新加坡公司法-英文版

恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONCHAPTER16SINGAPORECOMPANYLAWSection1IntroductionSection2IncorporationanditsConsequencesSection3CorporateGovernanceSection4EnforcementofCorporateRightsSection5ShareholderRemediesSection6SharesSection7DebenturesandChargesSection8CompaniesinDistressSection9WindingupINTRODUCTION1InSingapore,companiesareprincipallygovernedbytheCompaniesAct(Cap50,1994RevEd)(hereinafter“theAct").Itshouldbenotedthoughthatspecifictypesofcompaniesmay,inadditiontotheCompaniesAct,beregulatedbyotherstatutes.Forexample,insurancecompaniesandbanksarealsoregulatedbytheInsuranceAct(Cap142,1994RevEd)andtheBankingAct(Cap20,1994RevEd)respectively.Limitedliabilitypartnerships,whichdespitetheirnamearecompanies,aregovernedbytheLimitedLiabilityPartnershipAct(Act5of2005).CertainprovisionsinotherstatutessuchastheSecuritiesandFuturesAct(Cap289,1994RevEd)arealsorelevanttocompanies.?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATION2Itshouldalsobenotedthatthestatutoryprovisionsgoverningcompaniesaresupplementedbythecommonlaw.INCORPORATIONANDITSCONSEQUENCESObligationtoIncorporate1Undersection17(3)oftheAct,abusinessorganizationthathasmorethan20membersmustbeincorporatedasacompany.However,thisrequirementdoesnotapplytoapartnershipofpersonscarryingonaprofessionthatisformedinpursuanceofsomeotherwrittenlawinSingapore(section17(3)oftheAct).ThusmembersofthelegalprofessionwhoaregovernedbytheLegalProfessionAct(Cap161,1994RevEd)mayestablishpartnershipsofmorethan20partners.RegistrationofaCompany2Asageneralrule,anypersonmay,uponlodgmentoftherequisitedocumentsandpaymentoftheprescribedfee,registeracompanyinSingapore.Themandatorydocumentstobelodgedundersection19(1)oftheActarethememorandumandarticlesofassociation.Thememorandumandarticlesofassociationaretheconstitutionaldocumentsofthecompany.Undersection22(1)oftheAct,thememorandumofassociationmustprescribethenameofthecompany,theamountofitssharecapital(ifany)andwhethertheliabilityofthemembersofthecompanyislimitedorunlimited.Thearticlesofassociationaretheregulationsofthecompanyandcontainprovisionsrelatingtohowthecompanyistobegoverned.Wherethememorandumandthearticlesareinconflict,theformerwillprevail.3Oncethememorandumofthecompanyisregistered,theRegistrarwillissueanoticeofincorporationstatingthatthecompanyis,fromthedatespecifiedinthenotice,incorporatedandthe?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONtypeofcompanyitis,i.e.whetheritisalimitedorunlimitedcompanyandwhereapplicablethatitisaprivatecompany-seesection19(4)oftheAct.EffectsofIncorporation4Section19(5)oftheActsetsoutthegeneraleffectofincorporationwhichisthatthecompanyisabodycorporatewithallsuchpowersasflowfromsuchanentity.Thecompanymaysueandbesuedinitsownname,ithasperpetualsuccessioninthatitcansurviveindefinitelyuntilitiswoundup,itmayholdland,andtheliabilityofitsmembersislimitedintheeventthecompanyiswoundup.5Caseshaveestablishedthatasabodycorporateacompanyhasadistinctpersonalitythatisrecognizedbylaw.Inotherwords,acompanyhasanexistenceandidentityseparatefromthatofitsmembers-seeSalomonvASalomon&CoLtd[1897]AC22;LeevLe'esAirFarmingLtd[1961]AC12.Themostimportantconsequenceofthisisthatthedebtsandobligationsincurredbythecompanyareitsownanditsmembersdonotsharethecompanysliabilities.Creditorsofthecompanymayonlylooktothecompanyforpaymentofdebtsowedtothembythecompany.Ifthecompanyisinsolventandcannotpayitsdebts,thecreditorswillhavetobearthelosshoweversolventthecompanysindividualmembersmaybe.Allthatthemembersofacompanyareobligedtodoistocontributetheamountthatremainsunpaidonthesharesthatthemembershavesubscribed.Thisobligationisowedtothecompany,notthecreditorsofthecompany.Assuch,iftheshareswereissuedonafullypaidbasis,orhavealreadybeenfullypaid,themembershavenofurtherliabilitytothecompany.Thus,whenspeakingoflimitedliabilityitisimportanttonotethatwhatismeantisnotthatthecompanysliabilityislimitedbutthatthemembers,liabilitytocontributetothecompanyislimitedtothesharecapitalforwhichthemembershaveagreedtosubscribe.?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATION‘LiftingtheVeil’ofIncorporation6Whileanincorporatedcompanyhasapersonalityseparatefromthatofitsmembers,therearecircumstanceswhenthecourtswillignoresuchseparatepersonalityandtreatthecompanyanditsmembers(orofficers)asoneforlimitedpurposes.Thus,forexample,theremaybecircumstanceswhenthecourtswillholdthemembersofacompanyliablefordebtsincurredbythecompany.Whenthecourtsdoso,itissaidthattheveilofincorporationisliftedorpierced.Generally,thecasesofveilliftingfallintotwocategories:bystatuteandatcommonlaw.StatutoryExceptionstotheSeparatePersonalityDoctrine7ItisopentoParliamenttolimittheeffectsofincorporationbyasuitablywordedstatutoryprovision.Oneofthemoreimportantstatutorylimitationsontheseparatepersonalitydoctrinearisesundersections339(3)and340(2)oftheAct.Thecombinedeffectofthoseprovisionsisthat,wheredebtsarecontractedwithoutanyreasonableorprobableexpectationthatthecompanywouldbeabletopaythedebts,anyofficerofthecompanywhowasapartytothecontractingofsuchdebtsisguiltyofanoffenceandmay,afterconviction,bemadepersonallyliablebythecourtforthepaymentofthewholeoranypartofsuchdebts.8Anotherimportantexceptionisfoundinsection340(1)oftheAct.Whereitappearsinthecourseofthewindingupofacompanythatanybusinessofthecompanyhasbeencarriedonwithintenttodefraudcreditorsofthecompanyorcreditorsofanyotherpersonorforanyfraudulentpurpose,thecourtmaydeclarethatanypersonwhowasknowinglyapartytothecarryingonofthebusinessinsuchamannershallbepersonallyliableforalloranyofthedebtsorliabilitiesofthecompanyasthecourtmaydirect.?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATION9Athirdimportantexceptionariseswheredividendsarepaideventhoughtherearenoavailableprofitsoutofwhichtopaysuchdividends-seesection403(2)(b)oftheAct.Sincedividendsmayonlybepaidwherethereareprofitssoasnottoundulyprejudicecreditorsofthecompany,adirectorormanagerofacompanywhowilfullypaysorpermitsthepaymentofadividendintheabsenceofprofitswillbeliabletothecreditorsofthecompanyfortheamountofthedebtsduetothemtotheextentbywhichthedividendsexceedtheavailableprofits.CommonLawExceptionstotheSeparatePersonalityDoctrine0Personsincorporatecompaniesforvariousreasonsbut,undoubtedly,oneofthereasonsistoinsulatethemselvesfrompersonalliabilityshouldthebusinessfail.Accordingly,themerefactthatmembersorofficersofacompanyutilizethecorporatevehicletoshieldthemselvesfrompersonalliabilityisno-reasontodisregardthecompanysseparatepersonality-seeAdamsvCapeIndustriesplc[1990]1Ch433.However,thepositionisdifferentwherethemembersorofficersofacompanyabusethecorporateformforimpropermeans.1Thus,ifanindividualalreadyhasexistinglegalobligations,butattemptstousethecorporatevehicletoevadesuchobligations,thecourtswillignorethecompanysseparatepersonality.Forexample,ithasbeenheldthatapersonwhohasagreedtosellahousecannotavoidhiscontractualobligationsbytransferringthehousetoacompany.Bothheandthecompanywereorderedtospecificallyperformthecontracteventhoughthecompanywasnotapartytothecontract-seeJonesvLipman[1962]1WLR832.2Similarly,ifacompanyisusedtoperpetrateafraudulentact,thecourtswilltreatthecompanyandthosebehinditasoneandthesame.Thus,ifacompanyhasbeenincorporatedto?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONdefraudinnocentinvestors,thecourtmayholdthepromoterofthecompanyliableeventhoughthepromoterandcompanyareseparatepersons-seeReDarby[1911]1KB95.CORPORATEGOVERNANCESeparationofOwnershipandManagement1Section157AoftheActstatesthatthebusinessofthecompanyshallbemanagedbyorunderthedirectionofthedirectors.ThedirectorsmayexerciseallthepowersofacompanyexceptanypowerthattheActorthememorandumandarticlesofthecompanyrequirethecompanytoexerciseingeneralmeeting.Thisreflectsoneofthefeaturesofcompanylaw,namely,thatitcanfacilitateaseparationofownershipandmanagement.Themembersorshareholderswhoownthecompanyneednotnecessarilybeinvolvedinitsmanagementasdirectors.Whileinsomecompanies,particularlysmallones,themembersofthecompanymayalsobeinvolvedinitsmanagement-eitherasdirectorsorinsomeotherexecutivecapacity-inmanyothercompanies,themembersarenotinvolvedinmanagement.Instead,suchcompaniesaremanagedbyboardsofdirectorsinwhichmanyofthedirectorsarenotmembersofthecompany.Evenwhenthedirectorsaremembersofthecompany,theirshareholdingsinthecompanymayberelativelysmall.Itshouldalsobenotedthat,insuchcompanies,eventhismanagementbytheboardmayoftenbenotionalasthemajorityofthemembersoftheboardmaynotbefull-timedirectorsbutarenon-executivedirectors.Insuchcompanies,theday-to-daymanagementofthecompanywillbeinthehandsoftheseniorexecutiveofficersofthecompany,someofwhommaybeboardmembers.Theroleofboardsinsuchcompaniesisthentoexerciseageneraloversightbutnottobeinvolvedinexecutivematters.StatutoryDuties?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATION2Undercommonlaw,directorsareregardedasfiduciariesandthereforeowefiduciarydutiestotheircompanies.Atthesametime,theActalsoprescribescertaindutiesondirectorswhichmirrortheirgeneraldutiesunderthecommonlaw.Oneimportantprovisionissection157(1)oftheActwhichprescribesthatadirectorshallatalltimesacthonestlyandusereasonablediligenceinthedischargeofthedutiesofhisoffice.Section157(2)oftheActgoesontostatethatanofficeroragentofacompanyshallnotmakeimproperuseofanyinformationacquiredbyvirtueofhispositionasanofficeroragentofthecompanytogain,directlyorindirectly,anadvantageforhimselforforanyotherperson,ortocausedetrimenttothecompany.3Section157oftheActdoesnotpurporttobeanexhaustivestatementofthelawrelatingtothedutiesthatdirectorsowetotheircompanies.Inthisregard,section157(4)providesthatthesectionisinadditiontoandnotinderogation,ofanyotherruleoflawrelatingtothedutyorliabilityofdirectorsorofficersofacompany.Theeffectofsection157istorenderthosedutiesmandatorywhilethedutiesatcommonlawarecapableofexclusionbyagreementbetweenthecompanyanditsdirectors,assumingthatthecompanyhasmadesuchadecisionindependentlyoftheinteresteddirectors.Undersection157(3)oftheAct,abreachofsections157(1)and157(2)renderstheofficeroragentliabletothecompanyforanyprofitmadeoranydamagesufferedbythecompanyasaresultofthebreach.Atthesametime,abreachofthesesectionsisanoffence,andtheofficeroragentshallbeliableuponconvictiontoafinenotexceeding$5,000ortoimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingoneyear.DutyatCommonLawtoActintheBestInterestsoftheCompany4Intheexerciseoftheirduties,directorsmustactbonafideinwhattheyconsiderisinthebestinterestsofthecompany.Whentheactsofdirectorsarechallenged,thecourtsdonotsubstitutetheir?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONownjudgmentforthatofthedirectors-seeECRCLandPteLtdvWingOnHoChristopher[2004]1SLR105;VitaHealthLaboratoriesPteLtdvPangSengMeng[2004]4SLR162.Allthatthecourtsareconcernedaboutiswhetherthedirectorshaveactedhonestlyinwhatthey(andnotthecourts)consideredtobeinthecompanysbestinterests.Ofcourse,ifthedecisionisonethatnoreasonableboardwouldhavearrivedat,thiscastsseriousdoubtonthebonafidesofthedirectors.5Itshouldbenotedthoughthat,whilethedirectors1overridingdutyistothecompany,section159oftheActprovidesthatinexercisingtheirpowers,directorsareentitledtohaveregardtotheinterestsofthecompany,semployeesgenerally,aswellastheinterestsofitsmembers.Thatdirectorsmayhaveregardtotheinterestsofitsmembersisalsothepositionatcommonlawsincethememberscollectivelydoinasensecomprisethecompanynotwithstandingthecompanysseparatepersonality-seePetersAmericanDelicacyCoLtdvHeath(1939)61CLR457;GreenhalghvArderneCinemasLtd[1951]Ch286.Theentitlementtohaveregardtotheinterestsofemployeesisalsoasensibleonesinceadvancingtheinterestsofemployeeswilloftenbeinthebestinterestsofthecompany.6Therearealsocircumstanceswheredirectorsmusthaveregardtotheinterestsofcreditors.Generallyspeaking,creditorshavenointerestinthecompany，sassets.Acreditorwhowishestoenforcethedebtowingtohimfromthecompanymustbringaclaimagainstthecompany.Intheabsenceofaninterestinthecompany，sassets,thedirectorsofacompanydonothavetotaketheinterestsofcreditorsintoaccountwhenmakingcorporatedecisions.However,whenacompanyisunabletopayitsdebts,andistherebyeffectivelyinsolvent,theinterestsofitscreditorsmustbetakenintoaccount.Thisisbecausecreditorsofaninsolventcompanyareentitledtoappointaliquidatortogetintheassetsofthecompanytowhichthecreditorshaveapriorclaimbeforethemembersofthe

恒信泰富恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONcompany.Accordingly,insuchcircumstances,directorsmustensurethattheaffairsofthecompanyareproperlyadministeredandthatitspropertyisnotdissipatedorexploitedtotheprejudiceofthecreditors-seeWinkworthvEdwardBaronDevelopmentCoLtd[1987]1AllER114.DutyatCommonLawtoAvoidConflictsofInterest7Asafiduciary,adutyofloyaltyisimposedonadirect-vris/ithecompany.Asaresult,adirectorisobligednottoplacehimselfinapositionwherehisdutytothecompanymayconflictwithhisowninterests-seeChewKongHuatvRicwil(Singapore)PteLtd[2000]1SLR385;Kumagai-ZeneconConstructionPteLtdvLowHuaKin[2000]2SLR501.Oneparticularapplicationofthisdutyisthatadirectorisnotpermitted,withoutthefullyinformedconsentofthecompany,tomakeaprofitinconnectionwiththedirect3rsposition.Thus,ifthedirectorcomesacrossabusinessopportunitywhiledischarginghisroleasadirector,hecannotpersonallytakeadvantageofsuchanopportunityunlessthecompanyhas,withfullknowledgeofthefacts,permittedhimtodoso.Thispermissionmaybegivenbytherestoftheboard(assumingtheotherboardmembersgivingapprovaldonotstandtobenefitpersonally)orbythemembersingeneralmeeting.DutyatCommonLawtoActforProperPurposes8Themanagementofacompanyisgenerallyvestedintheboardofdirectorsandtheboardwilloftenhaveothermorespecificpowerssuchasthepowertoissuesharesundersection161oftheAct,providedthatthedirectorshaveobtainedaspecificorgeneralmandatetodoso.Suchpowersmustbeexercisedforproperpurposes.Evenifdirectorshaveactedingoodfaithinwhattheybelievei；inthebestinterestsofthecompany,theymayhaveexercisedcertainpowersinanimpropermanner.Forexample,ithasbeenheldthat,wherethepowertoissueshareswasusedtofacilitateatakeoverbi(?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONforacompany,thatwasnotaproperexerciseofsuchapowereventhoughthedirectorsfeltthattheywereactinginthecompanysbestinterests-seeHowardSmithLtdvAmpolPetroleumLtd[1974]AC821.EffectofBreachofFiduciaryDuties9Ifadirectorplaceshisowninterestsabovethoseofthecompany,thedirectorwillbeliableforanylosscausedtothecompany.Ifthedirectorhasprofitedfromhispositionwithouttheinformedconsentofthecompany,thedirectormayhavetoaccountfortheprofitstothecompany.Wherethedirectorhascontractedwiththecompany,e.g.thedirectorhassoldanassettothecompany,thecompanymaybeabletoavoidthecontractifthecontractwiththecompanywasenteredintoinbreachofthedirector,sfiduciaryobligationstothecompany.Whereathirdpartyhasenteredintoacontractwiththecompanyknowingthatthedirectorsofthecompanyhaveactedimproperly,thecompanymayalsobeabletoavoidthecontractvis-a-visthethirdparty.ENFORCEMENTOFCORPORATERIGHTSThe‘ProperPlaintiffRule1Asacompanyhasapersonalityseparatefromthatofitsmembers,amemberofthecompanycannotsuetoenforcerightsthatbelongtothecompany.Thisisknownasthe‘properplaintiffrule,namely,thatthecompanyistheproperplaintiffinrespectofanyrightsthatithas-seeFossvHarbottle(1843)2Hare461;NgHengLiatvKiyueCoLtd[2003]4SLR218.Whereacompanyhasrightstobeenforced,orisbeingsued,theusualbodythatisempoweredtodecidewhetherthecompanyshouldeitherbringanactionordefendtheclaimistheboardofdirectorsinwhomthepowerofmanagementisusuallyvested.?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONDerivativeActions2Notwithstandingtheproperplaintiffrule,theremaybeoccasionswhereamemberofthecompanyisentitledtobringanactiononbehalfofthecompany.Whereamemberdoesthis,theactionisreferredtoasaderivativeactionastherightisderivedfromthecompany.Thememberisnotsuingtoenforceanyrightsthatbelongtohimpersonally.Insuchactions,thecompanyisincludedasanominaldefendantsothatanydecisionofthecourtwillbindthecompanyaswell.3Amembermaybringaderivativeactioninrespectofawrongdonetothecompanywherethewrongdoeristhepersonwhohascontrolofthecompanyandisinaposition,orhasusedsuchcontrol,topreventaproperactionfrombeingbroughtagainsthim.Thewrongdonemayhavearisenbecausethepersonincontrolofthecompanyhasappropriatedthecompanysassetsforhimself,oritmayconsistofanabuseofthepowersvestedinthewrongdoers,e.g.wherethemajorityshareholdersattempttousetheirvotingpowerinanillegitimatemanner.Insuchasituation,thewrongdoerswouldusetheircontrolofthecompanytopreventaclaimfrombeingbroughtagainstthemselves.Accordingly,amemberwillbeallowedtoinstituteaderivativeactionagainstthewrongdoersifthememberisbringingtheclaimbonafideforthebenefitofthecompanyincircumstanceswherethereisnootherremedyavailable.Iftheactionisbeingbroughtforanulteriormotiveorinbadfaith,thecourtisentitledtotakethatintoaccountindeterminingifitisinthebestinterestsofthecompanythattheactionshouldproceed.StatutoryDerivativeAction4Inadditiontothecommonlawderivativeactiondiscussedabove,sections216Aand216BoftheActmakeprovisionforastatutoryderivativeaction.Thisactionispotentiallyavailabletoany?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONmemberofacompany,theMinisterofFinance(incertaincases),oranyotherpersonwhointhediscretionofthecourtisaproperpersontomakeanapplicationunderthesection.Suchpersonsarepotentialcomplainantsundersections216Aand216B.5Section216A(2)oftheActprovidesthatacomplainantmayapplytothecourtforleavetobringanactioninthenameandonbehalfofthecompanyorinterveneinanactiontowhichthecompanyisapartyforthepurposeofprosecuting,defendingordiscontinuingtheactiononbehalfofthecompany.Thecourtwillonlygrantleaveifthecourtissatisfiedundersection216A(3)oftheActthatthecomplainanthasgiven14days,noticetothedirectorsofthecompanyofthecomplainantsintentiontoapplyforleave;thecomplainantisactingingoodfaith;anditappearstobeprimafacieintheinterestsofthecompanythattheactionbebrought,prosecuted,defendedordiscontinued.Oneadvantageofthestatutoryderivativeactionisthatifthecourtauthorizesthebringingoftheaction,itcanorderthecompanytopayreasonablelegalfeesanddisbursementsincurredbythecomplainantinconnectionwiththeaction.Underthecommonlawderivativeaction,theriskoflegalcostsfallsonthepersonbringingtheaction.6Section216B(1)statesthatanapplicationundersection216AshallnotbestayedordismissedbyreasononlythatitisshownthatanallegedbreachofarightordutyowedtothecompanyhasbeenormaybeapprovedbythemembersofthecompanyHowever,evidenceofapprovalbythemembersmaybetakenintoaccountbythecourtinmakinganorderundersection216A.SHAREHOLDERREMEDIESTheOppressionRemedy?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATION1Inadditiontotheabilitytobringacommonlaworstatutoryderivativeactiontoprotectthelegitimateinterestsofthecompany,therearetwootherimportantremediesopentoshareholderswhofeelthattheirinterestsarebeingprejudiced.Thefirstarisesundersection216oftheAct.Section216(1)providesthatanymemberorholderofadebentureofthecompany,ortheMinisterofFinanceincertaincases,mayapplytothecourtforanorderthattheaffairsofthecompanyarebeingconductedinamanneroppressivetooneormoreofthemembersorholdersofdebentures,orindisregardoftheirinterestsasmembers,shareholdersorholdersofdebenturesofthecompany.Asimilarapplicationmaybemadeifanactofthecompanyhasbeendoneoristhreatenedwhichunfairlydiscriminatesagainstorisotherwiseprejudicialtooneormoreofthemembersorholdersofdebentures.Section216iscommonlyreferredtoasthe‘oppressionremedy/.2Wheresuchanapplicationismade,andthecourtafterhearingtheevidenceissatisfiedthatthecomplaintisavalidone,thecourtmay,withaviewtobringinganendorremedyingthematterscomplainedof,makesuchorderasitthinksfit.Suchordersmayincludedirectingorprohibitinganyactorcancelingorvaryinganytransactionorresolution;regulatingtheconductoftheaffairsofthecompanyinfuture;authorizingcivilproceedingstobebroughtinthenameofthecompany;providingforthepurchaseofthesharesanddebenturesofthecompanybyothermembersorholdersofdebenturesorthecompanyitself;orevenwindingupthecompany.3Section216oftheActisintendedtoproviderelieftomembersorholdersofdebentureswherethoseincontrolofthecompanyexhibitconductthatisequivalenttoabuseorwrongdoing.Thecourtsarenotconcernedwhetheracompanyiswellmanaged.Businessdecisionsarefortheboardtomakeandthecourtswillnotgenerallysecondguessbusinessdecisions.Norarethecourtsconcernedthatamemberorsomemembersarefrequentlyoutvoted.Itispartandparcelofcorporate?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONadministrationthatdecisionsaretakenbythemajority.Whatthecourtsareconcernedwithiswhethertheaffairsofthecompanyarebeingrunbythoseincontrolinsuchawaythatthereisavisibledeparturefromthestandardsoffairdealingandaviolationoftheconditionsoffairplaywhichashareholderisentitledtoexpect-seeReKongThaiSawmill(Miri)SdnBhd[1978]2MLJ227.Thismayarisewherekeyshareholdersareexcludedfrommanagement;whereshareholdersaredeprivedofinformationaboutthecompany;wherethedominantmembersareclearlypreferringtheirowninterests;andwherethepatriarchofafamilycompanybehavesinanautocraticmanner,justtogivesomecommonexamples.WindingUpontheJustandEquitableGround4Undersection254(1)(i)oftheAct,thecourtmaywindupacompanywhereitisjustandequitabletodoso.Thisisanimportantremedyforshareholdersasitprovidesameansfordisgruntledshareholderstousethewindingupprocesstodisengagefromacompany.5 Thejustandequitablegroundforwindinguphasbeenusedinanumberofdifferentcircumstances.Forexample,wherethemainobjectofthecompanycannotbeachievedorhasbeendepartedfrom,aggrievedmembersofthecompanymaypetitionforthecompanytobewoundup.Similarly,acompanymaybewoundupifitengagesinactsthatareentirelyoutsideofwhatcanfairlyberegardedashavingbeenwithinthegeneralcontemplationandunderstandingofthememberswhentheybecamemembersofthecompany.Anothersituationwherethejustandequitablegroundhasbeenusediswherethecompanysbusinesshasbeencarriedoninafraudulentmanner.Inaddition,wherethecompanyisaquasi-partnership,inthatthewaythebusinessisrunresembleshowapartnershipismanageddespitetheuseofthecorporateform,andfurther,trustandconfidence?恒信泰富ERIORGANIZATIONamongthemembershasbeenirretrievablydamaged,thecourtmayorderthewindingupofthecompanysincethememberscannolongerworkwithoneanother.SHARES1Ashareistheinterestofashareholderinthecompanymeasuredbyasumofmoney,forthepurposeofliabilityinthefirstplace,andofinterestinthesecond,butalsoconsistingofaseriesofmutualcovenantsenteredintobyalltheshareholdersbetweenthemselvesinaccordancewithsection39(1)oftheAct-seeBorland,sTrusteevSteelBrothers&CoLtd[1901]1Ch279.2Asmentionedearlier,theliabilityofamember/shareholderistocontributetothecompanyonlythatamountunpaidonthesharestakenupbythemember/shareholder.Thisiswhatismeantbylimitedliability.Ashareholderisentitledtoparticipateinthelifeofthecompanyonthetermssetoutinthecompany，sconstitutionaldocuments,namely,thememorandumandarticlesofassociation,andtotheextentallowedbytheAct.Theexactrightsoftheshareholderwilldependonthetermsofthememorandumandarticles.Generally,allshareholderswillbeentitledtoapro-ratashareofanydividendsthataredeclaredandpaid.Whereacompanyiswoundup,againallshareholdersaregenerallyentitledtoapro-ratashareofanyassetsremainingafterthecreditorsofacompanyhavebeenpaid.Shareholdersarealsoentitledtoappointandremovethedirectorsofthecompany.3Genera