外文翻譯-資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)績效

1、Capital Structure and Firm Performance1. IntroductionAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancialindustries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managersexerting insufficient work effort, indul

2、ging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their ownpreferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equalthe lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. Theory suggest

3、s that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under theagency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity andincreases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of sharehol

4、ders. Sincethe seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations ofcapital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financialleverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of li

5、quidation, which causes personallosses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc, (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), andthrough pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage canmitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers

6、 concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which thefirm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of mode

7、ls is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in loweragency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leveragebecomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt - including higherexpected costs of ban

8、kruptcy or financial distress - arising from conflicts between bondholders andshareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the two sources of agency costs, wefollow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be nonmonotonic.Despi

9、te the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature(see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesistypically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator

10、of leverage plussome control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.In the case of the banking industry studied here, there are also regulatorycosts associated with very high leverage.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratio

11、s fashioned from financial statements or stockmarket prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not netout the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond managemenfscontrol and therefore cannot reflect

12、 agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that areunrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm7sperformance that would be realised if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficien

13、cy as our indicator of firm performance.The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profitefficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiencyevaluates how close a firm is to earning the prof

14、it that a best-practice firm would earn facing the sameexogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that arenot part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similarmeasures typically

15、do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature areindustry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry 一 such as localmarket conditions 一 as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance

16、of a best-practicefirm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected toperform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation fromperformance to capital structure.

17、If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to takethis reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with theeffect

18、s of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. Wediscuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, theefficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis.

19、 We construct a two-equation structural model andestimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the2 Stiglers argument was part of a broader exchange over whether productive efficiency (or X-efficiency) primarily reflectsdifficulties in re

20、conciling the preferences of multiple optimizing agents 一 what is today called agency costs 一 versus true” inefficiency, or failure to optimize (e.g., Stigler 1976, Leibenstein 1978). firms equity capital ratio and other variables is used to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equationspecifyin

21、g the equity capital ratio as a function of the firms profit efficiency and other variables is used to testthe net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometricallyidentified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, s

22、ome, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Undervirtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership andcontrol that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shar

23、es may reduceagency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs bycreating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., S

24、hleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of theownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with thedependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage)through the reverse causality hypotheses noted

25、aboveTo address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equationexplaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abun

26、dance of qualitydata available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firmsproducing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and otherexogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In a

27、ddition, some studies in this literature findevidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs,including leverage and ownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject

28、to the same type of agency costs and otherinfluences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatoryconstraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are wellabove the regulatory capital minimums,

29、 and our results are based primarily on differences at the mar2. Theories of reverse causality from performance to capital structureAs noted, prior research on agency costs generally does not take into account the possibility of reversecausation from performance to capital structure, which may resul

30、t in simultaneous-equations bias. We offer twohypotheses of reverse causation based on violations of the Modigliani-Miller perfect-markets assumption. It isassumed that various market imperfections (e.g., taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information) result in abalance between those favoring more

31、 versus less equity capital, and that differences in profit efficiency move theoptimal equity capital ratio marginally up or down.Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, more efficient firms choose lower equity ratios than other firms, allelse equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected cost

32、s of bankruptcy and financial distress. Under thishypothesis, higher profit efficiency generates a higher expected return for a given capital structure, and thehigher efficiency substitutes to some degree for equity capital in protecting the firm against future crises. This isa joint hypothesis that

33、 i) profit efficiency is strongly positively associated with expected returns, and ii) thehigher expected returns from high efficiency are substituted for equity capital to manage risks.The evidence is consistent with the first part of the hypothesis, i.e., that profit efficiency is stronglypositive

34、ly associated with expected returns in banking. Profit efficiency has been found to be significantlypositively correlated with returns on equity and returns on assets (e.g., Berger and Mester 1997) and otherevidence suggests that profit efficiency is relatively stable over time (e.g., DeYoung 1997),

35、 so that a finding ofhigh current profit efficiency tends to yield high future expected returns.The second part of the hypothesis - that higher expected returns for more efficient banks are substitutedfor equity capital - follows from a standard Altman z-score analysis of firm insolvency (Altman 196

36、8). Highexpected returns and high equity capital ratio can each serve as a buffer against portfolio risks to reduce theprobabilities of incurring the costs of financialdistressbankruptcy, so firms with high expected returns owing tohigh profit efficiency can hold lower equity ratios. The z-score is

37、the number of standard deviations below theexpected return that the actual return can go before equity is depleted and the firm is insolvent, zi = (gi +ECAPi)/oi, where gi and ci are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the rate of return on assets, andratios for those that were fully o

38、wned by a single owner-manager. This may be an improvement in the analysis of agencycosts for small firms, but it does not address our main issues of controlling for differences in exogenous conditions and insetting up individualized firm benchmarks for performance.ECAPi is the ratio of equity to as

39、sets. Based on the first part of the efficiency-risk hypothesis, firms with higherefficiency will have higher gi. Based on the second part of the hypothesis, a higher gi allows the firm to have alower ECAPi for a ven z-score, so that more efficient firms may choose lower equity capital ratios.文章出處：R

40、aposo Clara C. Capital Structure and Firm Performance .Journal ofFinance.Blackwell publishing.2005, (6): 2701-2727.資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)績效1.概述代理費用不管在金融還是在非金融行業(yè)，都是非常重要的企業(yè)治理問題。在 專業(yè)管理公司中所有權(quán)和控制的分離可能導(dǎo)致的開工不足，努力發(fā)揮管理人員， 選擇輸入或輸出適合他們自己的特長，否則不能實現(xiàn)公司價值的最大化。實際上， 外部所有權(quán)的代理成本等于職業(yè)經(jīng)理人使自己的效用最大化的價值，而不是等于 公司價值。理論表明，資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇可以幫助減輕這些代理成本

41、。根據(jù)代理成 本假說，高杠桿或低股本/資產(chǎn)比率降低外部股權(quán)的代理成本和通過限制或鼓勵 管理人員采取行動，增加股東的利益。自從由詹森和麥克林的論文（1976年）， 資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論的解釋，開發(fā)了大量文獻(xiàn)，指出更大的財務(wù)杠桿可能會影響管理人 員的薪酬，而且通過減少清算，將導(dǎo)致個人損失的薪金，聲譽，特權(quán)經(jīng)理等（格 羅斯曼和哈特1982年，威廉姆斯1987年）的代理成本，并通過壓力產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流 量支付利息費用（詹森1986年）。較高的杠桿可以減輕股東和經(jīng)理之間關(guān)于投資 的選擇（例如，邁爾斯1977年），承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險金額（，詹森和梅克林1976年，威 廉姆斯1987年）的條件下，企業(yè)破產(chǎn)清算（哈里斯和拉維夫1

42、990年）和股息政策 （斯圖爾茲1990年）。這方面的一個模型的可檢驗的預(yù)測是增加杠桿比率能夠降低外部股權(quán)的代 理成本，提高公司績效，所有其他持有相同。然而，當(dāng)杠桿變得相對較高，進(jìn)一 步提高將會產(chǎn)生較高的外部債務(wù)代理成本：包括破產(chǎn)或財務(wù)困境較高的預(yù)期成本， 債券持有人和股東之間由此產(chǎn)生沖突，我們按照文學(xué)，并能計算機(jī)構(gòu)之間的總成 本，并且充分利用非單調(diào)的關(guān)系也很難區(qū)分兩種來源的經(jīng)驗成本，不管這一理論的重要性，最好是有實證證據(jù)，（哈里斯和拉維夫1991年，特 曼2000年，邁爾斯和評價2001年）。代理成本假說的檢驗通常用回歸分析的方法， 再加上一些控制變量，其他指標(biāo)性能的措施得出股本比例。至少有

43、三個問題出現(xiàn) 在我們的應(yīng)用程序，我們在以前的研究結(jié)果中已報告。銀行業(yè)案件在這里學(xué)習(xí)， 也有非常高的與杠桿相關(guān)的管理費用。首先，公司業(yè)績的措施通常是從財務(wù)報表或股票市場的價格，如行業(yè)調(diào)整后 營業(yè)利潤或股票的市場回報中取得。這些措施不排除外部市場因素對企業(yè)價值差 異的影響，但排除了管理層的控制范圍，因此不能反映代理成本。因此，這些測 試可能會混淆的因素，這些因素?zé)o關(guān)的代理成本。另外，這些研究一般都沒有為 每家公司的業(yè)績將實現(xiàn)成本最小化的機(jī)構(gòu)作為一個單獨的基準(zhǔn)。我們解決企業(yè)之間的生產(chǎn)效率和業(yè)績之間的聯(lián)系代理成本利潤指標(biāo)的測量 效率問題的建議最早是由斯蒂格勒（1976年）提出，利潤效率代表了利潤，因為

44、 這開發(fā)效益的改進(jìn)效益評估如何關(guān)閉企業(yè)，是賺取利潤最好的做法，在公司面臨 同樣的外部條件。這有控制的管理控制之外的不屬于代理成本的一部分因素受益。 相比之下，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)財務(wù)比率的比較，股市的回報，一般不會采取類似措施控制這些 外部因素。即使在文獻(xiàn)中使用的措施是產(chǎn)業(yè)調(diào)整，他們可能不占各公司行業(yè)內(nèi)重 大的分歧，例如當(dāng)?shù)氐氖袌銮闆r，我們能夠做的利潤效率。此外，一個最佳實踐公 司在相同的外部條件下，在代理成本最低的情況下，如何合理的預(yù)計該公司的代 理成本使很重要的。其次，以前的研究一般不考慮從性能反向因果關(guān)系的可能性。如果公司業(yè)績 能夠影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇，那么沒有考慮到這一點可能在同步反向因果關(guān)系方程 的結(jié)

45、果存在偏差。也就是說，企業(yè)績效回歸上的杠桿措施可能會混淆與資本結(jié)構(gòu) 對性能的影響。由于采用了我們解決我們的牢固的生產(chǎn)效率和業(yè)績之間的聯(lián)系代理成本利 潤指標(biāo)的測量效率問題的建議最早是由斯蒂格勒（1976年），和利潤效率代表了 效率的概念細(xì)化。第二，以前的研究通常是沒有考慮到從性能反向因果關(guān)系的可 能性資本結(jié)構(gòu)。如果公司業(yè)績影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇，那么沒有考慮到這一點可能 在同步反向因果關(guān)系，方程的結(jié)果偏差。也就是說，企業(yè)績效回歸上的杠桿措施 可能會混淆與資本結(jié)構(gòu)對性能的影響表現(xiàn)在資本結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。我們解決了從性能反向因果關(guān)系資本結(jié)構(gòu)使這個問題。我們下面討論兩個假 設(shè)為什么公司業(yè)績可能會影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)，效率風(fēng)險假說和專營權(quán)價值假說的選擇。 我們建構(gòu)一個兩方程模型，并估計它的結(jié)構(gòu)采用兩階段最小二乘法（2SLS）。 一個公式指定作為2斯蒂格勒的說法函數(shù)利潤效率是一個更廣泛的交流超過部分 是否生產(chǎn)效率（或X-效率），主要反映在協(xié)調(diào)多個優(yōu)化劑喜好-什么是今天所 謂的代理成本-與困難“真正的“低效或失敗的優(yōu)化（例如，斯蒂格勒1976年， 萊賓斯坦1978年）。公司的自有資本比率和其他變量是用來測試的代理成本假說， 并一式指定作為公司的利潤效率和其他變量的函數(shù)自有資本比率是用來測試的 效率，風(fēng)險和凈效果專營權(quán)價值假設(shè)。這兩個方程計量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)通過鑒定排除限制 與該