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文檔簡(jiǎn)介
The
Hidden
Toll
of
Drug
Price
Controls:Fewer
New
Treatments
and
HigherMedical
Costs
for
the
WorldTRELYSALONG
|
JULY2023Whennationsimplementpharmaceuticalpricecontrols,theyreducepharmaceuticalrevenues,whichthenreducesinvestmentsinfurtherR&D,limitingfuturegenerations’accessto
newnoveltreatmentsneededtofightdiseasessuchascancer,Alzheimer’s,heartdisease,
anddiabetes.KEY
TAKEAWAYS.Manycountriesarewillingtosacrificeeconomicwelfarebypayinghigherenergypricestosavetheplanetfromclimatechange.
Yet,whenitcomestocuringdiseases,theyfreerideontheinvestmentsofothers.....AfteradjustingforGDPpercapita,30
of32OECDcountriesforwhichdatawereavailablein2018hadlowerprescriptiondrugpricesthantheUnitedStates.Pharmaceuticalpricecontrolsin32OECDcountries,notincludingtheUnitedStates,reducedmanufacturersalesrevenuebyin201877percent,or$254billion.PharmaceuticalsalesrevenuecorrelatesstronglywithinvestmentsinR&D.Analyzingthatlinkfor478pharmaceuticalcompaniesin2021,thecorrelationcoefficientwas0.92.Liftingpharmaceuticalpriceregulationsin32OECDcountriesin2018wouldhaveincreasedpharmaceuticalsalesrevenuegloballyby$254.1billion,resultingin$56.4billionofadditionalR&Dexpendituresand25newdrugsannually...Ifjustfiverichnations—Japan,Germany,FranceUK,andItaly—paidtheirfairshare,humanitywouldbenefitfrom12newdrugseveryyear.Evenifthesecountriesreducedpricecontrolssuch
thatpricesroseto75percentofU.S.levels,pharmaceuticalcompaniescouldhaveincreasedR&Dexpendituresbyanadditional$23.9billion,resultinginatleast11newdrugsannually.CONTENTSKeyTakeaways1Introduction2PharmaceuticalPriceControls3PriceRegulations’ImpactonRevenue6ImpactofReducedrevenuesOnR&D8ImpactofAdditionalR&DInvestmentonNewDrugs10ImpactofNewDrugsonLifeExpectancyandSavings12CaseStudy:Europe’sPharmaceuticalRevenueandNewDrugs14PolicyRecommendations
20Conclusion
22Endnotes22INTRODUCTIONGovernment-imposedpriceregulationsonthepharmaceuticalsector
arethehealthequivalentofnotsigningtheParisAgreement.Whenitcomestoclimatechange,196partiessignedtheClimateAccords,agreeingtocontributetheirfairshare,includingaccepting
higherenergyprices,tofightingclimatechange.1
FrenchPresidentMacronwasemblematicwhenhestated,“Wewillnotsacrificeourcommitmentstotheclimate
…soallcountriesmustcontinuetoupholdalltheircommitments,”whichincludespendingmoremoney.2Yet,whenitcomestofinancialsolidarityforthehealthofpeoplearoundtheworld,FranceishappytopayalmosthalfasmuchfordrugsastheUnitedStatespays.Indeed,whenitcomestocontributingtothedevelopmentofnewdrugstotreatdiseases,manywealthycountriesimposeseverepricecontrols,freeridingoffafewnationssuchastheUnitedStates,andtherebyshirktheirresponsibilitytocontributetothehealthoffuturegenerations.
Accordingtomultiplestudies,whereas“USpolicydiscussionsofdrugpricingissuescommonlyincludetheirlikelyeffectsontheincentivesforinnovation,thatislesscommonindiscussionsofpricinginothercountries.Indeed,thereappeartobefewerconcernsexpressedby[restofworld]authoritiesaboutthefuturesupplyofinnovativepharmaceuticals.”3
IncontrasttotheirbeinggoodSamaritansonclimate,whenitcomestodruginnovation,countriesimposingpricecontrolsareselfishfreeriders.Whenwealthycountriesimposepriceregulationsondrugs,theyfailtobalancethewelfareofcurrentandfutureconsumers.Pricecontrolsreducecurrent
governments’andconsumers’healthexpenditures.Assuch,manywealthycountriesareunwillingtoabandonthembecausedoingsomeanstheirconsumer/taxpayerwelfarewouldfall.4
Inotherwords,thesecountrieschoosetoactintheirowninterestwhilesimultaneouslyforgettingtoconsiderthe
healthoffuturecitizens,boththoseintheirowncountryandglobally.Accordingtoonestudy,drugpricecontrolsreduce“R&D,theflowofnewproducts,firmvalue,andconsumerwelfare”fortheworld.5
Thismeanstoday’spricecontrolswillreducethenumberofnewdrugsavailabletofuturegenerationsinallINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
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JULY2023PAGE2countries,includingtocurediseasessuchasheartdisease,cancer,stroke,andAlzheimer’s.Conversely,liftingpriceregulationsbenefitsallcountriesbecauseitwouldboostbiopharmaceuticalrevenue,leadingtoanincreaseinR&Dandthedevelopmentofnewdrugs.6Thehealthoffuturegenerationsisjustasimportantasthewell-beingoftheclimateinthefuture.Assuch,itisdeeplytroublingthatsomanygovernmentsofwealthynationsarewillingtodotheirpartforclimatechangebutnotforthedevelopmentofnewdrugsthatwilldeterminethehealthoffuturegenerations.ThisreportexaminesthepharmaceuticalpriceregulationsofOECDcountriesandtheirimpactonrevenueandthedevelopmentofnewdrugs.PHARMACEUTICAL
PRICE
CONTROLSAmajorityofOECDcountriesimplementsomeformofpharmaceuticalpricecontrolonmanufacturersonthebasisthatsuchmeasureswillreducedrugpricesforcitizens.DespiteFrankeletal.’sfindingsthat“noveldrugcandidatesgeneratemoreknowledgespilloversthanincrementalones,”many
countrieschoosenottofosterecosystemsthatsupportinvestmentinthemost-innovativedrugs.7UsingtheRANDCorporation’sInternationalPrescriptionDrugPriceComparison,theInformationTechnologyandInnovationFoundation(ITIF)examinedprescriptiondrugpricedifferencesbetweentheUnitedStatesand32OECDcountries,usingdatafromTableC.1.“CalculatedU.S.VersusOther-CountryPriceIndices”fromthereport.8
Morespecifically,ITIFusedthe“MainResults”fromtheindicesinourestimatesofmanufacturerrevenuelosses,R&Dexpenditurelosses,andadditionaldrugslosttopricecontrols.9
The“MainResults”figuresareprescriptiondrugpricecomparisonsbetweentheUnitedStatesandanothercountry,aftercontrollingforthevolumeandmixofdrugsexamined.10
Moreover,thesepriceindicescannotbecomparedamongoneanotherbecauseofthe“differentnumberofpresentationsanalyzedforeachpairwisecomparisonoftheUnitedStateswithanothercountry.”11
ItshouldbenotedthatthesepriceindicesarenotadjustedforpercapitaGDPpurchasingpowerparity(PPP).12
Asaresult,ourestimatesadjustforthisdifference.TheunderlyingdatausedfortheTableC.1was2018quarterlymanufacturersalesforspecificdrugsextractedfromIQVIA.13
Asaresult,thedataandfiguresinthisstudyprecededtheUnitedStates’introductionofpricecontrolsthroughthe2023InflationReductionAct.Lastly,thisRANDCorporationstudyisoneofmanystudiesexaminingtheimpactofdrugpricecontrolsthathasfoundthatothercountriesareconsistentlypayinglessforinnovativemedicinescomparedwith
theUnitedStates.14Ofthe32OECDcountrieswithavailabledata,allhadlowerprescriptiondrugpricesthantheUnitedStates,whichhistoricallyhasnotimposedpricecontrolsonitspharmaceuticalsector.15EvenafteradjustingforGDPpercapita,30countriesstillhadlowerprescriptiondrugpricesthantheUnitedStatesin2018.16
(Seetable1.)Luxembourg(403.1percentlowerthantheUnitedStates),Turkey(246.8percentlower),andNorway(229.3percentlower)hadthelowestprescriptiondrugprices.17
Incontrast,Chile(25percenthigherthantheUnitedStates)andMexico(45.1percenthigher)hadthehighestprescriptiondrugpricesin2018onaGDPpercapita-adjustedbasis(mainlybecausebothnationshaverelativelylowerincomes).18
Inotherwords,manyOECDcountriesimplementsomeformofdrugpricecontrols,leadingtolowerdrugpricescomparedwithanenvironmentwithoutpricecontrols.INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
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JULY2023PAGE3Table
1:
Assessment
of
OECD
countries’
GDP
per
capita-adjusted
prescription
drug
price
levels
using
RANDCorporation
study
(numbers
over
100
indicate
2018
prices
lower
than
the
United
States’)19Price
Index:Main
ResultsPrice
Index:Main
ResultsCountryCountryLuxembourgTurkey503.1346.8329.3270.6249.9237.4222.4200.3198.3195.6191.2188.5188.0187.3186.6185.3183.7LithuaniaCanadaFinlandCzech
RepublicSloveniaItaly182.7176.9175.9167.1163.3158.3155.7154.4152.8150.0140.9140.8131.7100.075.0NorwayIrelandAustraliaSwedenNetherlandsKoreaGreecePortugalSpainBelgiumSwitzerlandNew
ZealandAustriaJapanPolandLatviaUnited
KingdomGermanySlovakiaEstoniaHungaryUnited
StatesChileMexico54.9FrancePharmaceuticalpricecontrolsforce
drugpricesbelowtheirmarketvalue.Forexample,Brekke,Grasdal,andHolmasfoundthatNorway’sreferencepricingpolicyreducedpricesfor
brand-nameandgenericdrugs.20
Historically,theUnitedStatesandthefewcountrieswithoutstringentpricecontrolshaveprovidedastrongbaselinefordrugpricesinanenvironmentwithoutextensivepricecontrolmeasures.Asaresult,fiveacademicstudiesfindthatdrugpricesincomparisoncountrieswithpricecontrolmeasureswereatleast30percentlowerthanintheUnitedStates,suggestingthattheaveragedrugpricewas30percentbelowthosedrugs’freemarketvalue.21AccordingtoamorerecentRANDCorporationstudy,pharmaceuticalpricecontrolscontinuetoreduceprescriptiondrugpricesbyanaverageof156percentin32OECDcountriescomparedwiththeUnitedStates.22INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
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JULY2023PAGE4Pharmaceuticalpricecontrolstendtolowerbrand-nameoriginatordrugpriceswhileraisingthepriceofgenericandbrand-namenonoriginatordrugs.EvenafteradjustingforGDPpercapita,all32OECDcountrieswithavailabledatahadlowerbrand-nameoriginatordrugpricesthantheUnitedStates,wheretherehavehistoricallybeennodrugpricecontrols—althoughtheBidenadministrationhasbegunaprocessofimplementingthemforMedicarePartDdrugsthroughprovisionsintheInflationReductionAct.23
(Seefigure1andfigure2.)Inotherwords,theaverageOECDcountrylikelyimposessomeformofforcedpricereductiononbrand-nameoriginatordrugs.In2018,theaveragepriceofbrand-nameoriginatordrugsforthese32countrieswas177.9percentlowerthantheUnitedStates’.24
Incontrast,26of32OECDcountrieshadhigherunbrandedgenericsandbrand-namenon-originatordrugpricesthantheUnitedStates.25
In2018,theaveragepriceofgenericsandbrand-namenon-originatordrugswas26.7percenthigherintheseothernationsthanintheUnitedStates.26
Inotherwords,pharmaceuticalpricecontrolsdisincentivize
manufacturersfromdevelopingnewmedicines
whileincentivizingtheproductionofgenerics(which,ofcourse,unwittinglyendangerstheavailabilityofmoregenericmedicinesinthefuture,asfewernewinnovativemedicinesarecreatedand
thus,inturn,can’tbecomefuturegenerics.)Figure
1:
Brand-name
originator
drug
prices
relative
to
U.S.
prices27LuxembourgTurkeyNorwayEstoniaIrelandKoreaNetherlandsAustraliaGreeceSwitzerlandJapanLatviaCzechRepublicItalyChilePortugalSpainPolandHungaryMexico0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
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JULY2023PAGE5Figure
2:
Unbranded
generics
and
brand-name
nonoriginator
drug
prices
relative
to
U.S.
prices28LuxembourgNorwayTurkeyNetherlandsIrelandAustraliaPolandPortugalCzechRepublicItalySpainHungaryJapanEstoniaSwitzerlandGreeceLatviaKoreaChileMexico0%100%200%300%400%500%600%700%PRICE
REGULATIONS’
IMPACT
ON
REVENUEBydefinition,priceregulationsreduceglobalpharmaceuticalrevenues.Accordingtoa2004UnitedStatesDepartmentofCommercereport,drugpriceregulationsin11OECDcountriesreducedpharmaceuticalrevenuesby25to38percent.29
Amorerecentstudyof19OECDcountriesfindsthatfiveoutofsixbroadcategoriesofpharmaceuticalpricecontrolsreducedrevenues.30
Directpricecontrols,whereregulatorsdirectlysetdrugpricesthroughpricenegotiationsorothermeans,
hadthemostsignificantnegativeimpactonpharmaceuticalrevenues,reducingthemby18.3percent.31
Althoughnotassubstantial,economicevaluationandbudgetregulationsreducedacountry’spharmaceuticalrevenueby6.1percent.32
(Seefigure3.)Inotherwords,pricecontrolmeasuresreducepharmaceuticalrevenuesand,subsequently,therevenuethatdrivesR&D.INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
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JULY2023PAGE6Figure
3:
Price
regulations’
impacts
on
revenue331GenericIncentive2orMoreGenericIncentivesEconomicEvaluationsExpenditureCapsProfitControlsDirectPriceControls-20%-15%-10%-5%0%Price
control
measures
reduce
pharmaceutical
revenues
and,
subsequently,
the
revenue
thatdrives
R&D.In2018,pharmaceuticalpricecontrolsin32OECDcountries(notincludingtheUnitedStates)reducedmanufacturersalesrevenueby77percent,or$254billion.34
Thesecountrieshadacombinedpharmaceuticalmanufacturersalesrevenueof$331.3millionatcurrentpricecontrollevels.35
IftheseOECDcountriesreducedpricecontrolsandraisedtheirpricesto75percentofU.S.levels,revenuewouldincreaseby$108billion.36
Withoutpricecontrols—ifcountriesraisedtheirpricesto100percentofU.S.levels—thesalesrevenuewouldbe$585.4billion.37
(Seefigure4.)Figure
4:
Pharmaceutical
manufacturer
sales
revenue
for
varying
levels
of
price
controls
for
32
OECD
countries38RevenueWithCurrentPriceLevelsRevenueWith75%ofU.S.PriceLevelsRevenueWith100%ofU.S.PriceLevels$0$200B$400B$600BINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
|
JULY2023PAGE7Countriesthatspendmoreonprescriptiondrugsandimposeextensiveforcedpricereductionontheirpharmaceuticalsectorreducedmanufacturers’revenuethemost.Thetop10
countriesthatnegativelyimpactpharmaceutical
manufacturers’revenuethemostreducerevenue
by$206.9billion.39
Atthetopofthelist,Japan’spricecontrolsreducedmanufacturers’revenueby$36.6billionandGermany’sreducedrevenueby$34.8billion.40
(Seefigure5.)Inotherwords,asaresultofcountries’independentandself-interestedbehavior,theexistenceofnewdrugsfallsshortoftheidealworldwidelevel.41Figure
5:
Manufacturer
revenue
losses
for
the
top
10
countries
with
the
most
extreme
price
reductions42SpainAustraliaKoreaCanadaTurkeyItalyUnitedKingdomFranceGermanyJapan$0$5B$10B$15B$20B$25B$30B$35B$40BIMPACT
OF
REDUCED
REVENUES
ON
R&DReducingpharmaceuticalcompanies’revenues
disincentivizesthemfrominvestinginR&D.Accordingtomultipleacademicstudies,pricesandprofitsarestronglylinkedtopharmaceuticalmanufacturers’investmentsinR&D.43
AbbottandVernonfoundthatpriceregulationsonthesector“significantlydiminishtheincentivetoundertakeearlystageR&Dinvestment.”44
TheyestimatedthatcuttingpricesintheUnitedStates,acountrywithfewpriceregulations,by40–50percentwouldleadtobetween30and60percentfewerR&Dprojects.45
AnotherstudyfindsthatR&Dinvestmentsincreasewithrealdrugpricesandestimatesanelasticityof0.6.46
Inotherwords,anincreaseof10percentinthegrowthof
realdrugpricesisassociatedwithanincreaseof6percentinthegrowthofR&Dintensity.47
Moreover,theCongressionalBudgetOffice(CBO)hasfoundthatpharmaceuticalcompaniesneedto“earna61.8percentrateofreturnonsuccessfulnewdrugs…toseea4.8percentafter-taxrateofreturnontheirinvestment”becausethedrugdevelopmentfailurerateissohigh.48Pharmaceuticalfirmsviewcurrentdrugpriceregulationsaslikelytocontinue,reducingtheirpotentialprofitswhiledisincentivizingtheirinvestmentinR&D.49
AccordingtoLakdawalla,sinceINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
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JULY2023PAGE8cashflow“appearstobeoneofthemostempiricallyimportantdeterminantsofprivateR&Dspendingbyprivatepharmaceuticalfirms…[even]shorttermdeviationsinprofitability…predictR&Dexpenditures.”50
Asaresult,theOECD’s“PharmaceuticalPricingPoliciesinaGlobalMarket”reportfindsthat“thereisahighdegreeofcorrelationbetweensalesrevenuesandR&Dexpenditure,”whileHendersonandCockburnnotedthat“R&DexpendituresaredirectlyproportionaltotheamountofsalesrevenuesavailabletoundertakeR&Dinvestments.”51Pharmaceuticalsalesrevenuecontinuestobeassociatedwith
investmentsinR&D.AcorrelationbetweennetsalesandR&Dexpendituresfor478pharmaceuticalcompaniesin2021resultedinastrongcoefficientof0.92.52
(Seefigure6.)Inotherwords,pharmaceuticalcompanieswithhighernetsalestendtoinvestmoreinR&D,meaningrevenueisacriticalfactorinhowmuchapharmaceuticalcompanyinvests
inR&D.Figure
6:
Net
sales
and
R&D
expenditures
for
large
pharmaceutical
companies53$90B$80B$70B$60B$50B$40B$30B$20B$10B$0$0$2B$4B$6B$8B$10B$12B$14BR&DExpendituresRevenuelostfrompriceregulationsreducesthecashflowavailableforR&Dexpenditures.AccordingtothePharmaceuticalResearchandManufacturersofAmerica
(PhRMA),thetoppharmaceuticalcompaniesintheUnitedStatesinvested22.2percentoftheirdomesticsalesondomesticR&Din2018.54
Inotherwords,thissuggeststhatpharmaceuticalcompaniesgenerallyinvest22.2percentinR&Dinanenvironmentwithoutpricecontrols.Asaresult,pharmaceuticalcompanieslost$56.4billion,or22.2percentofthe$254.1billioninrevenuelosses,inadditionalR&Dexpenditurestopriceregulationsin32OECDcountries.55
Moreover,evenifthesecountriesreducedpricecontrolssothatpricesroseto75percentofU.S.levels,pharmaceuticalcompaniescouldhaveincreasedR&Dexpendituresbyanadditional$23.9billion.56
(Seefigure7.)INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
|
JULY2023PAGE9Figure
7:
Additional
R&D
expenditures
from
varying
levels
of
price
controls
for
32
OECD
countries5775%ofU.S.PriceLevels100%ofU.S.PriceLevels$0$10B$20B$30B$40B$50B$60BDefendersofpricecontrolsknowthat
theyareontheweakestgroundwhenitcomestotheargumentthatcontrolshurtR&Dand,inturn,drugdevelopment.Assuch,manymakespuriousclaimsthatthisrelationshipis,infact,nottrue.Forexample,areportbyCongresswomanKatiePorter(D-CA)assertsthatthepharmaceuticalsectorcouldstillbeprofitableevenifitlost$1trillioninsales,implyingthatpricecontrolssimplyreduceprofits.58
However,thestudycitedinthePorterreportusesreturnoninvestedcapitalasitsmeasureofprofitability,which“poorlyreflectstheprofitabilityofR&D-intensiveindustrysinceR&Disnotcapitalizedbutexpensed.”59Otherserroneouslyassertthatpricecontrolsjustlimitextraneousexpenditures.Yet,Frechet.al.foundthattherevenuesfromhigherprices“representaninvestmentinpharmaceuticalinnovationthatdeliverslargeworldwidesocialreturns…[and]areconsideredas‘quasi-rents’ratherthanmonopolyprofitsinthattheyincentivizeandguideessentialsunkcosts.”60IMPACT
OF
ADDITIONAL
R&D
INVESTMENT
ON
NEW
DRUGSPriceregulationsreducetheamountofR&Dfirmswouldperformintheirabsence.AccordingtoFilson,iftheUnitedStatesadoptedpharmaceuticalpriceregulations,firmswouldconductlessresearchand,ultimately,reducetheflowofnewdrugs.61
Infact,heestimatedthatpricecontrolsintheUnitedStateswouldreduce“theflowofnewdrugs…byalmost40percentinthelongrun.”62
AnotherstudyfindsthatapharmaceuticalpricecontrolregimeintheUnitedStateswouldhavereduced“overone-thirdofallactualnewdrug[or330to365newdrugs]launchesbroughttotheglobalmarket”from1980to2001.63
Ontheotherhand,otherstudiesfoundthatgovernmentpoliciesthatpromotedrugprofitabilityincreased“newclinicaltrials,newmolecularentities,ornewdrugs.”64Lowerrevenuefromthepriceregulationsplaysaroleinreducingthenumberofnewdrugsdeveloped.CivonandMalonyfoundthatcurrentdrugpricesareanimportantdeterminantofR&Dspending,andGiaccotto,Santerre,andVernonfoundthatpriceschargedforcurrentdrugsareanimportantdeterminantofthenumberofprospectivenewdrugsintheR&Dpipeline.65Moreover,AcemogluandLinnnotedthat“a1percentincreaseinthepotentialmarketsizeforadrugcategoryleadstoa4to6percentincreasein
thenumberofnewdrugsinthatcategory.”66Similarly,astudybyPrecisionEconomicsfindsthataconservative8percentincreaseinmarketsizefromliftingpricecontrolswouldleadtoa“9percentincreaseintheworld’sinnovationleadingto8newdrugsperyearby2030.”67
Moreover,theCBOfoundthatabillthatgivestheINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
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JULY2023PAGE10secretaryofHealthandHumanServicesthepowertonegotiatedrugprices“wouldreducedrugcompanies’expectationsaboutfuturerevenues,”leadingto8fewerdrugsfrom2020to2029and“about30fewerdrugsinthesubsequent10years.”68
Inotherwords,priceregulationsandlowerrevenuesreducetheincentiveforpharmaceuticalcompaniestodevelopnewdrugs,hurtingfuturegenerations’accesstonoveltreatmentswhile
alsoreducingthecurrentgeneration’slongevity.69Conversely,liftingpriceregulationswouldincreasethenumberofnewdrugsdeveloped.Accordingto“Deloitte’s13thAnnualPharmaceuticalInnovationReport,”estimatessuggestthattheaveragecostofdevelopinganewdrugwas
$2.3billionin2022.70
Ourestimatesindicatethatliftingpharmaceuticalpriceregulationsin32OECDcountriesin2018wouldhaveresultedinanincreaseof$254.1billioninglobalpharmaceuticalsalesrevenue
and$56.4billioninadditionalR&Dexpenditures.71
Asaresult,theadditionalR&Dexpenditurefromliftingpricecontrolssothatpricesare100percentofU.S.pricelevelsforasingleyearcouldresultinanadditional25newdrugs.72
Evenliftingpricecontrolssothatpricesare75percentofU.S.pricelevelscouldresultinanadditional10newdrugs.73
Moreover,sincetheCenterforDrugEvaluationandResearchidentifiedthat32percentofnoveldrugsapprovedwerefirst-in-classdrugs,weestimatethateightnewfirst-in-classdrugswerelosttopricecontrolsinthese32OECDcountries.74
IftheCenterforDrugEvaluationandResearch’s2019estimatesforfirst-in-classdrugswereused,weestimatethat
11newfirst-in-classdrugswouldhavebeenlosttopricecontrols.75
(Seefigure8.)Inotherwords,pharmaceuticalpricecontrolsreducethenumberofnewdrugsdevelopedeachyear;hence,evenliftingsomepricecontrolscouldincreasethenumberofnewdrugsdeveloped.Figure
8:
Additional
new
drugs
produced
when
prices
are
raised
to
75
percent
or
100
percent
of
U.S.
levels76302520AllOthersFirst-in-Class15105075%ofU.S.PriceLevels100%ofU.S.PriceLevelsINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
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JULY2023PAGE11Ofthe25newdrugslosttopricecontrols,20camefromthesetop10countries.77
IfJapanpaiditsfairshareinsteadoffree-ridingontheUnitedStates,anestimated3.5additionalnewdrugswouldbedevelopedeveryyearglobally.78
Germany’sandFrance’spricecontrolsledtotheloss3.4and2.5newdrugs,respectively.79
Evensmallercountries,suchasSpainandAustralia,playaroleinhinderingnewdrugdevelopment,withtheirpricecontrolsreducingnewdrugsatapaceof1.3and1.2peryear,respectively.80
(Seefigure9.)Figure
9:
Number
of
drugs
lost
in
the
top
10
countries
with
the
most
extreme
price
reductions81SpainAustraliaKoreaCanadaTurkeyItalyUnitedKingdomFranceGermanyJapan-4.0-3.5-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.5-1.0-0.50IMPACT
OF
NEW
DRUGS
ON
LIFE
EXPECTANCY
AND
SAVINGSNewdrugsreducemortalityandincreaselifeexpectancy.Cutleretal.foundthatpharmaceuticalsaccountedfor35percentofthe3.3-yearincreaseinlifeexpectancyAmericansexperienced
from1990to2015(from75.4to78.7yearsofage).82
AccordingtoLichtenberg,thesourceofa6.9-year
increaseinlifeexpectancybetween1960and1997forAmericanswaspartiallyattributedtothediscoveryofnewpharmaceuticals.83
HefoundthattheapprovalofonenewdrugintheUnitedStatesresultedina0.093-year,orjustoveramonth,increaseinlifeexpectancy,
totalinga“l(fā)ife-yearsgainedperyearfromapermanentunitincreaseinnewdrugapprovals…[to]about372thousand.”84
AnotherstudybyBuxbaumfindsthat“pharmaceuticalsweresecondonlytoPublicHealthMeasuresinimportance,andcontributed35percentoftheoverallgain.”85However,newpharmaceuticalsarenotjustbeneficialtoAmericans’lifeexpectancy.AstudybyLichtenbergof27countriesfindsthatthelaunch
ofanewdrugintheprior11yearsisestimatedtoincreaselifeexpectancyby3percentforthoseyoungerthan85yearsold,andanewdruglaunchedmorethan12yearspriorincreaseslifeexpectancyby5.5percent.86
Whiletherearecertainlywell-knownmethodologicalchallengeswithcalculatingquality-adjustedlifeINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION
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JULY2023PAGE12years,there’snodoubttheestimatesarequitesignificant.Forinstance,TopelandMurphyestimatedthat“theaveragevalueofalifeyearisapproximately$150,000.”87
Asaresult,theincreaseinlifeexpectancycouldbevaluedatbillionsforacountry.Moreover,newdrugsreducehealthexpenditures.AccordingtoLichtenberg,thecostofmedicalcaretoincreaselifeexpectancybyayearis$11,000intheUnitedState
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