




版權(quán)說明:本文檔由用戶提供并上傳,收益歸屬內(nèi)容提供方,若內(nèi)容存在侵權(quán),請進行舉報或認領(lǐng)
文檔簡介
CRUPolicyBrief
vnetteHoffmann
Clingendael
NetherlandsInstituteofInternationalRelations
FEBRUARY2024
FromCatastrophetoFamine
ImmediateactionneededinSudan
tocontainmassstarvation
TheconflictinSudanhasasubstantialimpactonthecountry'sfoodsystemandhinders
people'sabilitytocopewithfoodshortages.Asthecountryshowstheworsthungerleveleverrecordedduringtheharvestseason(fromOctobertoFebruary),whichisusuallyaperiod
whenfoodismoreavailable,theseverityandscaleofhungerinthecomingleanseason
(mid-2024)willbecatastrophic.Thispolicybriefarguesthatratherthantheinevitable
consequenceofwar,thisfoodcrisisistheresultofthegenerals'deliberatedestruction
ofSudan'sfoodsystemandtheobstructionofpeople'scopingmechanisms.Basedon
availabledataandfamineliterature,accountsfromhungersufferers,aswellasdiscussionswithexpertsinandonSudan,thispolicybriefoutlinesscenariosthatlookseveralmonths
beyondcurrentlyavailablefoodinsecurityforecasts.Accordingtothemostlikelyscenario,sevenmillionpeoplewillfacecatastrophiclevelsofhungerbyJune2024(IPC5),withmassstarvationbeingtheprospect.Thewindowbywhichtosignificantlyreducetheimpactofwhatisbecomingtheworld'slargesthungercrisisindecadesisrapidllyclosing.
Besidesincreasingdiplomaticandeconomicpressuretostopthewar,theEU,itsmember
states,theUs,theUK,andNorway,aswellastheUNandINGOpartnersmusturgentlyand
massivelyscaleupmeaningfulassistanceby:
i.DeclaringtheriskoffamineforSudan;
ii.Injectingmobilecashdirectlytolocalproducers,aswellastoconsumersandlocalaid
providers(EmergencyResponseRooms);
ii.ImmediatelyscalingupfoodaidandWASH(Water,SanitationandHygiene)support.
Introduction:Sudan'slooming
famine'
Thewarthateruptedtenmonthsagobetweenthecountry'sregulararmy,theSudaneseArmedForces,andtheparamilitaryRapidSupport
TheauthorisindebtedtoTimmoGaasbeek,aseasonedfoodsecurityexpert,forhisguidanceandassiduousworkonthemodelswhichunderpinthescenariospresentedinthisbrief,andtoAlexdeWaalandEdwardThomas
fortheircriticalfeedbackonanearlierdraft.Special
thanksgotothemanySudanesetrappedinsideSudan
ordisplacedoutsideSudanwhosharedtheirinvaluableobservationswithme.Thebrief'scontentnaturally
remainstheresponsibilityoftheauthor.
Forceshaskilledatleast13,000people2
anddisplacednearly8million3.AsGeneral
Abdelfattahal-Burhan(SAF)andGeneral
MohamedHamdanDagalo(RSF)signalno
2Aconservativeestimate,asthelatestreportbytheUN
PanelofExpertshasannouncedthatbetween10,000and
15,000peoplehavebeenkilledinonecityinDarfuralone:
EthnickllingeinoneSudancity.leftypto.15.000.dead,.
!Nreportsaysl.Reuters.
3PTMSuden-Month!y.DisplacementQveryiew(05)!.
DisplacementTrackingMatrix():
2
CRUPolicyBrief
intentiontoceasefighting,civiliansbearthe
bruntoftheindiscriminateairstrikes,shelling
andincreasinglyethnicallymotivatedtargetedattacks.Amongthe45millionSudanesestillinthecountry18millionarefacingacutehunger,justafterthemainharvest.4Thisisequivalent
totheentirepopulationoftheNetherlands.
TheWorldFoodProgramme's(WFP)country
directorforSudanhassharedaccountsfrom
centralDarfurandpartsofKhartoumwhere
peoplehavediedeitherfrommalnutrition
orstarvation.5Thosewhoaretrappedinthe
hotspotsoffightingreporteatingbarelyone
mealaday.Moreover,reportsofchildrendyingofstarvationaretricklinginfromrefugeecampsinChad.?
Sudan'sgeneralshavenotonlyproducedthe
worstdisplacementcrisisintheworldtoday.8
Theyhavealsocausedtheworsthungerlevel
everrecordedduringtheharvestseasonin
Sudan.9Thisisusuallytheseasonwhenfoodis
moreavailableandaffordablethanduringthe
remainderoftheyear.Thecurrentfoodcrisisisthereforeexpectedtobecomemuchworseinthecomingmonths.AlreadylastyearinDecember,WFPraisedthealarmhintingatanimpending
hungercatastrophe.0Still,theUNkeepsrevisingtsownpredictionsupwards,showingthatthefoodcrisisisdeepeningatanalarmingpace.
Earlywarningsystemslackaprotocolfor
dentifyingtheriskoffamine,evenwhenlonger-termscenarios,aspresentedinthispolicybrief,suggestthatthetrajectorytowardscatastrophescertainandtheriskoffamineisveryhigh.
4WFPwarnsthathungercotgstropheloomsinconflict.hitSudanwithouturgentfoodassistance!World.Food.Programme:
5WarPushesSudentoBrinkofFirstFamineinDecedes.WFP.Says-Bloomberg:
6HungerinSouth.Kordofan'sDalamigs.calmreturms.after.fighting-Dobongg.Rodio.TY.Q).
7SudanesechildrenfacestarvationinChadcamp-Chad!.ReliefWeb.
8Sudan:!QMResponse!!QM,UNMigrgtion.
9!PCSudanAcuteFoodInsecurity.Qct2023_Feb2024.Snapshotpd()
10Hungercatastrophe!oominginwarrovagedSudan,UN.ggeneywarms!UNNews.
CombiningavailabledataandfamineliteraturewithinformationobtainedfromSudanexpertsandhungersufferersinsideSudan,thispolicybriefsummarizestheimpactofthewaron
Sudan'sfoodsecurity.Itoutlinesscenarios
ofmonthlycerealconsumptionpercapita
inSudanthroughout2024anddiscusses
theirimplications.Thebriefpresentsthree
complementaryrecommendationsforurgentactiontocontaintheseverityandscaleofthe
escalatinghungercrisisandadvocatesan
overhauloftheearlywarningsystem.Failingtoimplementtheseactionswithoutdelaywouldmaketheinternationalcommunitycomplicit
inimmensesuffering.Alackoftimelyand
adequateactionbyworldleaderswillcontributetowhatisbecomingtheworld'slargesthunger
crisisindecades,andexacerbatethealreadylargestdisplacementcrisisintheworld.
Background:Aprotracted
hungercrisis
ExtremehungerisnotnewtoSudan.The
countrywasplaguedbyaprotractedcrisisoffoodinsecuritylongbeforethewareruptedinApril2023.Decadesofexploitativeextractionsystems,thathadpersistedundersuccessivegovernments,resultedintheimpoverishmentoflargepartsofthepopulation.Farmers,
agriculturalworkersandminersinthecountry'speripheriesproducedthecountry'smain
exportcommodities(gold,sesame,peanuts,gumArabicandlivestock).Alargepartofthe
exportearningswereusedtopayforimportedandheavilysubsidisedwheatfortheurban
population."Thissystemplacedaheavy
burdenongovernmentrevenue,whileleavingthepopulationintheperipheriesstruggling
tosurviveontheirsubsistencemilletandsorghumproduction.
ThesecessionofSouthSudanin2011,throughwhichSudanlostmostofitsoilrevenue,led
11Thomas,E.andM.ElGizouli,2020.Sudan'sGrainDivide:Arevolutionofbreadandsorghum.RiftValleyInstitute,BriefingPaper.Feb2020.
3
CRUPolicyBrief
toadeepfoodcrisisl.Overalllevelsoffood
insecurityrosesharply;by2014,about20%of
thepopulationcouldonlyaffordtoeatcerealsandvegetables,nomeatordairyproducts.13
By2019,Sudanhadthehighestchildmalnutritionrateworldwide.4Thiscrisisbroughthunger
tothecapital-forthefirsttimeinSudan's
history-andultimatelycontributedtoal-Bashir'sfall.Theshort-liveddemocratictransitionthat
ensueddidnotchangethepoliticaleconomyoffoodsystemsandthecoupof2021reinstalledthe"hunger-makingpoliticalmarketplace"15.Thesuspensionofinternationaldevelopment
assistanceandthewarinUkrainelfurther
deepenedSudan'shungercrisis.Duringthe
harvestseasonbeforethecurrentconflict
brokeout,16%oftheSudanesepopulationwerealreadyenduringcrisis(IPC3)orworsethan
crisislevelsoffoodinsecurity".
Impactofthecurrentconflictonfoodavailability
ThefightingthateruptedinApril2023
exacerbatedboththeprecariousavailabilityoffoodandpeople'sabilitytoaccessit.
Abouttwo-thirdsofthegrainconsumedinSudanisgrownlocally:mostlysorghumandmillet,andsomewheatl?.Domesticproductionhasbeen
seriouslyaffectedbythefighting.Someregionsaremoreseverelyhitthanothers.Inthemain
producingareasofDarfur,Kordofan,andGezira,
12DeWaal,A.(2019).'Sudan:Apoliticalmarketplaceframeworkanalysis,'WorldPeaceFoundation,
occasionalpaperno.19,August.
13E.Thomas,2024.Sudan'sFood-HungerSystem,publishedonHome!Peaceofsudan:Unroveling.AdversityoftheWarinSudan.
141WFP[WorldFoodProgramme](2019).'Sudan
ComprehensiveFoodSecurityAssessment2018:
TechnicalSummary:'Rome:WFP,p.7.
15Thomas,E.andA.deWaal.2022.HungerinSudan'sPoliticalMarketplace.OccasionalPaper#32.WorldPeaceFoundation.ConflictResearchProgramme.April2022,p.4.
1680%ofSudan'swheatimportsdependedonUkraineand
Russia.The-Sudon-Grisis-Conflictond-Food-Insecurity.Juy-2023.pdf(insecurtyinsightorg):
17FAO[FoodandAgricultureOrganisation](2023).GIEWSCountryBrief.TheRepublicoftheSudan.'Rome:FAO,p.2.
18SUDAN'SFOOD-HUNGERSYSTEM*(pegceofsudan.
SRqce!:
insecurityhaspreventedfarmersfromcultivatingtheirland.InthecaseofDarfur,independent
investigationshaveconcludedthattheveryaimoftheattacksbytheRSFanditsalliedArab
militiaistoclearthelandofitsnon-Arabfarmingcommunitiesandtoimpedetheirreturn.20
PeopleindisplacementcampsinDarfurare
systematicallypreventedfromleavingthecamptoworkontheirland.?1Productioninthisregionis
thereforeexpectedtobeonlyafractionofthatin
previousyears.
GeziraState,southeastofthecapital,wasakeygrainproducingareaforSudan,withoneofthelargestirrigationsystemsintheworld.Before
thewar,theregiontypicallycontributedclosetohalf(42%)ofSudan'stotalwheatproduction?2
andwasthemainareafornationalgrainstorage.SincetheRSFviolentlytookcontrolinDecember,farmingactivityhasbeenconstrained.23
Forceddisplacementjeopardizesthehiringofagriculturallabour.Moreover,thedestructionoflargepartsofGreaterKhartoumhasimpactedthefinancialservicessector,whichexplains
thedifficultyinaccessingthecreditneededtopurchaseagriculturalinputs,evenwherethey
areavailable.24InthemechanizedfarmingareasoftheEastandtheNorth,farmerscannolongeraccesscreditorfuel,onbothofwhichthey
dependtobuyseedsandfertilizersandtohaveaccesstoagriculturalmachinery.IntheNorth,farmersreportdifficultiesinfindinglaboursince
theSAFintensifieditsrecruitmentcampaigns.25Thedisruptionofpestcontrolserviceshas
furtheraffectedyields.Thiswascompounded
byunfavourablerainfallinpartsofthecountry.Aneventwithpossiblelong-termconsequences
19TemplateWorkingPoper(ifpriorg):
20LastreportbytheUNPanelofExpertsonSudan,Jan.2024.
21ExchangeviaSignalwithinternallydisplacedpersonsfromWest,CentralandSouthDarfur.
22SpeciolReport?0??:FAO.ropandFoodSupply.
AssessmentMisslon(CFSAMtotheSuden.20March.
2023-Sudan!RellefWeh,p.24.
23InstancesarebeingreportedoffarmersinElGezirawhohavefloodedtheirfieldstopreventtheRSFfromattainingfurtherterritorialgains.
24Phoneinterviewswithagriculturalinputwholesalersand
distributorsinEastSudan.
25ExchangewithfarmersinRiverNileStateviaSignal.
4
CRUPolicyBrief
isthedestructionofSudan'sgenebank,whichskeytothedomesticproductionofimprovedseeds26.
Asaresultofthefightingandprevailing
insecurity,theexpectedcerealharvestfor
the2023-2024seasonismuchlessthan
average:theFAOhasestimatedthesorghum
andmilletharveststobe24%and50%lower
thanin2022,respectively.?'TheRSF'sviolent
takeoveroflargepartsofGeziraState,the
country'sbreadbasket2B,hasaffectedthewintercultivationofwheat.AstheSAFhasstarted
itscounter-offensivebringinginlargearms
shipmentsfromPortSudan,afurtherescalationofhostilitiesislikely.WhatremainsofSudan'sbreadbasketisatstake.
Nexttothewar'simpactondomesticgrain
production,manyagrifoodprocessingfacilitieshavestoppedfunctioning.Fromthefirstday
onwards,thecapitalhasbeenthetheatre
ofintensefighting(includingairstrikesand
artilleryexchanges)andsystematiclooting.
AsmuchofSudan'sagrifoodprocessingindustrywasconcentratedinKhartoum,mostofthe
factories(includingaboutthreequartersofthecountry'swheatflourmillingcapacity)have
ceasedoperating,althoughlevelsofdamage
areuncertain.?9Evenifpeacereturns,itwilltakemonthsbeforethesemillswillbeoperational
againandproductioncapacitywillbebacktotherequiredlevel.
AsavitalelementofSudan'sfoodprocessing
industry,andabeaconofhopeinthecountry'sfightagainstchildmalnutrition,theonlyfactoryforready-to-usetherapeuticfood(RUTF)has
26Thousandgeneticstrainsfaceonexistentialthreattg.
ggrieuturo!!esearchinAlgzeergskim-Darfur24News.
27llefweb,int/repert/sudan/suden-ipe-ocute:
food-insecurty-qnalysis-october-2023-februg!y-2024-
published-december-!?-2023,p.11.[accessed28January
2024].
28WarinSudanengultsggricultura!hear!landamidrecord.levelsofhunger:Peoples.Dispgtch.Beforethewar,
GeziraStateproducedhalfofallwheatgrowninSudan.
29Armed.conflictandbusiness.gpergtionsinSudan:.
Surveyevidencefromogr-foodprocessingfirms.-!FPR!.PublicotionsRepository-!FPR!KnowledgeCollections.
beendestroyed.30RUTFiscriticalfortreatingseverelymalnourishedchildren.3IImportsfromelsewherewillsubstantiallyincreasecostsanddeliverytimes.
Thesignificantdisruptionofdomesticproduction
increasesSudan'sdependencyongrainimports.
WheatisthepreferredfoodforSudan'surban
population.aInrecentyears,wheatimportscoveredathirdoftotalcerealrequirements.Yet,in2023
officialwheatimportsreachedonlyhalfofwhatistypicallyimported.33TradersquicklyadjustedtothedisruptioncausedbythefightinginKhartoumandstartedtoimportwheatflour,mostlyfromEgypt.34WhenWadMedanifell,furtherhamperingflour
distributionWestoftheNile,theoldtradingroutefromEgypttoElFasherwasswiftlyreactivatedtosupplytheDarfurandKordofanregionswithfooditems,includingwheatflourandbiscuits.However,pricesareextremelyhighandpurchasingpower
continuestoplunge.RecenttensionsintheRedSeahaveledtoanincreaseinshippingcoststhatwill
furtherdriveupwheatprices.35
Asthegeneralscontinuetocausecatastrophic
levelsoffoodshortages,theirwardoesnotsparefoodaideither.Intheyearsbeforethewar,foodaidusuallyonlymadeupabout2%ofSudan's
averagecerealconsumption.36Whilethisseemstobeverylittle,foodaidcansubstantiallyimprovefoodaccessforhungryhouseholds-boththrough
30The-Sudan-Crisis-Conflictend-Food-Insecurity:?uly-2023.
pdf(insecurityinsightorg)
31In2022,theSamilfactoryproduced60%oftheRUTF
inSudan,aswellasready-to-usesupplementaryfood
providedbytheWFP.The-Sudan-CrlsisGonflict:end-Food.
Insecurity-?uly-2023pdf(insecurityinsightorg):
32T‘homas,E.andM.ElGizouli.2020.Sudan'sGrianDivide.Arevolutionofbreadandsorghum.RiftValleyInstitute.
BriefingPaper.February2020.
February1.2024():AccordingtotheMinistryof
Agriculture,thetotalofficialwheatimportsin2023coveredonlyone-thirdoftheestimateddemandduetodeclining
governmentrevenueandshockstothesupplychain.
Itisworthnotingthatmuchoftheseimportstookplace
beforetheoutbreakofthewar,implyingthatimportlevelsin2024arelikelytobefurtherreduced.
34Accordingtoawell-informedsource,inthefirstmonthsofthewar,thisinfluxofwheatflourevenledtoasurplusandadropinprices,whichkickedoutmostofthesmallertraders.
35Reportfromaknowledgeablelocalexpert,25January2024.36
https://www.peaceofsudan.space/post/sudan-s-food
.
hunger-system.
5
CRUPolicyBrief
Marketsandtraderouteactivitymap,cropland,andviolenceevents,
December-January2024'
*FEWSNET.SudanFoodSecurityAlertFebruary1,2024:ClashesinSudan'sbreadbasket
threatennationalfoodavailability,2024.
directtargeting,andindirectlybymitigating
foodpricesinthemarkets.Yet,lessthanhalfoftheUN'sHumanitarianResponsePlanforSudanin2023wasfunded.37Meanwhile,containers
withfoodassistancearestuckinPortSudanduetotheauthorities'refusaltoissuetherequired
permits.Ofevenmoreconcern,thefoodthatdoesenterSudanstrugglestoreachthose
inneed,andfoodstocksthatwerealready
availableinWFPwarehousesinDarfurandWadMedanibeforethewarhavebeenlootedbytheRSF.38Todate,WFPhasonlybeenable
37SudanHumanitorianResponse.Plan2023!Financial!.
Irocking.Service(unochg.o!g)WFPfacesadditionalfundingconstrointsinthelightoftheRedSeashippingcrisis.
38https!!!www.W/news/wfp-condemnstheft-ife-saving-food-warehouse-gezirg-stote
toreachpeopleinneedinthecapitalonone
occasioninthelastthreemonths.OnlyoneoutoffivepeoplewhoaremostinneedoffoodaidhasreceivedfoodaidfromWFPsincetheconflict
startedinApril.39
Thehostilitiesaredisruptinglogisticsand
marketsacrossthecountry,especiallyin
GreaterKhartoum,Darfur,theSouth,and,morerecently,theSouthEast.TheRSF'stakeoverofWadMedanihasaffectedhumanitarianaccessandlogisticalconnectivitybetweendifferent
partsofthecountrybecausethewarringpartiesallowforhardlyanyfoodtocrossthefrontlines.
39WFPwarnsthothungercotastropheloomsinconflict.hitSudanwithouturgentfoodassistance!World.Food.
Programme:
CRUPolicyBrief
Unsafetransportrouteswithnon-discerning
checkpointshamperthedistributionoffood,
whetheritislocallyproducedorimported.
Inaddition,conflictinGeziraalsoledtomarketdisruptionsinneighbouringGedarefstate,
responsibleforalmost20%ofnationalcereal
production,whichwillmakeitharderforGedareftofeedcereal-deficitareas.Thisisterriblenewsforthosetrappedinthecrossfire,asfoodmostlyreachesthosewhoareinsaferregionsandwhoarehencebetteroff.
Overall,thedisastrousimpactthatthewarhasongrainproduction,processing,importsand
aidhasdramaticallyincreasedthethreatthatthiswarposestonationalfoodavailability.40Ithasdoubledthepercentageofpeople(35%)enduringcrisislevels(IPC3)orworselevelsoffoodinsecuritybyJune2023(duringtheannualleanseason)ascomparedtobeforethewar.
Despitetherecentharvest,thiswasforecasttofurtherincreaseto37%fortheperiodbetweenOctober2023andFebruary2024.4IThatis
thehighestpercentageoffoodinsecurity
immediatelyaftertheharvestonrecordfor
Sudan.ThedisruptioncausedbythefightinginGezirawilllikelyincreasefoodinsecurityfurtherinfooddeficitareaswestoftheNile.Asthe
leanseasonkicksinfightingcontinues,foodinsecurityislikelytofurtherincreasesharplyinthecomingmonths.
Impactofthewaronpeople's
entitlementstofoodand
copingmechanisms
AsSudan'shistoryhaspainfullydemonstrated,peoplecangohungryevenwhenthereis
enoughfoodavailablein(partsof)thecountry.42
Theextenttowhichfoodshortagesaffect
people'snutritionalstatushingesontheir
40TheSuden:Ropidgssessmentonthesummersegsen.ggriculturg!performance().
41Sudan:AcuteFoodInsecuritySituationJune2023and.
ProiectionsforJuly-September2023andOctober2023.
:Februory.2024!!PG.-!ntegratedFoodSecurity.Phase.
Glassificgtion(ieeinfoorg.[accessed28January2024].42Gedaref,acityinEasternSudan,illustratesthis
phenomenon:Althoughitproducesone-fifthofSudan'ssorghum,itsuffersabove-averagefoodinsecuritylevels.
entitlements,i.e.theirabilitytoaccessfood
throughothermeanssuchasproduction,labourandmarketexchange.43Itiscriticaltounderstandthesedynamicsofaccessanddistributionandtolearnfromthecopingmechanismsandsurvival
skillspeopledevelop.Unlessexternalinterventionstoalleviatehungerdrawonthisinformationandtakeaccountofregionaldifferences,theywill
beineffectiveatbestandriskmakingthingsevenworse.44
Inearliercrisessuchasthe1984famine,copingmechanismshelpedmanypeopletoavoidtheworstimpactoffoodshortages.TypicalcopingmechanismsinSudanincludelabourmigration,salesoffirewood/charcoal,theconsumption
of'wildfoods',andthesaleoflivestock.45Inthe
currentcrisis,however,accesstothesecopingmechanismsismuchreduced.
ThefightingbetweentheRSFandSAFhas
causedtheworld'slargestdisplacementcrisis.
AsofJanuary2024,almost8millionSudanese
havebeenforciblydisplaced.Whilemanyofthe
displacedinEastandNorthSudanhavemovedtoareaswheretheymayfindsomeworkandfood,thedemandforagriculturallabourwillbeverylimiteduntilthenextplantingseason(June-July2024).
ThedisruptionoftheongoingwinterseasonintheGezirairrigationschememeansthatthedemandforlabourfortheharvestinMarchwillbemuch
lessthanusual.Thislackofincomeopportunitieswillsendmanyhouseholdsintoaneconomic
tailspinbetweenJanuaryandJune.Inaddition,
duetothemassivedisplacement,thefewregionsthatcanofferworkareovercrowdedwithpeopledesperatetowork.Wagesarelikelytoslumpinthecomingmonths.IntheWestandtheSouth,where
rainfedtraditionalagricultureprevailedbefore
thewar,farmersusuallyhaveagreaterrelianceonunpaidfamilymemberstocultivatetheirland.Soevenwhensecuritystillpermitsfarming,very
43Sen,A.(1981).PovertyandFamines:Anessayonentitlementanddeprivation,Oxford,ClarendonPress.
44DeWaal,A.1989.FaminethatKills.OxfordUniversityPress;
Thebenefitsoffamine:gpolitica!economyoffamineand.reliefinsouthwesternSudan,1983-1989-LSEResearch.Online.
45DeWaal,A.1989.FaminethatKills.1989.OxfordUniversityPress.
7
CRUPolicyBrief
fewemploymentopportunitieswillbeavailable.Recruitmentintoarmedgroupsandmilitiasmayincreasinglybecomeoneoftheveryfewoptionstoaccessfood.
Thecombinationofpopulationgrowthand
large-scaledeforestationsincethe1980smeansthatwhilethedemandforcookingfuelinplacesofrefugehassurged,amuchsmallerpercentageofthepopulationthanbeforewillbeableto
earnanincomefromsellingfuelwood.46The
threatofsexualviolence,shockinglyeversinceacorollarywithfirewoodcollectioninDarfur,hasseenahorrendousincreasesincethewar.47However,hungerwillinevitablysubjectwomenandgirlstothatthreat.
So-calledwildfoods',mostlyfruitfromwild
treesandseedsfromwildgrasses,canbean
importantfoodsourceinruralareasintimesofneed.Theiravailabilityis,however,largelylimitedtotherainyseason,andinmanycultivatedareastheclearingoflandmeansthatwildplantsare
hardlyavailable.Inthecurrentsituation,wild
foodscanmakeameaningfulcontributionto
thedietsofonlypartsofthepopulationfrom
Julyonwards,particularlyinpartsofDarfurandKordofan.EspeciallyIDPsandurbanpopulationswillhaveverylimitedaccesstothesewildfoods.
Thesaleoflivestockhastraditionallybeenan
importantcopingmechanismforthosewhoownlivestock.Thiswilllikelybesothisyearaswell.However,veryfewurbanresidentsanddisplacedpeoplewillhaveanylivestocktosell,evenif
theyusedtoownanimalsbeforebeingforcedtoleave.
Justlikewaraffectsfoodavailabilityacrossthecountryverydifferently,theviolenceanddisplacementalsoaffectpeople'sabilitytoaccessfoodthroughalternativecommoditybundles-i.e.labour,firewood,forestfoods,
46Thismayhaveaspill-overeffectinChad:inthelastdecadeorso,WestDarfurwasanimportantsourceoffuelwoodforEasternChad.BecauselargepartsofWestDarfurarenotsafe,thismaywellexacerbatedeforestationwithinChad.
47SILENTWEAPONSLQUDESTWQUNDS:Addressing.the.GrisisofSexua!ViolenceinSudan-S!HA():
livestock-distinctlyacrossthecountry.ItisworthnotingthatthecurrentcrisisdiffersfrompreviousonesinthatthistimearoundurbandwellersandIDPsinurbansettingswillbehitmuchharder.
Theiraccesstolivestockandwildfruitswillbeminimal.Thetypicalurbansavings-buildings,vehicles,jewellery-havebeensystematicallytargetedandlootedbytheRSF.
However,somecopingmechanismssignifyalifelineforSudaneseacrossallregions:
remittancesandcommunity-basedsupport.
AnnualremittancesforSudanwereestimatedtobeUSs3billionannuallyfor2018-2019.48Althoughnotuntroubledbythewarandthecollapseof
Sudan'sfinancialsystem,diasporaremittancesremainavitalassistanceforthepeople.Even
ftheydirectlybenefitonlythosewithrelatives
abroad,thesefinancialinflowsalsokeeplocal
marketsalive,constitutingthedemand(or
purchasingpower)neededtokeepgoodscomingin.Withvaluablesandsavingshavingbeenlootedandpeopledisplaced,remittanceshavean
evengreaterrelevanceasacopingmechanismthanintimesofrelativepeace.DiasporalargelyreliesonmoneytransferagenciessuchasAltras,cryptocurrency,currencyexchangetradersandBankak,anapplicationoftheBankofKhartoumthatfacilitatesmobilemoneytransfers.Althoughinternetconnectionisunreliableandpatchy
inmostpartsofthecountry,thisappiswidelyusedandacceptedinsideSudanincludingbysmallshopkeepersandtradersinsteadofcashpayments.49Assuch,itconstitutesalifelineformillionsofSudanese.
Theotherlifelineenablinghungrypeopleto
accessfoodiscommunity-basedinitiatives
and,inparticular,EmergencyResponse
Rooms(ERRs).5°Bornoutoftheneighbourhood
48ThePotentialofSudanese.Diaspo
溫馨提示
- 1. 本站所有資源如無特殊說明,都需要本地電腦安裝OFFICE2007和PDF閱讀器。圖紙軟件為CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.壓縮文件請下載最新的WinRAR軟件解壓。
- 2. 本站的文檔不包含任何第三方提供的附件圖紙等,如果需要附件,請聯(lián)系上傳者。文件的所有權(quán)益歸上傳用戶所有。
- 3. 本站RAR壓縮包中若帶圖紙,網(wǎng)頁內(nèi)容里面會有圖紙預(yù)覽,若沒有圖紙預(yù)覽就沒有圖紙。
- 4. 未經(jīng)權(quán)益所有人同意不得將文件中的內(nèi)容挪作商業(yè)或盈利用途。
- 5. 人人文庫網(wǎng)僅提供信息存儲空間,僅對用戶上傳內(nèi)容的表現(xiàn)方式做保護處理,對用戶上傳分享的文檔內(nèi)容本身不做任何修改或編輯,并不能對任何下載內(nèi)容負責(zé)。
- 6. 下載文件中如有侵權(quán)或不適當(dāng)內(nèi)容,請與我們聯(lián)系,我們立即糾正。
- 7. 本站不保證下載資源的準(zhǔn)確性、安全性和完整性, 同時也不承擔(dān)用戶因使用這些下載資源對自己和他人造成任何形式的傷害或損失。
最新文檔
- 2025年小學(xué)教師資格考試《綜合素質(zhì)》教育評價專項模擬試題及答案解析集
- 2025年烘焙師職業(yè)資格考試真題卷:烘焙師職業(yè)發(fā)展與職業(yè)規(guī)劃試題
- 醫(yī)療數(shù)據(jù)安全與區(qū)塊鏈在反洗錢中的應(yīng)用探討
- 健康產(chǎn)業(yè)中的醫(yī)學(xué)教育國際合作項目
- 以健康為導(dǎo)向解讀企業(yè)醫(yī)化性化服務(wù)的內(nèi)涵與趨勢
- 2025年入團考試解析與試題及答案
- 醫(yī)療器械供應(yīng)鏈中的庫存管理策略
- 醫(yī)療安全與隱私保護的國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)
- 消防警報系統(tǒng)試題及答案詳解
- 供應(yīng)鏈中的數(shù)字化轉(zhuǎn)型-以醫(yī)療手術(shù)室為例
- 子宮及附件解剖及生理課件
- 2022年廣州市中醫(yī)院醫(yī)護人員招聘筆試試題及答案解析
- 房建技術(shù)員施工員考試參考題庫(含各題型)
- 美國南北戰(zhàn)爭用 完整版課件
- 紅十字會心肺復(fù)蘇課件
- 馬原對立統(tǒng)一規(guī)律課件
- 汽車設(shè)計-汽車熱成型零部件設(shè)計規(guī)范模板
- 美國南北戰(zhàn)爭 詳細版課件
- 神經(jīng)介入患者圍術(shù)期管理
- 企業(yè)組織機構(gòu)架構(gòu)圖
- 房地產(chǎn)集團公共區(qū)域標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化裝修教學(xué)課件
評論
0/150
提交評論