2023年美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)狀況(英)-SIA-2024-28正式版_第1頁(yè)
2023年美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)狀況(英)-SIA-2024-28正式版_第2頁(yè)
2023年美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)狀況(英)-SIA-2024-28正式版_第3頁(yè)
2023年美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)狀況(英)-SIA-2024-28正式版_第4頁(yè)
2023年美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)狀況(英)-SIA-2024-28正式版_第5頁(yè)
已閱讀5頁(yè),還剩23頁(yè)未讀, 繼續(xù)免費(fèi)閱讀

下載本文檔

版權(quán)說(shuō)明:本文檔由用戶提供并上傳,收益歸屬內(nèi)容提供方,若內(nèi)容存在侵權(quán),請(qǐng)進(jìn)行舉報(bào)或認(rèn)領(lǐng)

文檔簡(jiǎn)介

STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYTABLEOFCONTENTS23911INTRODUCTIONCHIPSIMPLEMENTATIONWORKFORCEANDMANUFACTURINGINDUSTRIALBASEGOVERNMENTSRACETODEVELOPCHIPINCENTIVES15GEOPOLITICALTENSIONS&THESEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY16THEGLOBALSEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY18SEMICONDUCTORDEMANDDRIVERS20U.S.INDUSTRYMARKETSHARE21U.S.TECHNOLOGYCOMPETITIVENESS24U.S.SEMICONDUCTORINNOVATIONPOLICYLANDSCAPEINTRODUCTIONSEMICONDUCTORSFORMTHEFOUNDATIONOFTHEDIGITALECONOMY,ENABLINGINNOVATIONSTHATMAKETHEWORLDSMARTER,GREENER,MOREEFFICIENT,ANDBETTERCONNECTED.WITHUPTOTENSOFBILLIONSOFTRANSISTORSONASINGLECHIP,PRODUCINGTHESECOMPLEXDEVICESISAMARVELOFMODERNTECHNOLOGY,MADEPOSSIBLEBYTHESYNCHRONOUSSYNERGYOFHIGHLYADVANCEDRESEARCH,DESIGN,ANDMANUFACTURING.In2023,thesemiconductorindustry’simportancetotheworldcontinuestogrow,aschipsbecomeanevengreaterpresenceintheessentialtechnologiesoftoday—andgiverisetothetransformativeAlthoughthefutureholdstremendouspromiseforthesemiconductorindustry,italsopresentsarangeofchallenges.U.S.-Chinatensionscontinuetoimpacttheglobalsupplychain,forexample,spurringnewgovernmentcontrolsonsalesofchipstoChina,thetechnologiesoftomorrow.Inall,morethan1trillionsemiconductorsweresoldgloballylastyear,atotalsoworld’slargestsemiconductormarket.Andotherhighthatifyoustackedthemoneontopofanother,theywouldreachhigherintotheskythanthemaximumcruisingaltitudeforcommercialaircraft.significantpolicychallengesremain,includingtheneedtoenactpoliciestoreinforceU.S.leadershipinsemiconductordesign,strengthentheU.S.semiconductorworkforcebyreformingAmerica’shigh-skilledimmigrationandSTEMeducationsystems,andpromotefreetradeandaccesstoglobalmarkets.Inaddition,whiletheglobalchipshortagehaseased,macroeconomicheadwindsandmarketcyclicalityhavecausedashort-termdownturninsales,whichisprojectedtolingerthroughouttheyear.Aschipdemandrises,countriesaroundtheworldhavebeenrampingupgovernmentinvestmentstoluresemiconductorproductionandinnovationtotheirshores.In2022,theU.S.governmentsteppeduptomeetthischallenge,enactingthelandmarkCHIPSandScienceActtoprovideneededsemiconductorresearchinvestmentsandmanufacturingincentives.andreinforceAmerica’seconomy,nationalsecurity,andsupplychains.Despitethesechallenges,thelong-termoutlookforthisfoundationalindustryremainsstrong.That’sSincetheCHIPSActwasintroduced,companiesfrombecausemovingforward,theworldwillneedmorearoundtheworldhaverespondedenthusiastically,andbettersemiconductorstopowereverythingfromannouncingdozensofnewsemiconductorecosystemappliancesandairlinerstoautonomouscarsandprojectsintheU.S.totalingwellover$200billioninprivateinvestments.TheseprojectswillcreatetensofthousandsofdirectjobsinthesemiconductorecosystemandwillsupporthundredsofthousandsofadditionaljobsthroughouttheU.S.economy.ImplementationoftheCHIPSActhasbeguninearnestin2023,andSIAseekstoplayaconstructiveroletoensurethenewlawreturnsmaximumbenefitsforAmerica’seconomy,nationalsecurity,andsupplychainresilience.artificialintelligence.Forsocietytoadvance,sotoomustchiptechnology.In2023,witheffectivegovernmentpoliciesandcontinuedhardworkandingenuityinourindustry,thesemiconductorsectorwillcontinuetogrow,innovate,andbuildabrighterfuturefortheworld.2|SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYASSOCIATIONCHIPSIMPLEMENTATIONEnactmentoftheCHIPSandScienceActinAugust2022wasanhistoricsteptowardreinvigoratingsemiconductorproductionandinnovationintheU.S.Thisyear,implementationofthenewlawhasbeguninearnest,andtheU.S.DepartmentofCommercehasmadegreatstridesinthisprocess.TheCHIPSProgramOffice(CPO)releaseditsfirstNoticeofFundingOpportunity(NOFO)inMarch,providingsemiconductorcompanieswiththeinformationneededtosubmitapplicationstoreceiveCHIPSincentivestoconstructorexpandcommercialfabricationfacilities,includingforleading-edgesemiconductors,current-generationandmaturenodes,andback-endmanufacturingprocesses.TheCPOreleasedasecondfundingopportunityforprojectsover$300millioninvolvingthemanufacturingofsemiconductormanufacturingequipmentandmaterialsinJune.Afundingopportunityforsupplychainprojectsbelow$300millionisexpectedinthefall.AfinalNOFOforprojectsinvolvingR&Dfacilitieswillbereleasedinthefall.2023STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY|3CHIPSINVESTMENTSTheCommerceDepartmentannouncedthatasofMay2023,ithadreceivedover400statementsofinterest(SOIs)forCHIPSprojects,reflectingtheexpansiveinterestintheCHIPSincentivesprogramacrossthewholesupplychain.SincetheintroductionoftheCHIPSActin2020,dozensofprojectsacross20stateshavebeenannounced,resultinginwellover$200billionofinvestment.Theseprojectswillcreatetensofthousandsofnew,high-qualityjobsintheU.S.semiconductorecosystemalone,aswellashundredsofthousandsofsupportedjobsthroughoutthebroaderU.S.economy.Astheapplicationprocessproceeds,thenumberofannouncedprojectsisexpectedtogrow,supportingthesemiconductorecosystemnationwide.U.S.SEMICONDUCTORECOSYSTEMSemiconductorsEquipmentMaterialsUniversityR&DPartner4|SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYASSOCIATIONCHIPSIMPLEMENTATIONTHECHIPSACTINACTIONTheCommerceDepartmenthasstartedissuingthekeyguidancedocumentsthatwillshapetheprogram.CommerceissuedaproposedruleforimplementationoftheCHIPS“guardrails,”whichrestrictcertainexpansionsofsemiconductormanufacturingincountriesofconcernandengagementincertainjointresearchandtechnologylicensingeffortswithentitiesofconcern.TheCommerceDepartmentalsoreleasedanenvironmentalquestionnaire,whereapplicantswillprovidetheCPOwithinformationregardingtheenvironmentalimpactsoftheproposedproject,whichwilldeterminethelevelofnecessaryfederalenvironmentalreview.ApplicantswillalsobeexpectedtoprovideCommercewithfinancialmodelsthatdemonstratethecommercialviabilityoftheprojectthroughoutthelifeofthefacility.ToensurethegoalsoftheCHIPSActarerealized,applicantsarecraftingcomprehensiveworkforcedevelopmentplanstoensurethesenewandexpandedfacilitieshavethetalentneededtosucceed.Stateandlocalpartners,includinguniversitiesandcommunitycolleges,areengagingwithapplicantstosupportprojectsintheirrespectiveregions.SIAsupportscontinuedefficient,effective,andtransparentimplementationoftheCHIPSincentivesprogram,andlooksforwardtofurthercollaborationwiththeCommerceDepartmenttoensurethesuccessoftheCHIPSAct.THECHIPSACTINACTIONSemiconductorsupplychainmanufacturinginvestmentsannouncedfromMay2020toJune2023SemiconductorsEquipmentMaterials2023STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY|5CHIPSIMPLEMENTATIONINVESTMENTTAXCREDITTheCHIPSActestablisheda25%advancedmanufacturinginvestmenttaxcredit,tobeimplementedbytheU.S.DepartmentofTreasuryToimplementtheadvancedmanufacturinginvestmenttaxcredit,theInternalRevenueService(IRS)andtheTreasuryDepartmentissuedaandsetforthinsection48DoftheInternalRevenueproposedrulemakingsettingforththeparametersCode.CoupledwiththeCHIPSgrants,theseforclaimingthecredit,includingprovisionstorecapturethecreditifcompaniesmakesignificantinvestmentsorexpansionsofmanufacturingfacilitiesinChina.Theregulationsareexpectedtobefinalizedlaterthisyear.incentiveswilllowerthecostgapbetweeninvestingintheU.S.andinvestingabroad,whilegeneratinggreaterbenefitstotheU.S.economy,nationalsecurity,supplychain,andtechnologyleadership.6|SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYASSOCIATIONCHIPSIMPLEMENTATIONSTRENGTHENINGTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORWORKFORCETheU.S.economyfacesasignificantshortageofskilledworkers,whichposeschallengestoU.S.economicgrowth,technologyleadership,andtonationalsecurity.Thisshortageimpactsthesemiconductorindustryandalltechnologyreliantindustries,includingkeytechnologiesofthefuture–cleanenergy,medicaltechnology,andcomputerscience).Ofthistotalworkforceshortage,weestimategapsof26,400technicians,27,300engineers,and13,400computerscientistsby2030.Amongengineers,9,900areatthebachelor’slevel(35%),12,300areatthemaster’slevel(47%),and5,100areatthePhDlevel(18%).artificialintelligence,cybersecurity,next-generationAddressingtheshortageoftrainedandeducatedcommunications,aerospace,automotive,andadvancedmanufacturing.Addressingthisskilledworkforcechallengemustbecomeanationalpriority.SemiconductorIndustryAssociation(SIA)commissionedareportfromOxfordEconomics,aleading,independenteconomicadvisoryfirm,toinvestigatetheskilledworkforcechallengesfacingtheU.S.semiconductorindustryinthecontextofeconomy-widechallenges.workers–boththroughoutthebroadereconomyandinthesemiconductorindustryinparticular–shouldbeanationalpriority.Atstakeisourcontinuedeconomicandtechnologyleadership,ourglobalcompetitiveness,andournationalsecurity.Thereportrecommends:1.StrengtheningsupportforregionalpartnershipsandprogramsaimedatgrowingthepipelineforskilledtechniciansforsemiconductormanufacturingandotheradvancedThereportprojectstheU.S.chipindustry’sworkforcewillgrowbynearly115,000jobsby2030,fromapproximately345,000jobstodaytoapproximately460,000jobsbytheendofthedecade,representing33%growth.Thereportestimatesthatroughly67,000riskgoingunfilledatcurrentdegreecompletionrates,or58%ofprojectednewjobs.These67,000unfilledjobsalsorepresentapproximately80%oftheprojectnewjobsintechnicalfields(technicians,engineering,manufacturingsectors.2.GrowingthedomesticSTEMpipelineforengineersandcomputerscientistsvitaltothesemiconductorindustryandothersectorsthatarecriticaltothefutureeconomy.3.RetainingandattractingmoreinternationalengineeringstudentswithintheU.S.economy.2023STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY|7CHIPSIMPLEMENTATIONTHENATIONALSEMICONDUCTORTECHNOLOGYCENTERAcorecomponentoftheR&DinvestmentsmadebytheCHIPSandScienceActistheNationalSemiconductorTechnologyCenter(NSTC).TheNSTCwasauthorizedinthe2021NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(NDAA)asapublic-privateconsortiumestablishedjointlybytheSecretariesofDefenseandCommercewiththegoalofconductingadvancedsemiconductormanufacturing,design,andpackagingresearchandprototyping.AdditionalclarificationwasgrantedregardingthestructureandtechnicalgoalsoftheNSTCinApril2023inawhitepaperreleasedbytheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.whitepapersetsforththeoveralldirectionoftheNSTC.TheNSTCconsortiumwillberunbyanew,independent,non-profitentitywhichwillbegovernedbyaBoardofTrusteeswhowillselectandempoweraCEO.TheBoardofTrusteeswillbedeterminedbyanindependentselectioncommittee.TheNSTCwillalsoconveneatechnicaladvisoryboardfromindustry,academia,andgovernmenttodeterminethetechnologyagenda.Therewillbeauniquelyidentifiedheadquarterswhichwillserveasaprominentgatheringplacefortheoveralleffortandwillservefunctionsofexecutiveleadership,governmentrelations,andfinancialandlegaloperationsalongsideageographicallydistributednetworkofresearchandengineeringcapabilitiesatconnectedtechnicalcenters.AlthoughthefullscopeandstructureoftheNSTCwillbedeterminedlaterin2023,theCommerceOPERATINGSTRUCTUREMemberAdvisorsNSTCConsortiumNSTCNonprofitOperatorBoardofTrustees&CEOGeneralCHIPSR&DOfficeFunding,oversight,supportTechnicalWorkforceHeadquartersAdministrationResearchVentureFundMemberServicesUSGRelationsConveningsWorkforceProgramsTechnicalCentersSource:CHIPSResearchandDevelopmentOffice,AVisionandStrategyfortheNationalSemiconductorTechnologyCenter.April25,2023Examples:Prototypingfacility,affiliateduniversitylabs,specializedequipmentaccess,etc.AdvancedAffiliatedfacilityAffiliatedfacilityAffiliatedfacilitypackagingfacility(incoordinationwithNAPMP)Thesetechnicalcenterswillcollectivelyprovideaccesstoabaselineofprototypingandscalingcapabilities.Keyareasoffocuswillinclude:leadingedge,trailingedge,andlegacyCMOSmanufacturing;highqualityprocessingofnovelmaterials;powerelectronicsmaterialsandmanufacturing;RF,analog,andmixedsignalmanufacturing;photonicsmaterialsandmanufacturing;micro-electromechanicalsystems;bioelectronics;anddesigntooldevelopment.TheNSTCwillalsoseektoofferacloud-baseddesignenablementgatewaytoserveasafocalpointforfablessR&Dneeds.Furtherdecisionsregardingthestructure,geographicdistribution,andtechnicalfocuswillbedeterminedthroughout2023and2024asNSTCleadershipisidentifiedandempowered.8|SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYASSOCIATIONWORKFORCEANDMANUFACTURINGINDUSTRIALBASEHavingacompetitivedomesticworkforceandmanufacturingcapabilitiesarecriticaltoAmerica’sleadinsemiconductors.Inaddition,astrongdomesticsemiconductorindustryisessentialtotheU.S.economy.ThesemiconductorindustryhasaconsiderableeconomicfootprintintheU.S.Roughly345,000peopleworkintheindustry,designing,manufacturing,testing,andconductingR&Donsemiconductorsthroughout49states.Over300downstreameconomicsectorsaccountingforover26millionU.S.workersareconsumersofandarethereforeenabledbysemiconductorsfortheirsectors.ThepositiveimpactofthesemiconductorindustryontheAmericanworkforce.TheU.S.semiconductorindustryisessentialtotheU.S.economy,providinginputstonearlyeveryindustryintheU.S.stimulatingjobs,andpayingincometoworkers.Intotal,theU.S.semiconductorindustrysupportedover2.3millionU.S.jobsin2022.activities,amongothers.Inaddition,foreachU.S.workerdirectlyemployedbythesemiconductorindustry,anadditional5.7jobsaresupportedinthewiderU.S.economy,eitherinthesupplychainsofthesemiconductorindustryorthroughthewagespendingofthoseemployedbythefirmsthemselvesoftheirsupplychains.Theindustrydirectlyemploysmorethan345,000domesticworkersinR&D,design,andmanufacturingMachinerymfg.30,000EDA9,000Devicemfg.206,000Design100,000345,000totaljobs050,000100,000150,000200,000Employment250,000300,000350,000Source:CES,QCEW,OxfordEconomics2023STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY|9TheU.S.semiconductorindustryaccountsforoveraquarterofamilliondirectU.S.jobsandnearly2millionadditionalindirectandinducedU.S.jobs.345,000directjobsintheU.S.semiconductorindustry...that’snearlyONEU.S.semiconductorjobsupports2,000,000ADDITIONALAmericanjobs5.7jobsinotherpartsintheU.S.economy...10|SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYASSOCIATIONGOVERNMENTSRACETODEVELOPCHIPINCENTIVESSupplychainresilienceremainsthetoppriorityfortheglobalsemiconductorindustry.Globalgovernmentscontinuetotakeproactivestepstobuilddomesticchipecosystemsandincreasemarketcompetitiveness.GovernmentsinAsia,Europe,andtheAmericasarecontinuingtoadvancetheirownversionsoftheCHIPSandScienceAct,creatingambitiouspackagesofsubsidiesandtaxincentivesforsemiconductorR&Dandmanufacturing.Coordinatingwithgovernmentefforts,companieshaverespondedwithlarge-scaleinvestmentsinresearchandworkforcedevelopment.TheEuropeanUnion:InApril2023,theEuropeanCommissionpassedthe“EUChipsAct,”aplantochipventurewitheightdomesticpartnersthataimstoachievecommercialproductionof2nmdoublethecontinent’sshareinglobalchipproductionchipsby2027.InFebruary2023,theJapaneseby2030throughmobilizing$47billioninpublicandprivateinvestment.Theplanwasexpandedfromitsoriginaltargetofadvancedchipmanufacturingtechnologytoincludetheentirevaluechain,includingolderchipsandR&Dfacilities.governmentapproveda$2.8billionsupplementtotheannualbudgettosubsidizeprivateinvestmentsinchipmakingequipment,rawmaterials,powerchips,andmicrocontrollers.SouthKorea:InMarch2023,theKoreangovernmentpassedthe“K-ChipsAct,”providing15%taxcreditsforlargecorporationsand25%forsmallandmediumenterprisesinkeynationalstrategicindustries,includingsemiconductors.InApril2023,theMinistryofTrade,Industry,andEnterpriseannouncedplansfortheIndustrialTransformationSuperProject,whichwillallocate70%ofitsR&Dbudget–approximately$4.7billion–tocoreindustrialsectorslikesemiconductors.China:SemiconductorsplayacriticalroleintheChinesegovernment’sagendatodevelopitsdomesticintegratedcircuit(IC)industry.Aspartofitsefforts,theChinesegovernmentplacednewincometaxexemptionsforadvancedtechnologyprocessnodes,establishedimportdutyexemptionsforICmanufacturers,andresumedoperationsofthe“BigFund,”China’s$50billion-plusstateinvestmentfundforchips.ChinaalsoestablishedanewNationalScience&TechnologyCommissionledbythePartytocoordinateitseffortsintheindustry.Taiwan:InJanuary2023,theTaiwanesegovernmentpassedamendmentstotheStatuteforIndustrialJapan:InDecember2022,theJapanesegovernmentInnovation,dubbedthe“TaiwanChipsAct.”Theannounced$500millionininitialfundingforRapidus,legislationwilloffer25%taxreductionsforR&Dandfollowedbyanadditionalr$2.3billionallocationinApril2023Rapidusisastate-organizedjoint5%fornewequipmentpurchases.2023STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY|11GOVERNMENTSRACETODEVELOPCHIPINCENTIVESIndia:InSeptember2022,theIndiangovernmentrevampedtheir$10billionProductionLinkedIncentive(PLI)schemetoprovideupto50%co-fundingforprojectcostsofbuildingsemiconductorfabsanddisplayfabs.Thailand,thePhilippines,andMalysia.SIAhasvisitedIndiaseveraltimesoverthepastyeartoencourageIndia’sexpandingroleintheglobalsemiconductorvaluechainandsupporttheU.S.-IndiainitiativeonCriticalandEmergingTechnology(iCET).SIAteammembershavealsomadeproductivetripstoEuropeandTaiwan.SoutheastAsia:ThegovernmentsofMalaysia,thePhilippines,Singapore,Vietnam,andThailandhaveintroducedincentivepackagestoattractforeignsemiconductorcompanyinvestments.Thescaleofglobalincentivespackagesrepresentsthestrategicsignificanceofsemiconductorsinnationalandeconomicsecuritynarratives.Healthycompetitioncaninnovatetheindustryanddiversifythesupplychaintobecomemoreresilienttoexteriorshocksandreducemarketvulnerabilities.Governmentsaroundtheworld,however,shouldbeexchanginginformationontheirprogramstostrengthentheirchipindustriestopromoteefficienciesandavoidredundancies.Overthepastyear,SIAstaffhavemadeseveralinternationaltripstolearnmoreabouttheseprogramsanddiscussdeepeninginvestmentties.InAugust2022,SIAledadelegationofmembercompanyexecutivestoparticipateinaconferenceinMexicoCitytopromotethegrowthofbilateralsupplychains.InJanuary2023,SIAtraveledtoSoutheastAsia,visitingSingapore,Vietnam,12|SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYASSOCIATIONGOVERNMENTSRACETODEVELOPCHIPINCENTIVESNORTHAMERICANSEMICONDUCTORCORRIDORTheNorthAmericanSemiconductorCorridor(NASC)ispartofamajorefforttorebalanceandrebuildsemiconductorsupplychainsinthewesternhemisphere.Coretothisisthe$52billionCHIPSAct,whichhasalreadyspurredmorethan$200billioninnewinvestmentcommitments.TheUnitedStates,however,cannotdothisonourown,andweneedtoworkcloselywithpartnersandalliestostrengthenglobalsemiconductorsupply-chainresiliency.TheNASCwaslaunchedatthelastNorthAmericaLeaders’SummitonJanuary10,2023.OneofthekeydriversbehindthelaunchofNorthAmericanSemiconductorCorridorwastheCOVID-19inducedglobalsemiconductorshortage,whilenoweasing,hitanumberofindustrieshard.BybuildingupthesemiconductorindustrywithinNorthAmerica,theregioncanimprovetheresilienceofitstechnologysupplychainsbyhavingagreatershareofthevalue-chainlocatedwithintheregion.Eachcountrybringsadvantagesandstrengthstothepartnership.ThehopeoftheNASCistocoordinateeffortsacrosstheregion,especiallyintheareaofworkforcetraininganddevelopment,establishinglinkagesforresearchcenters,coordinatinggovernmentincentivesforthesemiconductorindustry,andpromotingenvironmentalprotectionsintheareaofcriticalmineralsnecessaryforthemanufactureofsemiconductors.2023STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY|13GOVERNMENTSRACETODEVELOPCHIPINCENTIVESGLOBALSEMICONDUCTORMARKETSANDINTERNATIONALPARTNERSHIPSTheImportanceofGlobalMarketsandInternationalCooperationMulti-ChipandMulti-ComponentPackages(MCOsandMCPs)totheWTO’sInformationTechnologyAgreement.Mostrecently,thecooperationamongWSCmemberswascriticaltokeepingsemiconductoroperationsupandrunningduringCOVIDforcedclosures.ThistypeofstrongrelationshipsandtrustbuiltthroughtheWSCisessentialinensuringourThesemiconductorindustryisoneofthemostgloballyintegratedindustries,spanningdozensofnationswiththousandsofsuppliers.SIAanditsmembersarecommittedtorebuildingAmericansupplychains,furtherpromotingmoreaccesstoglobalmarkets,andfacilitatingincreasedglobaltradeglobalindustrycontinuetoprosper.throughdeeperinternationalcollaborationwithallkeypartnersandnations.SIAiscurrentlyleadingeffortstopromoteglobalindustrycooperationandexpandglobalmarketsthroughtheWorldSemiconductorCouncil(WSC)andtheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).InformationTechnologyAgreementSIA,togetherwithmorethan40otherglobalassociationsfromaroundtheworld,continuestocallfortheWTOtoexpandtheInformationTechnologyAgreement(ITA)again.TheITAwasoriginallylaunchedbytheWTOin1997toeliminatetariffsonabroadswathoftechproductsfromcellphonestocomputers.WhileITA-2(thepreviousroundofproductexpansion)capturedanimpressive$1.3trillionintechtradein2015,notasingleadditionalproducthasbeenaddedtotheagreementintheensuingeightyears,eventhoughthetechsectorisburstingwithinnovationanddemandfordigitaltechnologiesisgrowingexponentially.TheglobalindustrymustworktogethertopressforanotherproductexpansiontotheWTO’sITA.Thisismoreimportantthanever,astariffeliminationwillmakeaffordableandinnovativeproductsmoreaccessibleintheglobalmarket,includingthosethatareessentialtodealwithclimatechange,facilitateremoteworkandlearning,andsaveandextendlives.WorldSemiconductorCouncil(WSC)Establishedin1996,theWorldSemiconductorCouncil(WSC)isaforumthatcomprisesthesemiconductorindustriesofChina,ChineseTaipei,theEU,Japan,Korea,andtheU.S.,todiscusssharedindustryandgovernmentinitiativesandpoliciestoensureourindustryremainshealthy.Fewindustrieshavesuchabody,andfromdayone,theWSChasbeenashiningexampleofourindustry’scommitmenttointernationalcooperationandpoliciesthatfosterfairnessandopennessinthesemiconductorindustry.Forexample,theWSChassuccessfullypromotedatariff-freeglobalenvironmentforthetradeofsemiconductorproducts,includingaddingMulti-Componentand14|SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYASSOCIATIONGEOPOLITICALTENSIONS&THESEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYU.S.andChinaarekeyplayersinthesemiconductorglobalsupplychainthatdriveindustryinnovationandmarketexpansion.Chinaisthesinglelargestmarketforsemiconductorsaccountingfor36%ofsalesforU.S.companies.RisingtensionsinU.S.-Chinarelationsposebothshort-termandlong-termriskstosupplychainresilience,marketaccess,andultimatelythecompetitivenessoftheU.S.semiconductorindustrialbase.Bothcountrieshaveannouncedunprecedentedinvestmentsandpoliciestogrowtheirdomesticsemiconductorecosystemsandensureeconomicandnationalsecurity.SemiconductorshaveplayedathatreliesonaccesstoglobalmarketsthatcansupportthescaleofR&Dinvestments.Withoutaccesstotheseglobalmarkets,U.S.companieslosethescalenecessarytofinancebothcapitalcentralroleinbilateraltensions,andgiventherecentexpansionsandresearchanddevelopmenthereineconomicandgeopoliticalchallenges,havebecomethesubjectofvariousrestrictivepoliciesthathaveimpededtheabilityofU.S.companiestocompeteonalevelplayingfieldintheChinamarket.theUnitedStates.Atthesametime,theindustryunderstandstheneedforanarrowlytailoredandmultilateralapproachtotraderestrictionsthatcanaddressthediscretenationalsecurityconcernsandsupplychainvulnerabilities,whileatthesametimeensuringcommercialcompetitivenessoftheU.S.semiconductorindustry.Attheendoftheday,astrongsemiconductorindustryisgroundedinavirtuousinnovationcycle2023STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY|15THEGLOBALSEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYOverthepastthreedecades,thesemiconductorindustryhasexperiencedrapidgrowthanddeliveredenormouseconomicimpact.ChipperformanceandcostimprovementsmadepossibletheevolutionfrommainframestoPCsinthe1990s,theWebandonlineservicesinthe2000s,andthesmartphonerevolutioninthe2010s.Thesechip-enabledinnovationshavecreatedincredibleeconomicbenefits.Forexample,from1995to2015anestimated$3trillioninglobalGDPhasbeendirectlyattributedtosemiconductorinnovation,alongwithanadditional$11trillioninindirectimpact.Semiconductorshavebecomeessentialtoourmodernworld,whichiswhylong-termmarketdemandforsemiconductorsremainsstrong.The2022marketgrewthroughthefirsthalfoftheyearbutduetoweakerthanexpecteddemand,salesdroppedin

溫馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有資源如無(wú)特殊說(shuō)明,都需要本地電腦安裝OFFICE2007和PDF閱讀器。圖紙軟件為CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.壓縮文件請(qǐng)下載最新的WinRAR軟件解壓。
  • 2. 本站的文檔不包含任何第三方提供的附件圖紙等,如果需要附件,請(qǐng)聯(lián)系上傳者。文件的所有權(quán)益歸上傳用戶所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR壓縮包中若帶圖紙,網(wǎng)頁(yè)內(nèi)容里面會(huì)有圖紙預(yù)覽,若沒(méi)有圖紙預(yù)覽就沒(méi)有圖紙。
  • 4. 未經(jīng)權(quán)益所有人同意不得將文件中的內(nèi)容挪作商業(yè)或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文庫(kù)網(wǎng)僅提供信息存儲(chǔ)空間,僅對(duì)用戶上傳內(nèi)容的表現(xiàn)方式做保護(hù)處理,對(duì)用戶上傳分享的文檔內(nèi)容本身不做任何修改或編輯,并不能對(duì)任何下載內(nèi)容負(fù)責(zé)。
  • 6. 下載文件中如有侵權(quán)或不適當(dāng)內(nèi)容,請(qǐng)與我們聯(lián)系,我們立即糾正。
  • 7. 本站不保證下載資源的準(zhǔn)確性、安全性和完整性, 同時(shí)也不承擔(dān)用戶因使用這些下載資源對(duì)自己和他人造成任何形式的傷害或損失。

評(píng)論

0/150

提交評(píng)論