大二上財務管理課件

TypesofPreferredPreferredBankGuaranteedEuroPreferredWarrantConvertibleBondPreferred融資融資(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結構無關論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheoryMMpropositionIwithout（資本結構無關論PerfectcapitalTherearenotaxes,transaction costsassociatedwithsecuritytrading.Investorsandfirmscantradethesamesetsecuritiesatcompetitivemarket presentvalueoftheirfuturecashflows.

otheyrevealnewinformationtheyrevealnewinformationaboutMMpropositionIwithoutodiglianiandMertonMillerPropositionequalt hmrk fh hflVLInotherwords,financialmanagerscannotincreasevaluebychangingthemixsecuritiesusedtoVL((一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionI:withoutMMandtheLawofOneIntheabsenceoftaxesorothertransactioncosts,thetotalcashflowpaidouttoallofafirm’ssecurityholdersisequaltothetotalcashflowgeneratedbythefirm’sassets.Therefore,bytheLawofOnePrice,thefirm’ssecuritiesanditsassetsmusthavethesametotalmarketvalue.M&MI Doesn’tExample-RiverCruises-AllEquityNumberof PriceperMarketValueof

$1 Stateofthe perReturnonsharesM&MI Doesn’t50%debt

NumberofPriceperMarketvalueof

$500,000Marketvalueof $ Stateofthee$75,000125,000175,00050,00050,000Equity $25,00075,000125,000per Returnonshares (一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionI:withoutHoldingfixedthecashflowsgeneratedbythefirm’sassets,however,thechoiceofcapitalstructuredoesnotchangethevalueofthefirm.Itmerelydividesthevalueofthefirmintodifferentsecurities.LetEandDdenotethemarketvalueofequityanddebtifthfirmislevered.LetUbethemarketvalueofequityifthefirmisunlevered.AndletAbethemarketvalueoffirm’sassets.(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerIwithoutHomemadeLeverage:Investorsuseleverageintheirownportfoliostoadjusttheleverage madebythefirm.Aslongasinvestorscanborroworlendatthesameinterestrateasthefirm,homemadeleverageisaperfectsubstitutefortheuseofleveragebythefirm.M&MI Doesn’tExample-RiverCruises-AllEquity-Debtreplicatedby(marginloanandbuytwoassumedthattheinvestor'scostofborrowingmoneyisthesameasthatofthefirm StateoftheEarningsontwoLESS:Interest@Netearningson me i.e.,issueDebt+UnleveredFirm=LeveredeStateoftheM&MeStateoftheExample-RiverCruises–Firmdebtat-Investorcanunwrapdebt(oneshareandlendmoney)PLUS:Interest@ PLUS:Interest@ Netearningson Returnon$10 i.e.Leveredfirm+investDebt=UnleveredArbitrage， 理性投資者將杠桿，投資于無杠桿公(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerIwithoutAverageCostofCapital(NoForleveredfirm,weightedaveragecostofcapital(WACC)calculatesthecostofcapitalofthefirm’sassetsbycomputingtheweightedaverageofthefirm’sequityanddebtcostofcapital.Forunleveredfirminperfect(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionI:withoutWithperfectcapitalmarkets,afirm’sWACCisindependentofitscapitalstructureandisequaltoitsequitycostofcapitalifitisunlevered,whichmatchesthecostofcapitalofitsassets.Therefore,iftheriskofaprojectmatchestheriskoftheassetsofafirm,wecanusethefirm’sWACCtoestimatetheappropriatecostofcapitalforthe Inaperfectcapitalmarket,theLawofOnePriceimpliesthatallfinancialtransactionshaveanNPVofzeroandneithercreatenordestroyvalue. Consequently,thechoiceofdebtversusequityfinancingdoesnotaffectthevalueofThefundsraisedfromissuin equalthepresentvalueofthefutureinterestandprincipalpaymentsthefirmwillmake.Thatis,inaperfectcapitalmarket,afirm’schoiceofcapitalstructureisunimportantHowever,thisstatementisatoddswiththeobservationthatfirmsinvestsignificantresources,bothintermsofmanagerialtimeandeffortandinvestmentbankingfees,inmanagingtheircapitalstructures.(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionIwithoutInmanyinstance,thechoiceofleverageisofcriticalimportancetoafirm’svalueandfuturesuccess.Therearelargeandsystematicvariationsinthetypicalcapitalstructuresfordifferentindustries.Atyear-end-2004,Amgen,abiotechnologyanddrugfirm,hasdebtof$5bil.andamarketcap.ofmorethan$81bil.,givingthefirmadebt-equityratioof0.06.Incontrast,NavistarInternational,anautoandtruckmanufacturer,hadadebt-equityratioof0.95.Truckmanufacturersingeneralhavehigherdebtratiosthanbiotechnologyanddrugcompanies.forSelectedIndustriesDebtlevelsaredeterminedbybookvalues,andequitybymarketvalues.TheaveragedebtfinancingforallU.S.stockswasabout36%,butnotethelargedifferencesby(一）(一）Modigliani-MillerpropositionIwithoutIfcapitaltructureis whydoweseesuchconsistentdifferencesincapitalstructuresacrossfirmsandindustries?whydomanagersdedicatesomuchtime,effort,andexpensetothecapitalstructureMMpropositionIwithout實證結果不支持無關LysandSivaramakrishnan(1988務杠桿與DhrymesandKurz(1967資決策與融資決(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結構無關論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory(二(二 roositionII:withoutThereturnofaportfolioisequaltotheweightedaverageofthereturnsofthesecuritiesinit,theequalityimpliesthefollowingrelationshipbetweenthereturnsofleveredequity,debt,andunleveredequityForlevered inperfect(二）(二）Modigliani-MillerpropositionII:withoutMMPropositionThecostofcapitalofleveredequityisequaltothecostofcapitalofunleveredequityplusapremiumthatisproportionaltothemarketvaluedebt-equityCostofCapitalofLeveredGivenconstantrUandrD,rEincreaseswithdebtNextFigureillustratestheeffectofincreasingtheamountofleverage,whichismeasuredintermsofdebt-to-valueratio,D/(E+D),inafirm’scapital capital,itsdebtcostofcapital,anditswhererU;SE;BD;ksrE;kbMM’sPropositionII(w/riskyrIncludesBankruptcyIncludesBankruptcyAsthefirmborrows

Risky

moreofriskistransferredfromstockholderstoFig.WACCandLeveragewithPerfectCapitalMarketsAsthefractionofthefirmfinancedwithdebtincreases,boththeequityandthedebteriskierandtheircostofcapitalweightisputonthelower-costdebt,theweightedaveragecostofcapitalremainsFinancialDistress， 成本Legalandadministrativecosts(tendtobeasmallpercentageoffirmIndirectCosts（間接成本：在企業(yè) 往受到重大影響，企業(yè)價值大幅下降。）Impairedabilitytoconductbusiness(e.g.,lost無形資產的損AgencyCosts（公司管理者和股東會采取減少 MMpropositionII：without 企業(yè)不存在最優(yōu)CapitalStructureCapitalStructureFallacies(Doesdebtratioincreaseinshareprice?FigureEarningsperSharewithandwithoutThesensitivityofEPStoEBITishigherforaleveredfirmthanforanunleveredfirm.Thus,givenassetswiththesamerisk,theEPSofaleveredfirmismorevolatile.TheincreaseinexpectedEPSwillnotincreaseinshareprice.CapitalCapitalStructureFallacies(Willshareholdersgainfromnewequityissue?Ingeneral,aslongasthefirmsellsthenewsharesofequit atafairprice,therewillbeno ainorlosstoshareholdersassociatedwiththeequityissueitself.Themoneytakeninbythefirmasaresultoftheshareissueexactlyoffsetsthedilutionoftheshares.AnygainorlossassociatedwiththetransactionwillresultfromtheNPVoftheinvestmentsthefirmmakeswiththefundsraised.((二）Modigliani-MillerpropositionII:withoutLeveredandUnleveredBetas:Theeffectofleverageontheriskofafirm’ssecuritiescanalsobeexpressedintermsofbeta.Letbethebetaoftheleveredequity,bethebetaofequitywithoutleverage,bethebetaofdebt.Wehavefollowingrelationship:sincetheyhavesameWerefertoasafirm’sunleveredbeta.Itmeasuresthemarketriskofthefirmwithoutleverage,whichisequivalenttothebetaofthefirm’sassets.(二）(二）Modigliani-MillerpropositionII:withoutIfwearetryingtoestimatetheunleveredbetaforaninvestmentproject,weshouldbaseourestimateontheunleveredbetasoffirmswi leveredLet’ssolveleveredIfthefirm’sdebtisrisk ,thenitsbetaiszero(βD=0)es(Hamada’sHowtocalculatedebt-adjustedbeta(bottom-up(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結構無關論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory（三）Modigliani‐MillerpropositionIwith?公稅與負債比率會呈正向變動。Assume:keepthedollaramountofAssume:keepthedollaramountofdebtcTaxbenefit=Taxbenefit=$10,000x(.06)x(.35)=

DxrDx =DxPVof210perpetuity=$210/.06= Shield c=$10,000x.35=*Tocomputetheincreaseinthefirm’stotalvalueassociatedwiththeinteresttaxshield,weneedtoforecasthowafirm’sdebt—andthereforeitsinterestpayments—willvaryovertime.((三MMpropositionI：withInterestTaxTheInterestTaxShieldandFirmLetVLandVUrepresentthevalueofthefirmwiandwithoutleverage,respectively.WehavethefollowingchangetotheMMPropositioninthepresenceoftaxes:Thetotalvalueoftheleveredfirmexceedsthevalueofthefirmwithoutleverageduetothepresentvalueofthetaxsavingsformdebt:=VU+D*

Thehigherdebt,themoreOptimalcapitalstructure:asmuchdebtasC.S.&CorporateExample-YouownalltheequityofSpaceBabiesDiaperCo.The hasnodebt.The’sannualcashflowis$10,000,beforeinterestandtaxes.Thecorporatetaxrateis35%.Youhavetheoptiontoexchangepartofyour’equitypositionfor6%bondswithafacevalueShouldyoudothisandC.S.&CorporateExample-YouownalltheequityofSpaceBabiesDiaperCo.’hasnodebt.The sannualcashflowis$10,000,beforeinterest andtaxes.Thecorporatetaxrateis35%. Youhavetheoptiontoexchangepartofyourequitypositionfor6%bondswithafacevalueof$50,000.’ShouldyoudothisandAllE E InterestPmt Taxes@35%NetCash

0

C.S.&CorporateExample-YouownalltheequityofSpaceBabiesDiaperCo.hasnodebt.The ’sannualcashflowis$10,00 ,beforeinterestandtaxes.Thecorporatetaxrateis35%. Youhavetheoptiontoexchangepartofyourequitypositionfor6%bondswithafacevalueof$50,000.Shouldyoudothisand00InterestAll EquityAllEquity=TaxesTaxes@e*Equity+Debt=(4,550+NetCashNetCash*thevalueofafirmisthetotalamountitcanraisefromallinvestors,notjustequityholders.Fig.TheCashFlowsoftheUnleveredandLeveredFirmByincreasingthecashflowspaidtodebtholdersthroughinterestpayments,afirmreducestheamountpaidintaxes.Theincreaseintotalcashflowspaidtoinvestorsistheinteresttaxshield.(Assumea40%marginalcorporatetaxrateand$500mildebt.)(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結構無關論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory roositionII:withThecostofe r)D(1T whererUisthecostofcapitalthefirmwouldhaveifithadnodebtGivenconstantrUandrD,rEincreaseswithdebt在賦稅條件下，當負債比率增加時，股東財務風險所要求增加的風險的程度小于無稅條件下風險的增加程度，即在ValuingtheInterestTaxShield Infact,itThus,thereductionintheWACCincreaseswiththeamountofdebtfinancing.Thehigherthefirm’sleverage,themorethefirmexploitsthetaxadvantageofdebt,andtheloweritsWACC.(See.NextFigure)whereU;SE;BD;ksrE;kbTheWACCwithandwithoutCorporateTaxesWecomputetheWACCasafunctionofleverage.WithouttaxestheWACCisconstant.Withtaxes,theWACCdeclinesasthefirmincreasesitsrelianceondebtfinancingandtheinteresttaxshieldgrows.Thefigureassumesamarginal etaxrateofc=35%.(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結構無關論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheoryCostsofFinancialCostsofFinancialDistress-Costsarisingbankruptcyordistortedbusinessdecisionsbeforebankruptcy.(Baxter,1967) ValueifallEquity-PVCosts-PVCostsofFinancialThepresentvalueofthecostsoffinancialdistressincreaseswithincreasesthedebtratiobecausetheprobabilityofdefaultand/orbankruptcyisFinancialumvalueof

CostsfinancialMarketValueofTheMarketValueofThe

Valueoflevered

Fig.OptimalLeveragewithTaxesandFinancialAsthelevelofdebt,D,increases,thetaxbenefitsofdebtincreaseby*Duntilinterestexpenseexceedsthefirm’s ofdefault,andhencethe resentvalueoffinancialdistresscosts,alsoincreasewithD.Theoptimallevelofdebt,D*,occurswhentheseeffectsbalanceoutandVLis ized.D*willbelowerforfirmswithhighercostsoffinancialdistress.(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結構無關論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory?al alTaxesintheInterestTaxTheamountofmoneyaninvestorwillpayforasecurity ydependsonthebenefitstheinvestorwillreceive—namely,thecashflowstheinvestorwillreceive,afteralltaxeshavebeenpaid.Thus, altaxesreducethecashflowstoinvestorsanddiminishfirmvalue. Asaresult,theactualinteresttaxshielddependsonthereductioninthetotaltaxes(bothcorporateand thatarepaid.Todeterminethetruetaxbenefitofleverage,weneedtoevaluatethecombinedeffectofbothtaxes.TopFederalTaxRatesintheUnitedStates,1971-2005alAfter-TaxInvestorCashFlowsResultingfrom$1inEBIT eistaxedatrateifortheinvestor.Dividendorcapitalgain istaxedatratecforthecorporation,andagainatrateefortheinvestor.alTaxes ageofalTaxes ValuingtheInterestTaxShield alAslongas*0,thendespiteanytaxdisadvantageofat allevel,anettaxadvantageforleverageIncaseofpermanentdebt,thevalueofthefirmwithleverageBecausetheimlies

altaxdisadvantageofdebtgenerallyweseethatthebenefitofleveraeis (referp.關于Miller模型的討 只要Tei 如果的利息抵稅效應不能完全被抵消，則Miller模型預示企業(yè)價值隨著/權益比Miller

(1Tc)(1Te)

1 VL= VL<VU+TCDwhenTe< VL VL< DebtwherepBr0interestrateforattracting

1

)interestrateforattractinginvestorswithtaxrate(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結構無關論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgencySignalingTheory(七 理JensenandMeckling(1976):公司會發(fā)生兩 (a)管理者經營的利得需與股東 消費perk）。 股東會考慮這樣的可能性，而產生權 成本者間的利 Keiretsuin v

Next2.supermajority(1/2,2/3,

(七 理 ， 債融資,以賺取超額 (七 理B.債權人與股東間的負 問公 負債會發(fā)生負 成本,公司 會發(fā)生權 成本, 成(負 成

成本)極小化時,AT(R)=AD(R)+RR Myers(1977):當公司 Jensen(1986)舒緩管理者與股東間的利益，也因此成為負。A costsandFig.OptimalLeveragewithTaxes,FinancialandAgencyAsthelevelofdebt,D,increases,thevalueofthefirmincreasesfromtheinteresttaxshieldaswellasimprovementsinmanagerialincentives.Ifleverageistoohigh,however,thepresentvalueoffinancialdistresscosts,aswellastheagencycostsfromdebtholder–equity ucesfirmvalue. optimallevelofdebt,D*,balancesthesebenefitsandcostsofleverage.(一)MMpropositionIwithoutTaxes（資本結構無關論）(二MM roositionIIwithoutTaxes(三)MMpropositionIwithCorporateTaxesMMpropositionIIwithCorporateTaxesMillerEquilibrium（+個人所得稅AgencyTheoryAgency(八) MyersandMajluf(1984):當管理者的私有信息為新投資方案 時,因信息不對稱問題,公司的權益可能被錯誤的評價。即使公司新的投資計劃NPV為正，若股價被低權益的價值被高估時,管理者才會 股為壞消息,債券融資優(yōu)于權益融資。由于內部 因此內部權益是最受喜愛的來源，其次為一般債券及Myers(1984):依據(jù)MyersandMajluf 見融資優(yōu)序Fig.StockReturnsBeforeandAfteranEquityStockstendtorise(relativetothemarket)beforeanequityissueisannounced.Uponannouncement,stockpricesfallonaverage.ThisfigureshowstheaveragereturnrelativetothemarketbeforeandafterannouncementsusingdatafromDeborahLucasandRobertMcDonald,“EquityIssuesandStockPriceDynamics,”JournalofFinance45(1990):1019–1043.融資融資融資決策之因素(一)最適資本結構(Trade-off(二)融資優(yōu)序MarketTiming(一)最適資本結構理(Trade-off假設:投資人與管理者對未來成長機會有相同的由于市場不完善與成本極小化的持一目標的比率,以追求公司價值極大化.KrausandLitzenberger1973Scott1976),與Kim1978):負債帶來的租稅利益與成本間的決定了公Miller1977DeAngeloandMasulis1980人所得稅與非負債稅盾(non-debttaxshields)也該.(一)最適資本結構理(Trade-offRoss(1977):公司與投資人間有信息不對稱,投資人不知道公司的質量,高質量的公司由于 較低,因而會 較多的債券,以使自己與低質量,JensenandMeckling(1976):（參 SmithandWarner(1979):為使 (一)最適資本結構理(Trade-offAghionandBolton(1986): 控制權的喪失,卻也可能因財務杠桿而獲致較高的報酬.有效的融資形式乃是使 在某些經濟條件下,同時以負債及權益融資是最適決AghionandBoltn1988):增發(fā)會有股權稀釋的邊際成本,新發(fā)負債會有負債的邊際成本,權衡兩邊際成本后,即可適當分配控制權,決定公司的最適資本結構. Debt-to-ValueRatio[D/(E+D)]ofU.S.Firms,1975–2005Althoughfirmshaveprimarilyissueddebtratherthanequity,theaverageproportionofdebtintheircapitalstructureshasnotincreased(variedinarangefrom30%-45%fortheaveragefirm)duetothegrowthinvalueofexistingequity.Source:CompustatandFederalReserve,FlowofFundsAccountsoftheUnitedStates,PatternsofCorporate(一)最適資本結構(二)融資優(yōu)(PeckingOrderTheory:啄食順MarketTiming(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先順部權益券部權內 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負債短期負債及可轉(PeckingOrderThispeckingordermayupsetthetrade-off ofcaitalstructurebecausefirmsmabereluctanttoadddebttocapitalstructureevenifthereisadditionalvaluefromtheinteresttaxshield.Thus,firmsmayoperatewithlessthanthe"otimal"amountofdebtintheircaitalstructureaslongastheycanfundprojectswithretainedearnings.(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先順部權益券部權 而言,債券有固定的收益,因此價值較易被估計,也較為穩(wěn)定,較不會被低估. MyersandMajluf(1984)（參見發(fā)布訊號理論的介NetExternalFinancingandExenditures U.S.CororationsInaggregate,firmshaveraisedexternalcapitalprimarilybyissuingdebt.Thesefundshavebeenusedtoretireequityandfundinvestment,butthevastmajorityofcapitalexpendituresareinternallyfunded.Source:FederalReserve,FlowofFundsAccountsoftheUnitedStates,Fig.AggregateSourcesofFundingforExpenditures,U.S.Inaggregate,firmstendtorepurchaseequityandissuedebt.Butmorethan70%capitalexpendituresarefu Source:FederalReserveFlowof(PeckingOrderC.CornellandShapiro(1987):一企業(yè)與其客戶,經銷商、契約關系外，尚有隱藏的請求權(implicitclaim、(organizationalcapital)， 保證、工作安定本扣除組織負債后即為該企業(yè)的凈組織資本(net.

(PeckingOrder 加其內部;成功的企業(yè)由于擁有較多的組織資本,故其負債比(PeckingOrderD.Baskin(1989):由留存收益提供的內部不必承 成本,也避免了因放股利的個人所得稅,因此內部權益優(yōu)融資可因利息而減少公司稅的課征,且 成本較低,更不會造成控制權的稀釋.因此公司的融資決策會依循融(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權益券部權內 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負債短期負債及可轉(PeckingOrder內 優(yōu)于外 Narayanan(1988):舉債增加需要支付的利息就更 (PeckingOrderDonaldson(1985):由于 在及不可預測的因素,而動用留存收益融資 較小,因此除非是緊急防御或是采取攻勢,否則不應依賴 管理者為了增加自主權,常謀求減輕外在利益團體對公司運作的潛在干預,而運用內部正可避免投資大眾的注目,故內優(yōu)于外 (PeckingOrder (PeckingOrderDBartonandGordon(1987持決策的控制權及彈性,將會較喜歡內,(PeckingOrderEMillerandRock(1985于任何的壞消息,因此內部 采用何種外部融資方式均無差異。(亦即,，序理(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權益券部權內 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負債短期負債及可轉(PeckingOrder Scott(1977):公司有抵押擔保的新負債,會剝 擔保的債權人之,而提高公司權益的價值.因此如果管理者追求的是股東 GrossmanandHart(1982):舉債會增加 潤,而非要享受 (PeckingOrderLeland&Pyle(1977）：當企業(yè)投資可以使其價值提高時，將不會新股而降低原HotromandTirole(1989果管理以融。(亦即，不支融序理論的順(PeckingOrder. (PeckingOrderNarayanan(1988)：負債具有優(yōu)先求償因此舉債造成股價下跌的幅度較新股為(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權益券部權內 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負債短期負債及可轉(PeckingOrder故公司價值應會隨銀行借款增加而上 經濟效果，故多選擇發(fā)債籌Yosha1995來成長機會愈高的公司，為避免信(二HoustonandJames(1996):未來成長機會較高的公 Cole(1998):企業(yè)若與銀行已有財務往來,則銀行會 予該企業(yè),主因是銀行能藉由財務往來4 Krishnaswamietal1999利的信息但卻高度信息不對稱時，為避免公BootandThakor(2000),HoustonandJames(2001):(PeckingOrder4Hoshietal.(1991),Billettetal.(1995):實證發(fā)現(xiàn)銀行具有正面價值,支持銀行 。 SebouhandGordon(2000):銀行融資 ,而私募負,(PeckingOrder融資優(yōu)先部權益券部權內 優(yōu)于外債券融資 新股間的選銀行借款與負債短期負債及可轉(PeckingOrder短期負債及可轉Myers(1977):短期負債到期期間短,每次舉成本.JensenandMeckling(1976人或股東的,因此可轉債可降低成本.(一)最適資本結構(二)融資優(yōu)序MarketTimingCapitalStructureThestaticfirmsweighthetaxbenefitsofdebtagainstcostswithfinancialdistressandThedynamictrade-off:(HennessyandWhited(2005,JF)Thepeckingassourcesoffinancing,firmspreferinternalfunds,thenande asalast#informationasymmetry.(MyersandMajluf(1984,Themarkettimingfirmspreferequitywhentheyperceivetherelativecostequityislow,andpreferdebt#managerstimesecurityofferingstoexploitmarketinefficiency.(BakerandWurgler(2002,JF))EvidenceEvidencefavorstheMarketTimingFirmstendtoissuewhenFirmstendtoissuewheninvestorsarerathertooenthusiasticaboutearningsPost-issuestockreturnstendtobe“theamountbywhichourstockisundervaluedorovervaluedwasanimportantconsideration”inissuingeuit. GrahamandHarve 2001)Seasonedequityofferings,markettiming,andthecorporatelifecyclebyDeAngelo,DeAngeloandStulz(2010,Asimplelife-cycleyoungwithhighmrkt-to-book(M/B)ratiosandlowoperatingcashsellstocktofundwhereasma