天津大學(xué)模板學(xué)習(xí)教案

1、天津大學(xué)天津大學(xué)(tin jn d xu)模板模板第一頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。目錄目錄(ml)1. Introduction2. Literature Review3. Model 3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy 3.2 Cost Structure 3.3 Information Structure 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs 3.5 Signaling Game4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information5. Signaling with Verifiable

2、Inventory 5.1 Resource-Based Contract 5.2 Performance-Based Contract6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory 6.1 Resource-Based Contract 6.2 Performance-Based Contract7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies 7.1 Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability 7.2 Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyer

3、s8. Conclusions第1頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第二頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。1. Introduction供貨商買方(mi fn)產(chǎn)品(chnpn)PBCRBC可靠性私有(syu)信息使用備用庫(kù)存維護(hù)背景介紹背景介紹第2頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第三頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。文獻(xiàn)文獻(xiàn)(wnxin)回顧回顧2. Literature ReviewlPBC for outsourced serviceslasymmetric information in operations managementlthe use of warranties as a signaling mechanism第3頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第四頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模3.

4、 Model3.1 Repair Process and Inventory PolicyN: identical copies;B: inventory backorder;s: inventory;The expected backorders in steady state isAvailability is equal to 第4頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第五頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模3.2 Cost StructureEach time a product failure occurs, the buyer incurs a fixed cost r 0.The buyers expected cos

5、t is equal toThe vendors expected cost is equal to第5頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第六頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模3.3 Information StructureWe assume that the product offered by the vendor is one of two possible types, L or H, where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability. Hazard rate ordering（危險(xiǎn)率序）:Excess wealth ordering（剩余(

6、shngy)財(cái)富序）:第6頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第七頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模3.4 Contract Types and PayoffsWe can write the buyers expected payoff asThe vendors expected payoff is given byRBC:PBC: 第7頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第八頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模3.5 Signaling GameWe assume that the vendor, who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed produ

7、ct, chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer. The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued at .We seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that is also renegotiation-proof. 第8頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第九頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete

8、 InformationGiven the vendor type , the first-best outcome is obtained by solving the optimization problem.第9頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第十頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模5. Signaling with Verifiable InventoryWe now consider the setting in which the vendor possesses private information about product reliability.5.1 Resource-Based ContractThe

9、 value of set by the vendor in her contract may relay information about whether or not the product is reliable. 第10頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第十一頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模5.1 Resource-Based ContractIn summary, successful signaling by the reliable vendor is possible under RBC when her inventory choice is verifiable, but it comes at a c

10、ost since the vendor has to leave positive surplus to the buyer.第11頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第十二頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模5.2 Performance-Based ContractTherefore, successful signaling by the reliable vendor can be done under both RBC and PBC when the inventory is verifiable. However, PBC presents an advantage because its risk sharing

11、 mechanism is more amenable to signaling than that of RBC.第12頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第十三頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory6.1 Resource-Based ContractWith inventory no longer verifiable, the payoff functions for the vendor and the buyer under RBC remain the same as those of the verifiable inventory ca

12、se.An underinvestment in inventory causes economic inefficiency.第13頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第十四頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模6.2 Performance-Based ContractThe reliable vendor overinvests in inventory in equilibrium.Overall, we find that the interaction between the vendors discretionary inventory choice and her signaling incentive create

13、s subtle dynamics that impact the relative efficiency of after-sales service contracts in nontrivial ways. 第14頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第十五頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。建模建模Which contract type will the reliable vendor prefer?Thus, the reliable vendor finds that the ability to signal her type with PBC more than compensates for the cost associ

14、ated with overinvestment in inventory and any benefit presented by RBC, which does not improve upon a pooling outcome. 第15頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第十六頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。擴(kuò)展擴(kuò)展(kuzhn)7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement StrategieslEndogenizing Inventory VerifiabilitylPooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers第16頁(yè)/共19頁(yè)第十七頁(yè)，共19頁(yè)。結(jié)論結(jié)論(jiln)8. ConclusionsSuggestions: The key to bring efficiency to the s