巴塞羅那國際事務(wù)研究中心-北非的氣候變化和暴力極端主義（英）-2021.10-35正式版

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

MoussaBourekba,

BarcelonaCentreforInternationalAffairs(CIDOB)

SpotlightStudy|October2021

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

Contents

Contents

2

Acknowledgements

3

Introduction

4

I.ViolentExtremisminMaghrebCountries

5

II.DriversofViolentRadicalisationinNorthAfrica

8

III.Climatechangeandviolentextremism:atwo-wayrelationship?

15

IV.Climatechangeandpolicyresponsestoviolentextremism

25

Conclusion

27

Bibliography

30

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

Acknowledgements

IamgratefultoAdrienDetgesfromadelphiwhoprovidedcomments,guidanceandexpertisethatgreatlyimprovedthisresearchpaper.IalsowouldliketothankmycolleagueMarinaUtgésfromCIDOBforherwonderfulsupportinthisresearch.

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

Introduction

Asclimatechangeintensifiesinmanypartsoftheworld,moreandmorepolicymakersareconcernedwithitseffectsonhumansecurityandviolence.FromLakeChadtothePhilippines,includingAfghanistanandSyria,someviolentextremist(VE)groupssuchasBokoHaramandtheIslamicStateexploitcrisesandconflictsresultingfromenvironmentalstresstorecruitmorefollowers,expandtheirinfluenceandevengainterritorialcontrol.Insuchcases,climatechangemaybedescribedasa“riskmultiplier”thatexacerbatesanumberofconflictdrivers.

Againstthisbackdrop,thiscasestudylooksattherelationshipbetweenclimatechangeandviolentextremisminNorthAfrica,andmorespecificallytheMaghrebcountriesAlgeria,MoroccoandTunisia,whichareallaffectedbyclimatechangeandviolentextremism.Therearethreejustificationsforthisthematicandgeographicalfocus.Firstly,thesecountriesareaffectedbyclimatechangeinmultipleways:waterscarcity,temperaturevariationsanddesertificationareonlyafewexamplesofthenumerouscross-borderimpactsofclimatechangeinthisregion.Secondly,thesethreecountrieshavebeenandremainaffectedbytheactivityofviolentextremistgroupssuchasAlQaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM),theIslamicStateorganisation(IS)andtheirrespectiveaffiliatedgroups.Algeriaenduredacivilwarfrom1991to2002inwhichIslamistgroupsopposedthegovernment,whileMoroccoandTunisiahavebeenthetargetsofmultipleterroristattacksbyjihadistindividualsandorganisations.Thirdly,theconnectionbetweenclimatechangeandviolentextremismhasreceivedmuchlessattentionintheliteraturethanotherclimate-relatedsecurityrisks.

Althoughempiricalresearchhasnotevidencedadirectrelationshipbetweenclimatechangeandviolentextremism,thereisaneedtoexaminethewaystheymayfeedeachotherorleastintersectinthecontextofNorthAfricancountries.Hence,thisstudyconcentratesonthewaysviolentextremismcanreinforcevulnerabilitytotheeffectsofclimatechangeandonthepotentialeffectsofclimatechangeonvulnerabilitytoviolentextremism.Whilemostoftheexistingresearchontheinterplaybetweenclimatechangeandviolentextremismconcentratesonterroristorganisations(Asaka,2021;NettandRüttinger,2016;Renard,2008),thiscasestudyfocusesontheconditions,driversandpatternsthatcanleadindividualstojoinsuchgroupsinNorthAfrica.Inotherwords,itlooksatthewayclimatechangecanexacerbateaseriesoffactorsthatarebelievedtoleadtoviolentradicalisation–“apersonalprocessinwhichindividualsadoptextremepolitical,social,and/orreligiousidealsandaspirations,andwheretheattainmentofparticulargoalsjustifiestheuseofindiscriminateviolence”(WilnerandDubouloz,2010:38).Thisapproachisneedednotonlytoanticipatehowclimatechangecouldpossiblyaffectviolentextremisminthemediumandlongrunbutalsotodeterminewhetherandhowthepolicyresponsestobothphenomenashouldintersectinthenearfuture.DoesclimatechangeaffectthepatternsofviolentextremisminNorthAfrica?Ifso,howdothesephenomenainteractinthisregion?

Toanswerthesequestions,thecasestudypaperfirstgivesanoverviewofthethreatposedbyviolentextremisminthecountriesofstudyandexaminesthedriversandfactorsthatarebelievedtoleadtoviolentextremisminNorthAfrica.Secondly,itdiscusseshowthesedriverscouldbeaffectedbytheeffectsofclimatechangeonresources,livelihoods,mobilityandotherfactors.Finally,anattemptismadetounderstandthepossibleinteractionsbetweenclimatechangeandviolentextremisminthefutureandtheimplicationsforpolicymaking.

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

I.ViolentExtremisminMaghrebCountries

ViolentextremismisaphenomenonthataffectsallMaghrebcountries.Algeria,MoroccoandTunisiahavebeenandremainthetargetofthreekindsofVE.Firstly,transnationalterroristorganisationssuchasAlQaedaandIS,whichfocuson“globaljihad”(i.e.,warontheWest),haveperpetratedandinspiredseveralterroristattacksintheregion.Secondly,thereisdomesticterrorismbylocalgroups,suchastheMoroccanIslamicCombatantGroup,theAlgerianSalafistGroupforPreachingandCombatandAnsaralShariainTunisia.Thesegroupsmostlyfightagainstnationalgovernments,whoseregimesareaccusedofbeingcorrupt,anti-Islamicintheiressenceandalliedwith“theinfidels”,orinotherwords,foreignpowers.Severaldozenterroristattackshavebeenperpetratedbylocalgroupsinthisregion.Thirdly,thereistheforeignfightersphenomenon,wherebyindividualstraveltoLibya,SyriaandIraqtojoinviolentextremistgroups.Thishassignificantlyaffectedtheregion,asupto8,000individuals–20%ofthetotalnumberofforeignfightersflockingtoSyriaandIraqtojoinIS–camefromtheMaghreb(TheSoufanGroup,2015).Therearefearsthatsomemayattempttoreturntotheirhomelandtoperpetrateterroristattacks(Renard,2019).

Inthissection,somecontextualinformationisgivenontheextenttowhichviolentextremismrepresentsathreattoeachofthesecountries.

A.ViolentExtremisminAlgeria

OfthethreeMaghrebcountries,AlgeriaiscertainlythemostexposedtotheactivityofVEgroups(Gaub,2015).Althoughthenumberandpaceofattacksperpetratedbyviolentextremistgroupshasdecreasedsincetheearly2000s,theterroristthreatlevelinAlgeriaisstillrelativelyhigh.Surroundedbycountriesthatexperiencedthewaveofuprisingsinitiatedin2011(MoroccoandTunisia)and/orforeigninterventions(LibyaandMali),theAlgeriansecurityforceshaveconductedseveralcounterterrorismoperationsandbolsteredtheirpresenceonthecountry’sborderswithLibya,MaliandTunisia–wherejihadistgroupssuchasAQIMandISaffiliatesarestillactive.AQIM,forexample,expandeditsterritorialpresenceinnorthernMaliafterthestatecollapsedin2012andbenefittedfromarmsflowsfromLibyaduringthesameperiod(Arieff,2013).Themost-recentlarge-scaleterroristattackinthecountrywasagainstaBritishPetroleumgascomplexnearInAmenasinJanuary2013.PerpetratedbytheThoseWhoSigninBloodBrigade,ajihadistterroristfactionthatsplitfromAQIMandisoperatinginAlgeriaandMali,itclaimedthelivesof39foreignhostages.IS,meanwhile,hasclaimedresponsibilityfortheassassinationofFrenchmountainguideHervéGourdel(September2014)andofseveralArmysoldierssince2014.Regularclashesbetweenthearmyandviolentextremistsresultinthedeathofseveraldozensofpeopleeveryyearinthecountry.AlthoughterroristcellsaffiliatedtoAQIMandIS’sAlgerianbranch(includingJundal-Khilafah)remainonAlgeriansoilandclaimresponsibilityforseveralclasheswiththearmy,theyareputundersignificantpressurebythefrequentcounterterrorismraidscarriedoutbyAlgeriansecurityforces.Despitethis,AlgeriahasnotbeenasaffectedasitsMoroccanandTunisianneighboursbytheforeignfightersphenomenon.Whileitishardtofindtheexactfigures,mixedgovernmentalandnon-governmentalsourcesindicatethat170AlgeriancitizenshavelefttheircountrytojoinISinSyriaandIraq(Barrett,2017).Asweshallseebelow,thisphenomenonreacheddifferentproportionsinMoroccoandTunisia.

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

B.ViolentExtremisminMorocco

ViolentextremismrepresentsathreatforMorocco,eventhoughitspatternsandmanifestationsaredifferentfromtheAlgeriancontext.SincetheattacksontheAtlas-AsniHotelinMarrakesh(August2004)thatkilledtwopeople,Moroccohasbeenthetargetofthreeotherterroristattacks.FirstcametheCasablancaattacks(May2003),whichkilled33peopleandinjuredover100.Theywereperpetratedby14youngstersfromthepoorneighbourhoodofSidiMoumen(Casablanca)whowereinspiredbyAlQaedaandotherradicalgroups.Secondwasthe2011terroristattackthatkilled17peopleinJemaael-FnasquareinMarrakesh,whichwerecarriedoutbytwoAlQaedasympathisers.Finally,ISsympathisersbeheadedtwotouristsfromDenmarkandNorwayintheAtlasMountainsinDecember2018.

Despitetherelativelylownumberofterroristattacks,thethreatposedbyVEgroupsinMoroccoisreal.FollowingtheriseofISinSyriaandIraq,Moroccansecurityandintelligenceagencieshavedismantledover60terroristcellsinthecountry.MoroccoisalsoamongsttheArabcountriesmostaffectedbytheforeignfightersphenomenon.AccordingtoTheSoufanGroup(2015),morethan1,500MoroccanstravelledtoSyriaandIraqtojointheranksofgroupslinkedtoAlQaedaandIS.Atleast300arealsobelievedtohavetravelledtoLibyatojointheLibyanbranchofISasof2015(Masbah,2015).

C.ViolentExtremisminTunisia

Despitebeingtheonlysuccessstoryofthe2011Arabuprisings,Tunisiahasturnedintoabattlegroundforviolentextremistgroups.Whilethecountryisstillundergoingitsdemocratictransition,thethreatposedbyjihadistgroupshasbecomeamajorsourceofconcern.

Inthepastdecade,severalviolentextremistgroupshaveposedconsiderablesecuritychallengestoTunisianauthorities.Firstly,AnsaralSharia,anIslamistgrouppreachingtheIslamicisationofsociety,hasparticipatedinseveralviolentincidents(e.g.,anattackontheUSembassyinTunisinSeptember2012)andwasaccusedofinvolvementintothepoliticalassassinationoftwohigh-profilefigures–ChokriBela?dandMohammedBrahmi–inFebruaryandJuly2013.ThegroupwasbannedbytheauthoritiesinAugust2013.Sincethen,twomainviolentextremistgroupshavegainedtractioninTunisia:ontheonehand,theUqbaBinNafaabrigade,anAlQaedaaffiliatedbranchwhichmainlyoperatesontheAlgeria–Tunisiaborders.Between2013and2016,theTunisianMinistryofInteriorclaimstohavedismantledover673terroristcellslocatedneartheborder.Ontheotherhand,IS,whichhasconsolidateditspresenceinLibyasince2014,reachedouttoSalafijihadistsympathisersinTunisiaandplannedaterrorcampaignfromLibyanterritory.

Asaresult,Tunisiahasbeenthetargetofalargenumberofterroristattacks.In2015alone,17terroristactstookplaceinthecountry.Terroristattacksincluderegularclasheswiththearmyandpoliceforces(forinstanceattheAlgeria–Tunisiaborder),butalsolarge-scaleattacksagainsttouristsitesandpoliticaltargetssuchastheBardoNationalMuseumattack(March2015)whichkilled22peopleandinjuredover50;theSousseattacks(2015)thatkilled38andleft39peoplewounded;andtheattackontheTunisianpresidentialguard(November2015)inwhich12membersofthesecurityforcesdied.Finally,itisworthmentioningtheattempttotakeaTunisiancityinMarch2016,whenabout100ISfighterscarriedoutlarge-scaleattackstotakeBenGardane,acoastaltowninsouth-easternTunisiaclosetotheLibyanborder.BetweenMarch7thand9th2016,55ISmilitants,13securityforcespersonnelandsevenciviliansdiedinthisunprecedented,large-scaleassault.

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

TunisiaisalsonotoriousforbeingthemainproviderofforeignfighterstoSyriaandIraqbetween2011and2015.Dependingontheestimate,between3,000and6,000TunisiansarebelievedtohaveleftTunisiatojoinviolentextremistgroupssuchasIS(TheSoufanGroup,2015).ItisassumedthatTunisiahasthehighestratioofforeignfighterspercapitaintheworld.Furthermore,between1,000and1,500TunisiansarebelievedtohavejoinedviolentextremistgroupsinLibya,whiletheauthoritiesclaimedtohaveprevented27,000TunisiansfromjoiningterroristgroupsinLibya,IraqandSyria(Zelin,2018a,2018b).

ThemapbelowoffersanoverviewofsomeofthegroupspresentinNorthAfricancountries:

Figure1.PresenceofjihadistgroupsinNorthAfricain2021.Source:AfricaCenterforStrategicStudies(2021).

Tosumup,Algeria,MoroccoandTunisiafacemultifacedtransnationalanddomesticthreats.Severalviolentextremistgroups,networksandorganisationsarepresentineachofthesecountries(e.g.AQIM,IS),butthethreatgoesbeyondtheterroristactivitiesofsuchgroups.Indeed,itincludesloneindividualswillingtocommitterroristattacksinthenameofoneoftheseorganisations;individualsconvictedofterroristoffenceswhomaybereleased;andreturningforeignfighters–whoamounttoseveralthousandintheregion.Finally,twoaspectsofthisthreatarerelevantforthiscasestudy:ontheonehand,thethreathasastrongtransnationalcomponent,inbothphysicalandvirtualterms.Physically,terroristgroupsarenotrestrictedtosinglecountries,butmovefromoneterritorytoanotheronaregularbasis.Forinstance,jihadistsregularlymovebetweenMali,Algeria,Niger,LibyaandTunisia.Certaingeographicalfeatures(SaharaDesert,mountains)makeithardtosystematicallyspotorpreventsuchmovements.Ontheotherhand,jihadistgroupsmaypursueanagendathatisbothlocalandregional.Inthiscontext,aterrorist-relateddevelopmentinonecountrymayhaveanimpactonthelevelofterroristthreatinneighbouringcountries.Forinstance,thewarsinMaliandLibyahavehadclearspill-overeffectsonAlgeria,TunisiaandSaheliancountries.

Withaviewtoassessingthepossibleimpactsofclimatechangeonviolentextremism,thenextsectionconcentratesonthedriversofviolentextremisminthesecountries.

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

DriversofViolentRadicalisationinNorthAfrica

Asmallbutgrowingbodyoftheliteratureonclimatechangehasfocusedontheinterplaybetweenclimatechangeandterrorism(Asaka,2021;NettandRüttinger,2016;Renard,2008;Telford,2020).Thisstrandofresearchmostlylooksattheeffectsofclimatechangeonalreadyestablishedterroristgroupsandorganisations.Whilethisapproachinsistsonthewayclimatechangecanaffectthelevelofterroristthreatand/ormilitancy,onlyafewstudieslookatitspossibleeffectsonindividualswhomaybetemptedtojoinviolentextremistgroups(King,2015;NettandRüttinger,2016;Walch,2018).Insteadoffocusingonthepotentialinteractionsbetweenclimatechangeandterroristorganisations,thiscasestudylooksattheissuefromanotherperspective:thatofthepotentialinteractionsbetweenclimatechangeandthedriversandconditionsthatarebelievedtoleadtoterrorismandviolentextremism.Inotherwords,howcouldclimatechangeaffectthepatternsofviolentradicalisation?First,itwillbeusefultoexplaintheconceptualframeworkusedtounderstandviolentradicalisation,beforereviewingthemainpatternsofviolentradicalisationinMaghrebcountries.

A.ConceptualFrameworkforUnderstandingViolentRadicalisation

ThepatternsofviolentradicalisationandthedriversofviolentextremisminNorthAfricahavereceivedconsiderableattentioninthepastfewyears(BagchiandPaul,2018;Joffe,2012;Pargeter,2009;Vidino,2018).Theincreaseinthenumberofhomegrownterroristattacks,theriseofISinSyria,IraqandLibyaandthesubsequentforeignfightersphenomenonareamongstthemainelementsbehindthistrend.Whilethekeyquestion“Whatdrivespeopleintothehandsofviolentextremistgroups?”remainstheobjectofintensescholarlydebate,theconceptofviolentradicalisationcanhelpprovidecluesaboutviolentextremisminspecificcontexts.Itconcernstheideathatpeopledonotbecometerroristsovernight:rather,theyundergoaseriesofevents,experiencesandcircumstancesthateventuallyleadthemtouseorjustifytheuseofviolenceforideological,politicalorsocialgoals.Thischainofevents,experiencesandcircumstancesisoftenreferredtoasthe“processofviolentradicalisation”.

Whileseveralmodelshavebeendevelopedtoexplainandvisualisetheradicalisationprocess(Borum,2011;McCauleyandMoskalenko,2008,2017;Moghaddam,2005;Wiktorowicz,2002),itisimpossibletoestablishcausalrelationshipsbetweencertaindrivers,factorsandconditionsandtheprocessofradicalisationitself.Thefactthatwecannotdefinitivelyanswerthequestion“whatmakessomeoneembraceviolentextremistviewsandbehaviour?”isthereasontheconceptofviolentradicalisationhasbeenthesubjectofmajorcriticism(Heath-Kelly,2013;Kundnani,2009;Neumann,2013;Schmid,2013).

Despitethelackofconsensusonthedriversofviolentradicalisation,certainfactorsanddynamicsrecurinaccountsoftheprocessesleadingtoviolentextremism.Inthisregard,PeterR.Neumann(2017:11)considersthatfivefactorsanddynamicshelptoidentifyaprocessofviolentradicalisation:

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

Theexistenceofgrievancessuchasconflicts,exclusion,dynamicsofsegregationanddiscriminationorthefeelingofinjustice;

Individualneedssuchasthesearchforbelonging,thedesireforadventureorpower,theneedtobepartofacommunityorproject;

Theadoptionofaradicalideologytotheextentthatideologyprovidesanexplanationfor(realorperceived)grievancesandmakeslegitimatetheuseofviolenceasasolutiontothesegrievances;

Theroleplayedbypeopleandsocialnetworks(recruiters,leaders,friends,peergroups,orfamilymembers)asradicalisingagents;and

Theuseofviolence.

Thisapproachtoviolentextremismisparticularlyrelevantforourcasestudyasithelpstoshedlightonpotentialdriversofviolentextremism,inotherwords,thefactorsthatfeedtheexistenceofgrievancesandcreateorexacerbatecertainneeds.Theprocessofradicalisationcanoccuratoneorseveralofthefollowingthreelevels(Schmid,2013):

Micro-level:correspondstotheindividualpersonandinvolvesfeelingsofalienation,marginalization,discrimination,relativedeprivation,humiliationandrejectionamongothers;

Meso-level:includescommunitiesandgroupsandrelatestothesupportivesocialsurroundingsorbroaderradicalmilieu;

Macro-level:includestherolesofgovernment(includingitsforeignpolicy),society(e.g.,publicopinion),socioeconomicopportunities,andmajority–minoritydynamics,amongotherelements.

Theselevelsareoftenconnectedwhentheprocessofviolentradicalisationoccurs.Forinstance,foreigninterventionsinLibya(macro-level)mayleadcertaingroupstouseviolenceforpoliticalgains(meso-level)andeventuallyconvinceanindividualtojointhefight(micro-level).Intheframeworkofthiscasestudy,thepossibleinterplaybetweendriversofviolentradicalisationatthesethreelevelswillbeborneinmind,buttheprincipalfocuswillbeonthemacro-leveldriversofradicalisation,asthepossibilityofidentifyinghowtheymaybeinfluencedbyclimatechangeseemslikelytobeeasierthanforthemicro-andmeso-leveldrivers.

B.TheDriversofViolentRadicalisationintheMaghrebCountries

AstudycarriedoutfortheUnitedNationsOfficeofCounter-TerrorismdescribedthetypicalprofileofforeignfighterswhotravelledtoSyriaandIraqbetween2012and2016as“mostlikelytobemale,younganddisadvantagedeconomically,educationally,andintermsofthelabourmarket.[Theyare]alsomorelikelytocomefromamarginalizedbackground,bothsociallyandpolitically.Mostwereunemployed,orunderemployed,and/orsaidthattheirlifelackedmeaning”(ElSaidandBarrett,2017:40).Doesthatimplythateducation,politicalandsocialmarginalisationandunemploymentarethemaindriversbehindviolentradicalisationinNorthAfrica?DrawingontheliteratureonviolentextremisminMiddleEasternandNorthAfricancountries,thissectionfocusesonthetwo

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

maintypesoffactorthataccountforviolentextremisminMaghrebcountries:(1)politicaldriversrelatedtoauthoritarianismandconflictand(2)socioeconomicdriversofviolentradicalisation.

I.Authoritarianismandconflictaspoliticaldriversofradicalisation

IntheMaghrebregionanditssurroundings,therearetwomainfeatureswhichhelptounderstandawideseriesofpoliticaldriversofradicalisation:ontheonehand,thehistoricallyauthoritariannatureoftheAlgerian,MoroccanandTunisianregimessincetheirindependence;andontheother,theproliferationofconflictsinthepost-2011era(i.e.,Arabuprisings).

Authoritarianismandpoliticalradicalisation

TheexistenceofacorrelationbetweenauthoritarianismandpoliticalradicalisationisfrequentlyassumedwhentryingtoexplainthepatternsofviolentradicalisationintheMENAregion(Boukhars,2011;HarriganandElSaid,2011;Pargeter,2009;Storm,2009).Themainargumentusedisthat,unlikedemocracies,authoritarianregimesdonothavethecapacity(orwillingness)tochannelthegrievancesexpressedbycitizens.Besidesthis,theuseofpoliticalrepressioncombinedwithrestrictionsonfreedomandcivillibertyandtheirlackoflegitimacyareassumedtolegitimisesupportforradicalgroups–includingviolentextremistgroups–againstauthoritarianrulers.InthewordsofAnouarBoukhars(2011:34)“Perceptionsoftheunfairnessofthepoliticalsystemanditsinabilitytoaddresssocioeconomicdisparitiesaggravatesocialtensions,promptingrepressiveresponsesfromthestate,which,inturn,fueloppositionviolence”.

ThisappliestoNorthAfricancountries,wheretheviciouscycleofrepressionandradicalisationhastakenplacebothbeforeandsincethe2011uprisings.InAlgeria,thecivilwarbrokeoutafterthegovernmentcancelledtheparliamentaryelectionsandbannedtheIslamistpartyFIS–whichwasonthevergeofwinningtheelectionsanddefeatingtherulingNationalLiberationFront(FLN).The“BlackDecade”broughtthegovernmentintoconflictwithIslamistrebelgroupsandresultedinthedeathofover200,000Algerians.InEgypt,thecorrelationbetweenauthoritarianismandviolentextremismhasalsobeeninevidenceonmanyoccasions(AwadandHashem,2015).Sincethecoupd’étatagainstdemocraticallyelectedPresidentMohamedMorsi(IslamistFreedomandJusticeParty),thecountryhaswitnessedasurgeofviolentextremistattackstargetingtheauthorities.Around700terroristattackswereperpetratedin2015,makingthepost-coupd’étaterathedeadliestinsurgencyinEgypt’shistory(AwadandHashem,2015).Finally,oneofthemosttellingexamplesisthatofpost-2011Tunisia.Inthiscountry,theunprecedentedriseofSalafism(includingjihadistSalafism)hasbeeninterpretedasaconsequenceof“theunavoidableletting-outofpent-upfrustrationsafteryearsofrepression”thattargetedTunisiansatlargeandspecificallyIslamistmilitants(InternationalCrisisGroup,2013).

Thescholarlyliteraturehashighlightedothertypesofdriversofradicalisationthatdirectlyorindirectlyresultfromauthoritarianism.Amongtheoften-citeddriversarehistoricalantagonisms;theimpactofauthoritarianruleintermsofhumanrightsviolations;internationalrelationsinvolvingMuslim-majoritycountries;andstateresponsestoterrorism.

Intermsofhistoricalantagonisms,Pargeter(2009)hasshownthatcertainregionsofNorthAfricancountriesthatpreviouslyrebelledagainstcolonialpowerand/orthecentralauthoritiesarereceptivetoradicalideologies.SuchisthecaseofeasternLibya,whichwashistoricallyopposedtoGaddafi,sufferedfromstaterepressionforseveraldecadesand

ClimateChangeandViolentExtremisminNorthAfrica

providedafertilegroundforjihadistgroupstothrive(WehreyandBoukhars,2019).Likewise,historicalantagonismsbetweencertainAmazighpopulationsandtheMoroccanstateareconsideredadriverofviolentradicalisationamongstAmazighpopulationsinMorocco(Mounaetal.,2020).

Humanrightsviolationsareanotheraspectofthe“repression–violentradicalisation”viciouscirclethathasbeenstudiedintheNorthAfricancontext.DrawingondatafromMaghrebcountries,Storm(2009:1011)hasshownthatthecombinationofstaterepressionandhumanrightsabuses“hasresultedinmanyNorthAfricansbecomingradicalised”.Inmanyinstances,thosehumanrightsviolations–alongwiththelackofcivilandpoliticalrights–arebeingexploitedbyjihadistgroupsintheirpropaganda.Theseabusesareoftendepictedastheultimateproofoftheso-calledwaronIslamwagedbytheWestagainstMuslimcountries:theyarecitedinthejihadistpropagandamaterialasevidencethatauthoritarianregimesinMuslimcountriesaresidingwiththeWestintheframeworkofthe“globalwaragainstIslam”;awarinwhichtheyactivelyparticipatethroughtheirmultipleeconomic,politicalandstrategicallianceswith“Westernenemies”

(Burgat,2008;Githens-Mazer,2009).

Figure2.Theviciouscircleofauthoritarianism,repressionandviolentradicalisation.

Source:author(2021).

Conflictandpoliticalradicalisation

Alongthesamelines,conflictsandforeigninterventionsaffectingMuslim-majoritycountriesalsoappeartoplayaroleinmobilisingjihadistgroups,feedingtheirnarrativeandrecruitingpeople.IssuessuchastheIsraeli–PalestinianconflictandtheforeigninterventionsinAfghanistan,Iraq,LibyaandMaliarecentraltothenarrativeofa“war

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againstIslam”disseminatedbyjihadistgroups(Burgat,2008).Inthisrespect,theactivityandattractivenessofjihadistgroupscannotbedissociatedfrominternationalrelatio