低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)論文：低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作博弈分析與機(jī)制研究

低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)論文：低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作博弈分析與機(jī)制研究【中文摘要】氣候問題日益突出,使得低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)成為了國際社會(huì)政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、外交上的焦點(diǎn)。低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的外部性決定了國際合作是其必然選擇。可是低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)中有關(guān)減排責(zé)任分擔(dān)的爭論阻礙了國際合作的推進(jìn)。發(fā)達(dá)國家堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為發(fā)展中國家應(yīng)該與其一道承擔(dān)減排限排責(zé)任。而發(fā)展中國家堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為發(fā)達(dá)國家是氣候問題的主要責(zé)任者,基于公平原則,他們應(yīng)該率先減排,并向發(fā)展中國家提供資金和技術(shù)上的支持。由于減排涉及經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展方式的調(diào)整,成本巨大,將制約經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展速度,對(duì)減排量的爭論實(shí)質(zhì)是對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展空間的爭奪。作為一種“生存權(quán)”“發(fā)展權(quán)”,關(guān)于碳排放權(quán)分配的爭論已經(jīng)演變?yōu)楣胶托手疇帯募骖櫣胶托式嵌瘸霭l(fā),本文借助博弈論構(gòu)建了“一個(gè)產(chǎn)權(quán),兩次分配”的碳排放量分配模型。“一個(gè)產(chǎn)權(quán)”是指將全球碳排放量在各主權(quán)國家進(jìn)行分配,界定各主權(quán)國家排放量限額,并將這種限額視為一種可以行使國家主權(quán)的“產(chǎn)權(quán)”。這基于科斯定理,通過明晰產(chǎn)權(quán)能有效解決公共品供給不足的問題,實(shí)現(xiàn)資源的優(yōu)化配置?！皟纱畏峙洹笔侵笧榧骖櫣胶托?對(duì)碳排放權(quán)進(jìn)行兩次分配。第一次分配將基于公平原則,以考慮各國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展階段的差異為前提,在保證經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展優(yōu)先需求的基礎(chǔ)上合理分配全球碳排放權(quán)。第二次分配則是以市場為主導(dǎo)的分配,以通過市場規(guī)律實(shí)現(xiàn)低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)全球資源的合理配置,實(shí)現(xiàn)減排成本的最小化。“一個(gè)產(chǎn)權(quán),兩次分配”既滿足了國家之間平等的生存權(quán)和發(fā)展權(quán),又有效地提高了低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的收益和降低了countries,anddefinenationalemissionslimits,makingthislimitsasacanof“property.”ThisisbasedontheCoaseTheorem.Clearpropertyrightscaneffectivelysolvetheproblemofinadequatesupplyofpublicgoodstoachievetheoptimalallocationofresources.“Twodistributions”istoallocatethecarbonemissionstwicetoachievethebalancebetweenfairnessandefficiency.Inconsiderationofdifferentstagesineconomicdevelopmentamongnations,thefirstdistributionwilllaunchonfairnesstomeetthepriorityofeconomicdevelopment.Thesecondallocationwilldependonthemarketinordertoachievetheoptimalallocationofglobalresources,minimizingthecost.”Aproperty,twodistributions”notonlysatisfiestheequalityontherighttosubsistenceanddevelopment,butalsoeffectivelyimprovesthebenefitsoflowcarboneconomyandreduceitscosts.However,therehashightransactioncostsandlacksinternationalmonitoringmechanismsintheinternationalcommunity.Soweshouldconstructinternationalcooperationmechanismstoachieveinternationalcooperation.Basedonthis,weconstructthecost-sharingmechanism,selectiveincentivesmechanism,carbontradingmechanismandparticipationmechanismforenvironmentalnon-governmentalorganizations.Cost-sharingmechanismfollows“Whoemits,Whobears”principleonfairness.Becausethecurrentclimateproblemiscausedbytheindustrializationofthedevelopedcountriesformanyyears,theyshouldburdenthemajorcost.Asdevelopingcountriesemitmoreandmoregreenhousegas,theyalsoshouldbearthecorrespondingresponsibilityforemissionsreduction.Analyzinginterestdemandsofdifferentnations,selectiveincentivemechanismdesignsmeasurestoinspireandconstrainttheindividualbehaviortoconquer“freeride”andthetendencyofindividualopportunism.Itwillpromotecooperationandkeepcooperationstable.Thisarticleintroducesthreemeasures:IssueLinkage,InterestCompensationMechanism,SocialIncentiveMechanism.Theseconddistributionin“TwoDistributions”providesatheoreticalbasisforconstructingcarbonmarket.Afteranalyzingtheexistingcarbonmarketsystem,thispaperpointsoutthatthedispersionofexistingcarbonmarketsimpedestheglobalallotmentofresources.Differencesinreductioncostmakethemarketpatternunchangedintheshortterm.Atthisstage,weshouldpaymoreattentiontoconsummatingthebasicmanagementsystemofthecarbonmarket,tolaythefoundationforglobalintegration.Environmentalnon-governmentalorganizationspossessabundantprofessionalknowledgeandglobalresources.Theyplayuniqueroleininternationalissues.Ontheonehand,theybringnewideasforinternationalcooperationmechanisms;ontheotherhand,theyplayasupervisoryrole.Inthelow-carboneconomy,sovereigncountriesarecommittedtomaximizeindividualinterests,whiletheyarecommittedtomaximizethecommoninterestsofmankind,whichwillpropelinternationalcooperation.Basedonthis,ininternationalcooperationofthelow-carboneconomy,weshouldactivelyprovideopportunitiesfortheenvironmentalnon-governmentalorganizationstoparticipateininternationalcooperation.【關(guān)鍵詞】低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)公平和效率成本分擔(dān)機(jī)制選擇性激勵(lì)機(jī)制【英文關(guān)鍵詞】low-carboneconomyfairnessandefficiencycost-sharingmechanismselectiveincentivemechanism【目錄】低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作博弈分析與機(jī)制研究

摘要

6-8

Abstract

8-9

第1章緒論

12-24

1.1選題背景

12-13

1.2國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀

13-20

1.2.1國際合作與國際合作機(jī)制的相關(guān)理論

13-16

1.2.2關(guān)于低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作的研究

16-18

1.2.3關(guān)于國際合作難點(diǎn)的研究

18-20

1.3本文的研究思路、方法與主要內(nèi)容

20-24

1.3.1研究思路及方法

20-21

1.3.2研究內(nèi)容

21-24

第2章低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作特征及利益沖突

24-33

2.1低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作現(xiàn)狀

24-25

2.2低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)特征分析

25-27

2.3低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)博弈中的利益集團(tuán)

27-31

2.3.1歐盟利益集團(tuán)

27-28

2.3.2美國為首的傘形集團(tuán)

28-29

2.3.3以中國為首的發(fā)展中大國

29-30

2.3.4小島嶼國家聯(lián)盟

30-31

2.4不同集體利益訴求差異及其沖突

31-33

第3章低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作的博弈模型

33-44

3.1合作博弈分析

34-37

3.1.1引論

34-35

3.1.2困境的破解

35-37

3.2公平和效率之爭:碳排放權(quán)的分配

37-44

3.2.1“一個(gè)產(chǎn)權(quán),兩次分配”

37-38

3.2.2碳排放權(quán)的初始分配模型

38-40

3.2.3碳排放權(quán)的第二次分配模型

40-44

第4章低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作機(jī)制

44-58

4.1低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)國際合作的基本原則

45

4.2成本構(gòu)成及成本分擔(dān)機(jī)制

45-47

4.2.1成本構(gòu)成

45-46

4.2.2