職業(yè)健康安全管理體系和安全文化英文翻譯

1、 OHSMS and Safety Culture What is an occupational health and safety management system(OHSMS)?One difficultly in evaluating the effectiveness of OHSMS lies in the different meanings given to the team .Finding agreement upon criteria for effectiveness, or methods of measure-ment and evaluation is espe

2、cially hard where basic disagreement exists upon what an OHSMS . 1、The General Characteristics Of an OHSMS All OHSMS owe something to the legacy of general system theory. Systems theory suggests that there should be four general requirements for an OHSMS, although how there requirements are met in p

3、ractice allows for considerable diversity. The four general requirements are as follows. 1）System objectives. 2）Specification of system elements and their inter-relationship; not all systems need have the same elements. 3）Determining the relationship of the OHSMS to other systems (including the gene

4、ral management system, and the regulatory system , but also technology and work organization ). 4）Requirements for system maintenance (which may be internal, linked to a review phase , or external , linked for example to industry policies that support OHS best practice; system maintenance may vary b

5、etween systems). Several Australian authorities upon OHSMS have given definitions broadly consistent with these general system requirements. Thus Bottomley notes what makes an OHSMS a system “is the deliberate linking and sequencing of processes to achieve specific objectives and to create a repeata

6、ble and identifiable way of managing OHS. Corrective actions (are also )central to a systematic approach .” Warwick Pearse also emphasises systemic linkages, defining an OHSMS as “distinct elements which cover the key range of activities required to manage occupational health and safety. These are i

7、nter-linked, and the whole thing is driven by feedback loops.” Similarly, Gallagher defines an OHSMS as “a combination of the planning and review, the management organization arrangements, the consultative arrangements, and the specific program elements that work together in an integrated way to imp

8、rove health and safety performance.” 2、Voluntary Or Mandatory Implementation Methods One way that OHSMS differ arises from the various methods of implementation. Frick and Wren distinguish three typesvoluntary, mandatory and hybird. Voluntary systems exist where enterprises adopt OHSMS on their owe

9、volition. Often this is to implement strategic objectives relating to employee welfare or good corporate citizenship, although there may be other motives such as reducing insurance costs. In contrast, mandatory systems have evolved in a number of European countries where legislation requires adoptio

10、n of a risk assessment system. Quasimandatory methods may also exist where external commercial pressures take the place of legislative requirements. Thus many businesses adopt OHSMS to comply with the requirements of customers and suppliers, principal contractors and other commercial bodies. Hybrid

11、methods are said to entail a mixture of voluntary motives and legislative requirements. 3. Management Systems or Systematic Management Following from their distinction between voluntary and mandatory OHSMS, Frick and Wren also separate occupational health and safety “management systems”, and the “ma

12、nagement systems” of occupational health and safety. Specifically ,the former have been characterized as: market-based, promoted typically by consulting firms, and with usually highly formalized prescriptions on how to integrate OHSM within large and complex organizations and also comprehensive dema

13、nds on documentation. This “management systems” from must meet stringent criteria. Where these requirements of a “systems” are not met, then the term is said to be inapplicable. On the other hand, “systematic management” is described as “ a limited number of mandated principles for a systematic mana

14、gement of OHS, applicable to all types of employers including the small ones”. This approach stems from methods of regulation found in Europe as well as Australia, where businesses, including smaller ones, are encouraged or required to comply with a less demanding framework than “management systems”

15、. One example of this simpler regulatory framework might be the risk assessment principles within the 1989/391 European Union Framework Directive. Support for such a loose approach to OHSM also exists in Australia. One employer expert on OHS defined systems simply as “just a word for what you do to

16、manage safety”. Consistent with this is Bottomley's all-encompassing approach which allows that “an OHSMS can be simple or complex, it can be highly documented or sparingly described, and it can be home grown or based on an available model”. An example of a relatively simple “systematic”approach

17、 to the management of occupational health and safety is to be found in “Small Business Safety Solutions”-a booklet for small business published by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This advocates a four step process as follows: Step1: Commitment to a Safe Workplace(framing a policy ba

18、sed on consultation). Step2: Recognising and Removing Dangers(using a danger identification list) Step3:Maintaining a Safe Workplace (including safety checks, maintenance, reporting dangers, information and training, supervision ,accident investigation, and emergency planning). Step4: Safety Records

19、 and Information (including records and standards required to be kept by law) It is debatable whether such a framework for “systematic management” in a small business can include all the elements of planning and accountability that are essential to a “management system” in a large business. 4 . Syst

20、em Characteristics : managerialist and Participative Models Within “management systems” two different models can be found . The first variant stems from what Nielsen terms “rational organisation theory” ( Taylorist and bureaucratic models of organisation ) . Rational organisation theory is associate

21、d with top down managerialist models of OHSMS such as Du Pont . Some authorities now consider most voluntary systems to be managerialist . Thus Frick. et al . observe that “ . . . most voluntary OHSM systems define top management as the ( one and only ) actor”. Conversely, an alternative participati

22、ve model of “management systems” can be traced to socio-technical systems theory, which emphasises organisational interventions based on analysis of the inter-relationships of technology , the orientation of participants , and organisational structure . The strengths of this typology are two-fold .

23、First , it is grounded in the literature that discusses alternative approaches to managing OHS and different control strategies , and it reflects the principal debates in that literature . Second , it can be operationalised through empirical tests to see which type of OHSMS performs best . The typol

24、ogy also faces a difficulty in the fact that the “ safe place control strategy “ is mandatory in Australia and should be found in all workplaces . There in not , therefore . a clear choice between two mutually exclusive control strategies ; the workplace with dominant safe person characteristics sho

25、uld also be implementing safe place characteristics . 5 . Degree of Implementation: Quality Levels Frick and Wren expand upon their distinction between mandatory and voluntary OHSMS to further identify three levels of systems objectives , drawn from the literature on product quality control , that r

26、epresent different levels of achievement and measures of OHSM performance. 6 . degree of Implementation: Introductory and Advanced Systems The idea that there may be different levels of OHSM has been interpreted another way in Australia where performance levers in some programs are explicitly develo

27、pmental ( the business graduating up an ascending ladder as it demonstrates compliance with the requirements of each successive lever ) . One example of Australian program with developmental steps is the South Australian Safety Achiever Business System ( SABS ) ( formerly known as the Safety Achieve

28、r Bonus Scheme ) . The program specifies five standards ( commitment and policy , planning implementation , measurement and management systems review and implementation ) linked in a continuous improvement cycle . Three “l(fā)evels”of implementation are then prescribed cumulatively introducing all five

29、standards from a basic or introductory program to a continuous improvement system . Different evaluation standards are prescribed for each level . 7. OHSMS Diversity and Evaluation : A Summary While, in general, this Report advocates care in defining OHSMS with respect to the problems outlined above

30、 , for the purpose of this project an inclusive approach to the phenomena is to be adopted .In particular , the term OHSMS will be used broadly to encompass both the highly complex formal systems adopted voluntarily by some businesses as well as the more rudimentary mandatory or advisory frameworks

31、offered to and implemented by small business. So far , we have shown that OHSMS can vary upon a number of dimensions relating to method of implementation , system characteristics , and degree of implementation . Such variance is important because it affects evaluation and measurement of OHSMS perfor

32、mance . Measures appropriate for one dimension of a system will be irrelevant to another . Evaluation of OHSMS effectiveness may need to take account of what systems are expected to do . Are they to meet complex system or simple design standards ? Are they implemented at the behest of management or

33、external OHS authorities ? Are objectives the simple ones such as reducing direct lost-time injuries or do they include satisfying multiple stakeholders ? Are they at an early or established stage of development ; and which of several different configurations of control strategy and management struc

34、ture/style is adopted ? Drawing upon the review above , the diagram below sets out five key dimensions on which OHSMS vary that need to be considered in evaluation and measurement . 8. OHSMS Diversity : 5 Key Dimensions for Evaluation While all systems must meet the general requirements for an OHSMS

35、 , diversity may occur along five key dimensions as follows : Implementation method (voluntary , mandatory or hybrid) ; Control strategy (safe person/safe place) ; Management structure and style (innovative or traditional) ; Degree of implementation (from meeting basic specifications to meeting stak

36、eholder needs) ; Degree of implementation(form introductory stage to fully operational) . OHSMS is a process of continuous development of innovation, is a process of continuous improvement. In the process, the enterprise culture constantly adjust the original management idea, realize enterprise safe

37、ty culture reengineering. 1. What Is Safety Culture? The UK Health and Safety Executive defines safety culture as “ . . . the product of the individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organizati

38、on's health and safety programs.” A more succinct definition has been suggested: “Safety culture is how the organization behaves when no one is watching.” Every organization has a safety culture, operating at one level or another. The challenges to the leadership of an organization are to: 1) de

39、termine the level at which the safety culture currently functions; 2) decide where they wish to take the culture; and 3) chart and navigate a path from here to there. 2. Why Is Safety Culture Important? Management systems and their associated policies and procedures depend upon the actions of indivi

40、duals and groups for their successful implementation. For example, a procedure may properly reflect the desired intent and be adequately detailed in its instructions. However, the successful execution of the procedure requires the actions of properly trained individuals who understand the importance

41、 of the underlying intent, who accept their responsibility for the task, and who appreciate that taking an obviously simplifying but potentially unsafe shortcut would be, quite simply, wrong. The values of the group (e.g., corporation, plant, shift team) help shape the beliefs and attitudes of the i

42、ndividual, which in turn, play a significant role in determining individual behaviors. A weak safety culture can be (and likely will be) evidenced by the actions and inactions of personnel at all levels of the organization. For example, the failure of a critical interlock might have been caused by t

43、he mechanic who failed to calibrate the pressure switch and falsified the maintenance records. Alternatively, it might have been caused by the plant manager who denied the funding requested to address staffing shortages in the instrument department. Audits too frequently reveal ostensibly complete,

44、sometimes sophisticated, management systems within which one or more elements are falling well short of achieving their desired intent. Previously, we might have attributed such failures to a general concept of “l(fā)ack of operating discipline.” Certainly, the failure to maintain high standards of perf

45、ormance might be a contributor to the problem. However, deficiencies in other safety culture features likely contributed to the situation. Industry has gradually accepted the importance of identifying the management system failures that lead to incidents and near misses (i.e., identifying root cause

46、s). For example, let us suppose that an incident occurred because a control room operator, leaving at the end of the shift, failed to alert the oncoming operator of a serious, off-standard condition in the process. This problem might be diagnosed generally as a communications problem, with a specifi

47、c root cause identified as “Communications between shifts less than adequate.” Perhaps, however, perfunctory shift turnovers are the rule rather than the exception, and this circumstance is generally known to supervision. In this circumstance, another root cause related to supervisory practices, “Im

48、proper performance not corrected,” might be identified. This analysis so far leaves a number of questions unanswered, such as “Why do operators shortcut the turnover process and why do they feel comfortable in doing so?” or “Why do supervisors tolerate a practice that jeopardizes the safety of the f

49、acility?” We can attempt to answer these questions by seeking to understand the values, beliefs and attitudes that shape individual actions and inactions (i.e., by seeking to understand the safety culture). By identifying and addressing the pathologies within the safety culture (or, more appropriate

50、ly, by proactively seeking to maintain a culture free of such weaknesses), we are effectively addressing the root causes of what we typically regard to be the root causes of safety performance problems. Regardless of whether one is seeking to establish a new safety management system, repair an exist

51、ing underperforming system, or fine-tune a basically sound system to achieve higher performance, it is the actions or inactions of the individual working within the system that can ultimately be the limiting performance factor. Creating and sustaining a sound safety culture can be a decisive factor

52、in determining the performance of the individual and the system. 3. Who Is Responsible for Safety Culture? It has been suggested that “the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture”The leadership of an organization has the primary responsibility for identifying th

53、e need for, and fostering, cultural change and for sustaining a sound safety culture once it is established. However, not unlike the concept of “safety as a line responsibility,” the responsibility for fostering and maintaining a sound safety culture cascades down through the organization. Every ind

54、ividual in the organization has a role to play. Cultures are based upon shared values, beliefs, and perceptions that determine what comes to be regarded as the norms for the organization; i.e., cultures develop from societal agreements about what constitutes appropriate attitudes and behaviors. If t

55、he organization feels strongly about a particular behavior, there will be little tolerance for deviation, and there will be strong societal pressures for conformance. Each individual in the organization has a role in reinforcing the behavioral norms. Thus, in the broadest sense for a sound safety cu

56、lture, “The organization and each individual” is the most appropriate answer to the question “Who is responsible?” In a sound safety culture, an individual would be expected to intercede if they saw a co-worker about to commit an unsafe act. In a sound safety culture, leadership would be expected to

57、 monitor the heath of the safety culture and reinforce and nurture it when required. In a sound safety culture, individuals and groups would be expected to speak out if they perceived management acting in a fashion inconsistent with the organization's values. 4. What Are the Key Attributes Of A

58、Sound Safety Culture? A review of the literature on the topics of organizational effectiveness and safety culture, reinforced by learning from numerous chemical facility audits and incident investigations, has led to the identification 11 key attributes for a sound safety culture. These attributes, which are described in further detail in Table 1. Table 1. Key Attributes Of A Sound Safety Culture ?Espouse safety as a core value ?Provide strong leadership ?Establish and enforce high standards of performance ?Maintain a sense of vulnerability ?Empower individuals to successfully fulfill