CMA：2022年音樂(lè)和流媒體最終報(bào)告

streamingNovember22Crowncopyright22reusethisinformationnotincludinglogosfreeofchargeinanyformatormediumunderthetermsoftheOpenGovernmentLicenceToviewthislicence,visit.uk/doc/open-government-licence/orwritetotheInformationPolicyTeam,TheNationalArchives,Kew,LondonTW94DU,oremail:psi@.uk.TheCompetitionandMarketsAuthorityhasexcludedfromthispublishedversionofthemarketstudyreportinformationwhichitconsidersshouldbeexcludedhavingregardtothethreeconsiderationssetoutinsection244oftheEnterpriseAct2002(specifiedinformation:considerationsrelevanttodisclosure).Theomissionsareindicatedby[].[Somenumbershavebeenreplacedbyarange.Theseareshowninsquarebrackets.][Non-sensitivewordingisalsoindicatedinsquarebrackets.]4Contents1.Introduction 6Context 7StatementofScope,UpdatePaperandourconsultations 8Background 11Theimpactofdigitisationandstreaming 11Themarkettoday 152.ValueChain 22Overview 22Musicrights 24Musiccompanies 26Themajors 26Recordedmusic 29Musicpublishing 37Creators 41Artists 41Songwriters 52MusicstreamingservicesandUUCplatforms 53Musicstreamingservices 53UUCplatforms 58Themusicconsumer 60Howdifferentpartsofthevaluechaininteract 633.Agreementsbetweenrecordcompaniesandstreamingservices 66Rights,paymenttermsandothercommonclauses 66Functionalityclauses 67MostFavouredNationclauses(MFNs)onprices(PriceMFNs) 68OtherMFNs,non-discriminationclauses,andplaylistingclauses 69Mustcarryclauses 70Changeofbusinessmodel 70Confidentiality/NDAs 714.Analysisonhowwellcompetitionisworkingforconsumers 73Thesupplyofrecordedmusictomusicstreamingservices 73Thenatureandstrengthofcompetition 73Bargainingpositionofmusicstreamingserviceswithrecordcompanies 75Impactofcontractualclausesinlicensingagreementsoncompetitionbetweenrecordcompanies 77Majors’combinedactivitiesinlicensingrecordingandpublishingrights 81Conclusions 82Thesupplyofmusicstreamingservicestoconsumers 83Natureandstrengthofcompetition 83Barrierstoentryandexpansion 86Barrierstoswitching 89Barrierstoinnovation 91Impactandtransparencyofplaylists 93Conclusions 95Futurecompetitivedynamics 975.Analysisonhowwellcompetitionisworkingforcreators 100Artists 100Marketconcentration 100Howcompetitiontosignartistshasevolvedinthestreamingera 101Barrierstoexpansioninrecordedmusic 1025Impactoftermsinmajors’contractswithmusicstreamingservices 103Bargainingpositionandoutcomesforartists 112Informationasymmetry,artistrepresentationandtransparency 117Conclusion-artists 122Futuredynamicsincompetitiontosignartists 123Songwriters 124Publishingshareofrevenues 126Integrationofrecordingandpublishingbusinesses 132Extenttowhichcompetitiontosignsongwritersisincreasingthepublishingshare 134Tacitcollusion 139Majors’influenceonCMOs 140Otherconcernsraisedbysongwriters 142Conclusion-songwriters 1446.UserUploadedContent(UUC)platforms 148TherelativebargainingpowerofUUCplatformsandrightsholders 149ValuegapinwhatYouTubepaysformusiccomparedtoad-fundedmusicstreamingservices 152YouTube’simpactonmusicstreamingservices 154ScopeforincrementalrevenuesfromUUCplatforms 158TheUUCpolicyframework 159ContentmanagementsystemsandEUCopyrightDirective 160OurfindingsonpotentialforUUCplatformstogrowmusicrevenues 161Possibleissuestoconsideroncopyrightlegislation 1627.Conclusion 16361.Introduction1.1On27January2022theCMAlaunchedamarketstudyintomusicandstreaming.1TheCMAconsultedonaStatementofScope.2ResponsestothisconsultationwerepublishedonApril2022.1.2On26July2022,theCMApublishedanUpdatePaper3settingoutitsearlyfindingsfromthestudyanditsproposalnottomakeamarketinvestigationreferenceTheCMAconsultedonthisproposalandresponsestotheconsultationwerepublishedon1September2022.Wehaveconsideredtheseresponsesandundertakenfurtherassessmentofthemarket.1.3ThisFinalReportconcludesourmarketstudy,settingouttheconclusionswehavereachedonthestateofcompetitioninthemarketswithinourscope.OurcoreconclusionisthattheCMAshouldnotmakeareferencetoamarketinvestigation–alengthyprocessthatwouldinvolveallstakeholdersinalongandcostlyproceeding.Wedonotseeaplausiblepathtoanyinterventionthatwouldproducebenefitsforconsumersorcreatorsthatwouldmeritareference.1.4Wefirstdescribethecontextforthestudyandthebackgroundtothesector.Weexplainhowthemarketswithinourscopefunction,includingthelicensingandcontractualarrangementsWethenassesshowcompetitionisworkinginthedifferentmarketsandconsidertheimpactofuser-uploadedcontent(UUC)platformsonmusicindustryrevenues.Finally,wesetouttherationaleforourdecisionnottomakeareference.1.5Themusicindustrycontinuestochange,inlightofnewtechnologyandchangesinthewaymusicisproduceddistributedandenjoyed.Ourmarketstudyhasconsideredonespecificelement–thefunctioningofthemarket.Therearewiderpublicpolicyconsiderationsthataffecthowthemusicindustryoperatesincludingtheoverallbalancingoftheinterestsofmusiciansandtheiraudiencesthatareoutsidethescopeofourstudybutthatremainactivelyunderconsideration.Aswellasexplainingourdecisionandassessment,ourfindingsmayassisttoinformandsupportGovernmentandpolicymakers’considerationofthesewiderquestions.123TheMarketStudyNoticeispublishedontheCMA’scasepage.TheStatementofScopeispublishedontheCMA’scasepage.TheUpdatePaperispublishedontheCMA’scasepage.71.6Aswellasitswiderculturalandsocialrole,musicisanimportantcreativesectorfortheUKeconomyin2021contributing￡4billiontotheUKeconomyand￡2.5billioninexports.4esectorhaslikemanyothersbeenhardhitbythecoronaviruspandemicThefiguresaboverepresentaanddecreaserespectivelyfrom2019,despiterepresentinganincreasefrom2020.5LivemusicinparticularwasheavilyimpactedhurtingmusiccreatorsforwhomthispreviouslyrepresentedasignificantrevenuestreamArtistsweremuchmoredependentonotherrevenuesincludingthosefromstreaming.1.8AninquiryintotheeconomicsofmusicstreamingbytheDCMSSelectCommitteepublishedinJulyidentifiedconcernsthatmusiccreatorswerenotgettingafairshareofstreamingrevenues.TheDCMSCommitteealsoraisedconcernsabouttheroleofthethreelargestglobalmusiccompanies,referredtoasthe‘majors’(SonyMusicGroup(Sony),UniversalMusicGroup(UniversalorUMG)andWarnerMusicGroup(WarnerorWMG)),recommendingthattheGovernmentrequestaCMAmarketstudyintowhattheCommitteecalled‘theeconomicimpactofthemajors’1.9Totakeforwardtheissuesitidentified,theDCMSCommitteemadeaseriesofrecommendationsforbothlegislativereformandpolicyandregulatoryintervention.Inresponse,7theGovernmentsetoutarangeofactionstoconsidertheCommitteesrecommendationsandbetterunderstandtheissues.TheseincludetheestablishmentofaMusicContactGroupwithseniorrepresentativesfromacrosstheindustry;andthecreationoftechnicalindustryworkinggroupstoimprovecontracttransparencyandtackledataissuessuchastheprovisionofmetadataidentifyingcopyrights.8AlongsidethistheGovernmenthascommittedtoaresearchprogramme,includingby:4UKMusic,ThisisMusic2022,p11.5UKMusic,ThisisMusic2022,p11.6TheDCMSCommitteealsorecommendedthattheCMAconsiderexploringdesignatingYouTube’sstreamingservicesashaving‘StrategicMarketStatus’(SMS)undertheproposednewpro-competitionregimefordigitalmarkets.TheQueen'sspeechcommittedtopublishadraftBilltocreatenewcompetitionrulesforthelargestdigitalfirmswhichwouldbeoverseenbytheDigitalMarketsUnit.TheGovernment’sproposalsforsucharegimearesetouthere:Anewpro-competitionregimefordigitalmarkets-governmentresponsetoconsultation.Untilthatnewregimeisinforce,theCMAhasnopowertodesignatefirmswithSMSandthisrecommendationisthereforeoutsidethescopeofthismarketstudy.7HouseofCommonsDigital,Culture,MediaandSportCommittee(2021),Economicsofmusicstreaming:GovernmentandCompetitionandMarketsAuthorityResponsestoCommittee’sSecondReport.8Metadataisthedataassociatedwithtrackswhichprovidesinformationontheartist(s)andsongwriter(s),aswellasotherfeaturessuchaslength,genre,etc.8atheIntellectualPropertyOfficeIPOon(i)potentialoptionstostrengthencreatorrights(forexamplebyintroducingarighttoequitableremuneration9whenmusicisconsumedbydigitalmeans,arightforartiststorecapturetherightstotheirworksafteraperiodoftimeandtherighttocontractadjustmentiftheirworksaresuccessfulbeyondtheremunerationtheyreceive);(ii)theliabilityofuser-generatedcontent-hostingplatformsforcopyrightntswithinsuchcontentandbtheCentreforDataEthicsandInnovationCDEI,ontheimpactndationalgorithmsusedbystreamingservicesarehavingonmusicconsumption.1.10TheGovernmentwrotetotheDCMSCommitteeon18May2022settingoutitsprogresstodateandaforwardlookforitsprogrammeofwork.101.11TheGovernmentalsowrotetotheCMA,requestingitsconsiderationofaetstudyFollowingconsiderationbytheCMAsBoardtheCMAlaunchedamarketstudyintomusicandstreamingonJanuary2022.StatementofScopeUpdatePaperandourconsultations1.12AssetoutintheCMA’sStatementofScopepublishedon27January2022,ourstudyconsidersthemarketforthesupplyofmusic,fromthecreatorsofmusicthroughtotheconsumerinparticularviamusicstreamingservices.11orscoversallthemanycontributorsinvolvedinthemakingofmusicbutinthisdocumentunlessotherwisespecifiedwilltendtoreferparticularlytosongwritersbywhichwemeanbothcomposersandlyricists)andartists(bywhichwegenerallymeanfeaturedartists12unlessstatedotherwise).1.14TheCMA’smarketstudycoverstwokeylevelsofthemusicstreamingvalueaTheproductsandservicesofferedbymusiccompaniesincludinginrecordedmusicandmusicpublishingWenotedinourStatementof9Equitableremuneration,whichcurrentlyappliesintheUKinrespectofradioandTVbroadcastsandpublicperformances(eginpubs,clubs,shops,etc.),providesanautomatic,unalienable,non-transferablestatutoryrightforperformerstoshareinrecordingrevenues.10Thisletterispublishedhere.11SeetheCMANoticeof27January2022forthismarketstudy.12Featuredartistsarethemainartistsfeaturedonarecording.Otherartistsandmusiciansmayalsocontributetotherecordingandarereferredtoasnon-featuredartists.9Scopethatmostofthepossibleconcernswithakeycompetitionorconsumerelementlinkbacktopossibleissuesinrecordedmusic.13Whileourinitialproposalwastothereforefocusonrecordedmusic,inlightofrepresentationsreceivedfromstakeholderswehavealsoconsideredmusicpublishinginmoredetail.Withinmusicpublishing,ourworkhasfocusedinparticularonwhethercompetitionissuesmaybedistortingtheshareofstreamingrevenuesthatispaidoutforpublishingrights.Aspartofourassessmentofthemarketwehaveexaminedthenatureofcompetitionandoutcomesforartistsandsongwriters.bTheprovisionofmusicstreamingservicestoconsumers.ConsumeroutcomesareanimportantfactorinourassessmentofthemarketasitisourstatutorydutytoconsiderwhetherthemarketisworkingintheinterestsofconsumersMarketoutcomesforcreatorsareanintegralaspectofthisconsumersvaluecreativityalongsidethequalityandrangeofmusicsupplied–andareconsideredwithin(a)above.ourmarketstudyawiderangeofconcernshavebeenraisedanyofwhichrelatetohowthemarketfulfilsitswidersocialandculturalfunctionsandrewardsthebroadspectrumofthosewhocontributetomusic-makingOurfocus,asaconsumerandcompetitionauthority,inthisreportisnecessarilylimitedtoaspectsofthemarketthatmaydistort,orarisefromadistortionto,competition.Ourcompetitionassessmentisonlypartofawiderpolicyandcopyrightframeworkaimedatensuringthatintellectualpropertyrightsareproperlyprotectedandrewarded,andthatthesupplyofmusicissafeguardedasthewayconsumerslistentomusiccontinuestoevolve.1.16Wehaveconsultedalargenumberofpartiesthroughoutthismarketstudyandgatheredabroadrangeofevidence.ThishasinvolvedahighvolumeofsubmissionsfrompartiesinresponsetoourStatementofScopeandUpdatePapernumerousmeetingsanddiscussions,andourformalrequestsforinformationtomarketparticipantsTheseinformationrequestsenabledustointerrogatekeyinternaldocumentsincludingcontractsstrategypapers,researchandfinancialdataWearegratefultoallthosepartieswhohaveengagedwithuseitherpubliclyorinconfidence,andinformedourmarketstudy.tatementofScopewereceivedcallstoconductamarketigationfromfourrespondentsacrossthefollowingfourmarketsaThesupplyofrecordedmusictomusicstreamingservices13Seeparagraph85oftheCMA’sStatementofScope.hesupplyofmusicstreamingservicestoconsumerscThesupplyofrecordcompanyservicestoartists;anddThesupplyofpublishingservicestosongwriters.141.18TheCMAhasthepowertomakeamarketinvestigationreferencewhenthefindingsofamarketstudygiverisetoreasonablegroundsforsuspectingthatafeatureorcombinationoffeaturesofamarketormarketsintheUKprevents,restrictsordistortscompetitioninconnectionwiththesupplyoracquisitionofanygoodsorservicesintheUKorpartoftheUK(the‘reasonablesuspicion’test).15161.19AdecisionwhethertomakeareferenceismadebytheCMA’sBoard,inconsiderationoftheorganisationsfullrangeofprioritiesandobjectivesandtakingintoaccounttheCMA’spublishedguidance.17Inthiscase,akeyquestioniswhetherthereareimpactsoncompetition(sometimestermed‘marketfailures’)thatwouldbestbeaddressedinamarketinvestigation.1.20WepublishedourUpdatePaperon26July2022.IntheUpdatePaperweconsultedonourinitialviewthatthereasonablesuspiciontesthadbeenmetinrelationtothefirstthreemarketssetoutinparagraph1.17above,butnotinrelationtothefourthmarket(thesupplyofpublishingservicestosongwriters).Wesaidinrelationtothemarketswherethereasonablesuspiciontesthadbeenmetthatwedidnotconsiderthatareferencewouldbeappropriatetakingintoaccount,inparticular,thescaleofthesuspectedproblemsandwhetherareferencewouldbethebestmechanismtodeliverbetteroutcomes.18WesaidwewouldrevisitourprovisionalconclusionsintheUpdatePaperinlightoftheconsultationresponsesthatwereceivedandourfurtheranalysisduringtheremainderofthemarketstudy.1.21Wereceived75responsestoourUpdatePaperconsultation.Ofthosereceivedaresponsesallcomingfromorganisationsincludingallthreemajors)thatsupportedourproposalnottomakeareference;14SeethesubmissionsofTheIvorsAcademy,#BrokenRecordCampaign,theEuropeanComposerandSongwriterAllianceandfromanartistmanagementcompanyonourcasepage.15Section131oftheEnterpriseAct2002.16SeeAirwaveSolutionsvCMA[2022]CAT4,paragraphs8to12.17OFT511,paragraph2.1,containsalistofrelevantcriteriawhichmustbemetfortheCMAtoproposemakingareference.Evenifthesecriteriaaremet,theCMAretainsadiscretiontodecidewhetheritisappropriatetomakeareference.18Seeparagraphs6.14to6.21oftheUpdatePaper.bresponsescomingfromorganisationsandacademics,andfrom43ividualsthatopposedourproposalnottomakeareference(c)11responses(includingthosefrom6individuals)thatweresilentontheeferenceanddafurtherresponseswheretherespondentsstanceonourproposalnottomakeareferencewasunclear.1.22Theresponsessupportingourproposalnottomakeareferencedidnotdiscussthereferenceissueatlength.Onerespondent(UMG)wentfurtherthantheothersarguingthatthereasonablesuspiciontestwasnotmetastheconcernsidentifiedweredeminimis.ForthereasonssetoutinChapters4and5below,wedisagreewiththisrepresentation.1.23Themajorityoftheresponsesinfavourofareferencefocussedonissuesrelatingtopublishingrightsandortheinterestsofcreators(artistsand/orsongwritersratherthanthoseofconsumers.AnumberofthemarguedthattheCMAshouldfindthatthereasonablesuspiciontestwasmetinrespectofthemarketforthesupplyofpublishingservicestosongwriters.SomesuggestedfurtherareasfortheCMAtoinvestigate.1.24OurdetailedconsiderationoftheserepresentationsissetoutinChapters4and5below.Forthereasonselaboratedoninthosechapters,weconsiderthatthe‘reasonablesuspicion’testhasbeenmetinrelationtoallfourmarketssetoutatparagraph1.17above.1.25AssetoutinmoredetailinChapter7,wehavedecidednottomakeamarketvestigationreferenceonthebasisofacombinationoftwomainfactorsathescaleofthesuspectedproblemisnotsogreatthatareferencewouldpriateresponseandbareferenceisnotlikelytobethemostappropriatemechanismforassessingtheissuesanddeliveringbetteroutcomes.tisationandstreamingologicalchangehavehadaprofoundimpactonthesicsectoroverthelasttwentyorsoyearsInparticulartheabilitytolistentomusicthroughdigitalaudiofilestransformedconsumerbehaviourandexpectationstowhichthesectorhadtorespond.Itisnolongernecessarytovisita‘bricksandmortar’shoptopurchaseaphysicalCDorrecordinordertohaveaccesstothemusicyouwant.1.27Thegrowthoftheinternetenabledaudiofilestobesharedandgaveconsumersaccesstovastlibrariesofmusicattheclickofabutton.ationinitiallyledtoanincreaseinillegalfilesharingThishadaprofoundeffectontheindustrySalesofCDs,bothsinglesandalbums,fellconsiderablyandsignificantlymusicindustryrevenuesdroppeddramatically.Betweenand2015,UKrecordedmusicrevenuesdroppedaround60%from￡1,868millionto￡761million(seeFigure1.1).1.29Inresponsetothisriseinpiracy,newmodelsforlisteningtomusicemerged.lythiswasintheformoflegaldownloadsofmusicsuchasthroughApple’siTunesstore.Consumerswereabletopurchaseindividualtracksoralbumsthattheyownedandcouldlistentowhentheyliked.Thishadsomelimitedsuccessinreversingtherevenuedecline.rviceschangedthispictureagainThefirstoftheseintheUKwasSpotifyinIncontrasttothedownloadmodelstreamingservicesgiveconsumersongoing,legalaccesstovastcataloguesofmusicaspartofasubscriptionorforfreeiftheyarewillingtolistentoadvertisements.ThishasnowbecomethedominantmeansofconsumingmusicintheUK–in2020,morethan80%ofmusicsaleswerethroughstreamingservices.19sicindustrystreaminghasdrivenanincreaseinrecordedmusicrevenuesfromthelowpointofmillionin2015to￡1,115millionin2021(seeFigure1.1).StreamingnowaccountsforaroundthreequartersofUKrecordedmusicrevenues.Whilerevenuesareincreasing,recordedmusicrevenuesinrealtermsremainsignificantlybelowtheirpeakin19BPI(2021),BPIpublishesitsyearbook“AllAbouttheMusic2021”.Figure1.1:UKinflation-adjustedrecordedmusicrevenuesbetween2000and2021byformattypeSource:CMAanalysisofdatafromtheBPI.Notes:InflationadjustmentusingtheONSCPIIndex22June2022,2021priceyear1.32Thepredominantmodelforstreamingservicesis‘a(chǎn)llyoucaneat’–therearenoadditionalchargesforlisteningtolotsofmusicAswediscussbelowthishasimplicationsforcompetitionandthevaluechain.InDecember2021,therewere39millionmonthlyactiveusersofmusicstreamingservicesintheUK.20Intotal,trackswerestreamedmorethan138billiontimes21in2021.22Figure1.2:TotalnumberofmonthlyactiveusersandstreamsintheUK,2021Source:CMANotesWhenpresentingthenumberofstreamsreportedbyOfficialCharts,theCMAcaveatsthatsomestreamsandtracksareexcludedfromtheOfficialCharts’reporting.OfficialChartsexcludestrackswithlessthan100streamsonanygivenmusic20CMAanalysisofdatafrommusicstreamingservices.Monthlyactiveusersarethenumberofuniqueuserswhostreamontheplatforminagivenmonth.Ifthesameuserstreamsonmultiplestreamingservicestheywouldbeconsideredamonthlyactiveuseroneach.21Thisincludesofficialad-fundedmusicstreamsonYouTube.SeeTable2.11.22CMAanalysisofdatafromOfficialCharts.OfficialChartsisajointventureoperationownedbytheBPI(representingtheBritishrecordedmusicindustry)andtheEntertainmentRetailersAssociation(representingentertainmentretailersanddigitalservicesfromHMV,supermarketsandindiestoresthroughtoAmazonMP3,SpotifyandNetflix).Theroleofthecompanyistocommission,market,distributeandmanagetheUK'sofficialmusicandvideocharts.SalesdataiscurrentlycollectedonOfficialCharts’behalfbythemarketresearchcompanyKantar.SeeOfficialChartswebsite.streamingserviceandusergeneratedcontent.Itonlyincludesstreamswheretheuserstreamsforover30secondsand,forsomemusicstreamingservices,only'toptracks'arecollected.Asaresult,thedatamayrepresentaslightunderestimationofthetotalnumberofstreamsinthemarketandaffectsthenumberofstreamsreportedonsomemusicstreamingservicesmorethanothers.1.33Allthemostpopularstreamingservicesoffera‘fullcatalogue’ofmusic.23Asinglesubscriptionoraccountallowsconsumerstolistentoalmostalltherecordedmusictheyknowandlove.Itisnotnecessarytohaveadifferentsubscriptionoraccountfordifferentgenresofmusicorformusicownedbydifferentmusiccompanies.Mostmajorstreamingservicesoffercatalogueswithmorethan75milliontracks.1.34StreamingservicesalsoofferarangeoffeaturesthatareattractivetoconsumersThevastcatalogueofmusicthatisavailablemeansthereisvalueinitsorganisationsothatconsumerscanmoreeasilyfindwhattheywant.ConsumerscansearchforparticulartracksorartistsandtheycancreatetheirownplaylistsofmusictheylikeStreamingservicesthemselvescreateplaylistsbothviaalgorithmsandtheireditorialteams)