股權(quán)激勵(lì)外文文獻(xiàn)

TheDiffusionofEquity nsinItalianListedPaststudieshavebroughttolightthedissimilaritiesinthepaypackagesofmanagersinAnglo-Saxoncountriesascomparedwithothernations(e.g.,Bebchuk,FriedandWalker,2002;Chef?nsandThomas,2004;Zattoni,2007).IntheUKand,aboveallintheUS,remuneration passesavarietyofcomponents,andshortandlongtermvariablepaycarriesmoreweightthanelsewhere(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Inothercountries,however,fixedwageshavealwaysbeenthemainingredientintopmanagers’payschemes.Overtime,variableshort-termpayhas emoresubstantialandtheimpactoffringebenefitshasgraduallygrown.Notwithstanding,incentiveslinkedtoreachingmediumtolong-term goalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(TowersPerrin,2000).Inrecentyears,however,paypackagesofmanagershaveundergoneanappreciablechangeasvariablepayhasincreasedconsiderably,evenoutsidetheUSandtheUK.Inparticular,managersinmostcountrieshaveexperiencedanincreaseinthevariablepayrelatedtolong-termgoals.Withinthecontextofthisgeneraltrendtowardmediumandlong-termincentives,thereisapronouncedtendencytoadoptnsinvolvingstocksorstockoptions(TowersPerrin,2000;2005).Thedriversofthediffusionoflongtermincentivensseemtobesomerecentchangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironmentatthelocalandgloballevels.ParticularlyimportanttriggersoftheconvergencetowardtheUSpayparadigmarebothmarket internationalizationofthelabormarket,andlaw-orienteddrivers,suchascorporateortaxregulation(Chef?nsandThomas,2004).Drivenbythesechangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironment,weobserveaglobaltrendtowardthe“Americanizationofinternationalpaypractices,”characterizedbyhighincentivesandverylucrativecompensationmechanisms(e.g.,Chef?ns,2003;Chef?nsandIronically,thespreadoftheUSpayparadigmaroundtheworldhappenswhenitishotlydebatedathome.Inparticular,thecriticsareconcernedwithboththelevelofexecutivecompensationpackagesandtheuseofequityincentivens(Chef?nsandThomas,2004).CriticsstressedthatUStopmanagers,andparticularlytheCEOs,receiveverylucrativecompensationpackages.The’80sand’90ssawanincreasingdisparitybetweenCEO’spayandthatofrank-and-?leworkers.Thankstothiseffect,theirdirectcompensationhas eahundredtimesthatofanaverageemployee(HallandLiebman,1998).ThemaindeterminantsoftheincreasinglevelofCEOs’andexecutives’compensationareannualbonusesand,aboveall,stockoptiongrants(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Stockoptionnshaverecentlybeencriticizedbyscholarsandpublicopinionbecausetheycharacteristicallyaretoogenerousandsymptomaticofamanagerialextractionofthefirm’svalue(Bebchuketal.,2002;BebchukandFried,2006).Inlightoftheserecenteventsandoftheincreasedtendencytoadoptequityincentivens,thispaperaimsatunderstandingthereasonsbehindthedisseminationofstockoptionandstockgrantingnsoutsidetheUSandtheUK.ThechoicetoinvestigatethisphenomenoninItalyreliesonthefollowingarguments.First,thelargemajorityofpreviousstudiesyzetheevolutionofexecutivecompensationandequityincentivensintheUSand,toasmallerextent,intheUK.Second,ownershipstructureandernancepracticesincontinentalEuropeancountriesaresubstantiallydifferentfromtheonesinAnglo-Saxoncountries.Third,continentalEuropeancountries,andItalyinparticular,almostignoredtheuseoftheseinstrumentsuntiltheendofthe’90s.Ourgoalistocomparetheexnatorypowerofthreecompetingviewsonthediffusionofequityincentivens:1)theoptimalcontractingview,whichstatesthatcompensationpackagesaredesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweenmanagersandshareholders(JensenandMurphy,1990);2)therentextractionview,whichstatesthatpowerfulinsidersmayinfluencethepayprocessfortheirownbenefit(Bebchuketal.,2002);and3)theperceived-costview(HallandMurphy,2003),whichstatescompaniesmayfavorsomecompensationschemesfortheir(supposedorreal)costTothispurpose,weconductedanempiricalstudyonthereasonswhyItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentivenssincetheendofthe’90s.Togainadeepunderstandingofthephenomenon,wecollecteddataandinformationbothontheevolutionofthenationalinstitutionalenvironmentinthelastdecadeandonthediffusionandthecharacteristics(i.e.,technicalaspectsandobjectives)ofequityincentivensadoptedbyItalianlistedcompaniesin1999and2005.Weusedbothlogitmodelsanddifference-of-meansstatisticaltechniquestoyzedata.Ourresultsshowthat:1)firmsize,andnotitsownershipstructure,isadeterminantoftheadoptionoftheseinstruments;2)thesensarenotextensivelyusedtoextract althoughafewcasessuggestthispossibility;and3)ns’characteristicsareconsistentwiththeonesdefinedbytaxlawtoreceivespecialfiscaltreatment.Ourfindingscontributetothedevelopmentofthelitureonboththerationalesbehindthespreadingofequityincentiveschemesandthediffusionofnewernancepractices.Theyshow,infact,thatequityincentivenshavebeenprimarilyadoptedtotakeadvantageoflargetaxbenefits,andthatinsomeoccasionstheymayhavebeenusedbycontrollingshareholderstoextract valueattheexpenseofminorityshareholders.Inotherwords,ourfindingssuggestthatItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentivenstoperformasubtleformofdecoupling.Ontheonehand,theydeclaredthatnswereaimedtoalignshareholders’andmanagers’interestsandincentivevaluecreation.Ontheotherhand,thankstothelackoftransparencyandpreviousknowledgeabouttheseinstruments,companiesusedthesemechanismstotakeadvantageoftaxbenefitsandsometimesalsotodistributealargeamountofvaluetosomepowerfulindividuals.Theseresultssupportasymboliconcorporateernance,accordingtowhichtheintroductionofequityincentivenspleasestakeholders–fortheirimplicitalignmentofinterestsandincentivetovaluecreation–withoutimplyingasubstantiveimprovementofernancepractices. ernanceinItalianListedItaliancompaniesaretraditionallycontrolledbyalargeblockholder(Zattoni,1999).Banksandotherfinancialinstitutionsdonotownlargeshareholdingsanddonotexertasignificantinfluenceonernanceoflargecompanies,atleastasfarastheyareabletorepaytheirfinancialdebt(Bianchi,BiancoandEnriques,2001).Institutionalinvestorsusuallyyamarginalrolebecauseoftheirlimitedshareholding,theirstrictconnectionswithItalianbanks,andaregulatoryenvironmentthatdoesnotofferincentivesfortheiractivism.Finally,thestockmarketisrelativelysmallandundeveloped,andthemarketforcorporatecontrolisalmostabsent(Bianco,2001).Inshort,theItalianernancesystemcanbedescribedasasystemof“weakmanagers,strongblockholders,andunprotectedminorityshareholders”(Melis,2000:Theboardofdirectorsistraditionallyonetier,butashareholders’generalmeetingmustappointalsoaboardofstatutoryauditorsaswellwhosemaintaskistomonitorthedirectors’performance(Melis,2000).Further,somestudiespublishedinthe’90sshowedthattheboardofdirectorswasundertherelevantinfluenceoflargeblockholders.Bothinsideandoutsidedirectorswereinfactrelatedtocontrollingshareholdersbyfamilyorbusinessties(Melis,1999;2000;Molteni,1997).Consistentwiththispicture,fixedwageshavebeenthemainingredientoftopmanagers’remuneration,andincentiveschemeslinkedtoreachingmediumtolong goalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(Melis,1999).EquityincentiveschemesadoptedbyItaliancompaniesissuestockstoallemployeesunconditionallyforthepurposeofimprovingthe atmosphereandstabilizingthesharevalueontheStockExchange.Onlyveryfewcanbecomparedwithstockoptionnsinthetruesenseoftheterm.Eveninthiscase,however,directorsandtopmanagerswererarelyevaluatedthroughstockreturns,becauseofthesupposedlimitedabilityoftheItalianstockmarkettomeasurefirm’sperformance(Melis,1999).TheEvolutionofItalianInstitutionalTheinstitutionalcontextinItalyhasevolvedradicallyinthelastdecade,creatingthepossibilityforthedisseminationofequityincentivens.Themainregardedthedevelopmentofcommerciallaw,theintroductionandupdatingofthecodeofgoodernance,theissueofsomereportsencouragingtheuseofequityincentivens,andtheevolutionofthetaxlaw(Zattoni,2006).Concerningthenationallawandregulations,somereformsinthecommerciallaw(1998,2003,and2005)andtheintroduction(1999)andupdate(2002)ofthenationalcodeofgoodernancecontributedtotheimprovementofthecorporateernanceoflistedcompanies(Zattoni,2006).FinancialmarketsandcorporatelawreformsimprovedtheefficiencyoftheStockExchangeandcreatedaninstitutionalenvironmentmorefavorabletoinstitutionalinvestors’activism(BianchiandEnriques,2005).Atthesametimetheintroductionandupdateofthecodeofgoodernancecontributedtotheimprovementofernancepracticesattheboardlevel.ThesereformsdidnotproduceanimmediateeffectonernancepracticesofItalianlistedcompanies,althoughtheycontributedtoimprove,slowlyandwithsomedelay,ernancestandards(Zattoni,Beyondtheevolutionofernancepractices,somechangesintheinstitutionalenvironmentdirectlyaffectedthediffusionandthecharacteristicsofequityincentivens.BoththewhitepaperoftheMinistryoftheIndustryandForeignCommerceandthecodeofgoodernanceissuedbythenationalStockExchangeinvitedcompaniestoimplementequityincentivensinordertodevelopavaluecreationcultureinItaliancompanies.Furthermore,in1997fiscalregulationswereenactedallowingataxexemptiononthesharesreceivedthroughanequityincentiven.Accordingtothenewregulation,whichtookeffectonJanuary1,1998,issuanceofnewstockstoemployeesbyanemployeroranother belongingtothesamegroupdidnotrepresentcompensationinkindfor etaxpurposes(Autuori2001).Inthefollowingyears,theevolutionoftaxrulesreducedthegenerousbenefitsassociatedwiththeuseofequityincentivens,butalsothenewrulestofavorthedisseminationofthesens.Drivenbythesechangesintheinstitutionalcontext,equityincentivebecamewidelydiffusedamongItalianlistedcompaniesattheendofthe’90s(Zattoni,2006).Ironically,thediffusionoftheseinstruments–inItalyandinothersuchasGermany(Bernhardt,1999),Spain(AlvarezPerezandNeiraFona,2005),andJapan(Nagaoka,2005)–tookcewhentheywerestronglydebatedintheUSfortheirunpredictedconsequencesandthemalpracticesassociatedwiththeiruse(Bebchuketal.,2002).TheRationalesExiningtheAdoptionofEquityIncentiveEquityincentivensareamaincomponentofexecutivecompensationinUS.Theiruseismostlyfoundedontheargumentthattheygivemanagersanincentivetoactintheshareholders’interestsbyprovidingadirectlinkbetweentheircompensationandfirmstock-priceperformance(JensenandMurphy,1990).Beyondthat,equityincentivensalsohaveotherpositivefeatures,astheymaycontributetotheattractionandretentionofhighlymotivatedemployees,encouragebeneficiariestotakerisks,andreducedirectcashexpensesforexecutivecompensation(HallandMurphy,2003).Despitealltheirpositivefeatures,theuseofequityincentivensisincreasinglydebatedintheUS.Inparticular,criticsquestiontheirpresumedeffectivenessinguaranteeingthealignmentofexecutives’andshareholders’interests.Theypointoutthattheseinstrumentsmaybeadoptedtofulfillotherobjectives,suchastoextractvalueatshareholdersexpenses(e.g.,BebchukandFried,2006),oreventoachievea(realorperceived)reductionincompensationcosts(e.g.,Murphy,2002).Insummary,theactualdebateindicatesthatthreedifferentrationalesmayexinthedisseminationandthespecificfeaturesofequityincentivens:1)theoptimalcontractingview(JensenandMurphy,1990);2)therentextractionview(Bebchuketal.,2002);3)theperceived-costview(HallandMurphy,Accordingtotheoptimalcontractingview,executivecompensationpackagesaredesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweentopmanagers(agents)andshareholders(principals)(JensenandMeckling,1976).Theboardsofdirectorsareeffectiveernancemechanismsaimedatizingshareholdervalueandthetopmanagement’scompensationschemeisdesignedtoservethisobjective(FamaJensen,1983).Providingmanagerswithequityincentivensmaymitigatemanagerialself-interestbyaligningtheinterestsofmanagersandshareholders(JensenandMeckling,1976).Followingthealignmentrationale,equityincentivesmayimprovefirmperformance,asmanagersaresupposedtoworkfortheirownandshareholders’benefit(JensenandMurphy,1990).Inshort,theseinstrumentsaredesignedtoaligntheinterestsofmanagerswiththoseofshareholders,andtomotivatetheformertopursuethecreationofsharevalue(JensenandMurphy,1990).theprincipleofequityManagersandshareholdersisadelegateagencyrelationshipmanagersoperatinginassetsundermanagement,shareholdersentrusted.Butinfact,intheagencyrelationship,thecontractbetweentheasymmetricinformation,shareholdersandmanagersarenotcompleydependentonthemanager'smoralself-discipline.Thepursuitofthegoalsofshareholdersandmanagersisinconsistent.Shareholderswanttoizetheequityvalueofitsholdingsofmanagerswhowanttoizetheirownutility,sothe"moralhazard"existsbetweentheshareholdersandmanagers,throughincentiveandrestraintmechanismstoguideandlimitthebehaviorofInadifferentwayofincentives,wagesbasedonthemanager'squalificationconditionsand thetargetperformanceofapredeterminedrelativelystableinacertainperiodoftime,averycloserelationshipwiththe 'stargetperformance.Bonusesgenerallysuper-goalperformanceassessmenttodeterminethepartoftherevenuemanagerperformanceiscloselyrelatedwiththe short-termperformance,butwiththe 'slong-termvalueoftherelationshipisnotobvious,themanagerforshort-termfinancialindicatorsattheexpenseofthelong-terminterests.Butfromthepointofviewofshareholders'investment,hewasmoreconcernedwithlong-termincreaseinthevalueofthe.Especiallyforgrowth-orientedcompanies,thevalueofthemanager'smoretoreflecttheincreaseinthe 'slong-termvalue,ratherthanjustshort-termfinancialInordertomakethemanagersareconcernedabouttheinterestsofshareholdersneedtomakethepursuitoftheinterestsofmanagersandshareholdersasconsistentaspossible.Inthisregard,theequityincentiveisabettersolution.Bymakingthemanagerholdsanequityinterestinacertainperiodoftime,toenjoythevalue-addedbenefitsofequityriskinacertainway,andtoacertainextent,youcanmakemanagersmoreconcernedaboutthelong-termvalueofthe inthebusinessprocess.Equityincentiveincentiveandrestrainttopreventshort-termbehaviorofthemanager,toguideitslong-termbehavior.EquityIncentiveTheperformanceofReferstoamorereasonableperformancetargetsatthebeginningoftheyear,iftheincentiveobjecttotheendtoachievethedesiredgoal,the grantedacertainnumberofsharesortoextractarewardfundtobuy stock.Theflowofperformancesharesrealizedthatusuallyhavethetimeandnumberrestrictions.Anotherperformanceofthestockintheoperationandrolerelativetosimilarlong-termincentiveperformanceunitsandperformancestockdifferenceisthattheperformancesharesgrantedstock,performanceunitsgrantedcash.stockReferstoa therighttograntincentivetargetincentiveobjectcanpurchaseacertainamountoftheoutstandingsharesoftheatapredeterminedpricewithinaspecifiedperiodmaybewaivedthisright.Theexerciseofstockoptionshavethetimeandlimitthenumberofcashandtheneedtomotivatetheobjectsontheirownexpenditurefortheexercise.Someofourlistedcompaniesintheapplicationofvirtualstockoptionsareacombinationofphantomstockandstockoptions,thegrantedincentiveobjectisavirtualstockoptions,incentiveobjectsrights,phantomstock.virtualThatthe awardedtheincentivetargetavirtualstockincentiveobjectswhichenjoyacertainamountoftherighttodividendsandstockappreciationbutnotownership,withoutvotingrights,cannotbetransferredandsold,expireautomaticallywhenyouleavetheenterprise.stockappreciationMeanstheincentivetargetofarightgrantedtothe 'ssharepricerose,theincentiveobjectcanbeobtainedthroughtheexercisewiththecorrespondingnumberofstockappreciationgains,theincentiveobjectsdonothavetopaycashfortheexercise,exercise,getcashortheequivalentinsharesofcompanies.restrictedReferstothepriorgrantincentivetargetacertainnumberof shares,butthesourceofthestock,selling,etc.Therearesomespecialrestrictions,generallyonlywhentheincentiveobjectto plishaspecificgoal(eg,profitability),theincentivetargetinordertosellrestrictedstockandbenefitfromit.ThedeferredReferstoapackageofsalary endesignedtomotivateobject,whichpartoftheequityincentive e,equityincentive ewasissued,butaccordingtothefairmarketvalueofthe 'ssharestobeconvertedintothenumberofsharesafteracertainperiodoftime,theformof stockorwhenthestockmarketvalueincashpaidtotheincentivetarget.theoperator/employee-Meanstheincentivetargettoholdacertainnumberofthe 'sstock,thestockisagiftincentivetarget,orobjectof subsidyincentivestobuy,orincentivetargetisself-financedthepurchase.Incentiveobjectscanbenefitfromappreciationinthestocklossesinthedevaluationofthestock.Management/employeeMeanstoleveragefinancingtothe 'smanagementorallemployeestopurchasesharesofthe,to eshareholdersoftheandothershareholdersofriskandprofitsharing,tochangethe 'sownershipstructure,controloverthestructureandassetstructure,toachieveownershipbusiness.ThebookvalueappreciationDividedintospecificbuyandvirtualtwo.Purchasetypereferstothetargetinthebeginningoftheperiodpersharenetassetvalueoftheactualpurchaseofacertainnumberofshares,endofperiodvalueofthenetassetspershareattheendoftheperiodandthensoldbacktothe Virtualtypeincentivetargetinthebeginningoftheperiodwithoutexpenditureoffundsgrantedbytheonbehalfoftheincentivetargetacertainnumberofsharescalculatedattheendoftheperiod,accordingtotheincrementofthenetassetspershareandthenumberofsharesinthenameoftheproceedstostimulatetheobject,andaccordinglytoincentivetargetpaymentincash.2007在英國(guó)，尤其是，包括各種部分，和其他地方薪酬相比，短期和長(zhǎng)期的2002管理者的薪酬計(jì)劃中占了主要部分。隨著時(shí)間的推移，可變短期已經(jīng)變得更，酬已經(jīng)合理增加，這包括了除和英國(guó)以外的國(guó)家。尤其是，大多數(shù)國(guó)家的的管理者已經(jīng)經(jīng)歷了與長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)相關(guān)的可變的增加。在趨向中期和長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)的大的背景下出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)顯著的趨勢(shì)—采用與或股權(quán)相關(guān)的計(jì)劃(韜睿派場(chǎng)環(huán)境中看起來(lái)最近有些變化。特別重要是對(duì)的范例趨同觸發(fā)器都以市場(chǎng)為導(dǎo)向的驅(qū)動(dòng)，例如股權(quán)形式的演化或勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的，法律驅(qū)動(dòng)，例如2004的推動(dòng)，我們觀察到了一個(gè)趨向于“國(guó)際行為化”的全球趨勢(shì)，以高獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)和非常豐厚的機(jī)制為特（例如，2003和托馬斯2004，2004評(píng)論家強(qiáng)調(diào)管理者，特別是首席執(zhí)行官，都獲得非常豐厚的。十年代出現(xiàn)了首席執(zhí)行官和基層員工之間的日益懸殊。由于這種效應(yīng)，他們19882000的一個(gè)公司價(jià)值管理的提取癥狀（貝舒克等,2002；貝舒克和弗萊德，2006根據(jù)最近這些和采用股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃增長(zhǎng)傾向，這篇文章主要在于理解除和英國(guó)之外，和授予計(jì)劃宣傳背后的原因。選擇在意大利劃在和英國(guó)的發(fā)展。其次，所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和管理措施在歐洲大陸國(guó)家與盎格魯我們的目標(biāo)是對(duì)比這三個(gè)相互觀點(diǎn)在股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃擴(kuò)散上的解釋力：1