比較商事組織法

LawsonBusinessOrganizations:AComparativeStudyDr.Prof.DingDINGSchoolofLawUniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics(UIBE)1比較商事組織法

法律碩士課程(法學(xué))2BibliographyAnyTextbooksyoustudiedbeforeAresearchpaperonanyCorporateLawissuesRobertaRomano,FoundationsofCorporateLaw[公司法基礎(chǔ)(影印本)],法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版.BrianR.Cheffins,CompanyLaw:Theory,StructureandOperation[林華偉等譯],法律出版社,北京,2001年4月第一版.3Content·TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarket·LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiability·TheProductionandStructureofCorporationLaws·FinancingtheCorporation·InternalGovernanceStructures·ExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketforCorporateControl·SecuritiesRegulation4WhatIExpectfromyou…

ClasspresentationanddiscussionOff-classPreviewandReviewOpen-minded…5<國(guó)家中長(zhǎng)期教育改革和發(fā)展規(guī)劃綱要>(2010-2020)[公開征求意見稿]豐田汽車召回香港華懋集團(tuán)前董事局主席龔如心遺產(chǎn)案AVATAR6TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(1)為什么有企業(yè)/廠商?[交易\市場(chǎng)和企業(yè)/廠商]它們?cè)谫Y本市場(chǎng)的地位和作用代理成本和交易成本(為什么代理成本在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Means的調(diào)查表明,當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)200個(gè)最大的公司中,88個(gè)是由管理人員控制的.Berle和Means認(rèn)為,股東對(duì)于代理成本的監(jiān)督是無(wú)能為力的,你是否同意這一看法?授權(quán)機(jī)制的優(yōu)勢(shì)和弊端7TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)為什么股東被稱為“剩余財(cái)產(chǎn)的所有者”(ResidualOwners)?股東表決權(quán)----→集體行為----→監(jiān)督成本----→信息取得的代價(jià)(在股權(quán)分散的情況下,為什么股東都愿意做消極股東,搭便車-FreeRiders會(huì)很普遍?)如何約束代理人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為?(代理成本是所有和控制分離的代價(jià),第7頁(yè))8TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)股價(jià)能否反映公司管理人員的懈怠或其他機(jī)會(huì)主義行為?監(jiān)督機(jī)制包括哪些方面?9TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(3)經(jīng)理和股東存在利益沖突,代理成本不可能為零;所有者是代理成本的最終承擔(dān)者,增加代理成本則可以使經(jīng)理單方面受益,這里就出現(xiàn)了需要法律敢于的現(xiàn)象----成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干預(yù)的目標(biāo)----減少代理成本.因此,檢驗(yàn)公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否減少了代理成本.方流芳:序言,第3頁(yè).[Jensen&Meckling]

！結(jié)合我國(guó)<公司法>,你如何理解我國(guó)法律是否減少了代理成本,請(qǐng)舉例說明.10TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(4)企業(yè)正是針對(duì)機(jī)會(huì)主義\交易成本和合同不完備的回應(yīng)(p.10).當(dāng)合同一方是“交易專用財(cái)產(chǎn)”(trade-specificassets)的所有者時(shí),交易雙方組建企業(yè)比簽定合同更有效率(pp.11-15)OliverWilliamson11TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(5)HenryHansmann----權(quán)衡締約成本和所有權(quán)成本企業(yè)所有權(quán)類型和所有權(quán)成本存在相關(guān)性.→投資者所有→雇員所有→所有者缺位當(dāng)所有權(quán)成本過高的時(shí)候,沒有所有者比“產(chǎn)權(quán)清晰”更重要.12TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(6)以保險(xiǎn)公司與投保人的關(guān)系為例,說明公司股東與管理者的關(guān)系.SoleOwnership-----PartialOwnershipPecuniaryBenefits-----Non-pecuniaryBenefits13TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(7)在了解代理成本的存在之后,你的投資選擇是什么?在放棄全部所有權(quán)歸自己所有的企業(yè)形式后,投資者會(huì)面臨哪些合同關(guān)系?[NexusofContracts]作為投資者,你希望公司法或者公司章程加入企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任的內(nèi)容嗎?14TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(8)Question8atpp.24-25.RonaldCoase,TheNatureoftheFirm,4Economics386,1937.[中文譯本???]15InstitutionalArrangements在交易成本為零的條件下,制度的選擇不會(huì)影響經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的最終效益.在交易成本不為零的現(xiàn)實(shí)世界里,制度的安排會(huì)在不同程度上影響交易的效益.郁光華:<公司法的本質(zhì)>,法律出版社2006年版,第38頁(yè).RonaldCoase,TheProblemofSocialCost,3JournalofLawandEconomics1,1960.16FurtherReadingMaterialsRobertaRomano,pp.26-60.17LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiabilityWhatfeaturesacorporation?Pleaseprovideyourunderstandingandobservations.18ReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabilityandtheCorporationLimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirmTowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityforCorporateTorts19FourCharacteristicLimitedLiabilityforInvestorsFreeTransferabilityofSharesPerpetualLifeCentralizedManagement[SeetheTextbook]20CloseCorporationvs.

PublicCorporationWhyisLimitedLiabilitycrucialtoamoderncorporation?21有限責(zé)任的形成代表性論文如下：*PaulL.Davis,GowerandDavis’PrinciplesofModernCompanyLaw,40-46(6thEd,1997).*PhillipBlumburg,LimitedLiabilityandCorporateGroup,11JournalofCorporateLaw573(1986).22對(duì)于公司法人人格與股東有限責(zé)任合并意義的思考公司法人人格----積極的資產(chǎn)區(qū)分/公司財(cái)產(chǎn)成為公司債權(quán)人的擔(dān)保財(cái)產(chǎn)，為公司債權(quán)人設(shè)定優(yōu)先于股東或者公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者的債權(quán)人受償?shù)母?dòng)擔(dān)保（floatingcharge），公司債權(quán)人在評(píng)估公司財(cái)產(chǎn)時(shí)具有比較優(yōu)勢(shì)股東有限責(zé)任----消極的資產(chǎn)區(qū)分/股東的個(gè)人財(cái)產(chǎn)成為股東的債權(quán)人的擔(dān)保財(cái)產(chǎn)，降低了公司破產(chǎn)時(shí)的債權(quán)追討成本，簡(jiǎn)化并實(shí)質(zhì)性地穩(wěn)定了股票的定價(jià)過程總體意義----便利交易另一方明確交易對(duì)象，區(qū)分公司與其股東，公司及其股東的總體融資成本得以降低23對(duì)交易另一方的提示----來(lái)自公司法人人格與股東有限責(zé)任原則的適用共擔(dān)和轉(zhuǎn)嫁交易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)----債權(quán)人參與監(jiān)督公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者隔離公司的不同經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)與監(jiān)督成本的增加——信息不對(duì)稱（InformationAsymmetry）參見：HenryHansmann&ReinierKraakman,TheEssentialRoleofOrganizationalLaw,110YaleLawJournal387(2000).24LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreethatLimitedLiabilityeliminatestheriskofbusinessfailure?-作為有限責(zé)任的對(duì)價(jià),應(yīng)當(dāng)要求公司服從政府管制\為顧客,雇員和相鄰社區(qū)的利益考慮而決策和行事.Whatdoes“externalizationofrisk”meaninthecontextofLimitedLiability?25WhyLimitedLiability:

SomeTheoriesLimitedLiabilityandTheoryofFirmsLimitedLiabilityandCorporateCapitalInformationandCostsInsurance:ASubstitute26LimitedLiabilityreducescosts“[W]eknowfromthesurvivaloflargecorporationsthatthecostsgeneratedbyagencyrelationsareoutweighedbythegainsfromseparationandspecializationoffunction.Limitedliabilityreducesthecostsofthisseparationandspecialization.”FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,52UniversityofChicagoLawReview,89,1985,SeetheTextbookp.63.27LimitedLiabilityinacontextofdiversifiedshareholdingHowtoreducethecostsofmoralhazard?[FrankH.Easterbrook(美國(guó)第七巡回上訴法院法官)&DanielR.Fischel(芝加哥大學(xué)法學(xué)院教授)],TheEconomicStructureofCorporateLaw(公司法的經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)-張建偉&羅培新譯),LawPress,2005,pp.66-69.28LiftingtheCorporateVeil法院為了平衡有限責(zé)任的成本和收益的嘗試29LimitedLiabilityPiercingtheCorporateVeil:Analternativeforreducingthecostsofmoralhazard.-PiercingtheCorporateVeil-MinimumRegisteredCapital-MandatoryInsurance-DutiesofManagement-ExternalRegulation(fromthegovernment)

請(qǐng)用法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的方法分析上述各種方法的效率.30PiercingtheCorporateVeilCloseCorporationsv.PublicCorporationsCorporateShareholdersv.PersonalShareholdersContractsv.TortsVoluntaryCreditorsv.InvoluntaryCreditors(Seetheabovetopic)InadequateCapitalInvestment31Contractsv.TortsPiercingtheCorporateVeil[SeetheNoteNo.7,Textbook,pp.80-81]32TheProductionofCorporationLawsRobertaRomano,StateCompetitionforCorporateChartersJonathanR.Mace&GeoffreyP.Miller,TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporateLawFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,TheCorporateContractJeffreyN.Gordon,TheMandatoryStructureofCorporateLawJohnC.Coffee,Jr.,TheMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLaw:AnEssayontheJudicialRole33WhatConcerned:USAFederalism?Mandatory?+Enabling?+DefaultRules?34StateCompetitionAllparticipantsinthedebatebelievethattheincomeproducedbythecharteringbusinessspursstatestoenactlawsthatfirmsdesire.Howdoprinciples----theshareholders----ensurethattheiragents----themanagers----behavefaithfully?35Whynotfederaldomain?Cary’sArguments…Winter’sresponse…Romano’sfurtherobservation…36ATransactionalCostExplanationFranchisetaxrevenueConstitutionalsupermajorityrequirementInvestmentsinlegalcapital37TowardanInterestGroupTheoryof

DelawareCorporateLawTaxpayersDelawarebar38EnablingLaws…TheCorporateCodeinalmosteverystateisan“enabling”statute….Thehandiworkofmanagersisfinalinallbutexceptionalortrivialinstances…EasterbrookandFischel,pp.96-97.

Doyouthinkitistheinvestorswhochoosewhethertoorganizeasacorporation,trust,partnership,mutualorcooperative?39AnInvisibleHandHowdoestheinvisiblehandtakeaneffectontheself-interestedmanagers?40Whyisitamandatorystructureofcorporatelaw?InvestorProtectionHypothesisUncertaintyHypothesisPublicGoodHypothesisInnovationHypothesisOpportunisticAmendmentHypothesis41Mandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLawJudicialRole42WhatConcerned:China??????43WhattoCompromise?EUShouldweexpecttheemergenceofaEuropean“Delaware”withtheEuropeanCommunity’seconomicintegration?Romano,p.96.44WhatLearned:Japan公司形式的調(diào)整派生訴訟45WhatLearned:ChinaPiercingtheCorporateVeilDerivateSuits46FutureTrends:ConvergenceandCompromise???47FinancingtheCorporationCliffordW.Smith,Jr.&JeroldB.Warner,OnFinancialContracting:AnAnalysisofBondCovenants,pp.121-128KennethLehn&AnnettePoulsen,ContractualResolutionofBondholder-StockholderConflictsinLeveragedBuyouts,pp.128-130MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOsandthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.130-13248Cont’dWilliamA.Sahlman,TheStructureandGovernanceofVentureCapitalOrganization,pp.132-138FrankH.Easterbrook,TwoAgency-CostExplanationsofDividends,pp.138-13949TwoMechanismtoRaiseCapitalIssuingEquityIssuingDebt50AgencyCostsAgencycostofoutsideequityAgencycostofdebt51AStudyonCorporateBondMaturity:PerspectivefromTransactionCostsandAgencyCosts

發(fā)行長(zhǎng)期債券可以降低交易成本，但債券期限越長(zhǎng)，代理成本就越高。企業(yè)在發(fā)行新債券時(shí)必須對(duì)交易成本和代理成本進(jìn)行權(quán)衡，尋求最優(yōu)債券期限結(jié)構(gòu)。模型證明，發(fā)行企業(yè)債券時(shí)運(yùn)用提前贖回條款、賣回條款、償債基金條款和轉(zhuǎn)換權(quán)等債券契約條款可以同時(shí)達(dá)到降低發(fā)債總成本和延長(zhǎng)企業(yè)債券融資期限的目的。Transactioncostsassociatedwithbondissuescanbereducedbyissuingbondswithlongertermstomaturity.However,thelongerthetermtomaturity,thehighertheagencycostsassociatedwiththeissue.Firmsthatpursuingoptimalbondmaturitystructuremustweightransactionandagencycostsofanewcorporatebondissue.Modelsinthepaperindicatethatfirmscanmakeuseofbondcovenantssuchasthecallprovision,theputprovision,thesinkingfundprovisionandconvertibilitytoincreasethetermtomaturityofabondissueandatthesametimereducetheaggregateoftheagencycostsandtransactioncostsassociatedwithit.Xiao-kunZHOU(周孝坤),“企業(yè)債券期限結(jié)構(gòu)研究―基于交易成本和代理成本視角”,<生態(tài)經(jīng)濟(jì)>,2007/01,pp.75-77.52公司的債權(quán)人交易債權(quán)人機(jī)構(gòu)貸款人持有公司發(fā)出的付款證明的人53Examplesinpp.119-120Example1----ChoiceofShareholder----ProjectLExample2----ChoiceofBondholder----ProjectLExample3----withLeveragedEffect+LimitedLiabilityConcernedforShareholder----ProjectH

54Whynot100percentdebt-financedfirms?P.120,Textbook.55MajorSourcesofConflictbetweenBondholdersandStockholdersDividendPaymentClaimDilutionAssetSubstitutionUnderinvestment56BondCovenantsRestrictionsontheFirm’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictingthePaymentofDividendsRestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyCovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrustee57RestrictionsontheFirm’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictionsonInvestmentsSecuredDebtsRestrictionsonMergers58RestrictingthePaymentofDividendsPp.124-12559RestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyLimitationsonDebtandPrioritySinkingFundsConvertibilityProvisions60SinkingFunds償債基金為確保債券能干到期日有足夠的資金以償還債權(quán)人的本金，發(fā)行公司于債券未到期前預(yù)先按期提存的基金。償債基金通常是存入選定的一家銀行作為信托管理人，由信托管理人利用這筆基金進(jìn)行各種投資，投資收益則增加償債基金。由此可見，償債基金相當(dāng)于一筆專用基金存款。由于償債基金不在債券發(fā)行公司掌握中，其性質(zhì)是由受托人管理的公司債券持有人的資金，但在實(shí)際償還本金之前，并不抵消債券發(fā)行公司的債務(wù)。債券發(fā)行公司應(yīng)按券契約的規(guī)定提存償債，每年提存償債基金的終值應(yīng)等于債券的本金。每年年終應(yīng)根據(jù)信托管理人關(guān)于償債基金的收支報(bào)告，確認(rèn)應(yīng)有投資收益或投資損失。如果償債基金不足以清償券本金，則就首先從一般存款戶補(bǔ)足，然后作清償全部公司債的會(huì)計(jì)處理。公司償債基金應(yīng)作為一項(xiàng)長(zhǎng)期投資反映在年末資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上，償債基金投資收益或損失則應(yīng)作為其他項(xiàng)目列入當(dāng)年的損益表。

61CovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRequiredPurchaseofInsurance62TheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrusteePp.127-128信托擔(dān)保協(xié)議Awrittenagreementbetweentheuserofabondandhis/herbondholders,usuallydecifyinginterestrate,maturitydate,convertibility,andotherterms.Alsocalledindenture.指一張明確記載債券持有人與發(fā)行公司雙方所擁有的權(quán)利和義務(wù)的法律文件。由發(fā)行人和債券所有人達(dá)成的，通常標(biāo)明利率、期日、兌換性和其他項(xiàng)目的書面協(xié)議，也叫契約63債權(quán)人的考量期限回報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)----違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制利益沖突談判64InternalGovernanceStructureBoardofDirectorsShareholdersVotingRightsFiduciaryDutiesExecutiveCompensationBlock-holders(OutsideShareholders)65Readings(A)OliverE.Williamson,CorporateGovernance,pp.148-155.CliffordW.Smith,Jr.&BossL.Watts,IncentiveandTaxEffectsofExecutiveCompensationPlans,pp.155-162.RobertaRomano,TheShareholderSuit:LitigationWithoutFoundation?JohnC.Coffee,Jr.,Does“Unlawful”Mean“Criminal”?:ReflectionsontheDisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctioninAmericanLaw,pp.172-179.66Reading…MainPointsinEachArticles…67OliverE.WilliamsonWhatisCorporateGovernancefor?WhoaretheBODresponsiblefor?ShareholdersandotherConstituencies?OutsideShareholders’Role?Managersthemselves?68CliffordW.Smith,Jr.

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BossL.WattsManagementIncentivesandCorporateGovernance:proorcon?69RobertaRomanoDerivativeSuits:SomeObservationswithEmpiricalStudiesPlaintiffs’counselsasshareholders’agents?70JohnC.Coffee,Jr.TortsandCriminalLaws:Convergence?Benefits/Advantagesv.DisadvantagesWhy?71FiduciaryDutiesWhyFiduciaryDutiesinCorporateLaw?HowaboutnormalContracts?ResidualOwnersandMarginalRisks訂立內(nèi)容詳細(xì)的合同意味著極高的成本,信義義務(wù)成為不完備合同的補(bǔ)充規(guī)則.72BJRDeferentialApproach(順從路徑)Incentive-compatibleContracts73DerivativeSuitsWhyanditsRole…74Readings(B)FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.JeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.JohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.MarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.BernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.213-214.75FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.FischelFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.DoyouthinkVotingisakeyroleincorporategovernance?76JeffreyN.GordonJeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.WhydoAmericanCorporationsintroduceDualClassCommonStock?Howdoyoucommentonitsrelationshipwithcorporategovernance?77JohnPoundJohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.WhatisProxyMechanism?Didtheauthorconcludethatproxycontextfacilitatedtheefficiencyofcorporategovernance?78MarkJ.RoeMarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.HowwouldyouunderstandtheagencyprobleminAmericancorporategovernance?79BernardS.BlackBernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.WhowatchesWhom?80VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl81CasesParamountCommunications,Inc.v.TimeInc.,571A.2d1140(Del.1990).Revlon,Inc.v.MacAndrews&ForbesHoldings,Inc.,506A.2d173(Del.1986).Moranv.HouseholdInternational.Inc.,500A.2d1346(Del.Ch.1988).UnocalCorp.v.MesaPetroleumCo.,493A.2d1049(Del.1988).CityCapitalAssociatesv.IntercoInc.,551A.2d787(Del.Ch.1988).82AdditionalReadingMaterials…RonaldJ.GilsonandReinierKraakman,Delaware’sIntermediateStandardforDefensiveTactics:IsThereSubstancetoProportionalityReview,44BusinessLawyer247(1989).83VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl(A)TheoriesandEvidence反接管條例:向底競(jìng)爭(zhēng)還是力爭(zhēng)上游的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)?接管是最大化了個(gè)人(目標(biāo)公司股東)的權(quán)益,它是否同時(shí)可以最大化社會(huì)效益?84代理成本和要約收購(gòu)并購(gòu)是降低代理成本的有效方式?當(dāng)公司的代理成本過高時(shí),要約收購(gòu)行為給股東開除管理層的機(jī)會(huì).兼并與敵意要約收購(gòu):哪個(gè)成本更大?公司管理層應(yīng)當(dāng)聽任股東和相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的要約收購(gòu)者對(duì)投標(biāo)行為自由博弈?85WilliamsAct任何人持有公眾公司5%以上的股份時(shí),必須提交報(bào)告,披露其持股比例和意圖;而且,要約收購(gòu)者必須就其財(cái)務(wù)狀況和計(jì)劃，提交更為詳細(xì)的報(bào)告,同時(shí),必須向公眾開放其收購(gòu)要約一個(gè)月.要約收購(gòu)者在要約期內(nèi)不得向市場(chǎng)另行購(gòu)買股票,另外,必須以最高的交割按比例買超額售出的股份.86A.Theoriesand