拉丁美洲經(jīng)濟(jì)委員會(huì)-二十一世紀(jì)的工業(yè)政策：美國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)（英）

Industrialpoliciesfor

thetwenty-firstcentury

LessonsfromtheUnitedStates

WilliamB.Bonvillian

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Industrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury

LessonsfromtheUnitedStates

WilliamB.Bonvillian

ThisdocumentwaspreparedbyWilliamB.Bonvillian,LecturerinthePoliticalScienceDepartmentandtheScience,TechnologyandSocietyDepartmentattheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,andSeniorDirectorforSpecialProjectsintheOfficeofDigitalLearningofthesameInstitute.Itispartoftheactivitiesofthe“Recoverbetter:overcomingtheconsequencesoftheCOVID-19pandemicinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean”projectwithintheframeworkofthecooperationprogrammebetweentheEconomicCommissionforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(ECLAC)andDeutscheGesellschaftfürInternationaleZusammenarbeit(GIZ),financedbytheFederalMinistryofEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ)ofGermany.

ThedocumentwaspreparedunderthesupervisionofAndreaLaplane,EconomicAffairsOfficer,andNunziaSaporito,EconomicAffairsOfficer,bothoftheDivisionofProduction,ProductivityandManagementofECLAC,andunderthecoordinationofCeciliaPlottier,SeniorEconomicAffairsOfficerofthesameDivision.

TheUnitedNationsandthecountriesitrepresentsassumenoresponsibilityforthecontentoflinkstoexternalsitesinthispublication.

MentionofanyfirmnamesandcommercialproductsorservicesdoesnotimplyendorsementbytheUnitedNationsorthecountriesitrepresents.

Theviewsexpressedinthisdocument,whichhasbeenreproducedwithoutformalediting,arethoseoftheauthoranddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheOrganizationorthecountriesitrepresents.

UnitedNationspublication

LC/TS.2024/13

Distribution:L

Copyright?UnitedNations,2024

Allrightsreserved

PrintedatUnitedNations,Santiago

S.2400004[E]

Thispublicationshouldbecitedas:W.B.Bonvillian,“Industrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury:lessonsfromtheUnitedStates”,ProjectDocuments(LC/TS.2024/13),Santiago,EconomicCommissionforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(ECLAC),2024.

ApplicationsforauthorizationtoreproducethisworkinwholeorinpartshouldbesenttotheEconomicCommissionforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(ECLAC),DocumentsandPublicationsDivision,publicaciones.cepal@.MemberStatesandtheirgovernmentalinstitutionsmayreproducethisworkwithoutpriorauthorization,butarerequestedtomentionthesourceandtoinformECLACofsuchreproduction.

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...3

Contents

Introduction 7

I.TheUnitedStateshistoricalcontext 11

A.Post-WorldWarIIdevelopments 12

B.PositionofUnitedStatesmainstreameconomics 12

II.Definingindustrialpolicy 15

A.Thedebateoversocialgoalsforindustrialpolicy 15

B.Industrialeconomicpolicyversusindustrialinnovationpolicy 16

III.PriorUnitedStatesindustrialinnovationpolicies 19

A.Fourperiodsofindustrialinnovationpolicies 19

B.Remainingchallengesinenergyandmanufacturing 20

C.Overallpoints 22

IV.ThedrivingforcesbehindtheUnitedStatesnewpolicies 23

A.Thepandemic 23

B.Climatechange 24

C.China’stechnologicaladvance 24

V.UnitedStatesindustrialinnovationpoliciesinthe2020-2022period

andtheirunderlyingapproaches 25

A.Top-downapproach 25

B.Bottom-upapproach 29

C.Demonstrationprojectapproach 32

D.Directproductionsupportapproach 33

E.Supplychainapproach 35

F.Couplingbasicandappliedresearchapproach 36

G.Regionalimplementationapproach 39

H.Summingup 40

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...4

VI.ThenewinfrastructurerequiredforUnitedStatesindustrialinnovationpolicies 41

A.Organizationalinfrastructure 41

1.Crossagencycoordination 41

2.Linkingappliedtobasicresearchefforts 42

3.Integrationbetweenagencies,industry,anduniversities 43

4.Trainingchangeagentsskilledinprojectmanagementnotjustresearch 43

5.Workforceeducationforthetechnicalworkforce 44

6.Technologycertificationandvalidation 45

B.Scale-upinfrastructure 45

1.Adoptionofadvancedmanufacturing 45

2.Technologytestinganddemonstration 45

3.Scale-upfinancing 46

4.Procurement 46

5.Mappingsupplychainsandfillingthegaps 46

C.Evaluationinfrastructure 47

VII.SummaryofthenewUnitedStatesindustrialinnovationpolicies 49

VIII.Thetop-five:lessonsfromUnitedStatesapproachestoindustrialinnovation

policypotentiallyrelevanttoLatinAmericanandCaribbeannations 51

A.Thefivemostrelevantapproaches 51

1.Spurregionalinnovation 52

2.Offerscale-upfinancing 53

3.Promoteadvancedmanufacturing 53

4.Supportworkforceeducation 54

5.Consider“topdown”and“bottomup”approaches 55

Bibliography 57

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...5

ListofAcronyms

ARPA-E

AdvancedResearchProjectsAgency-Energy

ATP

AdvancedTechnologyProgram

CCS

CombinedChargingSystem

CDC

CenterforDiseaseControl

CHIPS

CreatingHelpfulIncentivestoProduceSemiconductors

CTAP

CoronavirusTreatmentAccelerationProgram

DARPA

DefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency

DEI

Diversityequityandinclusionforminoritiesandwomen

DOD

DepartmentofDefense

DOE

DepartmentofEnergy

EDA

CommerceDepartment’sEconomicDevelopmentAdministration

ESGC

DOE’sEnergyStorageGrandChallenge

EU

EuropeanUnion

EUA

EmergencyUseApproval

EV

Electricvehicles

EXIM

ExportImport

FCAB

FederalConsortiumforAdvancedBatteries

FDA

FoodandDrugAdministration

HDI

HumanDevelopmentIndex

HHS

DepartmentofHealthandHumanServices

IMF

InternationalMonetaryFund

MEP

ManufacturingExtensionPartnershipprogram

NASA

NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration

NIH

NationalInstitutesofHealth

NIST

NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology

NSF

NationalScienceFoundation

NSTC

NationalScienceandTechnologyCouncil

OSTP

WhiteHouseOfficeofScienceandTechnologyPolicy

OTA

OtherTransactionsAuthority

OWS

OperationWarpSpeed

PPP

Publicprivatepartnership

R&D

ResearchandDevelopment

SBIR

SmallBusinessInnovationandResearchProgram

STEM

Science,Technology,EngineeringandMathematics

TRL

TechnologyReadinessLevels

UN

UnitedNations

US

UnitedStates

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...7

Introduction

DuringtheCovid-19pandemicperiodof2020-2022,theworldwitnessedarevivalofactiviststateeconomicpoliciesinmanynations,throughattemptstosecuremedicalsuppliesanddeveloptherapies,aswellastooffsettheeconomicdropcausedbythepandemic.

1

Asthepandemicrecededtowardendemicstatus,manystatespursuedeconomicrecoverystrategiesthatcontinuedinterventionistpoliciesusedduringtheheightofthepandemicandwerebasedonindustrialpolicies.Thesenewapproacheshavemovedbeyondtraditionalrationalesofseekingproductivityandcompetitivenessgainstoembracedevelopmentofcapabilitiesininnovation-basedgrowth.

Thesegrowthpoliciesarebasedondeliberategovernmentalinterventionsinpost-researchstagesofinnovation.Thepoliciesrelyonimprovingtechnologicalknowledgeandcapabilitiestoenableproductionsystemstoadoptnewtechnologiesandexpandqualityjobs,andtobuildresiliencethroughsupplychainstorespondtofuturecrises,aswellastomeetsustainabilitydemands.Newformsofinnovationorganizationarerequiredandunderwayatsubstantialscaletomanagethenewprograms.Collectively,becausethesepoliciesarefocusedonfosteringinnovation,theycanbetermed“industrialinnovationpolicies.”Althoughdifferentnationsareattemptingdifferentapproaches,ananalysisofinternationalpracticescanprovideusefullessonsforLatinAmericanandCaribbeancountries.

ThepaperthereforeattemptstoevaluatenewindustrialinnovationpolicyapproachesintheUnitedStates(U.S.).Historically,theU.S.hasresistedsuchgovernmentalinterventionsinitsinnovationsystem.ButtheU.S.inthe2020-2022periodhasembarkedonasetofmajorindustrialinnovationpolicyapproachestoimproveitstechnologicalinnovationsystem,whichareexploredhere.

Thedocumentisstructuredintoeightsectionsinadditiontothisintroduction,therestofwhichaddressestheimportanceofindustrialpoliciesfordevelopingcountries.ThefirstsectionprovidesanhistoricaloverviewofindustrialpoliciesintheUnitedStates.Thesecondsectionexaminesthedefinitions

1Theviewsexpressedinthispaperaresolelythoseoftheauthorandnotnecessarilypositionsofhisemployer,MIT.

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...8

ofindustrialpolicyandthedebateonitsobjectivesandhighlightsthenotionofindustrialinnovationpolicy.ThethirdsectionpresentsthehistoricalprecedentsforindustrialinnovationpoliciesintheU.S.Thefourthsectiondescribesthedrivingforcesbehindtheresurgenceofindustrialpolicyinthecountry,inaqualityandquantityneverexperiencedbefore.ThefifthsectionanalyzessevenindustrialinnovationpolicyapproachesunderlyingrecentinitiativesintheU.S.inthe2020-2022period.Sectionsixlooksattheinstitutionalinfrastructurethatneedstoco-evolvewiththenewindustrialinnovationpolicyimpetusforittowork.Theseventhsectionsummarizesthesenewpoliciesandapproaches,andthensectioneightdiscussesfivemainlessonsforLatinAmericanandCaribbeancountriesandconcludes.

A.Relevanceofindustrialpoliciestodevelopingnations

Aresuchindustrialinnovationpoliciesrelevanttodevelopingcountries?TheUnitedNations(UN)hasdefineddevelopingcountriesasthosewitharelativelylimitedstandardofliving,anundevelopedindustrialbase,andamoderatetolowrankingontheHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),developedbytheUNin1993asacomparativemeasureofpoverty,literacy,education,lifeexpectancy,andrelatedfactors.

Industrialpolicyhaslongbeenacontentiousideaineconomics,arisinginrecentdecadesdespiteabackdropofneoliberaleconomicviewsdatingfromtheearly20thcenturybutdominantstartinginthe1960sandfavoringfreemarketsandtrade,deregulation,globalizationandalimitedgovernmentalrole.Acompetingeconomicsliteraturebeganemerginginthe1980sand1990sinoppositiontothismainstreamneoliberalism.

2

UNstudieshavelongexaminedindustrialpolicyapproachesfordevelopingnations.Forexample,a2016UNEconomicCommissionforAfrica(UNECA)studyfoundthat,

Thedebateonindustrialpolicyhasarguablybeenthemostideologicaloneinthehistoryofeconomics.Thebestproofoftheideologicalnatureoftheindustrialpolicydebateisshownbythedebateonthe‘economicmiracles’intheEastAsiancountries,likeJapan,(South)Korea,andTaiwan.Itishardtobelieveittoday,butuntilthe1980s,manymainstreameconomistsweredenyingtheexistence—nottospeakoftheefficacy—ofindustrialpolicyinthosecountries.Whydidtheseeconomistsdothat,whenaquicklookthroughfinancialnewspapersandmagazines—nottospeakashortvisittothosecountries—wouldhaverevealedhowextensiveandintrusivetheirindustrialpoliciesare?(UNECA,2016).

A2019InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)reporthassummarizedthebasicpointnotedabove.ItlookedatcountriesthatachieveddevelopedstatusafterWorldWarII(CherifandHasanov,2019).Ofthefourteencountriesinthatcategory,theIMFstudyfoundthreetypes:

(i)Countriesthatusedmajornaturalresources—primarilyoil—foreconomicgrowth.ThesewereMiddleEasternnations.

(ii)Countrieswithsmallereconomiesthatwereabletogrowthroughintegrationintolargerregionaleconomies.Portugal,whichintegratedintotheEuropeanUnion(EU),providesanexample.

(iii)Countriesthatappliedindustrialpoliciesbasedongovernmentaleconomicinterventions.ThisistheEastAsiandevelopmentmodel.

Allthecountriesinthisthirdcategoryusedindustrialpoliciesasthebasisfortheirgrowth,includingJapan(whichhadtorebuildafterWorldWarII),Korea(Rep.of),Taiwan,andSingapore.Clearly,industrialpolicyhasbeenamajorpathwaytowardeconomicdevelopmentinthesedevelopingnations.Chinaisthelatestexampleofadevelopingnationinthisthirdcategory.TheIMFreport,likethe2016UNECAreport,ispartofalargerliteraturethat,particularlyaftertheeconomiccrashof2008

2Forthehistoricalcontextsee,forexample,Oqubay,Cramer,ChangandKozul-Wright(2020);AndreoniandChang(2019);Chang(1994);Amsden(1989);Johnson,(1982).

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...9

whenmainstreameconomicsfacedsomethingofacomeuppance,suggeststhepotentialrelevanceofstudiesofindustrialpolicyapproachestodevelopingnations.

AnexaminationofarecentindustrialpoliciesintheU.S.thereforemaypresentsomeapproachesthatmayberelevanttodevelopingcountriesintheAmericas.Afteranin-depthexplorationofthesenewpolicies,anattemptismadetodrawlessonsfordevelopingeconomies.Theseincludeissuesregardingregionalinnovation,theimportanceofmanufacturingandadoptingcorrespondinginnovationinproduction,financingforproductionscale-up,workforceeducationandincorporatingboth“topdown”and“bottomup”approaches.

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...11

I.TheUnitedStateshistoricalcontext

TheUnitedStateswentthroughwavesofshiftingindustrialpoliciesasitevolvedfromanagrarian,developingcountrytodevelopedstatusbythemid19thcentury.

3

Thesehavefollowedapatternofgovernmentalactionandreaction.AfteritsConstitutionformedacentralgovernmentin1789,thefederalgovernmentadoptedaseriesofindustrialpolicyapproachesincludingacentralbankingsystemandgovernment-ownedarsenalsandshipyardsformilitaryproduction.Atthestatelevel,therewasdirectsupportforroads,canals,steamshiproutes,railroadsandmanufacturing.Apoliticalreactioninthe1830sendedthecentralbankandopposedstate-awardedmonopoliesfortransportationinfrastructureinfavoroflaissezfairecompetition.

TheAmericanCivilWarin1861-1865andtheriseofthenorthernpoliticaldominanceformostoftheremainderofthatcenturyledtoanotherroundofinterventionistpoliciesfortranscontinentalrailroads,land-grantuniversitiesandlanddistributionthroughhomesteading.Thesubsequentriseofthecorporationasthecoreorganizationalmodelforindustrychallengedthepowerofthestate.Inturn,thisledtoa“progressive”reaction,encompassinggovernmentregulationofrailroadsandantitrustlaws.

DuringWorldWarI,thefederalgovernmenttookcontrolovermuchoftheeconomy,includingimposingwidespreadpricecontrols.Thiswasfollowedbyareactionagainstgovernmentalinterventionsthatlasteduntiltheeconomicdepressionofthe1930sandthe“NewDeal”interventionistpoliciesthataccompaniedit.DuringWorldWarII,controlscomparabletoWorldWarI’swereimplemented.

3ThispaperdrawsfromBonvillian(2022).

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...12

A.Post-WorldWarIIdevelopments

Ontheinnovationpolicysideofthosewartimepolicies,VannevarBush—PresidentFranklinRoosevelt’sWorldWarIIscienceadvisor—ledthecreationofahighlyconnectedsystemfortechnologyadvance.Hisapproachenabledthefederallyfundedresearchuniversitytobeinitiatedatscale,andtheseuniversitieswerecloselylinkedtoindustry,themilitary,andgovernmentagencies.Federally-fundedresearchanddevelopmentcenters(latercalledFFRDCs)werecreatedaswell,andtheseelementsledtocriticalwartimetechnologyadvancessuchasradarandatomicweapons.Itwasanintensesystemof industrialpolicydesignedbyBushandothertechnologyleadersthatenabledtheU.S.andalliestowinthewar.Immediatelyfollowingthewar,Bushledthedismantlingofmuchofthisextremelysuccessful“connected”system.Herecommendedinsteadafocusonbasicresearchwithinadisconnectedsystem.Thetitleofhispolicytractadvocatingthisapproach,“Science,theEndlessFrontier,”wasdesignedtoappealtotheAmericansensethatopportunitybeckonsatthefrontier(Bush,1945).

Whydidheadvocatethisdisconnectedapproach?Withthewarmachinebeingdismantledintheexpectationofworldpeace,Bushlikelywastryingtosalvagesomepartsofthesystem.Hesawthepowerofthefederallyfundedresearchuniversityandadvocatedfederalsupportforbasicresearchthatcouldsustainthatcreation.Basicresearchisfarcheaperthanapplieddevelopment,andhelikelythoughtthegovernmentcouldstillsupportthatbasicstageamidthepostwarcutbacks.Healsowasconcernedthatscience,hadbecometootiedtogovernment,withallitsintensepoliticalandmilitarypower,andhewantedtoshieldit,reclaimitsindependence.Bushadvocatedwhatwaslatercalledthe“pipelinemodel”forinnovation,withearly-stageresearchasthefederalinputintothepipeline,withthe laterpipelineinputsleadingtotechnologydevelopmentrelyingonindustry.Themodeldisconnectedtheactorsinthatinnovationsystem.

OneoftheimplicationsofBush’sdisconnectedapproachwasthatthefederalgovernmentfailedtosupportinnovationinmanufacturingtechnologiesandprocesses.Thatwasindustry’sjob.TheU.S.wasthefirstnationtoadoptmassproductionatgreatscale,andbytheendofWorldWarIInonationwasclosetoitsindustrialoutputthroughthesemassproductioninnovations.Sotherewasnoneedforthegovernmenttofocusonmanufacturing,thatleadershipseemedassured.Yetproductioncanbehighlyinnovativeinitself—designinganewtechnologyorproductforimplementationisahighlycreativestep,involvingextensiveengineeringandoftennewsciencetobringanideatoamarketpricewithmarketresilience.YettheU.S.innovationsystemmissedthis—ittreatedtheresearchanddevelopment(R&D)stageasinnovationandfailedtograspthatproductionwasanimportantaspectofinnovation.Correspondingly,weaknessinproductioninnovationmeanserosionintheoverallinnovationsystem.

4

Toooftenitmeansthatnewproductsandtechnologiesremainideasandfailtoenterthemarketorarescaled-upelsewhere,withcorrespondingeconomicloss.

B.PositionofUnitedStatesmainstreameconomics

Bush’spipelinemodelalsoreflectedthesubsequentattitudesofmainstreamU.S.neoclassicaleconomists.Putsimply,theirviewhasbeenthatgovernmentalinterventionsinareaswheretherearenotclearmarketfailuresdistortmarketsandtheirefficiency.Therearetwounderlyingproblemseconomistshavenotedwithindustrialpolicy.Thefirstconcernsinformationasymmetry:governmentdoesnotknowwhattofocusonsoitsmarketinterventionswillbeinefficient.Thesecondconcernsregulatorycapture:rentseekersintheprivatesectorwillusegovernmentalsupportmechanismstodistortmarketstolimittheircompetition.

4ForadiscussionofthisproblemseeBonvillianandSinger(2018).

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...13

PartofthereluctanceofU.S.mainstreameconomiststocountenancegovernmentinterventioninnotsimplyaneconomybutinitsinnovationsystem,comesfromthelimitsoftheirtoolset.Theseeconomistsemphasizemathematicaleconomicmodelingofmarketsandtheirefficiencyandhaveaninabilitytomodelandthereforeunderstandinnovationandthecomplexsystemsbehindit.Innovationrequiresconsiderationofmanycomplexelementsoutsideofscientificadvancesthatarenotreadilyamenabletoeconomicmodeling,suchasculture,traditions,vestedpoliticalinterests,changeagents,governmentalinfrastructure,publicexpectations,collectiveaction,andorganizationalmanagement.

5

Manymainstreameconomistshavetreatedinnovationasexogenous—importanttoeconomicgrowthbutbeyondthereachoftheirtoolsetstograpplewithandmodel.

Ontheotherhand,economistDaniRodrikhasnotedthatthecaseforindustrialpolicyrestsontwobasicrationales:externalitiesandcoordinationfailures(Rodrik,2022;Rodrik,2008).Externalitiesincludecostsorbenefitsthatproducers’actionscreateforsocietyatlarge.Becausethesocialbenefitofinvestmentsintechnologydevelopmentexceedsthebenefittothefirmitself,thefirmwillinevitablyunderinvestandmuchoftheoverallpotentialbenefitwillbeunderachieved.Coordinationfailuresoccurbecausefirmswillinvesttoadvancetechnologywherethereisadequateinfrastructure,R&Dknowledgeavailable,qualitysuppliersnearby,andaskilledworkforcepresent.Iftheseconditionsdonotexist,therehasbeenacoordinationfailureincreatingthem,andgovernmentagencieshavearoleinimprovingthecoordination.Thishaslongbeenthetheoreticalbasisforthepursuitofindustrialpoliciesindevelopingeconomies(Rodrik,2004).

However,intheU.S.,theabovecoordinationconditions—infrastructure,R&D,suppliers,andworkforce—havelongbeenpresentinmanyregions.Therefore,mainstreamneoclassicaleconomistshaveopposedgovernmentalindustrialpolicyinterventionasdisruptiveofmarketefficiencies.Despitethis,theU.S.governmenthaspursuedindustrialpolicyapproachesinaseriesofeconomicareas,wheremarketfailuresofvariouskindsprevail:healthcare,transportationandenergyinfrastructure,agriculture,andeducation.

Ontheinnovationside,thegovernmenthasprovidedstrongsupportforscientificresearch,whichhasbeenjustifiedasovercomingamarketfailure,sinceindustrygenerallycannotbeartheriskoflongtermresearchwithoutclearapplications.Butthegovernment,applyingtheBushpipelinemodel,hasgenerallyfollowedmainstreameconomicdoctrineandavoidedgovernmentalinterventionsinpost-researchinnovationphases,apartfromthedefensesector.Thishasincluded,untilrecently,alackoffocusoninnovationinmanufacturingtechnologiesandprocesses.

5Foradiscussionofthedynamicsofinnovation,seeBonvillianandWeiss(2015).

ECLACIndustrialpoliciesforthetwenty-firstcentury...15

II.Definingindustrialpolicy

A.Thedebateoversocialgoalsforindustrialpolicy

Apreliminaryquestionconcernsdefiningindustrialpolicy.In2013,aBritisheconomistbroadlydefineditas“anytypeofinterventionorgovernmentpolicythatattemptstoimprovethebusinessenvironmentortoalterthestructureofeconomicactivitytowardsectors,technologiesortasksthatareexpectedtoofferbetterprospectsforeconomicgrowthorsocietalwelfarethanwouldoccurintheabsenceofsuchintervention”(Warwick,2013;UNCTAD,2016;PageandTarp,2017).Morerecently,anotheranalystdefinedindustrialpolicyas“asetofpoliciesandprogramsexplicitlydesignedtosupportspecifictargetedindustriesandtechnologies”(Atkinson,2021).Inthissense,therecanbemultipleindustrialpolicies,foravarietyofgoals—includingU.S.internationalcompetitiveness,especiallyinadvancedtechnologysectors.

6

Othershavetakentheterm“industrialpolicy”andtriedtoapplyittogoalsthataremoreaboutsocialpolicy,takingupthe“societalwelfare”elementtoadvocatefor“mission-basedinnovation”(Mazzucato,KattelandRyan-Collins,2020;Mazzucato,2020).Thisapproachseekstoapplytechnologicalinnovationnotonlytotechnologicalchallengesbuttosocietalmissionssuchasreducingeconomicinequalityandbuildi