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IDBWORKINGPAPERSERIESNoIDB-WP-1451

ConditionalCashTransfers,DebitCardsandFinancialInclusion:

ExperimentalEvidencefromArgentina

GuillermoCruces

Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank

DepartmentofResearchandChiefEconomist

August2023

ConditionalCashTransfers,DebitCards

andFinancialInclusion:

ExperimentalEvidencefromArgentina

GuillermoCruces

CEDLAS-UNLPandUniversityofNottingham

August2023

Cataloging-in-Publicationdataprovidedbythe

Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank

FelipeHerreraLibrary

Cruces,Guillermo.

Conditionalcashtransfers,debitcardsandfinancialinclusion:experimentalevidencefromArgentina/GuillermoCruces.

p.cm.—(IDBWorkingPaperSeries;1451)

Includesbibliographicreferences.

1.Transferpayments-Argentina.2.Banksandbanking-Argentina.3.Cash

transactions-Argentina.4.Incomemaintenanceprograms-Argentina.5.Financial

institutions-Argentina.I.Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank.DepartmentofResearchandChiefEconomist.II.Title.III.Series.

IDB-WP-1451

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Abstract

*

Cashtransferandothersocialprotectionprogramsindevelopingcountrieshaveoftenbeenaccompaniedbymeasurestofosterfinancialinclusion,suchastheadoptionanduseofbankaccountsandelectronicmeansofpayments.Argentina’ssocialbenefitsarepaidinbankaccountsandaccessedthroughdebitcards.Withthesimultaneousobjectiveoffosteringformalityamongbeneficiariesandstores,theuseofdebitcardsforpurchaseshasbeenincentivizedbymeansofadditionalsubsidies.Westudiedthelowtake-upoftheseextrabenefitsbymeansofafieldexperimentinvolving400,000beneficiariesofArgentina’slargestconditionalcash-transferprogram(with2.2millionbeneficiarieswhoaretheparentsoffourmillionchildren,40%ofthecountry’s0-17-yearolds).Byusingtheirdebitcardtospendtheallowance,ratherthanwithdrawingcashfromATMs,theycanreceivearebateof15%oftheirexpenditures.However,theysystematicallyfailtoclaimthisbenefit:onlyabout25%ofbeneficiariesreceivethistransfer.Ourexperimentprovidedinformationabouttheeffectivenessofaninformationcampaignconductedviatextmessagesorthroughon-screenmessagesatATMmachines.Thecampaignincreasedpurchaseswithdebitcardsandsubsequentrebatessignificantlybutnotsubstantiallyintheshortrun.However,beneficiarieswhoincreasedtheiruseofdebitcardsdonotexhibitahigherprobabilityofhavingaccesstocreditthroughthefinancialsystem,norhigherlevelsofformalemployment.Theresultsindicatethatculturalfactors(apreferenceforcash),administrativehassleandcitizensecurityissuesarerelevantissuesthatlimitthepotentialoffinancialinclusionthroughincreaseduseofdigitalmeansofpayment.

JELclassifications:C93,H26,K34,K42,Z13

Keywords:Take-upofsocialbenefits,Financialinclusion

*Correspondingauthor:gcruces@.ThispaperispartoftheLatinAmericanandCaribbeanResearch

Networkproject“FinancialInclusioninLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,”withoriginalfundingfromPIERI-

PartnershipforEconomicPolicy(

/

).Thisworkwascarriedoutwithfinancialandscientific

supportfromthePartnershipforEconomicPolicy(PEP),withfundingfromtheDepartmentforInternational

Development(DFID)oftheUnitedKingdom(orUKAid)andtheGovernmentofCanadathroughtheInternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre(IDRC).TheviewsandopinionsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseofPEP,DFIDortheIDB.ThisstudyisregisteredintheAEARCTRegistrywiththeuniqueidentifyingnumberAEARCTR-0003516.TheprojectwasapprovedbytheInstitutionalReviewBoardoftheDepartamentodeEconomía,FacultaddeCienciasEconómicas,UniversidadNacionaldeLaPlata.Theresearch

teamincludedVerónicaAmarante,LucíaRamírez,andJosefinaBáez.WethankMaríaLauraAlzúa,PIERI’s

director,andJaneMariaraandJohnCockburnfromPEPfortheirsupport,aswellasPIERI’sHabibaDjebbarifordedicatedmentorshipandDelfinaCerisoliforsupport.

2

1Introduction

Cash-transferandothersocialprotectionprogramshavegreatlyexpandedindevelopingcountriesinthelasttwodecades.Arelatedissueisfinancialinclusioninthecontextoftheseprogramsandtheirtargetpopulations.Theyhaveoftenbeenaccompaniedwithmeasurestofosterfinancialinclusion,suchastheadoptionanduseofbankaccountsand

electronicmeansofpayments.Theexistingliteraturehasfocusedmainlyondebit-cardandbank-accountusebythepoorandontheimpactofthatuseonsavings(Bachasetal.,2021;Callenetal.,2019;Higgins,2019).

Argentina’ssocialbenefits(theconditionalcashtransferprogram,AsignacionUniver-salporHijo-AUH)arepaidinbankaccountsandaccessedthroughdebitcards.Withthesimultaneousobjectiveoffosteringformalityamongbeneficiariesandstores,theuseofdebitcardsforpurchaseswasincentivizedbymeansofadditionalsubsidies.1Byus-ingtheirdebitcardtospendtheallowance,ratherthanwithdrawingcashfromATMs,beneficiariesreceivedarebateof15%oftheirexpenditures.However,onlyabout25%ofbeneficiariesrespondtothisincentiveandreceivethisadditionaltransfer.

Drawingonseverallarge-scaleadministrativedatasetsonbeneficiariesandcommer-cialandfinancialinfrastructure,weleveragealargefieldexperimentinvolving400,000beneficiariesofArgentina’slargestconditionalcashtransferprogram(with2.2millionbeneficiarieswhoaretheparentsoffourmillionchildren,40%ofthecountry’s0-17yearolds),conductedinpartnershipwiththesocialsecurityadministration,thenationaltaxadministration,andtheMinistryofFinance.Theexperimentconsistedofaninforma-tioncampaignconductedviatextmessagesandthroughon-screenmessagesatATMmachines.

Previousworkonasubsetofthisexperimentfocusedonbenefittake-up.Someofthebarrierspositedintheliteraturehavebeenfearofstigma,administrativeandtransac-tioncosts,hassle,lackofinformationorinattention,andmisinformation/misperceptionsaboutpotentialnegativeconsequencesofsigningup.Alloftheseissuesareexacerbatedinadeveloping-countrycontextwithhighlevelsofinformalityandcomplexregulations.Previousresultsfromasubsetofthisexperimentindicatesthatthecampaignsignifi-cantlyincreasedpurchaseswithdebitcardsandsubsequentrebates,butthatthebenefithadlowsalience,withlimitedinformationonthedebit-cardpurchaserebateprogram(Cruces,2020).

Ourinformationcampaignviatextmessagesincreasedtake-up(i.e.,purchaseswithdebitcardsandsubsequentrebate)significantlybutnotsubstantiallybyprovidingin-formationandraisingsalience.Theoriginalexperimenthadseveralarmstoattempttodistinguishamonghypothesesonbenefittake-up–salience,stigma,andlackofinforma-

1Inarelatedstudy,BrockmeyerandSaenzSomarriba(2022)analyzetheimpactofasimilarprogramaimedatthewiderpopulationandnotatcashtransferreceipientsinUruguay.Thefocusofthisprogramandoftheanalysisistaxcomplianceratherthanfinancialinclusion.

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tion,amongothers.

Theadditionalanalysispresentedhereaimstostudyaseriesofadditionalquestions.Themainresearchquestionistogaugetheimpactofincreaseddebitcarduse(beyondtheadditionalpurchaserebate)onaccesstocreditanduseoffinancialtoolsandinsti-tutions,andthefactorsbehindlimiteduseofdebitcard.Wewilldosobyansweringtwomainquestions.Ontheonehand,wewilluncoverthedeterminantsofdebitcardusebeyondsimpleextractionofcashfromATMs:despitesubstantialfinancialincen-tives,beneficiariesmayhavedifficultiesfindingstoresthatacceptdebitcards,and/orthelattermightbemoreexpensivethanmoreinformalstores,amongotherreasons.Ontheotherhand,weaimtostudytheimpactofincreasedaccesstodebitcardsandbankaccountsonbeneficiaries’credituseandsubsequentsocioeconomicoutcomes.Wewillstudywhetherandhowthepaymentofbenefitsbymeansofdebitcardsfosteredfinan-cialinclusionbystudyingwhetherdebitcardadoptionhasledtobeneficiaries’increasedaccesstocredit,and,indirectlythroughthispotentialinclusioneffect,tohigherlevelsofformalsalariedandformalself-employment.Thesequestionswillbeaddressedbymeansofseveraladditionaldatasources.Thefirstisasurveyofbeneficiariesandexper-imentparticipantstounearthlonger-termimpactsandreasonsforlimiteduseofdebitcards.Second,wematchtheoriginalexperimentalsamplewith60months(including36post-treatmentmonths)ofdatafromtheCentraldeDeudores(BancoCentraldelaRepublicaArgentina),anopenmonthlydatabaseofallindividualsengagingincreditactivities(mostlybankloansandcreditcarduse),andadministrativerecordsonformalemploymentandformalself-employment.

Thispaperbuildsonandwillcontributetotheliteratureonfinancialinclusionindevelopingcountries(Burgessetal.,2005;Reddyetal.,2013;BruhnandLove,2014;Callenetal.,2019;Higgins,2019;KastandPomeranz,2014;Bachasetal.,2021),ontheuseofinformationcampaignstoincreasetake-upandparticipation(BlancoandVargas,2014;Chareyronetal.,2018;Reyesetal.,2021),andonthebroaderliteratureontheimpactsofelectronicmeansofpaymentsindevelopingcountries(SuriandJack,2021). Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Wefirstpresentadiscussionoftheinstitutionalcontextoftheprogramandamotivationforthisstudy(Section2).Section3discussestheexperimentalsetup.Section4presentstheempiricalresults,andSection6concludes.

2InstitutionalContext

LaunchedinNovember2009,AUHisamassive,non-means-testedconditionalcashtrans-ferprogramthatreaches3.9millionchildrenin2.1millionhouseholdsandrepresentsapproximately7%oftotalnationalexpenditures(includingcontribution-basedfamilybenefits;MinisteriodeHacienda,2017).TheAUHisArgentina’slargestconditionalcashtransferprogramandcoversfourmillionbeneficiaries,about40%ofthecountry’s0-17

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yearolds.Assuch,itisoneofthemostimportantcomponentsofthecountry’scurrentsocialsafetynet.Recipientsaretheparentsorlegalguardiansofchildrenunderage18whowereunemployed,workedintheinformaleconomy,workedunderspecifictaxregimesdesignedtoencourageformalizationoflow-skilledworkers,orwereparticipantsinselectedemploymentprograms.HouseholdsthatreceivethiskindofassistancemakeupthemostvulnerableportionofthepopulationinArgentina(thelastavailablepovertyheadcountestimatewas25.7%,whichrisesto39.7%forchildrenaged0-14).Inparticu-lar,84%ofchildrenwhoreceivetheallowancebelongtothetwopoorestquintilesofthehouseholdincomedistributionandspecificallytothefirstthreedeciles.

About95%ofthe2.1millionrecipientsreceivethebenefitbymeansofatransfertoagovernment-providedbankaccount.Themonthlyallotmentis$1,694Argentinianpesosperchild,butbeneficiariesreceiveonly80%ofthisamounteachmonth(roughly13%ofthemeanmonthlyhouseholdincomeoftheseconddecileoftheincomedistribution).InDecember,attheendoftheschoolyear,theyreceivetheremaining20%transferaccumu-latedduringtheyear,conditionalonfulfillmentofavaccinationplan,healthcheck-upsforchildrenundersix,andcertifiedschool-yearcompletionforschool-agechildren.

Beneficiariesofthistransferareassignedaspecialsavingsaccountintowhichtheirbenefitisdepositedeachmonthinthenameofthelegalbeneficiary.Theyarealsoissuedadebitcard(fromoneofthetwomajorworldwidecardproviders)whichtheycouldusetowithdrawcashfromATMsortomakepurchasesatstoresequippedwithPoint-of-Sale(POS)terminals.AllstoresinArgentinaarerequiredbythenationaltaxauthoritytoacceptcardpayments,becausetaxevasionismuchmoredifficultonthesepayments(BrockmeyerandSaenzSomarriba,2022).

Compliancewiththisrequirementhasbeenheterogeneousamongsmallandmiddle-sizedstores,however.Inanefforttoprovideadditionalsupporttopoorfamiliesand,atthesametime,promoteformalityandreducetaxevasion,in2016thegovernmentestablishedanadditionaltransferforAUHbeneficiariesthroughpurchasesmadewithdebitcards.Thepurposeoftheprogramwastotargettransferstotheneediestpopu-lation.Atthesametime,thetransferprovidedanadditionalincentiveforbeneficiariestospendtheirbenefitsintheformalsectoroftheeconomybecausepurchasesmadewithdebitcards(ingeneral)cannotavoidVATandothertaxes.Beneficiariesreceivedanadditionaltransferintotheiraccountsiftheyusedtheirgovernment-provideddebitcardtomakepurchases.

However,theuseofdebitcardsforpurchasesamongbeneficiarieswasnotwidespread,despitethissubstantialfinancialincentive.InFebruary2018,only248,808beneficiariesoftheAUHprogram(outofnearly3.9millionchildrenandtheir2.1millionparents/legalguardians)usedtheirgovernment-provideddebitcardstopurchasegoodsandthusre-ceivedtheadditionaltransfer(thedebit-card-purchaserebate).Thetotaloffundstrans-ferredwaslessthan3%oftheactualbudgetallocatedtothisprogramforbeneficiaries,

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andonlyabout20to30%ofbeneficiariesreceivedthisadditionaltransferduringtheyearofourstudy,2018.Thevastmajoritychosetowithdrawcashthedayitwasdepositedintheiraccountsandtoforegotheadditionalbenefit.Ifthetypicaleligiblehousehold,com-posedoftwoadultsandtwominors,hadtakenadvantageofthefulldebit-card-purchaserebate,theirincomewouldhaveincreasedbyabout5.6%,renderingthisanon-trivialsupplementtohouseholdincome.

3DataSourcesandExperimentalSetup

3.1DataSources

Thebenefittake-upanalysisoftheoriginalexperimentfocusedondifferencesinimpactondebitcardusebytreatment,withsub-treatmentsdesignedtocaptureelementsidentifiedinthebenefittake-upliterature(stigma,information,salience,etc.).Theanalysisinthispaperfocusesontheaggregateeffectoftheinformationcampaign–i.e.,thefocuswillbethepooledtreatmenteffectwithoutdistinguishingthesubtledifferencesbetweensub-treatments.

Themainoutcomeofinterestisuseofdebitcardforpurchases—i.e.,whetherbene-ficiariesusedthedebitcardtopurchasegoods(requiredforthemtoreceivetherebate)ratherthansimplytowithdrawcashfromtheiraccountsandusingthecashtomakepurchases.Thesocialsecurityadministration(ANSES),ourpartnerintheimplementa-tionofthisproject,andthetaxauthority(AFIP),whichisresponsiblefortransferringtherebate,keepmonthlyrecordsofwhichbeneficiariesusedtheprogrambecauseitisresponsiblefordepositingtherebateineachbeneficiary’sbankaccount.Thiswashowwemeasuredourmainoutcomeofinterest:abinaryvariableindicatingtake-upornon-take-upoftheprogramduringthemonthwhenthebeneficiaryreceivedthemessageabouttherebate,eitherbytextmessageorthroughtheATMscreen.ThemaindatasourceswerethusANSESandAFIPadministrativerecords.

Weaddtwokeydimensionsmissingfromthepreviousanalysis.Themainresearchquestionwillbetogaugetheimpactofincreaseddebitcarduse(beyondtheadditionalpurchaserebate)onaccesstocreditanduseoffinancialtoolsandinstitutions.Thiswillbebasedinmatchingtheoriginalsamplewith60months(including36post-treatmentmonths)ofdatafromtheCentraldeDeudores(BancoCentraldelaRep?。blicaAr-gentina),anopenmonthlydatabaseofallindividualsengagingincreditactivities(mostlybankloansandcreditcarduse).Asadditionaloutcomesthatmightresultfromincreasedcreditandfinancialinclusion,wewillestablishwhetherthecampaignhadanyimpactonformalsalariedandself-employment.Wewilldrawonexistingsourcesofinformationthatcanbematchedwithourindividual-levelbeneficiarydata:formalsalariedandformalself-employmentinferredfromcreditratingagencies’data(thatroutinelyaccesssocialsecu-

6

ritydatabases)andfromthetaxauthorityrecord(“padr?3n?)oftaxpayerswhoengageinformalself?employment(?autonomos?and?monotributo??asimplifiedtaxregime).

TheexperimentalsamplewasrandomlydrawnfromasubjectpoolofmorethantwomillionadultswhowerelegalrecipientsoftheAUHprogram.Thetotalexperimentalsampleconsistedof400,723individuals,with205,000inthecontrolgroupand195,723inthepooledtreatmentgroup.Wehaveinformationondebitcardusethrough2018and2019,eightmonthsbeforeandeightmonthsaftertheintervention(conductedinOctober2018).

3.2ExperimentalSetup

Thecausalparameterweestimatedwastheeffectofprovidinginformationaboutthedebit-card-purchaserebateforbeneficiariesofAUHconditionalcashtransfersonthetake-upofthisrebate.Weexpectedtheparametertohaveapositivesign:exposuretoinformationabouttherebateshouldincreasedebitcarduse.

Thesocialsecurityadministration(ANSES),ourpartnerintheimplementationofthisproject,routinelyrunsmassivecommunicationcampaignsviatextmessagessenttobeneficiaries’cellphones,andmostofourinformationtreatmentswerethereforeconveyedinthisway.Moreover,virtuallyallbeneficiariesofthecashtransfergotoanATMtoretrievecashfromthebenefit.ThesocialsecurityadministrationhastheabilitytodisplaymessagesforbeneficiarieswhentheyinserttheirdebitcardintheATM.Weusedboththesemechanismstoconveyaseriesofshortmessagesaboutthedebit-card-purchase-rebateprogram.

Regardingheterogeneity,weexpectedthattreatmentsmightdifferintheirimpactaccordingtofactorsthatmightdeterminepatternsofdebit-carduseoradoption.Theuseofthedebitcardandthepotentialeffectsofourtreatmentsmayhavebeenrelatedtoindividualcharacteristicssuchasage(youngerwomenmayhavehigherlevelsoffinancialliteracybutalsolessexperiencewithfinancialinstitutions).Mostimportantly,debit-cardusemayvarybypreviousexposuretofinancialinstitutions.Forinstance,individualswithsomecredithistorybydefinitioninteractedwiththeseinstitutions,andbeneficiarieswhowereformalemployeesinthepastmighthavehadbankaccountsbecauseemployersmadethemcompulsoryforsometypesofemployeestoreceivetheirwagepayments.Weexpectedlargevariationsindebit-cardusebygeographicalarea(forinstance,byprovince,becausedifferentlevelsofeconomicdevelopmentwereinvolved),orbyfinancialinstitution(somebeneficiarieswereassignedtosmallorlargeprivatebanks,whereasothersreceivedtheiraccountsanddebitcardsfromnationalorprovincialbanks,whosepoliciesmighthavedifferedwithregardtousingdebitcards,forexample).Alternatively,differencesmightbemorelocal,whichweproxiedbycharacteristicsofthespecificbankbranchassignedtothebeneficiary:thismayvarybybranchsize,orsomebranchesmight

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beinareaswithgreateropportunitiestousedebitcards(forinstance,supermarkets).

Finally,useofthedebitcardandthepotentialeffectsofourtreatmentsmayhavebeenrelatedtoindividualcharacteristicssuchasage(youngerwomenmayhavehigherlevelsoffinancialliteracybutalsolessexperiencewithfinancialinstitutions).Mostimportantly,debit-cardusemayvarybypreviousexposuretofinancialinstitutions.Forinstance,individualswithsomecredithistorybydefinitioninteractedwiththeseinstitutions,andbeneficiarieswhowereformalemployeesinthepast2mighthavehadbankaccountsbecauseemployersmadethemcompulsoryforsometypesofemployeestoreceivetheirwagepayments.TheanalysisofheterogeneityalongthesedimensionsispresentedinSection4.2.

3.3ExperimentalSampleandTreatmentGroups

Weselectedoursubjectpoolfromthesubsetofthe2.1millionAUHbeneficiaries(parentsand/orlegalguardians,morethan90%ofwhomwerewomen)withvalidmobilephonenumbers,andsentinformationmessagesbytextmessagesformostofourexperimentalsample.AnadditionalgroupwasshownamessageonATMscreens.Whilethephonenumberswerevalid,wecannotknowwhetherthesemessageswereactuallyreceivedbybeneficiariesoriftheywereread.OurestimateswereIntentiontoTreatratherthanTreatmentontheTreated.

Wedevisedfourdistincttreatments,dividedintoeightsub-treatmentswithtwolargecontrolgroups.ThecontentofthemessageswasdisplayedinTable1.Thetwochannelsavailable(textmessagesandATMscreenmessages)onlyallowedalimitednumberofcharacters,soinformationhadtobeconveyedinaverysuccinctway.Thesamplesizeswere30,000forthebaselinetreatment(textmessages);60,000foraninformationtreat-mentcomposedoftwotextmessages(storesandnocash,with30,000recipientseach);80,000forthesaliencetreatment(foursubgroupsaccordingtothenumberofbeneficiarychildrenoftherecipient,20,000recipients);and30,000forthechanneltreatment(ATMscreen).

Finally,theimplementationagencydidnotauthorizeseparatecontrolgroupsforeachofthetreatments,withtheexceptionofTreatment4.Instead,ourpartnerofferedalargecontrolgroupof180,000forthetext-messagetreatment(1to3),andafurther30,000beneficiariesservedascontrolsfortheATMchanneltreatment(seebelowforthisspecificgroup).These210,000individualsreceivednomessagesatall.Thesaliencetreatmentgroupswereselected,inthesensethatthenumberofchildrenwascorrelatedwithdebit-carduse.Ifwehadhadfourdistinctcontrolgroupsbynumberofchildren,with20,000observationsforeachthesetreatments,ourfullsampleoftreatedandcontrolswouldhavebeenbalancedintermsofthenumberofobservations.Instead,thesaliencetreatment

2NotethatAUHbeneficiariesmustnotbeformallyemployedatthetimeofreceivingthebenefit.

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groupswereover-represented.Therewerenot,forinstance,20,000beneficiarieswithfourchildreninthecontrolgroupof180,000.Theregressionspoolallobservationsandincludeeitherindividualfixedeffects(panelregressions)orabasicsetofcontrols(lastdigitofIDnumberanddummiesbynumberofchildren—basiccontrols)3orindividualfixedeffects,whichcontrolledforthesamedifferencesandensuredthatthetreatmentandcontrolgroupswerebalanced.Ourfinalsample,asdescribedinTable1,includedjustover400,000observations.4

Ourtreatments(textmessagesandATMinformationcampaigns)wereappliedinthefirstweeksofNovember2018,sothattheypotentiallyinfluenceddebit-card-purchaserebatesforthemonthsofNovemberandDecember2018.TheprogramwasdiscontinuedinJanuary2019.Ourpre-treatmentperiodwasJanuarytoOctober2018,whereasthepost-treatmentperiodforthefullsamplewasNovemberandDecember2018.Finally,foralargestate-ownedbank,whichwasusedbyaboutathirdofourexperimentalsample,wemanagedtogetadditionaldataforthefirstsixmonthsof2019.Forthisadditionalsample,wethereforehad10pre-treatmentmonthsandeightpost-treatmentmonths—twomonthswhiletheprogramwasinplaceandsixmonthsafteritwasdiscontinued.

Finally,inJune2019ANSESconductedanonlinesurveyviaemailonelectronicmeansofpaymentinwhichwewereabletointroduceaseriesofquestionsrelatedtotheexperiment.Onlyabout8,000ofourtotaltotalsubjectsamplerepliedtothissurvey,althoughtheserespondentswerebalancedbetweenourtreatmentgroups.Whiletherearelikelyissuesofselection(startingbythosewhousedemailregularlyandrepliedtoANSES’request),westillconsidertheseresultstobevaluable.WediscusstheseresultsinSection4.4.

4EmpiricalResults

4.1OverallImpactoftheExperiment

Topresenttheoverallimpactofourexperiment,wehaveprovidedmonthlyestimatesofthedifferenceindebit-carduseforpurchasesamongindividuals,thecontrolgroups,andthetreated,poolingallsub-treatmentsintooneindicator.5Figure3presentssimple

3AUHbeneficiariesarepaidatthebeginningofthemonthaccordingtothelastdigitoftheirnationalIDnumber–0onthefirstworkingdayofthemonth,1onthefollowing,etc.Wesentatextonpaydayandanotherexactlyoneweeklater.Forlogisticalreasons,ATM-screenmessagesweresentonlytothosewithdigits5to9,whichiswhyaspecificcontrolgroupwasestablishedforthischannel.Thesemessageswereshownonlyoncewhenbeneficia