【劍橋工業(yè)創(chuàng)新政策研究所】2025年英國(guó)創(chuàng)新報(bào)告

UKINNOVATIONREPORT2025

BenchmarkingtheUK)sindustrialand

innovationperformanceinaglobalcontext

InstituteforManufacturing,UniversityofCambridgeMarch2025

Tableofcontents

Listofcharts

3

Whatmakesthereportdifferent?

4

Introduction

5

Contributorsandacknowledgments

7

Executivesummary

8

Theme1:StructureandperformanceoftheUKeconomy

15

Theme2:Investmentininnovation

30

Theme3:Industrialperformance-internationalcomparison

42

Theme4:Scienceandengineeringworkforce

57

Theme5:Net-zeroinnovation

65

Theme4:Scienceandengineeringworkforce

Chart4.1.WorkforcemismatchesinG7countriesChart4.2.Tertiaryandvocationaleducation

attainment

Chart4.3.GraduatesinSTEMandhealthdisciplinesChart4.4.ScienceandtechnologyworkforceintheUKChart4.5.Researchersinthebusinesssector

Theme5:Net-zeroinnovation

Chart5.1.UKannualterritorialgreenhouse-gasemissionsbysourcesector

Chart5.2.PublicR&Dspendingonlow-carbonandrenewableenergytechnologies-totalbudgets

Chart5.3.PublicR&Dspendingonlow-carbonandrenewableenergytechnologies-bytechnology

Chart5.4.Innovationinenvironment-relatedtechnologies

Chart5.5.Specialisationrankingmatrixper

technologyareafortop10patentingcountriesworldwide

Chart5.6.Top10ownersofgreentechnology

internationalpatentfamilies(IPFs)inventedintheUK

Theme3:Industrialperformance-internationalcomparison

Chart3.1.Worldmanufacturingvalue-addedshares

Chart3.2.Worldmanufacturingemploymentshares

Chart3.3.Worldmanufacturingexportshares

Chart3.4.Internationalindustrialcompetitivenessrankings

Chart3.5.StructureofmanufacturingvalueaddedacrossG7andChina

Chart3.6.Value-addedtrendsofkeymanufacturingsectors

Chart3.7.Employmenttrendsofkeymanufacturingsectors

Chart3.8.Productivitytrendsofkeymanufacturingsectors

Chart3.9.StructureofmanufacturingexportsacrossG7andChina

Chart3.10.Exporttrendsofkeymanufacturingsectors

Chart3.11.Globalexportsharesinkeymanufacturingsectors

Chart3.12.Globalvalue-addedmarketsharesinadvancedindustries

Chart3.13.Levelofspecialisationinadvancedindustries

Listofcharts

Theme1:StructureandperformanceoftheUKeconomy

Chart1.1.StructureoftheUKeconomy,2023

Chart1.2.Top10industriesbyvalueaddedandcapitalinvestment

Chart1.3.Top10industriesbylabourproductivity

Chart1.4.Top10industriesbyemploymentandsalary

Chart1.5.ThevalueoftheUKmanufacturingsupplychain

Chart1.6.Topmanufacturingindustriesbyvalueaddedandemployment,2023

Chart1.7.Topmanufacturingindustriesbygoodsandservicesexports,2023

Chart1.8.Topmanufacturingindustriesbycapitalinvestment,2023

Chart1.9.OverviewofadvancedmanufacturingsectorsChart1.10.TrendsofadvancedmanufacturingsectorsAppendix1.1.Sectorclassificationandstatisticalcodes

Appendix1.2.Methodologyusedtocomputetheindirectanddirectvalueofmanufacturing

Appendix1.3.Methodologyusedtoidentifyadvancedmanufacturingsectors

Theme2:Investmentininnovation

Chart2.1.R&Dintensity:internationalcomparisonChart2.2.OverviewofUKexpenditureonR&D

Chart2.3.UKbusinessresearchanddevelopment

Chart2.4.GovernmentfinancialsupportforbusinessR&DintheOECD

Chart2.5.GovernmentfinancialsupportforbusinessR&DinG7countriesChart2.6.UKgovernmentR&Dtaxcredits

Chart2.7.TopR&D-investingcompaniesintheworldChart2.8.Patentapplicationsinkeytechnologyfields

3

4

Whatmakesthereportdifferent?

TheaimoftheUKInnovationReportistofacilitatepolicydiscussionsoninnovationandindustrialperformance–andtheinterplaybetween

them.Whilenumeroussourcesofdataonthetopicofinnovationexist,theUKInnovationReportmakesacontributionbybringingtogether,inasingleplace,innovationandvalue-addedindicatorsinaconciseandaccessibleformat.

Insteadofstructuringthereportaccordingtotraditionalinputandoutputindicators,theintentionwiththereportistoincludedatathatprovidesrichquantitativerepresentationsofthevitalityofboththeUK)sinnovationactivityanditsindustrialperformanceinaninternationalcontext.

Animportantthemethroughoutthereportistheanalysisofsectoraldatatobetterunderstandthedriversofnationalperformanceandprovide

moregranularpolicyinsights.Whilethereportdoesnotmakespecificpolicyrecommendations,itdoeshighlightareaswhereadditionalevidenceandpolicyactionmayberequired.

Motivation

ToreviewtheUK)sinnovationandindustrialperformanceandcompareitwiththatofotherselectedcountries;Tofacilitatediscussionsontherelationbetweeninnovationandsectoralcompetitiveness;and

Tocontributetotheevidencebasethatisavailabletoinformindustrialandinnovationpolicy.

Pleasereferencethisreportas:CambridgeIndustrialInnovationPolicy(2025).UKInnovationReport2025.IfMEngage.InstituteforManufacturing,UniversityofCambridge.

Introduction

TheUKInnovationReportremainsavitalresourceforunderstandingtheevolvinglandscapeofinnovationandindustrialpolicyintheUK.Thisyear)seditioncomesataparticularlysignificantmoment,astheUKgovernmenthasplacedindustrialstrategyatthecoreofitsgrowthagenda,withastrongemphasisoninvestment,technologyadoption,andhigh-growthsectors.

InOctober2024,thegovernmentpublishedthe

IndustrialStrategyGreenPaper

,markingthefirststeptowardsdevelopinga“modern”industrialstrategy.Thefinalstrategy,settobelaunchedinspring2025alongsidethespendingreview,willoutlinealong-termvisionforstrengtheningtheUK)sindustrial

competitiveness.Akeyelementofthisstrategyisthedevelopmentofsectorplansforeightprioritygrowthsectors,whichinclude:advancedmanufacturing,cleanenergyindustries,creativeindustries,defence,digitalandtechnology,financialservices,lifesciences,andprofessionalandbusinessservices.

Thepastyearhashighlightedthegrowingneedforevidence-basedindustrialandinnovationpolicymaking.TheGreenPaperwasaccompaniedbya

publicconsultationthatreceivedover3,000responses,reflectingwidespreadengagementfromindustryandstakeholders.Eachsectorplanwillrequirein-depthanalysistoassessdriversofinnovation,competitiveness,andfuturetrends,aswellastoidentifystrategiesforenhancingtheUK)sglobalposition.

However,thedatanecessarytosupporttheseplansisneitherreadilyavailablefromofficialstatisticsnorstraightforwardtocollect.Inresponsetothese

challenges,theDepartmentforBusinessandTrade(DBT)launchedacallforevidenceattheendof2024,focusingonaccesstofinanceforadvanced

manufacturingscale-ups.Thisinitiativeaimstoidentifythekeyfinancialbarriersthatcompaniesfacewhentransitioningfromtechnologicaldevelopment

tocommercialsuccess.Meanwhile,theDepartmentforScience,InnovationandTechnology(DSIT)introducedthe

TechnologyAdoptionReview

,ledbytheGovernmentChiefScientificAdviserandtheNationalTechnologyAdviser)toevaluatetheUK)seffectivenessinadoptingcutting-edgetechnologies.

Asthedemandforstrongerevidenceinindustrialandinnovationpolicymakinggrows,theUKInnovationReport2025makesatimelycontributionbyprovidingnewdata,analysesandperspectivestosupportevidence-basedpolicydevelopment.

5

Whatisnewinthe2025editionoftheUKInnovationReport?

Thisyear)sUKInnovationReportbuildsonlastyear)spolicydiscussionsandintroducesnewindicatorsanddatasourcestoassesstheUK)s

innovationperformanceovertime.Itprovidesadeeperfocusonsectoralcompetitiveness,aligningwiththeIndustrialStrategyGreenPaper.Thereportisorganisedasfollows:

?Section1examineschangesintheUK)seconomicstructure,withafocusonthecontributionofthemanufacturingsector.

?Section2providesanoverviewoftheUK)sresearchanddevelopment(R&D)fundingandexpenditurelandscape.

?Section3analysesshiftsinthecompetitivepositionoftheUK)smanufacturingsectorsoverthepasttwodecades.

?Section4exploresqualificationandskillsmismatchesintheUK,alongwiththeuptakeofvocationaleducation.

?Section5reviewspublicR&Dexpenditureonlow-carbonandrenewableenergytechnologies,aswellaspatentactivityandspecialisationinenvironment-relatedtechnologies.

6

7

Contributorsandacknowledgements

CambridgeIndustrialInnovationPolicy

CambridgeIndustrialInnovationPolicy(CIIP)isaglobal,not-for-profitpolicygroupbasedattheInstituteforManufacturing,UniversityofCambridge.

CIIPworkswithgovernmentsandglobalorganisationstopromoteindustrialcompetitivenessandtechnologicalinnovation.Weoffernewevidence,insightsandtoolsbasedonthelatestacademicthinkingandinternationalbestpractice.ThisreportwasdeliveredthroughIfMEngage,theknowledge-transferarmoftheInstituteforManufacturing,UniversityofCambridge.

IfMEngage,17CharlesBabbageRoad,Cambridge,CB30FS,theUK

www.ciip.group.cam.ac.uk

Contributors

Thecontributorstothisreportare:JenniferCasta?eda-Navarrete,ZongshuaiFan,MateusLabrunie,DavidLeal-Ayala,CarlosLópez-GómezandMichelePalladino.DesignbyEllaWhellamsandDeborahHarward.Copy-editingbyElizabethTofarisandAmandaGeorge.

Acknowledgements

TheauthorswouldliketothankTimMinshallandEoinO)Sullivan)whoprovidedcommentsandsuggestionsandreviewedearlierversionsofthisreport.Wewouldalsoliketothankalloftheorganisationswhoprovidedvaluableinsightsduringconsultationscarriedouttoinformthereport.

Disclaimer

Namesofcountriesandterritoriesfollowwidelyacceptedconventionsanddonotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheauthorsortheiraffiliatedinstitutionsconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,territory,cityorarea,orofitsauthorities.Anymentionoffirmnamesorcommercialproductsdoesnotconstituteanendorsementbytheauthorsortheiraffiliatedinstitutions.

Forfurtherdetails,pleasecontact:

ifm-policy-links@eng.cam.ac.uk

Pleasereferencethisreportas:CambridgeIndustrialInnovationPolicy(2025).UKInnovationReport2025.IfMEngage.InstituteforManufacturing,UniversityofCambridge.

Executivesummary

UKINNOVATIONREPORT2025

8

AdefiningmomentfortheUK)sindustrialcompetitiveness

?Thereporthighlightsthesignificantshiftintheworld’s

industrialcentreofgravitysince2000.TheG7countries,

includingtheUK,haveseentheircombinedshareofglobal

manufacturingvalueaddeddeclinefrom56%in2000to33%in2022.Incontrast,Chinahasemergedastheworld’sleadingindustrialplayer,withitssharerisingdramaticallyfrom6.4%in2000to31%in2022.

?Worryingly,theUK’sshareofglobalmanufacturingvalue

addedfellfrom3.1%in2000to1.9%in2022,whileitsshareofglobalmanufacturingexportsmorethanhalved,droppingfrom3.7%to1.5%.

?MoreconcerningistheUK’slossofcompetitivenessinhigh-

value-addedindustries.Overthepastdecade,themost

significantdeclinesinglobalexportshareshaveoccurredin

historicallystrongsectors,includingpharmaceuticalsandothertransportequipment,whichcoversaerospace,shipbuilding,

andrailwayequipment.Additionally,theUK’sglobalmarketshareinadvancedindustriesfellfrom4.4%in2000to2.6%in2020.

9

Manufacturing:recedingbutstillvital

?ThereportconfirmsthattheshareofmanufacturingjobsintheUKhasalmosthalved,goingfrom13.4%to7.2%inthelast20

years.Meanwhile,lesswell-paidsectorsareemployingagreatershareofworkers.In2023,humanhealth,wholesaleandretail

trade,andadministrativeandsupportservicescollectively

employedmorethanathirdofUKworkers,yettheirsalarieswerebelowthenationalmedian.

?Despitethis,thereportevidencesthecriticalroleof

manufacturinginraisingtheUK’seconomicproductivity.

Manufacturingstandsoutasoneofthesectorswiththe

fastestproductivitygrowth,withnotableproductivitygainsintransportequipment,machinery,metalproducts,and

automotivebetween2010and2022.

?ThereportalsoestimatesthewiderimpactofmanufacturingontheUKeconomy.Officialstatisticsshowthatmanufacturingaccountedfor9.1%ofthevalueaddedand7.2%ofthe

employmentin2023.However,thereportestimatesthat

manufacturinggeneratessignificantindirecteconomicandemploymenteffects,accountingforaround15%ofUKvalueaddedandemployment.

10

TheUK:aleaderingovernmentsupportforbusinessR&D

?In2021,theUKprovidedthehighestlevelofgovernment

financialsupportforbusinessR&DasashareofGDPamong

OECDcountries,reaching0.48%ofGDP,morethandoubletheOECDaverage.ThemajorityofthissupportcameintheformofR&Dtaxrelief,whichaccountedfor0.33%ofGDP,whileonly

0.15%ofGDPwasallocatedthroughdirectfunding.

?ThistrendreflectsabroadershiftseenacrossOECDcountries,wheretherehasbeenasignificantchangeinthebusinessR&Dsupportpolicymixoverthepasttwodecades.Mostcountrieshavemovedawayfromdirectfundinginstrumentsandhave

movedtowardsagreaterrelianceonR&Dtaxincentives.In

2021,R&Dtaxincentivesaccountedforapproximately58%oftotalgovernmentsupportforbusinessR&DacrossOECD

countries,comparedtojust35%in2006.

11

Industrialworkforce:hightertiaryeducationalattainmentbutpersistent

skillsmismatches

?In2023,theUKworkforcereportedsomeofthehighestlevelsof

qualificationandskillsmismatchesamongOECDcountries.Atotalof37%ofUKworkersbelievedtheirqualificationsexceededthelevelrequiredfortheirjob,comparedtotheOECDaverageof23%.

Similarly,34%ofUKworkersfeltover-skilledfortheircurrentrole,higherthantheOECDaverageof26%.

?Despitehavingoneofthehighesttertiaryeducationattainment

rates,theUKhasalowershareofworkerswithavocational

educationandthetechnicalskillsneededinmodernindustries.

In2023,60%of25-34-year-oldsintheUKheldauniversitydegree,comparedtotheOECDaverageof48%.However,only22%pursuedvocationaleducation,wellbelowtheOECDaverageof31%and

significantlylowerthanEuropeanpeerssuchasFrance(41%),Germany(37%),andItaly(36%).

?TheshareofUKgraduatesinengineering,manufacturing,andconstructionstoodatjust9.3%in2022,laggingbehindtheG7averageof13.9%,withonlytheUSArankinglowerat6.9%.

?TheUKSTEMworkforceaccountedfor28.7%oftotalemploymentin2023.Overthepastdecade,theSTEMworkforcegrewby22%,outpacingthe11%growthacrossalloccupations.Lookingahead,projectionssuggestthatemploymentinSTEMoccupationscouldexpandasmuchas6%to10%between2023and2030,comparedto3%acrossalloccupations.

12

TheUK:aleadinginnovatorinrenewableenergytechnologies

?BasedondatafromtheInternationalEnergyAgency,theUKhadthefourth-highestpublicresearch,developmentand

demonstration(RD&D)expenditureonlow-carbonrenewableenergytechnologiesbetween2013and2023,belowtheUSA,FranceandJapan.

?AtUS$1.8billion,theUK’spublicRD&Dbudgetinlow-carbonandrenewableenergytechnologiesin2023waslowerthanJapan(US$2.9billion),France(US$4billion)andtheUSA

(US$10.3billion),buthigherthanGermany(US$1.5billion)andCanada(US$1.4billion).

?Amonglow-carbontechnologies,thehighestpublicRD&D

expenditureintheUKin2023wasonnuclearpower

technologies,followedbyenergyefficiency,andrenewables.

13

UKInnovationReport2025:datahighlights

TheglobalshareofmanufacturingvalueaddedforG7countriesdeclinedfrom56%in2000to33%in2022.

Incontrast,China'ssharesurgedfrom6.4%to31%overthesameperiod.

Inthelasttwodecades,UKglobalmanufacturingexport

sharesdecreasedfrom3.7%to1.5%.Inaselectionof10

advancedindustries,theUK’sglobalmarketsharedecreasedfrom4.4%in2000to2.6%in2020invalue-addedterms.

ManufacturingistheUK’ssecond-largestmarketsector

byvalueaddedandthelargestcontributortocapital

investment.Includingitsvaluechain,itrepresentsaround15%oftheUKeconomy.

At2.77%,theUK’sresearchanddevelopment

expenditureremainsjustabovetheOECDaveragebutisstillbehindleadingcountriessuchasKorea,theUSAandGermany.

AmongOECDcountries,theUKleadsintotalgovernmentfinancialsupportforbusinessR&DasashareofGDP,

relyingheavilyonR&Dtaxreliefoverdirectfunding.

In2023theUKremainedagloballeaderpernumberof

topR&D-investingcompanies,butitspresencehasnearlyhalvedoverthepastdecade.

TheUKshowspersistentskillsandqualification

mismatches:37%ofworkersfeelover-qualifiedwhile34%believetheyareover-skilled.

Only22%ofyoungpeopleintheUKhavepursued

vocationaleducation,wellbelowtheOECDaverage(31%)andEuropeanpeerslikeFrance(41%)andGermany(37%).

TheUKhasdecoupledGDPgrowthfromgreenhouse-gas

emissions,meetingitsclimatetargetssofar.However,

futurecarbonbudgetsrelyondeepercutsinhard-to-

decarbonisesectorsliketransport,buildings,andagriculture.

TheUKisaleadinginnovatorinrenewableenergy

technologies,rankingfourthinpublicRD&Dspending

(2013-2023)andseventhinenvironment-relatedpatentapplications(2010-2021).

14

15

THEMEONE

HowhasthestructureoftheUKeconomychangedinthelasttwodecades?

WhatisthevalueofUKmanufacturing?

Structureand

performanceoftheUKeconomy

WhatarethetopUKmanufacturingindustries?

16

KEYFINDINGS

Theme1:StructureandperformanceoftheUKeconomy

DespitethedeclineinmanufacturingasashareofGDPoverthepasttwodecades,thesectorremainsakeycontributortotheeconomy:

?Overthepasttwodecades,oneofthemostsignificantchangesinthestructureoftheUKeconomyhasbeenthedeclineintheshareofmanufacturingvalueadded,from14.8%in2000to9.1%in2023.Incontrast,activitiesthatincreasedtheirparticipationintheUK

economyincluded:humanhealthandsocialwork;professional,scientificandtechnicalactivities;andfinancialandinsuranceactivities.

?DespitethedeclineinmanufacturingvalueaddedasapercentageofGDP,itremainsthesecond-largestmarketsectorbyvalueadded,thelargestcontributortocapitalinvestment,thesecondinlabourproductivitygrowth,andtheseventh-largestsectorbyemployment.

Weestimatethatthemanufacturingvaluechainaccountsforaround15%oftheUKeconomy:

?ManufacturingisakeypillaroftheUKeconomy,accountingfor9.1%ofthevalueaddedand7.2%oftheemploymentin2023.Inparticular,advancedmanufacturingsectorsaccountforaroundhalfofthesector’svalueaddedandemployment,showingabove-averageproductivitylevels.

?Thewiderimpactofmanufacturingcanbemeasuredthroughitsinterconnectednesswithotherindustries.Usingavalue-chainapproach,weestimatethatmanufacturingcontributed￡331billiontotheeconomyin2022andsupported4.5millionfull-timeequivalentjobsin

2019.Thesefiguresrepresentapproximately15%ofUKvalueaddedandemploymentduringtherespectivereferenceyears.

KeyUKmanufacturingindustriesincludefoodproducts,transportequipment,machineryandequipment,fabricatedmetalsandpharmaceuticals:

?Foodproductsisthelargestmanufacturingemployer,contributesthehighestshareofvalueadded,andhasthesecond-largestcapitalinvestmentamongmanufacturingindustries.However,itismoredomesticallyoriented,accountingforjust4.2%ofmanufacturing

goodsexportsin2023.

?Incomparison,motorvehicles,othertransportequipment,machineryandequipment,andfabricatedmetalsaremoreexport-oriented,jointlyaccountingfornearlyhalfofmanufacturingexports,whilealsomakingsubstantialcontributionstovalueaddedandemployment.

?Thepharmaceuticalindustrystandsoutforitshighvalueadded,relativelylargeservicesexports,andthehighestcapitalinvestmentamongmanufacturingindustries.

%oftotaleconomy

Employment

Goodsexports

Servicesexports[1]

BERD[2]

Chart1.1.StructureoftheUKeconomy,2023

Grossvalueadded,employment,exportsandbusinessenterpriseR&D

￡2,378billion

35.7

million

￡393.5billion

￡413.9billion

￡50

billion

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Grossvalueadded

Agriculture,forestryandfishingMiningandquarrying

Utilities

Low/medium-techmanufacturingMedium/high-techmanufacturingConstruction

Knowledge-intensiveservicesLabour-intensiveservices

Note:[1]Servicesexportsdatacorrespondsto2022;goodsandexportspercentagesdonotincludecategory“unknownindustry”.[2]Businessenterpriseresearchanddevelopmentbydetailedproductgroups.

Source:OfficeforNationalStatistics(ONS).

17

In2023knowledge-intensive[1]andlabour-intensiveservices[1]contributedtoapproximately80%oftheUKeconomy’sgrossvalueaddedandemployment.

Medium/high-techmanufacturing[1]representedthelargestshareofgoodsexportsandthesecondlargestshareofR&DperformedinUKbusinesses(BERD).Itamountedto59.1%ofgoodsexportsand43.9%of

BERDin2023.

Knowledge-intensiveservicesaccountedforthelargestsharesofservicesexports(65.7%)andBERD(43.9%).

Themainserviceexportsinclude:businessservices;

financialservices;andtelecommunications,computerandinformationservices.

[1]Note:Appendix1.1presentsdefinitionsofthesesectorclassifications.

Valueadded

Wholesaleandretail

trade

Manufacturing

Financialandinsurance

Humanhealthandsocialworkactivities

Professional,

scientificand…

Education

Construction

Informationandcommunication

Administrativeandsupportservices

Publicadministrationanddefence

Capitalinvestment

Change

2000-23[2]

-1.2

4.4

2.9

2.1

-5.3

-0.7

0.4

-2.3

0.7

0.8

Manufacturing

Construction

Education

Publicadministrationand

defence

Informationandcommunication

Transportationandstorage

Administrativeandsupportservices

Wholesaleandretailtrade

Professional,scientificandtechnicalactivities

Humanhealthandsocial

work

Chart1.2.Top10UKindustriesbyvalueaddedand

capitalinvestment[1]

Grossvalueaddedandgrossfixedcapitalformation,2000,2013and2023

Change

2000-23[2]

-1.8

-5.7

2.2

3.0

2.4

1.1

0.5

-0.2

1.5

0.1

0%5%10%15%20%

Shareoftotalgrossvalueadded

0%5%10%15%

Shareoftotalgrossfixedformation

2023

2013

2000

Note:[1]Realestateactivitiesareexcluded,asvalueaddedincludesimputedrents,andassetinvestmentmainlycoversdwellings.[2]Percentagepoints.

Source:OfficeforNationalStatistics(ONS).GDPoutputapproach,lowlevelaggregates,UK,Quarter3(JultoSept)2024.

18

Attheindustrylevel(sectionsoftheUKStandard

IndustrialClassification),thetopcontributingindustriestoUKvalueaddedin2023include:wholesaleandretailtrade(9.9%),manufacturing(9.1%),financialand

insuranceactivities(8.8%),humanhealthandsocialwork(8.5%)andprofessional,scientificandtechnicalactivities(8.3%).

Overthepasttwodecades,industriesthatincreasedtheirshareofvalueaddedinclude:humanhealthandsocialwork,risingfrom5.5%in2000to8.5%in2023;professional,scientificandtechnicalactivities,goingfrom5.8%to8.3%;andfinancialandinsurance

activities,increasingfrom6.6%to8.8%.

Incontrast,manufacturingdeclinedfrom14.8%in2000to9.1%in2023,whilewholesaleandretailtradefell

from11.7%to9.9%.

Intermsofcapitalinvestment,manufacturing(9.2%),construction(8.9%),education(6.9%),public

administrationanddefence(5.6%)andinformationandcommunication(4.7%)accountedforthelargestsharesin2023.

Overthepasttwodecades,however,informationandcommunicationsawthebiggestdeclineincapital

investment,withitssharedroppingfrom10%in2000to4.7%in2023,whileconstructionincreasedfrom

4.5%to8.9%.

Chart1.3.Top10UKindustriesbylabourproductivity

Valueadded(chainedvolumemeasures)perjob,2000,2013and2023

Change

2000-23[1]

-5.0%

￡0￡500,000￡1,000,000￡1,500,000￡2,000,000￡2,500,000

Miningandquarrying

Change

2000-23[1]

-1.9%

1.4%

-2.3%

6.7%

3.0%

0.6%

-0.4%

0.7%

-0.2%

Electricity,gas,steamFinancialandinsurance

Watersupply,sewerage,wasteInformationandcommunicationManufacturing

PublicadministrationanddefenceConstruction

Otherservices

Professional,scientificandtechnical

activities

2023

2013

2000

￡0￡100,000￡200,000