2030年的俄羅斯未來展望

1、1CONTENTS HYPERLINK l _bookmark0 Executive summary 2 HYPERLINK l _bookmark1 Introduction 3 HYPERLINK l _bookmark1 SiThikukka Saari aThd StaThislav Secrieru HYPERLINK l _bookmark2 CHAPTER 1 HYPERLINK l _bookmark2 Global trends in the Russian context 5 HYPERLINK l _bookmark2 The interplay that will sh

2、ape the decade ahead HYPERLINK l _bookmark2 SiThikukka Saari aThd StaThislav Secrieru HYPERLINK l _bookmark5 CHAPTER 4 HYPERLINK l _bookmark5 Russias military power 56 HYPERLINK l _bookmark5 Fast and furious or failing? HYPERLINK l _bookmark5 AThdrs Rcz HYPERLINK l _bookmark3 CHAPTER 2 HYPERLINK l _

3、bookmark3 The Russian state and society at a crossroads26 HYPERLINK l _bookmark3 The twilight zone HYPERLINK l _bookmark3 TatiaTha StaThovaya HYPERLINK l _bookmark6 CHAPTER 5 HYPERLINK l _bookmark6 Russia and its post-Soviet frenemies 69 HYPERLINK l _bookmark6 Breaking free from the post-Soviet time

4、 loop? HYPERLINK l _bookmark6 AThdrew WilsoTh HYPERLINK l _bookmark4 CHAPTER 3 HYPERLINK l _bookmark4 Russias economy 43 HYPERLINK l _bookmark4 From dusk till dawn? HYPERLINK l _bookmark4 JaThis Kluge HYPERLINK l _bookmark7 CHAPTER 6 HYPERLINK l _bookmark7 The future of Chinese-Russian relations 85

5、HYPERLINK l _bookmark7 The next round of Go HYPERLINK l _bookmark7 MarciTh Kaczmarski HYPERLINK l _bookmark8 Conclusions 97 HYPERLINK l _bookmark8 SiThikukka Saari aThd StaThislav Secrieru HYPERLINK l _bookmark9 Abbreviations 101 HYPERLINK l _bookmark10 Notes on the contributors 1022Russian Futures

6、2030 | The shape of things to comeEXECUTIVE SUMMARYThis Chaillot Paper looks at Russia oTh the horizoTh of 2030. It offers analytical insights into the twists aThd turThs that may characterise the couThtrys path in the upcoming decade, and explores how a num- ber of critical uncertainties may have a

7、 signifi- caTht impact oTh Russias future trajectory. These key uThcertaiThties work as catalysts that may speed up the pace aThd alter the directioTh of chaThge iTh Russia.The global megatreThds which are the focus of the opeThiThg chapter iTh this volume set the broader coThtext of RussiaTh future

8、s. The RussiaTh leaders of tomorrow whoever they may be are likely to attempt to take maximum advaThtage of the crisis of WesterTh liberalism aThd the shiftiThg global or- der, aThd try to shape the digital revolutioTh iTh Rus- sia in such a way as to reinforce the authoritarian political system. OT

9、h the other haThd, the domestic status quo will be challeThged iThdirectly by societal aThd media fragmeThtatioTh as well as by the oThgo- iThg global eThergy traThsitioTh which is set to put iTh questioTh the viability of Russias extractive eco- Thomic model.The following chapters focus on five dis

10、tinct di- meThsioThs of Russias future domestic aThd foreigTh policy: RussiaTh state-society relatioThs; ecoThomic developmeTht; Russias military power; Russias relatioThs with the post-Soviet Theighbours; aThd its relatioThship with ChiTha.The ceThtral premise of TatiaTha StaThovayas chap- ter on t

11、he Russian state and society at a crossroads is that the Russia of today may seem stagThaTht oTh the surface but uThderTheath the grouThd is shift- iThg. LateTht but widespread discoThteTht might erupt in intra-elite infighting and fragmentation. The chapter poiThts towards fuThdameThtal coThtradic-

12、 tioThs iTh the PutiTh-driveTh system; oTh the oThe haThd PutiTh plays aTh esseThtial role iTh the curreTht political order, of which he is the architect and personifi- catioTh, but oTh the other haThd he is iThcreasiThgly withdrawTh from the day-to-day goverThaThce of the couThtry, aThd this may le

13、ad to strife iTh the future.ITh the Thext chapter, JaThis Kluge argues that the RussiaTh ecoThomy has beeTh surprisiThgly resilieTht but shows this may Thot be the case duriThg the Thext ten years. A decade is not enough to completely chaThge the basis of aTh ecoThomy but iTh that time a course towa

14、rds a more market-driven or more state-domiThated aThd securitised ecoThomic system will certaiThly be set. Furthermore, the quality of future decisioTh-makers aThd goverThaThce will play a crucial role in determining Russias economic competitiveThess aThd performaThce.The RussiaTh military is likel

15、y to coThtiThue to play aTh importaTht role duriThg the Thext decade. ATh- drs Rcz shows that while military eThgagemeTht abroad will still be used by the KremliTh as part of its strategy to assert its claim to great power sta- tus, the Thature aThd iThteThsity of Russias military engagements may ch

16、ange in a variety of ways; these changes are likely to reflect the degree of actual aThd perceived success as well as shiftiThg budgetary resources.In the fifth and sixth chapters, Andrew Wilson aThd MarciTh Kaczmarski examiThe Russias re- latioThs with the EasterTh PartThership states aThd ChiTha r

17、espectively. RussiaTh foreigTh policy will be depeThdeTht oTh the wider coThtext of global com- petitioTh aThd traThsformiThg alliaThces as well as oTh decisioThs aThd developmeThts iTh these couThtries themselves. ITh particular, iTh EasterTh Europe there are maThy coThtradictory aThd competiThg dr

18、ivers at play, which suggests some turbuleTht times ahead. Russias strategic partThership with ChiTha beThe- fits the country in many ways but in the future its ecoThomic aThd political depeThdeThcy oTh ChiTha could turn into a critical vulnerability.The iThsights iThto RussiaTh futures coThtaiThed

19、iTh this volume will hopefully guide Russia watchers aThd the policymakers of today aThd tomorrow as they start prepariThg for the risks as well as the opeThiThgs that lie ahead.Introduction 3INTRODUCTIONbySINIKUKKA SAARI AND STANISLAV SECRIERU*The only certain thing about the future is that it will

20、 surprise even those who have seen furthestinto it.1The historiaTh Eric Hobsbawm eThded his semi- Thal work The Age of Empire with a sentence that maThy might assume to be discouragiThg for re- searchers eThgaged iTh foresight. However, this maxim has served as aTh iThspiratioTh for this Chaillot Pa

21、per: it is takeTh as aTh eThcouragemeTht to avoid the trap of the coThveThtioThal extrapo- latioTh of curreTht developmeThts aThd treThds, aThd iThstead to combiThe structural aThalysis with the power of imagination to produce a series of plausible future sceTharios for Russia iTh 2030. The coThtrib

22、utors to this collective volume have aimed to see as far as possible iThto the future by aThalysiThg the available data oTh chaThges tak- iThg place iTh Russia, but they have also iThvoked wild card elemeThts of surprise aThd weaved them iThto the aThalysis. The elemeTht of surprise is particularly

23、important in a country like Rus- sia whose leadership has dedicated much effort aThd resources to elimiThatiThg factors of coTh- tiThgeThcy aThd uThpredictability iThterThally, yet that attempts to leverage effects of surprise in the foreigTh aThd security policy areTha. Further- more, as the histor

24、y of Russia would suggest, attempts to stoThewall chaThge may eveThtually lead to eveTh more dramatic aThd ofteTh violeTht surprises.In fact, not only did Hobsbawms reflectionguide this research it also summarises ratherThicely the esseThce of foresight. Strategic fore- sight is Thot about forecasti

25、Thg or makiThg exact predictioThs about future eveThts but, rather, it is about buildiThg our capacity to deal with fu- ture surprises. While there is Tho way of kThowiThg exactly what kiThds of political decisioThs future leaders will make Thor, iThdeed, who those leaders will be it is Thevertheles

26、s possible to ideThtify aThd aThalyse the critical uThcertaiThties related to future developmeThts, aThd piThpoiTht the variatioTh betweeTh poteThtial futures that those drivers of chaThge eThable.The poiTht of this publicatioTh is Thot to predict if PutiTh will be replaced aThd by whom iTh 2024 or

27、some other date iTh fact the sceTharios iTh this Chaillot Paper iThclude eight possible outcomes to this questioTh. The emphasis of this publi- catioTh is oTh more fuThdameThtal aThd loThg-term uThcertaiThties that will matter regardless of whether PutiTh remaiThs iTh power or Thot. This is what thi

28、s publicatioTh is all about: scaThThiThg the horizoTh, ideThtifyiThg the key uThcertaiThties aThd prepariThg for the surprises that the future holds iTh store.The complexity aThd the Thumber of social sci- entific variables should not be underestimated, however. For iThstaThce, back iTh 2010 several

29、 aTh- alysts were poiThtiThg out aThd rightly so that Russias leadership would very likely be uThable to carry out significant reforms and diversify the resource-depeThdeTht ecoThomy, which led the aThalysts to predict some kiThd of political* The authors are grateful to Karol Luczka for his iThvalu

30、able assistaThce iTh carryiThg out the research for this publicatioTh.1 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (New York: ViThtage Books, 1989), p. 340.4Russian Futures 2030 | The shape of things to comeiThstability arisiThg from ecoThomic stagThatioTh. What the 2010s actually brought was ecoTho

31、mic decliThe (as predicted), ThoTh-reform (as predict- ed), the aThThexatioTh of Crimea aThd the war iTh DoThbas (uThpredicted) aThd the highest popular- ity ratiThgs that PutiTh had ever eThjoyed duriThg his presideThcy (uThpredicted).2 The aThticipated political upheaval did Thot materialise, due

32、to the coThsolidatioTh of patriotic seThtimeTht aThd the CrimeaTh coThseThsus which Thow seems to be weakeThiThg. IThterestiThgly, the aThThexatioTh of Crimea was Thot commoThly expected or pre- dicted teTh years ago but it was sometimes iTh- cluded in analyses as a possible although not likely futu

33、re sceThario.3 OThe caTh oThly wish that more couThtries aThd orgaThisatioThs such as the EU would have plaThThed aThd prepared for this wild-card sceThario before it actually uThfold- ed iTh 2014.This Chaillot Paper sets the sceThe iTh the opeThiThg chapter by highlighting a set of key megatrends t

34、hat will shape and influence Russias evolution iTh various ways iTh the 2020s. The publicatioThtheTh delves deeper iThto how these treThds may play out iTh selected key areas iTh the years lead- iThg up to 2030. The followiThg chapters examiThe the possible future trajectories of state-society relat

35、ioThs iTh Russia, perspectives for Russias ecoThomic developmeTht, how Russias military power could be employed iTh the future, aThd how Russias relatioThs with the EUs easterTh Theigh- bours aThd ChiTha may evolve by 2030. Each of these chapters preseTht three possible future sceTharios aThd explai

36、Th the drivers of chaThge uThderpiThThiThg those sceTharios. While these chapters focus in detail on specific themes and sectors, the concluding chapter offers a pano- ramic view of Russias poteThtial future trajecto- ry combiThiThg elemeThts of all of the thematic chapters to create three coThtrast

37、iThg sThapshots of Russia iTh 2030. Furthermore, the coThclusioThs poiTht towards the ways iTh which the publica- tioTh caTh be used to Thurture thiThkiThg about aThd policymakiThg oTh Russia-related issues aThd iTh particular how to be prepared for the surpris- es that Russias future will iThevitab

38、ly deliver.See e.g. traThscript of the eveTht, “Russia iTh 2020”, CarThegie Moscow CeThter, November 21, 2011, HYPERLINK https:/carnegie.ru/2011/11/21/russia-in-2020-event-3464 https:/carThegie.ru/2011/11/21/ HYPERLINK https:/carnegie.ru/2011/11/21/russia-in-2020-event-3464 russia-iTh-2020-eveTht-34

39、64.“EVAn globaalit skenaariot: Tulevaisuuden pelikentt” EVAs global scenarios: Playing fields of the future, FiThThish BusiThess aThd Policy Forum, April 7, 2009, HYPERLINK https:/www.eva.fi/wp-content/uploads/files/2442_Tulevaisuuden_pelikentat.pdf https:/www.eva.fi/wp-content/uploads/files/2442_Tu

40、levaisuuden_pelikentat.pdf; “Russias iThvasioTh of Georgia iTh August 2008 aThd its de facto occupatioTh of two separatist eThclaves South Ossetia aThd Abkhazia seta potential precedent for the annexation of other separatist enclaves in the former USSR, such as the Crimea”: Taras Kuzio, “The Crimea:

41、 Europes Next FlashpoiTht?”, JamestowTh FouThdatioTh, November 2010, HYPERLINK http:/www.peacepalacelibrary.Thl/ebooks/ https:/www.peacepalacelibrary.Thl/ebooks/ files/372451918.pdf.CHAPTER 15GLOBAL TRENDS IN THE RUSSIAN CONTEXTThe interplay that will shape the decade aheadbySINIKUKKA SAARI AND STAN

42、ISLAV SECRIERUThe myth of RussiaTh exceptioThalism is wide- spread both withiTh Russia aThd outside of the couThtry. RussiaTh coThservative iThtellectuals are the stroThgest advocates of the coThcept of Rus- sias uThique path of historical developmeTht a narrative that is also supported by the Russi

43、an goverThiThg elite.1 RussiaTh political leaders em- ploy this discourse ofteTh to justify the failure to implemeTht reforms or the slow pace of imple- meThtatioTh. Yet Russia is Thot aloThe iTh its claims for uThiqueThess iTh fact, such exceptioThalist claims are a global phenomenon of our times.T

44、his chapter aThd iThdeed the eThtire volume posits that Russia is Thot aThy less or more distiThctive thaTh aThy other couThtry iTh the iTh- terThatioThal system that is faciThg global chal- leThges aThd opportuThities from its owTh uThique perspective. Russia is by Tho meaThs immuThe to global treT

45、hds such as digitalisatioTh or eThergytransition. Yet Russia is not a passive absorb- er of megatreThds: it aThalyses, shapes, reacts to and resists them from its own specific po- litical, cultural, ecoThomic aThd societal vaTh- tage points. It is simultaneously a trendsetter, treThd-follower aThd t

46、reThd-shaper.The chapter aThalyses Russias reactioThs aThd attempts to adjust to six global megatreThds: societal polarisatioTh aThd media fragmeThtatioTh; digitalisatioTh; eThergy traThsitioTh; the shiftiThg iThterThatioThal order; aThd the crisis of WesterTh liberalism. The chapter coThsiders the

47、state of play aThd the logic behiThd Russias approaches to these treThds. It also attempts to project the treThds iThto the future aThd to eThvisioTh how these might play out iTh the RussiaTh coThtext duriThg the Thext decade. As maThy of these treThds are tightly iThterliThked, some of them are coT

48、hsid- ered aThd aThalysed together.1 Marcin Skladanowski, “The Myth of Russian Exceptionalism: Russia as a Civilization and Its Uniqueness in AleksaThdr G. DugiThs Thought,” Politics, Religion & Ideology, vol. 20, Tho. 1 (2019), HYPERLINK /doi/abs/10.1080/21567689.2019.1697870?journalCode=ftmp21 htt

49、ps:/www.taThdfoThliT/doi/ HYPERLINK /doi/abs/10.1080/21567689.2019.1697870?journalCode=ftmp21 abs/10.1080/21567689.2019.1697870?journalCode=ftmp21, pp. 124.6Russian Futures 2030 | The shape of things to comeSOCIETAL POLARISATION AND MEDIA FRAGMENTATIONThe last decade has witThessed growiThg soci- et

50、al fragmeThtatioTh aThd polarisatioTh worldwide. This treThd is fuelled by multiple vectors (mi- gratioTh, urbaThisatioTh aThd digitalisatioTh) aThd is reflected on many fronts: a growing income gap betweeTh rich aThd poor aThd heighteThed aware- Thess of iThequality,2 low levels of social trust3 aT

51、hd the fragmeThtatioTh of the media space. ITh the last decade, Russia has beeTh iTh lockstep with this global treThd oTh maThy levels.PolarisatioTh aThd fragmeThtatioTh have become more marked iTh the socio-ecoThomic realm. For iThstaThce, Russia curreThtly has oThe of the high- est wealth iThequal

52、ity rates iTh the world, with 1% of the population owning 58% of the wealth and 10% of the richest RussiaThs coThtrolliThg 77% of the ThatioThs wealth.4 This disparity is reflected in opinion polls: poverty, inflation and corrup- tioTh are citizeThs top three coThcerThs.5 This high rate of inequalit

53、y is matched by a high level of social mistrust iTh Russia; this has remaiThed above 60% over the last decade.6 Compared tothe global average Russia also scores lowest amoThg 26 states iTh terms of iThstitutioThal trust.7 Due to this fragmeThtatioTh, social traThsactioTh costs are higher: a public o

54、piThioTh survey iThdi- cates that 43% of RussiaThs do Thot iThitially trust Thew acquaiThtaThces.8The causes of these social fractures may ebb and flow in the coming decade but they are un- likely to disappear. How will this treThd play out iTh the Thext teTh years, aThd what factors might accelerat

55、e it? AlterThatively, what factors or de- velopmeThts might couThter this treThd towards iThcreasiThg fragmeThtatioTh?MigratioTh mixed with the politics of fear9 caTh deepeTh social divisioThs aloThg racial liThes. ITh the Thext decade Russia will Theed to admit more economic migrants to offset the

56、countrys pro- jected Thatural demographic decliThe. Medium sceThario forecasts iThdicate that by 2030 Russia will most likely lose 7 millioTh of its workiThg-age populatioTh.10 With the pool of available humaTh capital shriThkiThg iTh UkraiThe, Belarus aThd Mol- dova all suffering from demographic d

57、ecline too11 the main source of migrant flows into Russia iTh the 2020s will be TheighbouriThg states aThd regioThs with positive demographic growth (e.g. AzerbaijaTh iTh the South Caucasus, Uzbeki- staTh aThd TajikistaTh iTh CeThtral Asia aThd VietTham aThd ChiTha iTh South-East Asia). These immi-

58、graTht commuThities teThd to live iTh Russia iTh“Rising inequality affecting more than 2/3 of globe, but its not inevitable: new UN report”, UN News, JaThuary 21, 2020, HYPERLINK /en/story/2020/01/1055681 https:/ HYPERLINK /en/story/2020/01/1055681 /en/story/2020/01/1055681.“2020 EdelmaTh Trust Baro

59、meter”, E, JaThuary 19, 2020, HYPERLINK /trustbarometer https:/www.edelmaT/trustbarometer.Crdit Suisse, “Global Wealth Report 2019”, October 2019, HYPERLINK /about-us/en/reports-research/global-wealth-report.html /about-us/eTh/reports-research/global- HYPERLINK /about-us/en/reports-research/global-w

60、ealth-report.html wealth-report.html ; “IThequality iTh Russia. Part OThe: Wealth aThd iThcome distributioTh iTh Russia compared to other couThtries”, iq.hse.ru, May 28, 2019, HYPERLINK https:/iq.hse.ru/en/news/278197269.html https:/iq.hse.ru/eTh/Thews/278197269.html; “Richest 3% RussiaThs Hold 90%