亞開(kāi)行-國(guó)有企業(yè)和公私伙伴關(guān)系財(cái)政管理的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施治理方法（英）-2022.11-46正式版

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ANINFRASTRUCTUREGOVERNANCEAPPROACHTOFISCALMANAGEMENTINSTATE-OWNEDENTERPRISESANDPUBLIC–PRIVATEPARTNERSHIPSNOVEMBER2022ASIANDEVELOPMENTBANKANINFRASTRUCTUREGOVERNANCEAPPROACHTOFISCALMANAGEMENTINSTATE-OWNEDENTERPRISESANDPUBLIC–PRIVATEPARTNERSHIPSNOVEMBER2022ASIANDEVELOPMENTBANK?CreativeCommonsAttribution3.0IGOlicense(CCBY3.0IGO)?2022AsianDevelopmentBank6ADBAvenue,MandaluyongCity,1550MetroManila,PhilippinesTel+63286324444;Fax+63286362444Somerightsreserved.Publishedin2022.ISBN978-92-9269-760-0(print);978-92-9269-761-7(electronic);978-92-9269-762-4(ebook)PublicationStockNo.TCS220410-2DOI:/10.22617/TCS220410-2TheviewsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsandpoliciesoftheAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB)oritsBoardofGovernorsorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.ADBdoesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthispublicationandacceptsnoresponsibilityforanyconsequenceoftheiruse.ThementionofspecificcompaniesorproductsofmanufacturersdoesnotimplythattheyareendorsedorrecommendedbyADBinpreferencetoothersofasimilarnaturethatarenotmentioned.Bymakinganydesignationoforreferencetoaparticularterritoryorgeographicarea,orbyusingtheterm“country”inthisdocument,ADBdoesnotintendtomakeanyjudgmentsastothelegalorotherstatusofanyterritoryorarea.ThisworkisavailableundertheCreativeCommonsAttribution3.0IGOlicense(CCBY3.0IGO)/licenses/by/3.0/igo/.Byusingthecontentofthispublication,youagreetobeboundbythetermsofthislicense.Forattribution,translations,adaptations,andpermissions,pleasereadtheprovisionsandtermsofuseat/terms-use#openaccess.ThisCClicensedoesnotapplytonon-ADBcopyrightmaterialsinthispublication.Ifthematerialisattributedtoanothersource,pleasecontactthecopyrightownerorpublisherofthatsourceforpermissiontoreproduceit.ADBcannotbeheldliableforanyclaimsthatariseasaresultofyouruseofthematerial.Pleasecontactpubsmarketing@ifyouhavequestionsorcommentswithrespecttocontent,orifyouwishtoobtaincopyrightpermissionforyourintendedusethatdoesnotfallwithintheseterms,orforpermissiontousetheADBlogo.CorrigendatoADBpublicationsmaybefoundat/publications/corrigenda.Notes:Inthispublication,“$”referstoUnitedStatesdollars.ADBrecognizes“Korea”astheRepublicofKoreaand“Russia”astheRussianFederation.CoverdesignbyIngridSchroder.PrintedonrecycledpaperContentsTable,Figures,andBoxivForewordvAuthorBiographiesviiAcknowledgmentsviiAbbreviationsviii1.Introduction12.AsiaInfrastructureInvestmentChallenges33.InvestinginQualityInfrastructure94.SourcesofEfficiencyGapsinInfrastructureInvestment13Public–PrivatePartnershipsasaSourceofFiscalandDebtRisk21ActualandContingentLiabilities22AccountingStandards—DisclosureofActualandContingentLiabilities245.GovernanceApproachtoManagingFiscalRisks26IntegratedPlanningandtheBudgetRule26SubsidiesDisguisedasGuarantees27ManagingContingentLiabilities286.Conclusions30References32iiiTable,Figures,andBoxTableInfrastructureInvestment—EstimatesofAnnualBenefitsfromEfficiency12andProductivityAssociatedwithQualityInfrastructureFigures1ADB-EstimatedInfrastructureInvestmentNeedsbySector,2016–2030,at2015Prices32InternationalMonetaryFundPublicInvestmentManagementAssessment5forAsiaandthePacific3GrowthinGovernmentDebt,PercentofGrossDomesticProduct64ClassificationofADBDevelopingMemberCountriesBasedonLevelsofDebtDistress75FiscalImpulsesinDevelopingAsia,2020–202386BuildingthePublicInvestmentFrontier107PublicCapitalandInfrastructurePerformance:HybridPublicInvestmentEfficiency11ScorebyRegion8GovernmentandState-OwnedEnterpriseFiscalRelationships169AverageReturnonEquity,State-OwnedEnterprisesversusPrivateFirms,2010–20181710IllustrativeExampleCashFlowsforLoss-MakingState-OwnedEnterprise1811ImplicitSubsidies,2010–201818BoxFiscalRiskManagementReforminArmeniaandthePhilippines23ivForewordTheAsiaandPacificregioniscommittedtoaclimate-resilientandsustainableeconomicfutureevenasitgrappleswithfiscalanddebtpressuresfollowingthevastincreaseofpublicexpendituretodriveeconomicrecoverywiththecoronavirusdisease(COVID-19)pandemic.TheRussianinvasionofUkraineexacerbatesthesefiscalanddebtconcernsassanctionsonexportsandsupplychaindisruptionsfromBlackSeaportsseverelyimpacttheexportofenergyandfoodfromUkraineandtheRussianFederation.TheAsianDevelopmentOutlookoftheAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB)showsBrentcrudeoilspotpricesincreased64.3%fromJune2021toJune2022.1TheFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations(FAO)FoodPriceIndexreachedahistoricalhighinFebruary2022,rising21%over2021.2Theincreaseinwheatpriceswillaffectcountrieswherewheatisover10%ofthefoodconsumerpriceindexsuchasArmenia,India,Pakistan,thePhilippines,theRepublicofKorea,SriLanka,andTajikistan.TherapidincreaseinenergyandfoodpriceswillcontributetothegrowthofinflationinmostADBdevelopingmembercountries(DMCs)ofaround3.7%in2022,comparedto2.5%in2021.3Growthprojectionsreboundedin2021from–0.8%to6.9%fordevelopingAsia,butremainbelowpre-pandemicgrowthratesinallsubregionsofAsiaandthePacific.Theaveragefiscaldeficitasapercentofgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)inemergingmarketsandmiddle-incomecountriesintheAsiaandPacificregionremainedsignificantat–7.5%in2020and–6.29%in2021,whereaslow-incomedevelopingcountriessawthefiscaldeficitasapercentageofGDPgrowfrom–2.27%in2019to–3.97%in2021.Debt-to-GDPlevelsremainmanageableoverall,butthelevelofriskvariesgreatlyamongcountriesandregions.SriLankastandsoutfordebtthatswelledfrom78%ofGDPin2015tojustover107%ofGDPin2021andprecipitatedaneconomiccrisisspurredbythepandemic.4Consideringthenarrowingfiscalspace,theincreaseindebtlevels,thegrowingcostsofdisastersduetoclimatechange,andanincompleteeconomicrecovery,thereisgrowingconcernaroundtherisktogovernmentownersofstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)andpublic–privatepartnerships(PPPs)thatcontingentliabilities—thatis,liabilitiesthatmayoccurdependingontheoutcomeofanuncertainfutureevent—andotherfiscalrisksmaymaterializewithsizablecoststothebudget.SOEsandPPPsdeserveattentionbecausethereisalreadyevidencethatPPPshavecharacteristicsthatcanobscurepropermanagementandmitigationoffiscalcostsandrisks.PPPsarepronetothe“fiscalillusion”arisingfrompooraccountabilityforthemanagementofcontingentliabilities.SOEcontingentliabilitiesandotherfiscalrisks,oftenundisclosedinpublicaccounts,alsoposeasubstantialfiscalriskifnotproperlyaccountedforandmanaged.ThisreportdescribesinfrastructureinvestmentchallengesintheAsiaandADB.2022.AsianDevelopmentOutlook(ADO)2022Supplement:RecoveryFacesDiverseChallenges.Manila.FAOCouncil,HundredandSeventiethSession,13–17June2022.ImpactoftheUkraine–RussiaconflictonglobalfoodsecurityandrelatedmattersunderthemandateoftheFAO.ADB.2022.AsianDevelopmentOutlook(ADO)2022:MobilizingTaxesforDevelopment.Manila.Emergingmarketsandmiddle-incomecountriesaredefinedaccordingtotheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)classificationaccordingtofactorssuchasmarketaccess,exportdiversificationpercapitaincomelevel,andthedegreeofintegrationintotheglobalfinancialsystem.Thelow-incomecountrieshavepercapitalincomelevelsbelowathresholdcurrentlysetat$2,700.Formoreinformationandfulllistofcountrygroupings,seeIMF.2021.MethodologicalandStatisticalAppendixI.IMFFiscalMonitor.vForewordPacificregion,providesevidenceofthepositivemacroeconomicandfiscaleffectsofinvestinginqualityinfrastructure,andrecommendsa“gateway”assuranceprocessateachstageofpublicinvestmentmanagementtoimproveinvestmentqualityandclimateresilience,integrationofupstreamplanningwithinthemedium-termfiscalframework,andestablishmentofastandardizedprocessformanagementofdirectandcontingentfiscalliabilitiesincurredbyPPPsandSOEs.HiranyaMukhopadhyayChiefofGovernanceThematicGroupSustainableDevelopmentandClimateChangeDepartmentAsianDevelopmentBankAuthorBiographiesHanifRahemtulla,PrincipalPublicManagementSpecialistHanifRahemtullaisprincipalpublicmanagementspecialistattheAsianDevelopmentBank.Heisapublicsectorreformspecialistfocusingonpublicfinancialandinvestmentmanagementandfiscaldecentralizationwithmorethan20yearsofexperienceinprojectmanagement,advisoryservices,andresearchinmorethan10developingcountriesintheAsiaandPacificregion.HeobtainedhisdoctoraldegreefromUniversityCollegeLondonandhispostdoctoraldegreefromMcGillUniversity,Canada.MichaelSchur,InfrastructureFinanceSpecialistMichaelSchurhasover25yearsofglobalexperienceasaninfrastructurefinanceandinvestmentspecialistandhaschiefexecutiveexperienceinboththepublicandprivatesectors.Heiscurrentlyanindependentboardmemberofaprivateconcessionsinvestmentcompanyandadvisortoprivateandpublicsectorclients,bothinAustraliaandinternationally.Hepreviouslydevelopedthecommercialpolicyframeworkforstate-ownedenterprisesinNewSouthWales,Australia,andthegovernanceframeworkforpublic–privatepartnerships(PPPs)asinauguralheadofthecountry’sPPPunitintheNationalTreasuryinSouthAfrica.DavidBloomgarden,PublicInvestmentManagementExpertDavidBloomgardenisapublicinvestmentmanagementexpertwithover30yearsofglobalexperienceinpolicy,management,andprojectdesignandimplementation.AsPPPandinfrastructuregovernanceconsultant,hehasadvisedtheWorldBank(GlobalInfrastructureFacility)andtheAsianDevelopmentBankoninfrastructuregovernanceanddevelopmentofknowledgeproductsonqualityinfrastructureinvestments.Priortohiscurrentrole,hewasheadoftheupstreamPPPunitoftheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,MultilateralInvestmentFund,andservedaschiefoftheInclusiveCitiesUnitresponsibleforsmallandmedium-sizedenterpriseslendingandinvestments.AcknowledgmentsThisreportwasledbyHanifRahemtulla,principalpublicmanagementspecialist,GovernanceThematicGroupofADB’sSustainableDevelopmentandClimateChangeDepartment(SDTC-GOV);MichaelSchur,infrastructurefinancespecialist;andDavidBloomgarden,publicinvestmentmanagementspecialist.WeacknowledgethehelpfulcommentsprovidedbyHiranyaMukhopadhyay,chief,SDTC-GOV;AdrianTorres,ChiefofPPP-TGS,OPPP;JoaoPedroFarinha,principalfinancialsectoreconomist,PublicManagement,FinancialSector,andTradeDivision,CentralandWestAsiaDepartment;DavidAaronRobinett,seniorpublicmanagementspecialist(state-ownedenterprisereforms),SDTC-GOV;AgustinaMusa,seniorfinancialmanagementspecialist,SoutheastAsiaDepartment;andStellaBalgos,consultant,SDTC-GOV.viiAbbreviationsADB AsianDevelopmentBankCOVID-19 coronavirusdiseaseDMC developingmembercountryGDP grossdomesticproductGIH GlobalInfrastructureHubIMF InternationalMonetaryFundIPSAS InternationalPublicSectorAccountingStandardMoF MinistryofFinanceOECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentPFRAM Public–PrivatePartnershipFiscalRiskAssessmentModelPIE-X PublicInvestmentEfficiencyIndexPIM publicinvestmentmanagementPIMA PublicInvestmentManagementAssessmentPPA powerpurchaseagreementPPP public–privatepartnershipQII qualityinfrastructureinvestmentSOE state-ownedenterpriseVFM valueformoneyviii1.IntroductionThetrilemmaofsubstantialinfrastructuregaps,lowerrevenue,andhigherdebtlevels,followingthecoronavirusdisease(COVID-19)economiccontractioncompoundedbytheimpactsofclimatechange,representtheperfectstormconstrainingpublicinfrastructureinvestmentinAsia.Theneedforshort-termfiscalstimulustomanagetheimpactofCOVID-19createdfinancialrisksformanycountriesleadingtoaperiodoffiscalconsolidation.Centralgovernmentexpenditurerosebyanaverageof3.06%ofgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)from2019to2020.ThelargestincreasewasinSouthAsia,whichrecordedthelargestexpenditureincreaseof4.93%ofGDP,followedbyEastAsiawithanincreaseof3.55%ofGDP,andSoutheastAsiawithanincreaseof2.27%.ThePacificregionhadthelowestexpenditureincreaseof1.3%between2020and2021,albeitstartingfromahighlevelofgovernmentexpenditureasashareofGDP.5FiscalriskshavealsobeenexacerbatedbytheRussianinvasionofUkraineandhigherinterestrates,COVID-19variants,inflation,andsupplychaindisruptions.TheexternaldebtofregionalmembersoftheAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB)willincreaseby9%ofGDPbetween2020and2022.Around20%ofdevelopingmembercountries(DMCs)—Bhutan,Fiji,India,theLaoPeople'sDemocraticRepublic,Maldives,Mongolia,Pakistan,andSriLanka—areabovethe“highscrutinythreshold”oftheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)formonitoringpublicdebt.6Reducingpublicinfrastructureinvestmentandredirectingtheavailablefiscalspacetowardshort-termstimuluswasarationalpolicyresponseduringtheheightofCOVID-19.However,thereisadownside:thelossofmedium-andlong-termbenefitsofqualityinfrastructureinvestmenttoimproveaccesstoinfrastructureserviceandhelpmeetcriticalSustainableDevelopmentGoalssuchasaccesstoclearwaterandsanitation,affordableandcleanenergy,sustainablecities,andclimateaction.7ADB’sAsianDevelopmentOutlook(2022)showseconomicrecoveryof5.2%in2022and5.3%in2023,whichshouldhelptoreducevulnerabilitytoexternalshocksinmostcountries.AkeychallengeforeconomicrecoverywillbetomobilizesufficienttaxrevenueasapercentageofGDPcombinedwithmoreefficientpublicinvestmenttocreateemployment,stimulateeconomicgrowth,addressclimatechange,andenhancethequalityoflife.Publicinvestmentwillneedtobeavitalcomponentofthepost-COVID-19recoveryinthecontextofhigherdebt,fiscalconsolidation,andtheneedtoinvestinclimateresilienceandmitigation.ThisisbecausethereiscompellingevidencethatefficientandproductiveinfrastructureinvestmentwillnotonlyraiseGDP,butwillcausedebt-to-GDPratiostofallandmaximizetheeconomicandfiscalgainsinafiscallyconstrainedenvironment.Fordecision-makerstoensurefiscalsustainability,facilitateGDPgrowth,andlowerdebt-to-GDPlevels,itiscriticallyimportantthatsuchinvestmentisofthehighestpossiblequality—thatis,therightinfrastructuredeliveringmaximumeconomicbenefitsatthelowestcost.Thiswillrequireinvestmentofadifferentkind—investmentinsoundinstitutions,governanceframeworks,andintegrationofclimatecostsandbenefitsinpublicfinancialmanagementtodeliverhigh-quality,green,inclusive,andresilientinfrastructure.ADB.2022.AsianDevelopmentOutlook.Manila.B.Ferrarini,M.Giugale,andJ.Pradelli,eds.2022.TheSustainabilityofAsia’sDebt,Problems,Policies,andPractices.Manila:ADB.ADB.2021.SupportingQualityInfrastructureinDevelopingAsia.Manila.1AnInfrastructureGovernanceApproachtoFiscalManagementinSOEsandPPPsContingentliabilitiesaresizableinmanycountriesand,thus,posearisktopublicfinanceespeciallyforpublic–privatepartnerships(PPPs)andstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)whichmeritextraattentionbypublicfinanceauthorities.Unlikeconventionalpublicinvestments,PPPscanescapefiscalscrutiny.Aslong-termcontracts,PPPsmaytransferasignificantvolumeofriskstoprivateoperators,payingthecorrespondingriskpremium,ortheycanpayalowerdirectcost,hidingfiscalrisksinthePPPcontract.Similarly,SOEstypicallyhavecomplexfiscalarrangementswithgovernments.MuchofgovernmentsupportforSOEsisdirect,intheformofsubsidies,currenttransfers,andcapitalinjections,butgovernmentsupportisalsointheformofon-lending,loans,andlendingguarantees.Thesearrangementshavethepotentialtocreatefiscalrisksifnotappropriatelymanagedandfullydisclosedinthebudgetandfinancialstatements.PooroversightofSOEinvestmentsbygovernmentscanexacerbatetheserisks.AccordingtotheWorldBank,dataonliabilitiesoflow-incomedevelopingcountriesreportcontingentliabilitiesfromPPPsinlessthan10%ofthecases,andofficialgovernmentstatisticoftenreportondirectdebtonly,omittingSOEdebt.8InEastAsiaandthePacific,only12%ofcountriesrecordexplicitandcontingentliabilitiesarisingfromPPPsinthenationalaccountsascomparedto87%inhigh-incomeOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)countries.9Fiscalgovernancereformswillvarybycountrydependingoninstitutionalcapacity.ReformsshouldaimtointegratePPPswithinfrastructureplanningandthemedium-termfiscalframework,andincorporateprocessesforeffectivecontingentliabilitymanagement,includingastrong,standardizedprojectapprovalprocesswithcoordinationandfinalapprovalbyacentralagencysuchastheMinistryofFinanceorTreasury.WorldBank.2021.DebtTransparencyinDevelopingEconomies.Washington,DC.Theterm“LIDC”refersgenerallytotheWorldBank’sInternationalDevelopmentAssociationborrowerswhichcorrespondstoAsianDevelopmentFund(ADF)-borrowingcountries.Forthecurrent2022fiscalyear,theWorldBankdefineslow-incomeeconomiesascountrieswhosegrossnationalincome(GNI)percapitais$1,045orlessin2020;forlower-middle-incomeeconomies,theGNIpercapitaisbetween$1,046and$4,095;forupper-middle-incomeeconomies,between$4,096and$12,695;andforhigh-incomeeconomies,equaltoorgreaterthan$12,696.WorldBank.2020.BenchmarkingInfrastructureDevelopment2020:AssessingRegulatoryQualitytoPrepare,Procure,andManagePPPsandTraditionalPublicInvestmentinInfrastructureProjects.Washington,DC.ThecountriesincludedforAsiaandOECDbytheWorldBankcanbefoundatBenchmarkingInfrastructure-development-2020.AsiaInfrastructureInvestmentChallengesTheAsiaandPacificregionisforecasttorequire$26.2trillion,or$1.7trillionperyear,torestoreitsgrowthmomentum,eliminatepoverty,andaddressclimatechange.Mostofthisinvestmentisineconomicandsocialinfrastructure,including$434billionannuallyforcleanenergy,climateresilience,andadaptation,andasmuchas$196billionannuallyfortransport,watersupplyandsanitation,andotherpublicinfrastructure(Figure1).Figure1:ADB-EstimatedInfrastructureInvestmentNeedsbySector,2016–2030,at2015PricesClimate-adjustedestimatesBaselineestimatesTotal.trillionTotalAnnualaverage.trillion.trillionAnnualaverage.trillion.trillion.trillion.trillion.trillion.trillion.trillion.trillion.trillionADB=AsianDevelopmentBank.Note:Estimatedneedsfor45developingmembercountries.Source:AsianDevelopmentBank.2017.MeetingAsia'sInfrastructureNeeds.Manila.

WaterandSanitationCommunicationsTransportPower3AnInfrastructureGovernanceApproachtoFiscalManagementinSOEsandPPPsWhileincreasedinfrastructurespendingwillhelpaccelerateeconomicrecoveryinsomecountries,othercountriesmaynothavethefiscalcapacitytoincreasespendingduetotheirrevenueanddebtlevels.Theworseningofthedebtsituationandextremelylimitedfiscalspaceandinflationarytrendscanleadtohigherinterestcostsandreducedinfrastructureinvestments,andtheneedtoprioritizespendingonthemosturgentprojects.Itiscriticaltobalancethevitaldemandforinfrastructurefinancingwithanemphasisonincreasinginvestmentefficiencyandintegratingandstrengtheningthepolicy,legal,regulatory,andinstitutionalframeworksintraditionalpublicsectorinvestments,SOEs,andPPPs(footnote7).DMCswithstrongpublicinvestmentmanagement(PIM)institutionshavemorecredible,predictable,andefficientinvestmentsthatdelivereconomic,social,andenvironmentalobjectiveswithbetterdevelopmentimpact.10Strongerinfrastructuregovernanceisassociatedwiththeimprovementofboththequalityandvolumeofinfrastructureinvestmentandimplementation.ImprovedPIMandbetterintegrationofthedevelopmentandcurrentbudgetswillensureprojectsarebuiltontimeandwithinbudget,therebycontainingrisksofensuingdebtbuildup.Anessentialdriverofinfrastructuregovernanceisinvestmentefficiency.TheIMFfindsthatcountriesinAsiaandthePacificlose32%onaverageofthepotentialeconomicbenefitsofpublicinvestmentduetoinefficienciesintheinvestmentprocess,andlower-incomeeconomieshaveagreaterefficiencygapofupto40%.11Thispricingofefficiencylossleadstoprojectsthatarenotcorrectlycostedduringupstreamprojectpreparationtoaccountforrisks,includingclimaterisks,norarethosecostsincorporatedinthemedium-termexpenditureframeworkasaninputintopublicinvestmentdecisions.ThespiderdiagraminFigure2istheIMFPublicInvestmentManagementAssessment(PIMA)forAsiaandthePacific.PIMAevaluatesinstitutionaldesignwhichconsidersfactorssuchastheorganizationalrulesandproceduresonpaperandinstitutionaleffectivenesstoassessthedegreetowhichtheintendedpurposeoftheinstitutionisachievedandhasimpact.Theresultsshowthatcountriestendtoscorehigheroninstitutionaldesignthenoneffectiveness,particularlyforprojectselection,projectappraisal,andprojectimplementation.ImprovementsinservicedeliveryarecloselyassociatedwithstrengtheningSOEgovernanceandtheroleofSOEsininfrastructuredevelopment,includingforPPPsthatSOEsdesignandimplement.WeakSOEgovernanceandoversight,underfundedpolicymandate,andweakinstitutionalcapacityattheenterpriseleveltomanagerisksandresourcescannegativelyaffectpublicfinancesresultingfromlowerprofitabilityandfinanciallosses.Thesefactorsresultinsubstantialfiscaltransfersfromthenationalgovernmentbudget,andthecreationofhighSOEindebtednessandothercontingentliabilities.PoorSOEgovernancecanalsoincreasethecostsofconstructingandoperatinginfrastructureandloweritsquality,andmayweakenpotentialopportunitiestoattractothersourcesoffinance.Itisalsoasourceofallocativeinefficiencyintheeconomy.SOEreformscanhelptoreducetheseliabilitiesbyprofessionalizingthemanagementofSOEassetsandliabilitiesonthebalancesheetofSOEs,andallowingforscalabilitythroughnonsovereignborrowingbySOEs.Thesetypesofreformscreatesovereignfiscalspace,improveaccesstofinanceforinfrastructureinvestment,andimproveSOEmanagement.PIMinstitutionsrefertopublicsectorinstitutionsthatareinvolvedintheplanning,allocation,andimplementingofpublicinvestments.Itisasubsetofbudgetinstitutionsthatoverseethepublicfinancialmanagementprocess.IMF.2018.PublicInvestmentManagementReviewandUpdate.Washington,DC.Tomeasurecountryinfrastructuregovernancecapability,theIMFdevelopedthePublicInvestmentFrameworktoevaluateinfrastructuregovernancebasedonananalysisofinstitutionsthatcoverthethreestagesofthepublicinvestmentcycle:planning,allocation,andimplementation.Itassessesinstitutionsfromthreeperspectives:institutionaldesignandroles,effectiveness,andreformpriorities.AsiaInfrastructureInvestmentChallenges5Figure2:InternationalMonetaryFundPublicInvestmentManagementAssessmentforAsiaandthePacificPlanning(Institution-) Allocation(Institution- ) Implementation(Institution - ).Monitoring?.Management ofPublicAssetsProjectImplementation?.PortfolioManagementandOversightn?.AvailabilityofFundingp.FiscalTargetsandRules...PlaNationalandSectorPlanningCoordinatingbetweenEntitiesProjectAppraisal.Procurement

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.AlternativeInfrastructuresFinancing.Project.MultiyearBudgetingSelection?.Maintenance?.Budgeting?.BudgetandFundingComprehensivenessforInvestmentandUnityInstitutionalDesignEectivenessSource:InternationalMonetaryFund./content/PIMA/Home/Region-and-Country-Information/Regions/Asia-and-Pacific.html.ThecountriescoveredinthisPublicInvestmentManagementAssessmentareBangladesh,Bhutan,Cambodia,Indonesia,Kiribati,Malaysia,Maldives,Mongolia,Nepal,thePhilippines,SriLanka,Thailand,Timor-Leste,andVietNam.Privatesectorparticipationinthedevelopmentandoperationofpublicserviceassetsisneededtoprovideadditionalresourcestosupplementtraditionalpublicinvestment.SoundgovernancepracticesforPPPprogramsandprojectsshouldbeadaptedandimplementedespeciallyindevelopingcountrieslackingwell-developednationalinfrastructuregovernanceinstitutions.Governmentdecision-makersshouldnotviewtheuseofPPPprocurementasapanaceatosolvefiscalconstraints.InternationalexperiencewithPPPshasledtotheconceptofa“fiscalillusion”thatplacesPPPsoff-budgetandnotaccountedforascontingentliabilitiesandpublicdebt.Countriesalsoneedtoensurethattheinvestmentdecisionisfirstbasedonvalueformoney(VFM)andcost–benefitanalysistodetermineifaprojectoptimizesefficiencyandeffectivenessthroughtheallocationofrisksbetweenthepublicandprivatesectors.Oncetheprojectanalysisshowsthataproje