人的社會(huì)智力的最廣泛的定義，“與一般人相處的能力、社會(huì)技能或者是適應(yīng)社會(huì)的能力、社會(huì)事務(wù)的相關(guān)知識(shí)、來自其他組成員的刺激的敏感性，以及對(duì)暫時(shí)的情緒或陌生人相關(guān)人格特質(zhì)的洞察能力”（第44頁(yè)）。相比之下，韋氏（1939年，1958年），沒有給與這個(gè)觀念足夠的重視。韋氏也承認(rèn)，用圖片排列的分測(cè)驗(yàn)的WAIS可以作為衡量社會(huì)智力的手段，因?yàn)樗u(píng)估了人們理解社會(huì)情境的能力( 吉爾和謝弗, 1968；坎貝爾和麥科德,

45、 1996，見解一致)。然而，在他看來，“社會(huì)智力只是適用于社交場(chǎng)合的一般智力”（1958年，第75頁(yè)）。在狗仔隊(duì)（1972年，第209頁(yè)）爆出的第五版韋氏的專著中再次消失，其中“社會(huì)智力”不再作為索引項(xiàng)。定義社會(huì)智力似乎很容易，尤其是將其作為抽象的智力。然而，當(dāng)要測(cè)量社會(huì)智力時(shí)，桑代克有點(diǎn)沮喪地指出：“簡(jiǎn)便易行的社會(huì)智力測(cè)驗(yàn)是很難設(shè)計(jì)出來的社會(huì)智力大量地存在于幼兒園、操場(chǎng)上、兵營(yíng)里、工廠里和交易市場(chǎng)里，但是它回避了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的實(shí)驗(yàn)室測(cè)驗(yàn)。人們需要做出反應(yīng)，需要時(shí)間來適應(yīng)，例如臉，聲音，手勢(shì)，和工具性的態(tài)度（第231頁(yè)）。然而，為了達(dá)到真正的心理測(cè)量學(xué)的目標(biāo)，社會(huì)智力的抽象定義被轉(zhuǎn)換成用于測(cè)量個(gè)體

46、在社會(huì)智力方面的差異的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的實(shí)驗(yàn)性測(cè)驗(yàn)（額外的評(píng)論，見泰勒，1990；泰勒和Cadet，1989年，沃克和福利，1973）。喬治華盛頓社會(huì)智力測(cè)驗(yàn)第一個(gè)是喬治華盛頓社會(huì)智力測(cè)驗(yàn)（GWSIT；亨特，1928年，莫斯，1931年；莫斯，奧馬克和Running，1927年；以后的版本中，莫斯，亨特，奧馬克，1949年；莫斯，亨特，奧馬克和伍德沃德，1955年）。像斯坦福大學(xué)貝尼特智力測(cè)驗(yàn)，韋氏成人智力量表，GWSIT是由一些可以結(jié)合得出總分的分測(cè)驗(yàn)組成的，這些分測(cè)驗(yàn)是：社會(huì)形勢(shì)的判斷；名字和面孔記憶；觀察人的行為；言語背后的心理狀態(tài)識(shí)別；從面部表情識(shí)別心理狀態(tài)；社會(huì)化信息；幽默感。前四個(gè)分測(cè)驗(yàn)適用于

47、所有版本的GWSIT。臉部表情和社會(huì)化信息分測(cè)驗(yàn)消失了，在以后的版本中添加了幽默這個(gè)分測(cè)驗(yàn)。亨特（1928年）最初是通過成人職業(yè)地位的相關(guān)性研究來驗(yàn)證GWSIT的，如大學(xué)生所追求的課外活動(dòng)數(shù)量，主管和員工之間相處的頻率。然而，一些隨之而來的爭(zhēng)議認(rèn)為社會(huì)智力是否應(yīng)與社會(huì)化的或外向的人格測(cè)驗(yàn)相關(guān)（比如String，1930年，桑代克和斯坦因，1937）。然而，最重要的是，因?yàn)榕c抽象智力具有相對(duì)較高的相關(guān)性，GWSIT受到了直接的批評(píng)。因此，亨特（1928）發(fā)現(xiàn)，GWSIT總得分與喬治華盛頓大學(xué)心理警覺性的測(cè)試（GWMAT）這種早期的心理量表（見Broom，1928年）的相關(guān)系數(shù)是R =0.54。R

48、L桑代克（1936）表示，GWSIT分測(cè)驗(yàn)的因素分析和GWMAT分測(cè)驗(yàn)的因素分析高度相同。伍德羅（1939），對(duì)GWSIT一個(gè)更大的認(rèn)知能力測(cè)驗(yàn)進(jìn)行分析，沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)任何證據(jù)，表明獨(dú)特的社會(huì)智力因素存在。RL桑代克和斯坦因（1937）得出的結(jié)論是：GWSIT在言語和思維能力上占有很大比重，社會(huì)智力的差異往往會(huì)被淹沒在抽象的智力差異中。（第282頁(yè)）。無法區(qū)分社會(huì)智力和智商，再加上選擇外部標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來達(dá)到可驗(yàn)證量表的規(guī)范性的困難，這就導(dǎo)致了對(duì)GWSIT興趣的下降，而事實(shí)上，整個(gè)社會(huì)智力的概念已作為一個(gè)獨(dú)立的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)實(shí)體。當(dāng)然，斯皮爾曼（1927）的G測(cè)驗(yàn)?zāi)Ｐ蛯?duì)于社會(huì)智力而言也沒有什么特別之處。它既不是社會(huì)智力，甚至暗示了瑟斯頓（1938年）測(cè)驗(yàn)中的基本心理能力也不是。社會(huì)智力的智力結(jié)構(gòu)自從一開始對(duì)GWSIT爆發(fā)了極大地興趣后，在社會(huì)智力的評(píng)估和相關(guān)性的研究工作就一直急劇下降（沃克和福利，1973年），直到20世紀(jì)60年代吉爾福特智力結(jié)構(gòu)模型測(cè)驗(yàn)才重新喚起研究者們的興趣。吉爾福特推測(cè)至少存在120種獨(dú)立的智力因子。這是基于五種操作（認(rèn)知